BENEFITS AND OBLIGATIONS

Reading 1Corinthians 8:6 in Context

Howard Nicholson Pilgrim

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ABSTRACT

A detailed examination of the relation between 1 Corinthians 8:6 and its textual context is significant both for historical Christology and for exegesis of the epistle. The textual context is identified as a multi-genre argumentative discourse in which Paul seeks to persuade the "wise" and "strong" in the Christian community in Corinth to defer to the sensibilities of those they regard as ignorant and weak in faith in relation to foods that have been offered to idols. At the same time he must defend himself against critics of this policy who use his refusal of financial support from them as grounds to question his apostolic status. The central topos used by Paul is the authoritative example of Christ, which Paul claims to exemplify in his practice of renouncing the full use of his own rights.

The analysis of the relation between the verse and its context takes place in three stages. The first (chs.2 - 6) uses an examination of the argumentative genres present both in the epistle as a whole and in 1 Cor.8-10 as an analytical tool to identify the complex pattern of argumentation surrounding the verse. The dominant genre in this discourse is shown to be deliberative rhetoric, with judicial rhetoric, appeal to Jewish scripture, and appeal to the established proclamation of Christ also appearing as inclusions within the discourse.

The second stage of analysis (chs.7-8) examines the grammatical structures governing 1 Cor.8:6, both in its internal structure and in its relation to the textual context. Three conclusions are drawn: that the placement of this verse indicates that it is most likely to function as a deliberative *prothesis* indicating the fundamental rhetorical grounds on which the author will argue his case throughout the ensuing discourse; that it is grammatically structured to play an integral part in that discourse; and that its semantic structures indicate that it is intended to assert something about the relation between benefits received from God through Christ and obligations owed to God through Christ.

The third stage (chs.9-10) considers the most likely significance of this benefits-and-obligations schema within the social context of the discourse and concludes that two related Greco-Roman social structures, patronage and family, determine the semantic field within which the author intends the audience to interpret this verse, in order that it may achieve the communicative function indicated for it by its textual context.

We may conclude that the discourse function of 1 Cor.8:6 as a deliberative prothesis, and its semantic context within the epistle, indicate an interpretation in which the key concepts are drawn from the social context which the discourse addresses. We thereby preclude interpretations in which this verse is essentially a cosmological statement or a deliberate reformulation of a traditional credal formulation drawn from scripture.

PREFACE

The research and writing of this thesis has been largely a spare-time labour of love spread over eight years, from its initial acceptance as a Theol.M. proposal with the Melbourne College of Divinity in 1994 to its eventual submission as an Otago University Ph.D. in December 2002. I ended this marathon at a very painful walk, urged on by those who insisted that dropping out was not an option.

The foremost of these, without whose generous encouragement I would never have begun, is my wife Sue Dick. Her eventual impatience with this ever-present rival in her life was the greatest spur for me to bring it to closure.

My supervisors, Paul Tribilco and Greg Dawes, never flagged in their gracious expressions of confidence in my progress, even when I was far from confident, feeling that I had come to them emptyhanded. At all times they encouraged me to trust in my own judgement and to follow my own developing sense of the text's coherence.

Finally, there was the text itself: it would never relax its grip on me until it had finished telling me what I needed to know. There were altogether too many angels dancing on the head of this pin for me to turn aside from the fascination it offered, until I was eventually satisfied that I had read it aright. A far more able scholar than I has captured the process of being taught by a text in these words:

> Every text presents the task of not simply employing unexamined our own linguistic usuage nor in the case of a foreign language the usuage we are familiar with from writers or from daily discourse. We regard our task as rather that of deriving our understanding of the text from the linguistic usuage of the time of the author. The question is, of course, to what extent this general requirement can be fulfilled. In the field of semantics, in particular, we are confronted with the problem of the unconscious nature of our own use of language. How do we discover that there is a difference between our own customary usuage and that of the text?
> I think we must say that is generally the experience of being pulled up short by the text. Either it does not yield any meaning or its meaning is not compatible with what we had expected.
> (Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* 237)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 New Testament Christology: A Big Bang?[1]

Near the end of the concluding chapter of James Dunn's ground-breaking study of New Testament christology, he makes a summary reference to "...the tensions and pressures within the earliest Christian assessment of the Christ-event which forced Christian thinking towards a modification of Jewish monotheism that would give adequate place to Christ.."[2] The whole of his book constitutes Dunn's account of those "tensions and pressures" to which he refers, and it has since proved to be both persuasive and seminal for scholars studying the development of christology in the New Testament. It provides a comprehensive treatment of categories within Jewish thought, such as Wisdom, Logos, Son of God, Son of Man, Adam, Spirit, and Angel that both moulded and further stimulated an emerging theological dynamic that sprung first of all from experiences of Christ's resurrection. What it does *not* do, however, is to give an equally persuasive explanation of the other side of the equation implied in Dunn's statement above: what was it about Jewish monotheism in the first century that rendered it so susceptible to modification in the face of pressure from christology? At several places in his book, Dunn makes the point that Jewish monotheism needed no modification to allow christology to develop within its theological categories. Now, right at the end, he admits that a modification was happening. Where was the resistance from Jews both within and outside the Christian movement? Why is this not reflected within the New Testament, as we find in the case of Christian modifications to halachah?

Dunn has been aware of this underexamined problem both within this book and since, and his response seems to take three different forms. Firstly, his approach to the Jewish categories minimises the extent and significance of the changes: by explaining just how far christology could go without breaking new ground, he is saying in effect, "Well yes, Jewish

[1] I owe the characterization of the picture adopted by Martin Hengel and others as a "big bang theory", in parallel to the well-known cosmological theory, to John Macquarrie, *Jesus Christ in Modern Thought* (London: SCM Press, 1990) 49-50.

[2] James D. G. Dunn, *Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry Into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1980) 266.

monotheism did get modified, but not much."[3] A second implication of his position might be framed, "...and it all really happened rather late in the piece when the ties with Judaism were cut and those involved were mostly Gentiles."[4] We should note that the focus in Dunn's book is on pre-existence and incarnation, rather than on all aspects of christology. If we switch our attention to the application of divine titles to Christ, for example, then we might possibly discover some early developments among Jewish Christians that are much more significant challenges to the shibboleths of Jewish monotheism. Further, Dunn has since emphasized the non-controversial (in fact) nature of christology in Paul's writings and other early New Testament writings.[5] The initial tensions between Jewish Christians and their compatriots were focused on other issues than monotheism, namely the Temple, the Covenant and the Israel of God.[6]

In a later article, Dunn sets out his position in contrast to Martin Hengel's landmark statement regarding the development of christology by the first generation of Christians,

> ....and one is tempted to say *that more happened in this period of less than two decades than in the whole of the next seven centuries, up to the time when the doctrine of the early church was completed*. Indeed one might even ask whether the formation of doctrine in the early church was essentially more than a consistent development and completion of what had already been unfolded in the primal event of the first two decades, but in the language and thought-forms of Greek, which was its necessary setting.[7]

Dunn develops Hengel's statement further:

> Congruent with Hengel's thesis is the more recent restatement of the older view that the payment of divine honours to and worship of Jesus was an early feature of Christology which must have been sufficient of itself to cause a breach with monotheistic Judaism. Here again the argument is in effect that the decisive make-or-break issues were already being posed during the time of Paul's ministry and writings. Indeed, it can hardly mean other than that Paul himself, the most important and controversial of the early principal figures in Christianity's expansion and self-definition, played an active role in sharpening the issues which focused in Christology. On this reckoning, the split between Christianity and Judaism over Christology was all over bar the shouting by the time Paul disappeared from the scene, with only the "i"s to be dotted and the "t"s crossed for the full extent of the divisions to become clear to all.[8]

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[3] This is my formulation, of course, but it is based on one of the main thrusts of *Christology in the Making*, Dunn's demonstration of the great diversity of pre-Christian Judaism, and the extent to which some of its developing strands were already expressing a far-from-simple monotheism. For instance, he speaks of 'nascent Jewish binitariansm' which the Fourth Gospel is 'in danger of stretching into some form of 'nascent ditheism' (p.264).

[4] See his summary section at the end of Ch.7, Dunn, *Christology in the Making*, 248-50.

[5] James D.G. Dunn, "How Controversial Was Paul's Christology?" *From Jesus to John: Essays on Jesus and New Testament Christology in Honour of Marinus de Jonge.*, Ed. Martinus C. De Boer, JSNT Supplement Series 84 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993) 148-67.

[6] A book-length exposition of his position, structured by the concept of "the four pillars of Second Temple Judaism", is provided by James D.G. Dunn, *The Partings of the Ways: Between Christianity and Judaism and Their Significance for the Character of Christianity* (London: SCM Press, 1991).

[7] Martin Hengel, *The Cross of the Son of God*, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1978) 2.

[8] Dunn, "How Controversial?" 149.

Against the position typified by Hengel, Dunn minimises the rate of christological development during the first century, especially among Jewish Christians. So when reading Paul, who was the earliest New Testament writer and also self-identified as a thoroughgoing Jew, Dunn has the task of explaining the christological features that would appear to be in conflict with Jewish monotheism. In the essay just cited, he tackles three general points of early Christian belief: that Jesus was the Messiah, that his death constituted an atonement, and the "divine significance" of Jesus. In each case Dunn argues that Paul's language, beliefs and attitudes never put him outside the Jewish pale. Why should he bother? Why can he not countenance the thought that maybe Paul and other contemporary Jewish Christians might have been involved in christological thinking that would put them offside with other Jews? The answer is simple, and sound: in contrast to the conflicts surrounding the other three "pillars", *there is no evidence in his letters that Paul was aware of any controversy arising from conflict between christology and monotheism. For him, and by implication his readers, they simply coexist, with no visible signs of tension discernible to modern exegetes.*

This is the fundamental datum around which all recent discussion of Paul's christology has revolved, an axiom from which the discussion begins. No one asks for it to be explicitly established, because once it is made explicit it is so obviously true. Where the disputants divide is in explaining this hard fact. Dunn maintains that the significant christological developments had not yet happened in Paul's day; Hengel and his allies say it was all over, *including the shouting.* And that is just where Dunn's argument is at its strongest: in his colloquial paraphrase of Hengel's position he is in fact too kind in saying "all over bar the shouting", because in Paul's time no one was shouting about christology at all: the texts from that time carry no Jewish voices, nor whispering echoes of voices, criticising Christians for modifying or transgressing their Jewish monotheism. If it all happened in the two decades before Paul began to write the letters we now possess, why are there no aftershocks discernible to even the most sensitive exegetical seismographs? On this basis alone, Dunn's position is intrinsically more credible, but it still must be argued, instance by instance. To one such crucial text, discussed by Dunn in several places, we now turn all our attention.

1.2 1 Corinthians 8:6: A Text Out of Context?

A crucial test for Dunn's position is provided by one verse: 1 Corinthians 8:6.

> αλλ ημιν εις θεὸς ο πατὴρ εξ ου τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεις εις αυτόν, καὶ εις κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς δι ου τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεις δι αυτοῦ.
> But for us, there is one God, the Father, from whom (is) everything, and we (are) unto him; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom (is) everything and we (are) through him.

On the surface, this succinct credal statement seems to affirm a christology of the very highest order: in the course of an argument in which he rejects several inadequate monotheistic slogans, Paul gives his approval to this formulation in which "one Lord Jesus Christ" stands alongside "one God, the Father" without any apparent sense of incongruity. The very manner of its presentation implies that Dunn is right: here too, Paul's christology is uncontroversial, or else its use in his argument would require further supporting arguments. And that constitutes the mystery that this present thesis sets out to solve. How can we read this verse in such a way that its uncontroversial nature is apparent?

1.2.1 Dunn's Reading of 1 Corinthians 8:6

Dealing with the problem of Paul's apparent ascription of a cosmic role in creation to Jesus here and in *Colossians 1:15-20*,[9] Dunn acknowledges the serious challenge these two texts offer to his general theory.

> The relevant range of material [the evidence of these two texts] first comes to notice because it seems to lift early christology on to a wholly new plane - where *pre-existence and a role in creation are clearly attributed to Christ*. Such an attribution surely lifts the christology concerned well beyond any thought of a vindicated or glorified man; the lines of *deity* are being clearly sketched into this christology.[10]

Dunn begins his solution by quoting several Jewish texts (*Prov.3:19*, *Wisdom.7:26, 8:4-6 and 8:22-30*, *2 Enoch 30:8*, and *Sirach 24:9*) in which very similar language is used not of Christ but of Wisdom.

> Any Jew familiar with such passages would at once recognize what Paul was doing in 1 Cor.8.6 and Col.1.15ff. when they heard Paul's letter being read to them. Paul was describing Jesus in the language of divine Wisdom. *He was in effect identifying Jesus with the figure of divine Wisdom.* That point is clear enough. The crucial issue, however, is what such language used of Jesus would have meant to such a hearer - or indeed to Paul himself... This crucial question can be answered *only if we are first clear what such language would have meant for the typical Jew of Paul's time quite apart from its application to Jesus*.[11]

Dunn considers three possibilities for such an interpretation of the Wisdom figure: the straightforward polytheistic one that would understand Wisdom to be another god; a "hypostatization of divine attributes";[12] and a personification of divine activity, "a way of speaking about *God* in his wisdom and in the wisdom of his action."[13] Only the third of these is credible within the Judaism of Paul's time, in Dunn's view, and he gives three reasons in

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[9] Unlike Dunn, I do not accept that the letter to Colossae was written by Paul. Following a well-established critical consensus, I shall refer to seven extant epistles as undisputed: Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and Philemon.

[10] Dunn, *Partings*, 195, his italics.

[11] Dunn, *Partings*, 197, his italics.

[12] Dunn, *Partings*, 197.

[13] Dunn, *Partings*, 198.

support of this conclusion. Firstly, it is wholly in line with established Hebrew poetry and imagery. Secondly, it takes account of the fact that such language is applied in the Jewish literature not only to Wisdom but also to other figures including the Word of God, the Spirit of God, the Glory of God and the Name of God. And, crucially, there is "the constant stress in the same writers on the activity of God where it is quite clear that God himself is the acting agent and 'wisdom' just a way of expressing how he acts....*Such is the language of a Jewish monotheism so confident of its major premise that it can speak vigorously of God's wisdom without any thought of attributing a separate divine status to this wisdom or of compromising that monotheism.*"[14]

Applying this finding to Paul's application of the same language to the figure of Christ, Dunn draws the conclusion that here too a metaphorical reading must prevail, "that *this is the language of poetry and hymn, not of finished theological logic*. To interpret it in what *we* today might regard as its most straightforward sense is probably a sure recipe for *mis*-interpretation."[15] Jewish readers of Paul's time would have understood his figurative mode of speaking intuitively.

> The great probability is that Jewish readers would have been no more perturbed by Wisdom language used of Jesus than they were by the vigorous poetic imagery used for 'righteousness', 'repentance', etc. They had used the same vivid metaphor of divine Wisdom to express the full significance for them of the Torah. They would understand that the first Christians were doing the same in the case of Jesus. Hellenistic Jews anxious to explain or commend their faith and way of life to sympathetic Gentiles would be saying in effect: If you wish to have access to the wisdom which lies behind the world, the creative rationale immanent within the cosmos, the wisdom by which God seeks to bring humankind to the highest good, you will find it in the law. So they would recognize that the first Christians were doing the same: if you want to see the fullest and clearest expression of God's wisdom, you will see it in Jesus Christ. This, in fact, is precisely what Paul says in his first reference on this whole theme - 1 Cor.1: 24,30. To Corinthians who were seeking wisdom in words and in terms of knowledge of the divine, Paul says, 'You will find the true measure of divine Wisdom in the cross of Christ' (1 Cor,1:20-25).[16]

Neat as this solution may seem at first, it does give rise to several further questions:-

1. In 1 Corinthians, Paul is writing to a predominantly Gentile rather than Jewish audience.[17] Can we be sure they would have been as familiar with the Jewish Wisdom figure as Dunn requires?
2. To make a connection between divine wisdom and the crucified Christ, as Paul does earlier in 1 Corinthians, is one thing. It is quite a different conceptual process to connect

[14] Dunn, *Partings*, 199, his italics.

[15] Dunn, *Partings*, 200, his italics.

[16] Dunn, *Partings*, 200.

[17] Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 3-4; Ben III Witherington, *Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995) 24-28.

Christ with a metaphorical "Wisdom" that is in itself a personification of God's creation of the Cosmos. Is Dunn's interpretation in itself a mixed metaphor?

3. As Dunn himself acknowledges, there is a significant difference between identifying the figure of a personified Wisdom, expressing God's creative action, with the Torah which thereby becomes personified, and identifying that personified quality with an actual person. "To refer the personification of divine Wisdom to the Torah was one thing. But to refer it to a man of living memory was a significant step beyond."[18] Not only in living memory either: was personified Wisdom ever identified with a human being such as Moses or Enoch?[19]

4. Finally, we need to seek evidence that this is what Paul was actually doing in the context of 1 Cor.8. It is all very well for Dunn to speak of Paul "using Wisdom language of Jesus" and asserting that such use would seem unexceptional to his contemporary fellow-Jews, but he does not go on to say *what* Paul was actually using it to say, in the course of his argument. Are there any precedents in the Jewish literature for using the figure of Wisdom, in the course of a similar discussion to the one here in 1 Cor.8, to settle practical issues arising from conflicting forms of monotheistic belief, especially in regard to setting boundaries around cultic practices regarded as idolatrous?[20] And would Paul's fellow Jews have found his use of this motif helpful as they heard his discussion of this issue? Dunn does not go on to give us such an exegesis of this text: he is concentrating on establishing the *possibility* of such a usage; that is of speaking of Christ or anyone else in such metaphorical terms without implying personal pre-existence and personal agency in the creation of the cosmos. But the exegesis is necessary if Dunn's explanation of the text is to stand. It is not my intention to produce such an interpretation in support of Dunn's reading, but rather to argue for a quite different reading of the text in its context. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that Dunn has established a first-century Jewish figurative space in which such language *could* be read, and can accept the corollary that figurative readings should always be sought before concluding that similar texts imply personal pre-existence and a pre-cosmic role.

1.2.2 The Missing Discourse Function of 1 Corinthians 8:6

This verse is often read as a dead end in Paul's argument, a statement of Christian knowledge closing off a preliminary section that serves to dismiss knowledge as the basis on which to determine the issue at hand. This is typified by Allo, four decades ago, who classified the two parts of Ch.8 as "a) 1-6: ce que dit la science; b) 7-13, ce que dit la

[18] Dunn, *Partings*, 200-01.

[19] Dunn certainly found none in his extensive study of the Wisdom motif. Dunn, *Christology in the Making*, 168-76.

[20] I shall argue later that such boundary-setting is what is happening here, but not involving the Wisdom motif.

charité."[21] Such a reading gains some grammatical support from the adversive Αλλ with which 1 Cor.8:7 begins.

Likewise, Gordon Fee pays no further attention to v.6 in his lengthy interpretation of the remainder of Chs.8 -10: in his reading, from v.7 Paul has turned back to the pre-eminence of love over knowledge propounded in v.1b - 3, which he says enunciates the principle "that love, not knowledge, builds up, and therefore that love is what knowledge is all about."[22] Verses 4 - 6 are accorded a bridging function inasmuch as they establish "that though all may believe at the theoretical level that an idol is no god, not all share this 'knowledge' at the experiential, emotional level."[23] That is, v.4 links and explains the apparent contradiction between v.1 and v.7. Verse six plays no positive role in the wider argument, merely explaining why Paul and his readers believe the monotheistic sentiments expressed in v.4 to be true rather than the polytheism of v.5.[24] So pervasive is this scholarly consensus about the irrelevance of v.6 to the wider argument of Chs.8-10 that Margaret Mitchell, in her recent analysis of the rhetorical structure of the epistle, sees wider significance for v.6 only in its phrase τὰ πάντα: Christ being Lord of all is the basis for the unity which, she argues, is Paul's prime concern throughout the letter. Her only comment on the rhetorical function of the verse is, "He agrees with the fundamental principles of *both sides*, to which he adds a proper reminder of their unity in the common baptismal acclamation of one God and one Lord in 8:6".[25]

Mitchell's comment illustrates an important corollary of this common reading of v.6. It implies that the formulation used is most probably traditional, or at least well established in Paul's thinking, as in the minds of his readers. Why would Paul introduce it in his argument at all, if he intends to make no further use of it beyond this point, unless it is already well established as a credal formula which neither he nor his readers find contentious? It can thus function as a resting-point, a suitable summation of matters under discussion which can now

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[21] E.-B. Allo, *Première Épitre Aux Corinthiens*, 2nd ed., Études Bibliques (Paris: J.Gabalda et Cie., 1956) 202.

[22] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 378.

[23] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 379.

[24] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 378-79. This is essentially the position taken by most other commentators. See Christophe Senft, *La Première Épitre de Saint Paul Aux Corinthiens*, Commentaire Du Nouveau Testament, Deuxième Série (Paris: Deachaux & Niestlé, 1979) 108-14; William F. Orr and James Arthur Walther, *1 Corinthians: A New Translation*, The Anchor Bible 32 (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1976) 230-35; Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, trans. Leitch James W., Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) 144-46; C.K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 2nd ed. (London: A.&C. Black, 1971) 188-97; Allo, *1 Corinthiens*, 196-204; Hans Lietzmann, *An Die Korinther I.II*, Handbuch Zum Neuen Testament (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1949) 37-38; Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians*, The International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T.& T.Clark, 1911) 166-69; Frederick Louis Godet, *Commentary on First Corinthians* (Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 1977) 416-21;

[25] Emphasis original. The "both sides" here refers to those who ate idol-foods and those who opposed them. Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1991) 241.

be agreed upon and put aside. Support for its traditional origin is provided by the opening phrase, αλλ ημν : This is something true for "us", for both Paul and his readers, and therefore presumably something already known. How would it be known, then? At this point, Form Criticism is often brought into play, highlighting the structural features of the verse so that it begins to collect labels such as "hymnic fragment"[26], "baptismal acclamation",[27] and "confessional/credal"[28], suggesting that a tradition-history expedition might be in order, seeking to dig up evidence upon which to base a pre-history of the verse's genesis within the primitive church. An older generation of exegetes, before the advent of Form Criticism and Tradition Criticism, had less difficulty in accepting that the apostle simply composed the verse, expressing the common theology of the earliest church in an uncontroversial manner: for them, there was no need to look for any application of this verse in Paul's wider argument, because there was nothing exceptional about it.[29]

Richard Hays offers an interesting departure from this approach, arguing that the verse is a traditional formula but used by Paul as the foundation for his ongoing argument.

> Why, then, does Paul quote this confessional statement? First of all, he is establishing firm common ground with his readers, who will enthusiastically share in the monotheistic affirmation of verses 5-6. At the same time, however, by bringing this formula into play, he has subtly broadened the theological basis on which the discussion of idol meat must occur. Christian thought about this problem must start neither from an abstract doctrine of monotheism nor from a theoretical statement of the "gods" that do not really exist; rather Christian thought begins from a confession that binds us specifically to the one God of Israel and declares our personal union with and allegiance to this one God. We exist "for him" and not for our own purposes. To the extent that this confession of the one God echoes the *Shema*, we should also hear the echo of that text's call to "love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might" (Deut.6:5). (Indeed, the reference in 1 Cor.8:3 to *loving* God - which seems to fit awkwardly into the context - suggests that Paul already had the *Shema* in mind a few sentences earlier.) All of this has a direct bearing on the question of idol meat: this one God of Israel is a "jealous God" who is well known to have no tolerance for idolatry. At this point in the argument, however, Paul is content to let that suggestion reverberate in the background; he will bring it directly into the foreground in chapter 10.[30]

The links Hays identifies so succinctly between v.6 and Paul's wider argument about food offered to idols seem inherently plausible, and I shall examine these in some detail in a later chapter. They are just the sort of thing we should expect to come from an exegete who has laid great stress on the importance of noticing the "echoes" of Jewish scripture in Paul's writings and in other New Testament texts. However, he sidesteps the issue of explaining how

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[26] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 126.

[27] eg. Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 241, having it both ways!

[28] Richard B. Hays, *First Corinthians*, Interpretation: A Biblical Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997) 139; Orr and Walther, *1 Corinthians*, 231; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 144; Senft, *1 Corinthiens*, 111.

[29] cf. Robertson and Plummer, *First Corinthians*, 167-68; Godet, *First Corinthians*, 416-19.

[30] Hays, *First Corinthians*, 140.

Paul might justify such an explicit modification of the Shema, by throwing our problem back into the prior theological development of the early church. He avers that,

> Paul's present interest is not to reflect about christological problems or to explain the relation of Jesus Christ to God the Father. Still, we must observe in passing that the early Christian confession cited in verse 6 takes the extraordinarily bold step of identifying "the Lord Jesus" with "the Lord" acclaimed in the *Shema*, while still insisting that "for us there is one God." Paul and other early Christians have reshaped Israel's faith in such a way that Jesus is now acclaimed as Lord within the framework of monotheism. It is a great pity that Paul's surviving letters nowhere take up this paradox as a topic for extended discussion.[31]

A pity indeed, although we might make two points in response. Firstly, it could well be argued that Paul does in fact reveal a key to his general thinking on this point in *Philippians 2: 9-10*, where the gift of the divine name to Jesus in his exaltation is seen as a means of glorifying the Father: not an extended discussion, certainly, but at least a good clue as to why Paul may have not considered such use of "the Lord" to be paradoxical at all. But it is more germane to our present purpose to focus on Hays' exegesis of the verse before us and to note that while affirming its significance for Paul's subsequent argument he uses the established label of "early Christian confession" to avoid considering the possibility that an exploration of that significance-in-context might uncover the very sort of discussion he would like to have had from Paul, albeit an implicit one.

Hays' exegesis of this verse is in line with an emerging readiness among a few recent commentators to read Paul's discussion of theological issues in vv.1 - 6 as laying a positive foundation for the ensuing discussion of Christian *praxis* in 8:7 - 11.1. Once that door is opened, we are squarely faced with the further possibility that verse 6 is Paul's own formulation, even composed specifically for this epistle. The significance of that possibility is not necessarily grasped by those who acknowledge it. After a brief summary of scholarly discussion of its possible origins in Hellenistic Jewish Christianity, and concluding that these "can neither be proved nor disproved",[32] Fee jumps without any substantive argument to the conclusion, "Most likely it is a Pauline construct, created *ad hoc* in the present argument, but making use of language that he has in common with his Hellenistic Jewish origins. In any case, it so thoroughly fits the present argument that the question of background or origin is ultimately irrelevant."[33] Witherington allows that "Verse 6 is probably a Pauline adaptation of the Shema, one that reflects a reading of it through a sapiential lens."[34] An earlier commentator, Senft, raises the question of Pauline authorship in a footnote, citing three exegetes against it and one in favour, and by implication accepts the majority vote or else concludes that the matter is of no further importance, despite noting the dissenting voice of

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[31] Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1989) 140.

[32] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 374.

[33] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 374.

[34] Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 198.

Feuillet in this fashion: "selon A. Feuillet...la formule est si parfaitement adaptée à la situation corinthienne, qu'elle ne peut être que de Paul."[35] None of these commentators seem interested in exploring the consequences of Paul's suggested authorship of the formula.

1.3 Intertextuality and the Shema'

A vigorous recent argument for Pauline authorship of verse 6, by one who is fully aware of the radical consequences of this position, is provided by N.T. Wright in Chapter 6 of his study of Pauline theology, *The Climax of the Covenant*.[36]

His position can be condensed into these key points:-

1. 1 Cor.8:6 is an implicit modification of the Shema, one of Israel's most privileged texts, whose function within Jewish faith and piety is to encapsulate the centre of Torah observance and Israel's covenant obligations.
2. Paul is the author of this modification, which he has produced in the course of composing this epistle to Corinth and to fulfil his purposes in this specific situation. The modified formula plays an essential part in his resolution of the issue at hand, concerning idolatry and the issue of food offered to idols.
3. Paul's purpose in constructing this modified monotheistic formula is to arrive at a distinctively Christian theological formulation that will not only encapsulate a christological redefinition of monotheistic faith in God but in doing so will implicitly give a christologically determined answer to the question, "Who are the people of God?". It is this question that lies at the heart of the boundary-marking problems raised by Christian *praxis* concerning food offered to idols. "He is going back to the foundations, and laying the claim that the people formed by *this* formula of belief form a new family with a new family code of behaviour."[37]
4. Although brought into being in response to the situation in Corinth, the modified formula is intended to remain as a permanent statement, both expressing and demarcating the separate being of the Christian faith community now emerging as a social entity distinguished from the old social divide between Jew and Greek, Israel and the nations. Within the new context of this faith community, the language and concepts of Israel's scriptures are given new content. Christology thus both affirms received concepts and statements (notably, Wisdom, Messiah, and the Oneness of God) and transforms them into new theology, by the inescapable pressure of its own inner dynamic. This transformation is major rather than incremental: Wright refers to "the enormity of the theological move implied in v.6" and "the unprecedented bifurcation

[35] Senft, *I Corinthiens*, 111 n.17.

[36] N. T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992) 120-36.

[37] Wright, *Climax of the Covenant*, 130. In my fourth chapter I shall argue strongly that 1 Cor.8:6 does indeed have strong family associations, but not on the basis that Wright offers here: not as a modification of monotheism.

within monotheism that he (Paul) believes must be expressed."[38] Paul's specific intent in composing v.6 as a new formulation of "christological monotheism" is to draw a line of demarcation between the Christian community and other Jewish monotheists. He is constructing a new creed in order to force a separation between those who stand within the Christian community and make this confession and all those who do not, both pagans and monotheists.

> It is therefore this confession that marks out the people of God against their neighbours, both Jewish and pagan, much as in the tripartate division of 10.32. The confession of 'one God, one Lord' marked the community out sociologically as well as theologically.[39]

Wright's reading of this key verse is clearly stated and its ramifications made clear. The first two points seem to provide a sound basis for further discussion, as has been implied by my summary of other commentators, and I shall do so later at some length. The third and fourth points, however, are very much open to dispute. They combine to constitute the dividing line between his position and that of Dunn, and thereby focus us on the crucial issues in our present investigation. As an initial response to Wright, we can pose several critical questions indicating the vulnerability of his position to further debate:-

1. If Paul intends v.6 to constitute a new boundary marker, why does he introduce it with so little fuss? Where are the signs of controversy? Where is his defence against those who will find it objectionable? This is Dunn's fundamental question regarding this text, and the strength of his position concerning New Testament christology in general: it was not conspicuously controversial.
2. Wright's exposition of Paul's thought is heavily theological, in the sense of providing an abstract, even philosophical, analysis of the significance of both the Jewish and christological versions of monotheism, and then postulating the latter as an explanation of the logic of Paul's argument in Chapters 8 to10 of this epistle. What he does not do is to provide a correspondingly detailed analysis of the subsequent text to demonstrate the outworking of that inferred logic. He depicts Paul as he were operating as a philosopher in this chapter.[40] Can

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[38] Wright, *Climax of the Covenant*, 130.

[39] Wright, *Climax of the Covenant*, 132.

[40] Consider this sampling of Wright's language as he explains what Paul is doing in 1 Cor.8: "Jewish monotheism at this period was not a matter of theoretical belief, of speculative investigation of the being of God for its own sake. It was the fighting doctrine which engaged in battle on two fronts: against dualism, the rejection of the goodness of the created order, and against paganism, the deification of the created order or parts of it, or of forces within it.The second of these (paganism) seems to have been more important in the period we are considering .... Monotheism was therefore exactly the doctrine to which one would appeal in going back to first principles when faced with the question as to how a group that asserted its continuity with the people of God (cf. 1 Corinthians 10:1, etc.) might behave when faced with living in a pagan society. Equally, it is clear that Paul, like many Jews of his period, was just as alert to the dangers of lapsing into a metaphysical or ontological dualism .... This two-pronged battle, I suggest, helps to explain the delicate nature of Paul's argument throughout 1 Corinthians 8. He is determined to maintain the balance of genuine creational monotheism, warding off the dangers (as he would see it) of dualism on the one hand and of paganism on the other." Wright, *Climax of the Covenant*, 125-26. While such abstractions are the tools of philosophical analysis,

this be confirmed empirically, from the wider passage?

3. In this letter in general, and concerning the issue of idol-food in particular, does Paul really want to encourage a further separation of the Christian community from its Jewish and Greek social environment? Wright takes 10:32, with its tripartite phrasing, Ιουδαίοις...καὶ«Ελλησιν καὶ τῇ εκκλησιᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ, in support, holding that Paul is already thinking of the Christian community of faith as constituting a social entity in distinction from Jews and Greeks, a new nation in effect. That idea has recently been subjected to heavy criticism from scholars who emphasize Paul's ongoing self-identification as a Jew and point out the need for rigorous scrutiny of one's own presuppositions before reading Paul in such terms, especially if one is European, Protestant and Gentile.[41] At the very least, we must now say that the hermeneutical onus is very much on Wright to prove his case at this point. We might also argue that if he had cited 10:32 in full, as απρόσκοποι καὶ Ιουδαίοις γίνεσθε καὶ«Ελλησιν καὶ τῇ εκκλησιᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ, then he might have taken more notice of Paul's irenical intention at that point, to create social harmony rather than emphasizing communal distinctiveness.

1.4 Text in Context: An Exegetical Challenge

My introductory discussion so far has enabled me to set out issues of historical christology surrounding 1 Corinthians 8:6 as presented by the opposing positions of James Dunn and N.T.Wright: the former reading it in the light of his general thesis that the development of christology reflected in the New Testament was gradual and mostly uncontroversial, and the latter maintaining a version of Hengel's thesis that it all happened decisively and early. Wright in fact has characterised Paul's composition of this verse as "one of the greatest pioneering moments in the entire history of christology."[42].

The fact that such contrasting views of this verse's theological significance can be held by two contemporary scholars who in other respects can be seen as very similiar should lead us to suppose that their differences in view are rooted in the problematic nature of the verse itself. I propose to establish, in the course of this thesis, that it does indeed contain a number of significant ambiguities on several different levels, which are largely unexamined in the scholarly literature, and to engage in a detailed, principled contextual exegesis of this one verse in order to attempt to resolve these inherent problems.

The value of such an enterprise rests firstly in the verse's significance for historical theology: was it indeed a great pioneering moment in the development of christology, and if so what exactly was its distinctive contribution? But just as interesting is the exegetical

it is not so clear to me that they are an accurate description of the apostle's struggle for the gospel.

[41] See the discussion in Daniel Boyarin, *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity*, Contraversions: Critical Studies in Jewish Literature, Culture and Society (Berkeley: U of California P, 1994), passim.

[42] Wright, *Climax of the Covenant*, 136.

challenge inherent in the attempt to resolve the verse's inherent ambiguities. There is a lengthy tradition of scholarly interpretation of this verse and its textual context. If I am to argue that this tradition has failed to produce an adequate reading, I must also account for the plausibility of previous readings: how have so many learned predecessors got it wrong? Why have so many scholars been content to accept established readings? Coming at this from another angle, we might say that in order to establish a radically new interpretation of any text, one must argue for a fresh reading not only of the text in itself, but also of its context. If, as I suspect, previous readers have misunderstood the text, and remained unaware that they are doing so, then they must also to some extent have misread the context. I shall now consider one such eminent scholar as a case in point.

1.4.1 Thüsing's Approach

Wilhelm Thüsing's *Per Christum in Deum* is an important study of Pauline christology by a German scholar which has continued to exercise an influence in European commentaries.[43] Its value for my present study lies chiefly in the way in which its approach illustrates some key exegetical issues facing us as we seek to relate the verse to its context. He opens his discussion with the observation that the verse says more about God and Christ than is needed in the context, inasmuch as the end of v.4 ("....and that there is no other God apart from one") has already shown the nothingness of the gods and with it the meaningless of food offerred to idols. "V.7 would join on to v.4 very smoothly"[44] he remarks, without supporting argument, presumably relying on the consensus of exegetical scholarship concerning Chapters 8-10 with which he is familiar. The verse's function is to support v.4 as a "familiar key sentence",[45] and v.5 acts only as a means of introducing it into the argument. On this basis he adopts the hypothesis that Paul has not "constructed this formula *ad hoc*",[46] but rather "found it somewhere else and introduced it here."[47] That somewhere else is then asserted to be most probably "a frequently used element of Paul's own preaching and instruction"[48] rather than a communal creed or a verse of a hymn. Support for that option is provided in the course of a discussion of parallel passages. The final crucial move in Thüsing's exegetical logic is his argument that the meaning of this verse can best be clarified by consideration of parallel passages in which Paul's use of the same terminology is semantically defined by the context, with special reference to Romans 11:36. We can summarize the essential logic of his exegesis

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[43] Wilhelm Thüsing, *Per Christum in Deum*, 3rd ed., Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen (Münster: Aschendorff, 1986), 225-33 in particular.

[44] Thüsing, *Per Christum in Deum*, 225, my translation (as are the following quotations from the same place).

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

thus:-

1. Verse 6, along with v.5, is supplementary rather than essential to Paul's argument regarding idol-food.
2. It functions as a supportive formula, already known to and respected by the audience.
3. Therefore its meaning for Paul is not reducible to its significance in the present context.
4. The semantic fields of its key phrases are best indicated by an examination of other contexts (other arguments and other letters) in which Paul uses them unambiguously.
5. Such an examination will in fact allow us to conclude that this verse is one among several expressions of a theological viewpoint that is consistent and distinctively Pauline, however it may have been related to traditional community formulae.

The logic of an alternative possibility can now be outlined by contrast:-

1. Verses 5 and 6 form an essential part of Paul's argument regarding idol-food, which cannot rest on v.4 alone. (The chief possibilities are that they constitute an essential refinement of v.4 or that they stand in opposition to it)
2. Whether or not this verse was previously known to either Paul or his audience as a formula, and whatever its authorship, its meaning *in this context* is equivalent to its use and significance within his present argument.
3. Therefore that meaning must be isolated by an examination of that context in this letter.
4. If such an examination yields a sufficient explanation of all the semantic features in the verse, recourse to explanations of key terms or phrases derived from other texts by the same or different authors is at best only confirmation and at worse misleading. That is, other texts may indicate semantic possibilities, but they cannot do so exhaustively, inasmuch as the present text may well have something fresh to say; and recourse to usage in another text may suggest a meaning that may be uncritically transferred to the present one, blinding us to the distinctive qualities of language or thought in the text before us.
5. My subsequent exegesis of this context will in fact argue for just such a sufficient explanation of the verse's function and meaning.

The initial difference between these two alternative approaches is provided by the first premise in each case, and it is that difference I shall address as my first exegetical task. Nevertheless, I should also acknowledge that the logic in each of the alternatives outlined above is to some extent circular. That is, it is not possible to determine which of the alternative first premises is best without also developing a sense of how we will handle the consequent issues: we will be more inclined to read Paul's argument about idol-meat as an outcome of v.6 if we have a strong sense of that verse's semantic links with other parts of the letter (my position), and less inclined to do so if it carries strong resonances for us of what we perceive to be Paul's language use and theological convictions expressed in other places

(Thüsing's approach in what is, after all, a book dealing with Paul's theology in general rather than with the exegesis of this epistle).[49]

My chosen approach depends largely on a set of related methodological presuppositions: that the significance of a passage must always be sought first of all in its own immediate textual context; that the context will provide sufficient evidence to indicate such significance or to verify meanings suggested by parallel texts; and that we should presume, until the evidence of the text itself proves otherwise, that every component part of a text has a "good fit" to its context rather than carrying a "greater meaning" unconnected with the text's own semantic world.

At this point I also need to own a further crucial presupposition which separates me not from Thüsing, but from those post-modern literary critics who dismiss or minimise the possibility of distinguishing between alternate "readings" of a text, given that they all necessarily reflect the subjectivity of the readers.

1.4.2 Valid and Invalid Interpretations

In the body of this dissertation I seek to argue that a new interpretation of 1 Corinthians 8:6 is both possible and necessary, and to establish that this new reading is a more probable interpretation of Paul's intended meaning than has been put forward to date. Such a programme clearly implies a definite hermeneutical stance, which I am happy to own. I find myself in fundamental agreement with E.D. Hirsch in his criticism of a "hermeneutical skeptism" widespread among literary critics of his day:

> The theoretical aim of a genuine discipline, scientific or humanistic, is the attainment of truth, and its practical aim is agreement that truth has probably been achieved. Thus the practical goal of every genuine discipline is consensus - the winning of firmly grounded agreement that one set of conclusions is more probable than others - and this is precisely the goal of valid interpretation. It must not be dismissed as a futile goal simply because the subject matter of interpretation is often ambiguous and its conclusions uncertain. Certainty is not the same thing as validity, and knowledge of ambiguity is not necessarily ambiguous knowledge.[50]

Hirsch's position, and my own, is that interpreters of a text must distinguish between the text's *meaning* and its *significance*; and that while the latter term points us to a plethora of possible connections between the text and various communities of readers, the readings favoured by those various audiences belong to them, not the text.[51] The *text's* meaning

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[49] I do not want to place either Dunn or Wright in this continuum of exegetical method. Their difference is in their reading of Paul's theology, and I have suggested that their broad views, while founded on their exegesis of a wide range of texts, must also be corroborated in the course of detailed exegesis of particular passages, including 1 Cor.8:6 in which I have taken a special interest. Thüsing does offer a close examination of this text, but uses a methodology which I think is flawed , as I have explained here.

[50] E.D. Hirsch, Jr, *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1967) vii-ix.

[51] I must, of course, acknowledge that this distinction between meaning and significance is hotly disputed in current critical theory, and that the debate involved is one of the defining issues of *postmodernism*. A passage by Paul Ricoeur seems to encapsulate the position that Hirsch opposes. "According to another fallacious view, the

belongs not to any audience, but to its author alone - it is what the author intended the text to say to its intended audience, that and no more. The prime task of interpretation is to find that intended meaning (or meanings, but only if it can be shown that the text is intentionally polyvalent).

Interpretation can never achieve certainty, only probability relative to alternative interpretations.

> Since the meaning represented by a text is that of another, the interpreter can never be certain that his reading is correct ..... but if he remembers that his job is to construe the author's meaning, he will attempt to exclude his own predispositions and to impose those of the author. However, no one can establish another's meaning with certainty. The interpreter's goal is simply this - to show that a given reading is more probable than others. In hermeneutics, verification is a process of establishing relative probabilities.[52]

Hirsch offers four criteria by which we may adjudicate between competing interpretations.[53] These, of course, merely make explicit what exegetes commonly do when arguing for the plausibility of their textual readings.

1. The criterion of *legitimacy*: the reading must be permissible within the public norms of the *langue* in which the text was composed.
2. The criterion of *correspondence:* the reading must account for each linguistic component of the text.
3. The criterion of *generic appropriateness:* if the text follows the conventions of a specific genre, it is inappropriate to construe the kind of meaning found only in another genre.

hermeneutical task would be governed by the original audience's understanding of the text. As Gadamer has firmly demonstrated, this is a complete mistake: the Letters of Saint Paul are no less addressed to me than to the Romans, the Galatians, the Corinthians, etc. Only dialogue has a 'you', whose identification proceeds from the dialogue itself. If the meaning of a text is open to anyone who can read, then it is the omni-temporality of meaning which opens it to unknown readers; and the historicity of reading is the counterpart of this specific omni-temporality. From the moment that the text escapes from its author and from his situation, it also escapes from its original audience. Hence it can procure new readers for itself." (Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, John B. Thompson [Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981] 192). Ricoeur allows us to take no prisoners, and I must reject his position without qualification. It is one thing to allow that Paul's audience in Corinth might possibliy have misunderstood his letter to them, but it is quite another to assert that it is *no more addressed to them than to anyone else*. The letter is, in fact, an integral part of an ongoing dialogue between Paul and the Corinthian audience to whom he specifically addresses it (1 Cor.1:2), and our role is akin to that of eavesdroppers unknown to the participants. *To investigate what Paul's text might have signified to him and to them is an enterprise quite distinct from reporting what it signifies to me now*, although the former may well influence and be influenced by the latter. To affirm or deny this distinction is an article of methodological faith, rather than a matter open to "demonstration" by Gadamer or anyone else. I have chosen to side with Hirsch, and will proceed on that basis. I am not yet convinced that Gadamer can be enlisted in wholehearted support of Ricoeur's position above. Ricoueur gives no references for Gadamer's purported demonstration, but see Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1975) 235-305 in general, and pp.299-301 in particular for a distinction between historical and hermeneutical interpretation. For a sympathetic presentation of the value of post-modern approaches within biblical criticism, see Edgar V. McKnight, *Post-Modern Use of the Bible: The Emergence of Reader-Oriented Criticism* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1988); and for a short, trenchant criticism, D.A. Carson, *Exegetical Fallacies*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1996) 125-28.

[52] Hirsch, *Validity*, 235-36.

[53] Hirsch, *Validity*, 236.

4. The criterion of plausibility or *coherence*: the reading "makes most sense" as a contribution to its particular discourse context. This is of particular importance when a text is regarded as "problematic" because the first three criteria allow for more than one interpretation.

These four criteria provide the most general guidelines for my present study, which is focused on establishing the most probable interpretation of a problematic text; and which must also show that previously established readings of the text are more problematic than other readers have supposed. What makes a text problematic, in general? Obviously, indeterminacy in any of these four factors would give it that status to some extent, but Hirsch attaches special importance to the issue of coherence as the most common reason for problematic texts. This relates mostly to the problem of recovering implicit rather than explicit meanings:

> It is often said that implications must be determined by referring to the context of the utterance, which, for ordinary statements like "I have a headache," means the concrete situation in which the utterance occurs. In the case of written texts, however, context generally means verbal context: the explicit meanings which surround the problematical passage. But these explicit meanings alone do not exhaust what we mean by context when we educe implications. The surrounding explicit meanings provide us with a sense of the whole meaning, and it is from this sense of the whole that we decide what the problematical passage implies. We do not ask simply, "Does this implication belong with these other explicit meanings?" but rather, "Does this implication belong with these other meanings *within a particular sort of total meaning?"*.... The ground for educing implications is a sense of the whole meaning, and this is an indispensible aspect of what we mean by context.[54]

The "total meaning", in Hirsch's sense, in the case of our present text is something we must derive from our reading of the epistle as a whole, and that task is well established as an essential aspect of all competent exegesis. However, we should recognize that the "written texts" in Hirsch's pervue are *literary* artifacts which have been written to stand largely on their own, creating their own textual worlds of meaning; rather than being primarily *occasional* and thus written as a means of communication between specific people in order to facilitate specific relationships and address specific situations, as is the case with Paul's letters. This difference is a matter of degree rather than of absolute kind, but it does mean that "the concrete situation in which the utterance occurs" is just as essential a part of the context we must establish as is the "total meaning" of the text. It is for this reason that exegesis of Paul's epistles must always attempt to establish, or at least to hypothesize, a situational context that identifies what is going on between the writer and his addressees. These two aspects of context, which we may refer to as the situational and textual, are of equal importance in determining implications. Unfortunately, after 2000 years our access to the situational context is quite problematic, relying heavily on reconstructions drawn from evidence provided by the text itself, with some help from other contemporary texts. For this

[54] Hirsch, *Validity*, 220.

reason it is likely to remain more hypothetical than the textual context. It may be that our most reliable criterion for evaluating competing hypotheses about the situational context involves evaluating the contributions they each make to a reading of the "total meaning" of the text.

Another way of expressing this whole endeavour is to use the concept of "horizon", which Hirsch derives from Husserl. It refers to " a system of typical expectations and probabilities",[55] generally unconscious, that are derived from our sense of the text as a whole.

> "Horizon" is thus an essential aspect of what we usually call context. It is an inexplicit sense of the whole, derived from the explicit meanings present to consciousness.... The explicit meanings are components in a total meaning which is bounded by a horizon. Of the manifold typical continuations within this horizon the author is not and cannot be explicitly conscious, nor would it be a particularly significant task to determine just which components of this meaning the author *was* thinking of. But it is of the utmost importance to determine the horizon which defines the author's intentions as a whole, for it is only with reference to this horizon, or sense of the whole, that the interpreter may distinguish those implications which are typical and proper components of the meaning and those which are not.[56]

Hirsch then goes on to make the point that a major part of the horizon presented to the readers is constituted by their awareness of any established genres as well as the material created by the author. That is to say, there is a close relationship between the third and fourth criteria, and it is not possible to determine coherence without considering genre. It would seem, therefore, that *genre* provides a very useful issue with which to begin our interpretation of 1 Corinthians 8:6 and its relations with its surrounding text. That is, I will begin by asking whether there is any clearly identifiable generic structure governing that surrounding text which would help us to define the horizon of meaning within which the verse should be interpreted.[57] If no such generic structure can be found, we would then need to rely wholly upon the surrounding text to indicate the horizons of meaning which Paul himself has established for the guidance of his intended audience.

1.5 The Search for Genre

"Genre" is actually a term drawn from the discipline of literary criticism, and is a shortened form of "literary genre". David Aune, in his monograph exploring the relationship between the New Testament and its contemporary literary environment, describes the importance of genre studies for the discipline of New Testament scholarship:

> Literary genres and forms are not simply neutral containers used as convenient ways to package various types of written communication. They are social conventions that provide

[55] Hirsch, *Validity*, 221.

[56] Hirsch, *Validity*, 221 – 222.

[57] As I will show early in my next chapter, in following Hirsch I am already adopting a use of "genre" that is consistent with general literary criticism but at odds with some recent New Testament scholarship, where it is used to characterise whole texts only rather than to identify modes of discourse within a text.

> contextual meaning for the smaller units of language and text they enclose. The original significance that a literary text had for both author and reader is tied to the genre of that text, so that the meaning of the part is dependent upon the meaning of the whole. A *literary genre* may be defined as a group of texts that exhibit a coherent and recurring configuration of literary features involving form (including structure and style), content, and function. *Literary forms*, on the other hand, while exhibiting similar recurring literary features, are primarily constituent elements of the genres that frame them.[58]

Aune's definition of genre as a set of texts is acceptable only if we allow for the possibility of intersecting sets: in recent literary theory, it is generally recognised that a given text may belong to more than one genre.[59] This sets the terminology of biblical scholars, as represented by Aune, somewhat at odds with that current among literary theorists. I shall argue later in this chapter (2.3.3.1), when discussing the work of Margaret Mitchell, that this difference has some serious consequences, particularly if by using "forms" instead of "genres" in our description of subdivisions within a text we assume a fixed relation between structural (that is, *formal*) features and the generic cross-textual conventions they express. Genre seems most useful as a literary-critical concept when used to identify different *conventional modes of discourse* that an author expects an audience to recognize, whether or not there are any fixed forms of expression characteristic of each genre (some have them, others do not).[60] To confine its use, as Aune does, to whole texts, is to deprive ourselves on an established tool of literary analysis For example, we shall see that many recent interpreters of Paul's letters have seen them as belonging to at least two genre-producing fields: ancient letter writing and ancient rhetoric, and that the former is often used as a shell around the latter. Yet we shall also see that formal features are more characteristic of the letter genre than of rhetorical genres, so if anything we might be tempted to reverse Aune's order and describe literary genres as primarily consitutents of the literary forms that frame them. It would be better, however, to simply abandon any definition that involves making one a constituent of the other: as literary phenomena, forms and genres are different in kind, should be defined independently, and identified as such however they function in relation to each other in particular texts. Accordingly, I shall use literary *forms* to identify fixed combinations of

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[58] David E. Aune, *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment*, Library of Early Christianity (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1987) 13. For other studies of genre by New Testament scholars, see the articles in *Semeia 43*; especially Mary Gerhart, "Genric Competence in Biblical Hermeneutics," *Semeia* 43 (1988): 29-44, and C.H. Talbert, "Once Again: Gospel Genre," *Semeia* 43 (1988): 53-73.

[59] See John Reichert, "More Than Kin and Less Than Kind: The Limits of Genre Theory," *Theories of Literary Genre*, Ed. Joseph P. Strelka, Yearbook of Comparative Criticism, VIII (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978) 57-79, especially 60-66.

[60] It seems to me that we are struggling here with the legacy of form-criticism, which is grounded in an axiomatic correlation of formal structures and modes of discourse, with context of situation included as a further correlated element. The continuing dominance of this critical methodology in German biblical scholarship is reflected in such fine publications as Schrage's commentary on 1 Corinthians, and Hermann Probst, *Paulus und der Brief*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchingen Zum Neun Testament, 2.Reihe 45 (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1991).

words or fixed structural features, and literary *genres* for distinct modes of discourse recognisable as such by the audience.

We should also note that genre is a concept with both synchronic and diachronic aspects: genres are subject to constant evolution.[61] This means that in attempting to identify literary genres within Paul's writings we must be constantly aware of both the value and the dangers of carrying our experience of genres from one historical context into another. For instance, there may be significant differences as well as similarities in the genre "preaching" as found in modern Christian churches, in classical Greek philosophy, in first-century Judaism or popular hellenistic culture, and in Paul's mission. To determine the state of a genre as used by Paul and his audience in a particular context is essentially a matter of historical investigation, rather than of simply relying on the dogma of modern literary or discourse-linguistic theories.[62] In this respect there are important similarities between genre study and linguistic investigation in their combination of synchronic and diachronic dimensions of the phenomena studied.

The body of my study which follows is structured in three parts. The first and longest part, consisting of Chapters 2 to 6, is an extensive investigation of the major literary genres active in 1 Corinthians in general and in the discourse on ειδωλόθυτα in particular, while determining the argumentative structure of that discourse. My reason for delaying an examination of 1 Cor. 8:6 until after that lengthy examination of its context is that I am attempting to apply Hirsch's third and fourth interpretative criteria (*generic appropriateness* and *coherence*) with the utmost rigour. Only by determining the verse's likely genre and discourse context in advance can we maximize our chances of reading the verse in the light of its context rather than the converse.[63] The first conclusion I will draw from this process is that the discourse context of the verse is an extended argument of mixed but primarily deliberative genre in which the writer's discourse goal is to persuade his audience to adopt a set of values

[61] Alistair Fowler's extensive study of genre theory includes this generalization: "Genre criticism has tended to split into two quite distinct and almost unrelated activities. One is abstract speculation about permanent genres. It excited many during the Renaissance and for a century after, but is now regarded as unreal - unless, of course, it is structuralist. The other activity is plodding chronicle history of individual genres that continually transform themselves without ever waiting long enough for generalization. One concentrates on fixity (if necessary, inventing it), the other on change (even if no general ideas emerge). In the abstract, the polarity is the irreducible one of synchronicity versus diachronicity. But good criticism will avoid or combine these opposites." Alastair Fowler, *Kinds of Literature: An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1982) 48.

[62] Failure to observe this principle greatly diminishes the value of the analysis of 1 Corinthians offered by Ralph Bruce Terry, which relies uncritically on a theory of "text-types" [genres by another name] without establishing the applicability of its dogmas to the Pauline corpus. Ralph Bruce Terry, *A Discourse Analysis of First Corinthians*, Publications in Linguistics, 120 (Arlington: Summer Institute of Linguistics, 1995).

[63] Of course an "interpretive circle" is operative in any reading, so that in the course of my research my emerging sense of the inner structure of the verse threw light on its context. My attempt at interpretive rigour consists of separting these processes as far as possible as I now argue my case.

that are less "Greek" and more "Jewish" in nature. My second conclusion, at the end of Chapter 6, will be that the probable discourse function of the verse itself is that of a θήσις, expressing the underlying general theme the particular concrete case (υποθεσις) argued by the writer, which in this discourse is that his audience should minimize their contacts with pagan cultic activity. Having determined that probable function of the verse, I am ready to examine the content of the verse itself and to confirm that it can indeed function as a θήσις for the whole discourse.

The second part of my argument, presented in Chapters 7 and 8, focuses on the verse itself, 1 Cor.8:6, in accordance with Hirsch's second criterion of *correspondence*. I explore in detail the grammatical structures that determine its semantics both intrinsically and in relation to its immediate context in the opening paragraph of the discourse. I will argue that the syntax of the verse ties it firmly into its present context, making it quite unlikely to have had a previous life in anything like its present form. From that syntactic and semantic structure I will also draw the conclusion that the assertive force of the verse lies not in the monotheistic affirmations of its twin main clauses, but rather in its four subordinate clauses, which combine to make a strong affirmation of the connection between benefits received by the audience from God through Christ and the obligations to God and Christ that follow from those benefits.

The third part of my argument, in Chapters 9 and 10, then looks to the social context of the discourse, the situation of the Corinthian believers within their wider Greco-Roman society, in order to show just how apposite such a θήσις statement is, both to the situation Paul faces and to his particular strategy for dealing with it in this discourse. I argue that the semantics of the benefits-and-obligations schema appealed to by Paul can best be understood in the light of the social structures of patronage and family basic to Greco-Roman society. By doing so, I seek to satisfy Hirsch's first criterion, that of *legitimacy*.

In my concluding chapter I review the methodology of the study, summarizing the results obtained at each stage and arguing that the sequential nature of the process gives those results the status of a "best reading" displacing rather than complementing previous readings. I then briefly consider the implications for the theological and intertextual issues raised in this introduction.

CHAPTER 2

GENRE SOURCE ONE: ANCIENT EPISTLES

The most obvious generic classification we must give 1 Corinthians is to recognize that it is an ancient letter. Recent studies of the New Testament epistles comparing them with other surviving Hellenistic letters have thrown considerable light on features of their composition that should be attributed to generic conventions rather than to authorial style and invention.[1] Five features of Paul's letters have generally been identified as belonging to the epistolary genre *per se*. Three of these are found in every letter: the *prescript*, the *letter body*, and the *closing*; and a further two, an *opening thanksgiving* and a section of *closing paraenesis* are much more characteristic of the Pauline epistles than of the wider genre.[2] As these are all generic features, they are all open to modification as a means of communication: departures from recognisable norms can be taken as significant indicators of an author's communicative intent rather than meaningless stylistic variation. I shall now discuss the contribution each of these generic features makes to our understanding of 1 Corinthians, leaving the letter body until last, as it is the most problematic of the five.

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[1] David E. Aune, *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment*, Library of Early Christianity (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1987) includes two chapters on epistolary literature which constitute a substantial study of this genre. Important monographs focusing on this genre alone include: William G. Doty, *Letters in Primitive Christianity*, Foreword by Jr. Dan O. Via, Guides to Biblical Scholarship, New Testament Series (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973); and Stanley K. Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity*, Library of Early Christianity (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986). Other studies focusing on particular aspects of ancient epistolary form or focusing on particular epistles include: John Lee White, *The Form and Function of the Body of the Greek Letter: A Study of the Letter-Body in the Non-Literary Papyri and in Paul the Apostle*, 2nd ed., Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series, no.2 (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1972); Peter Thomas O'Brien, *Introductory Thanksgivings in the Letters of Paul*, Supplements to Novum Testamentum (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1977); Michael Bünker, *Briefformular und rhetorische Disposition im 1.Korintherbrief*, Göttinger Theologische Arbeiten (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1983); Stanley N. Olson, "Epistolary Uses of Expressions of Self-Confidence," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 103.4 (Dec 1984): 585-97; Margaret M. Mitchell, "Concerning ΠΕΡΙ ΔΕ in 1 Corinthians," *Novum Testamentum* 31.3 (July 1989): 229-56; R.F. Collins, "Reflections on 1 Corinthians as a Hellenistic Letter," *The Corinthian Correspondence*, Ed. R. Bieringer, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 125 (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1996) 39-61; and Jeffrey T. Reed, "Philippians 3:1 and the Epistolary Hesitation Formulas: The Literary Integrity of Philippians, Again," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 115.1 (Spring 1996): 63-90.

[2] See Doty, *Letters*, 27-47, for a summary of the consensus.

2.1 The Prescript

A formal opening sentence specifies the sender and addressee and then expresses a brief salutation. Commonly in Hellenistic letters this is as simple as "X to Y, greeting (χαίρειν)", and sometimes it is a little more elaborate. Paul, however, seems to have made a habit of expanding each of these three elements into a form more like, "Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ through the will of God, with X the brother; to the saints/church in (place) Y; grace and peace from God our Father and our Lord Jesus Christ."[3] This characteristic expansion of a generic form does of course communicate significant aspects of Paul's relations with his addressees in general. Further extensions of this form indicate particular complications in the relationships between Paul and his addressees, relating to the various matters Paul is about to raise. That is, in such cases we are justified in saying that he begins his communication in earnest right from the prescript, rather than allowing this form to function in a purely conventional way.

In the case of the letter to Philemon, the relational complication is that while Philemon is the direct addressee, being the only one who can do anything to resolve the issue at hand, Paul wants to increase the moral pressure on him by raising the matter in public: he does this by including other members of Philemon's church community as secondary addressees (1:2a), but first moderates the potentially shaming effect of this on Philemon by honouring him with the words, Φιλήμονι τῷ αγαπητῷ καὶ συνεργῷ ημῶν (1:1b).

Writing to the Galatians, Paul greatly expands both his self-designation as an apostle and his salutation, combined with a minimal designation of the addressees. The effect of these modifications is to emphasize four themes which will prove crucial as he develops them in the body of his letter: his apostleship is of divine origin without any need for human mediation or approval (1:1); nevertheless he is no maverick but operates within a team of "brothers" (1:2a); the grace and peace they have from God (1:3) involves the self- giving of Christ "for our sins" to rescue us from the present evil age (1:4a); and God alone should be credited and praised for the salvation they share (1:4b-5). It is not difficult to correlate these opening features with disturbances in the relationship between Paul and his addressees in Galatia: some of them have challenged his apostolic status as unsupported by other apostolic figures, and questioned the gospel message he had proclaimed among them, undervaluing the foundational nature of Christ's death, and overvaluing the significance of "works of the law".

The letter to the church in Rome features by far the longest of Paul's prescripts, in which he expands his self-designation into a full-scale personal introduction, a

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[3]See 2 Cor.1:1-2; Phil.1:1-2; 1 Thess.1:1; and all of the deutero-Pauline epistles except Titus: Eph.1:1-2; Col.1:1-2; 2 Thess.1:1-2; 1 Tim.1:1-2; 2 Tim.1:1-2. It is tempting to offer the occurence of such an uncomplicated form as a characteristic of the deutero-Paulines on the basis that they assume an uncomplicated relationship between the apostle and his addressees. The case of the letter to Titus stands in my way somewhat.

presentation of his apostolic credentials. The relational complication motivating this variant to the prescript is simple: he is writing to people who have never met him and have no personal experience of his apostolic ministry and connection with "the gospel of God". I take the unusually extended nature of this self- designation as an indication of one the purposes of the letter: to present and validate those apostolic credentials in preparation for his upcoming visit.

Turning to 1 Corinthians, we may note that its prescript does include one significant expansion of Paul's basic formula, in his designation of the addressees:

> ...τῇ εκκλησίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ οὔσῃ εν Κορίνθῳ, ηγιασμένοις εν Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ, κλητοῖς αγίοις, σὺν πᾶσιν τοῖς επικαλουμένοις τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ εν παντὶ τόπῳ, αυτῶν καὶ ημῶν·(1:2)

What relational difficulty or complication does this variant signal? The form of address Paul has chosen here suggests that his addressees have a problem in relating not merely to him personally but to the wider Christian movement, in two aspects. They remain too closely identified with their community of origin from which they have now been set apart by God, which is why he doubly emphasizes their calling to live as the "saints" they are, ηγιασμένοις εν Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ, κλητοῖς αγίοις. Furthermore, they are insufficiently identified with their membership of the wider Christian movement and its common allegiance to Christ, σὺν πᾶσιν τοῖς επικαλουμένοις τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ εν παντὶ τόπῳ, αυτῶν καὶ ημῶν. I would like to argue that these significant modifications of Paul's habitual formula constitute the first expression of the fundamental relational issues unifying the epistle.[4] Throughout the epistle he labours to strengthen their sense of allegiance to one another as a faith community created by God, with obligations to one another and to the wider Christian community that must take priority over their obligations to the pagan society surrounding them. Those obligations include embracing a way of life befitting Christ's holy people: holiness is not only a gift of present holy status (ηγιασμένοις εν Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ) but a calling to ongoing change towards holiness (κλητοῖς αγίοις). Explicating and motivating some of the changes required of them in their current situation if they are to fulfil their calling in unity with the wider community of Christ will constitute the heart of the epistle's message. Meanwhile, Paul's mode of addressing them indicates from the outset that he intends to relate to them within these two parameters: their calling to be holy, and their context within that wider body of Christ's people.

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[4]The significance of this extended salutation as a means of foreshadowing important issues in the epistle, especially those involving the Corinthians' relation to the wider Church, has been increasingly noted in the commentaries: see Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 32-34; Raymond F. Collins, *First Corinthians*, Sacra Pagina 7 (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1999) 46-47; and Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000) 73-78.

2.2 The Opening Thanksgiving

While expressions of thanksgiving and benediction may occur anywhere in a Pauline letter, he makes a characteristic feature of placing an extended general thanksgiving between the prescript and the letter body. Its general function is to acknowledge the status of the addressees as recipients of God's favour and to affirm their common standing in that status as the basis for Paul's communication in the letter.[5] Its general form may be summarized, "I thank God for all that I hear about you in my absence: it is apparent from all reports that you have responded wholeheartedly to the gospel of Christ, are enjoying God's blessings, and are glorifying God by your manner of life. I pray that all of this may continue and that we may share those blessings face to face before long." With minor variations, this formula is found in Romans 1:8-12; Philippians 1:3-11; 1 Thessalonians 1: 2-10; and Philemon 4-7. The three remaining undisputedly Pauline letters, Galatians and the two letters to Corinth, have significant departures from Paul's normal thanksgiving.

Most famously, Galatians has no opening thanksgiving at all. Paul is about to launch into an angry confrontation with his addressees, and does not wish to disguise his mood with false praise: there is nothing in their situation which makes him thankful enough to postpone or soften the rebuke he needs to get off his chest.

In 2 Corinthians, Paul includes a lengthy thanksgiving (1:1-7 or 1-11), but it is for God's grace experienced in his own ministry, including the benefits that flow from his sufferings on their behalf and for the consolation they will experience as they share in those sufferings. As the epistle makes clear, a good portion of those sufferings have arisen out of a lengthy and painful conflict between the apostle and this church, and that conflict is not yet entirely resolved: hence his reframing of this thanksgiving to reflect both the gains and the pains of the situation as it now stands.

The thanksgiving in 1 Corinthians (1:4-9) is commonly read as rather fulsome, as it is indeed in its description of God's grace and gifts given to the addressees. The effusiveness with which Paul describes their giftedness can lead us to overlook a highly significant omission: alone among his opening thanksgivings, this one says nothing about

[5] O'Brien, *Introductory Thanksgivings*, 13-15. Building on and extending the work of P.Schubert (1939), O'Brien identifies four functions of the Pauline thanksgivings: communicating pastoral concern; a didactic function of indicating what he considers important for the recipients; indicating the paranetic thrust of the letter; and an epistolary function indicating the main themes of the letter. These all overlap to some extent.

their response to all this grace.[6] In every other letter-opening thanksgiving, his thanks for God's goodness to the addresees is joined with an appreciative acknowledgement of the manner in which they have responded to that generosity.[7] Even 2 Corinthians credits his wayward audience with entering into the redemptive sufferings he describes.[8] But here, no credit is given to them at all. In a culture highly attuned to issues of praise and blame, and to the obligations entailed in the receipt of gifts, this silence is a profound rebuke to the Corinthian church.[9] Paul's total silence about their response is only accentuated by the virtual hyperbole with which he describes how much they have received. The implication is obvious: they are undeserving recipients, standing in danger of losing all that they have received if a more appropriate response is not forthcoming. To underscore the danger in which they stand, he reminds them of the coming "day of our Lord Jesus Christ" for which only the faithful calling of God can prepare them (1:8-9). The overall effect is to emphasize that the spiritual giftedness of which they boast is to God's credit, not theirs, and that a more fitting response is still required of them before their giftedness becomes praiseworthy.

2.3 The Postscript

Most Hellenistic letters ended with a formulaic blessing (typically a health wish) and farewell. In addition, the opening salutation might be repeated, and secondary recipients of the letter might also be greeted. These elements are all found, and usually greatly expanded, in Paul's letters. They appear to have fulfilled the vital function within his letters of building and maintaining his relationships with key individuals and

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[6]A significant fact overlooked in most commentaries: cf. Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 93; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 56-58; Christian Wolff, *Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther*, Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament 7 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1996) 19-23; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 36-46; Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians: a Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, trans. Leitch James W., Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) 25-29; F.W. Grosheide, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Wm.B.Eerdmans, 1953) 26-32; Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians*, The International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T.& T.Clark, 1911) 4-8. Some earlier commentators seem to have noticed, however: C.K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 2nd ed. (London: A.&C. Black, 1971) 40, comments, "That he says nothing of an answering trust, love endurance, and faithfulness on the Corinthians' part (Bachmann) is partly, but only partly, due to circumstances in Corinth." A similar observation is attributed to Weiss by Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1991) 195 n.53.

[7]Rom.1:8; Phil.1:5,7; 1 Thess.1:3,6-10; Philem.4.

[8]2 Cor.1:7.

[9]I shall deal extensively with the relation between gifts and obligations in my fourth chapter. The importance of praise and blame in Greco-Roman society is an outcome of the even wider dynamic of honour and shame: see David Arthur DeSilva, *Honour, Patronage, Kinship & Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000) 23-93. A consideration of the social importance of epideictic oratory is also germane: George A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1963) 152-203.

leadership groupings within the communities he addressed. Thus his letter to the church in Rome, which he has never visited, ends with a long list of its members whom he does know, or know of: rather like a list of referees, at the end of what is essentially a letter of self- introduction, this list may serve to remind the congregation as a whole of how many among them already have reason to vouch for his ministry. Alternatively, for those among these names who may not know Paul, he may want to be seen to have paid the church the courtesy of finding out the names of their prominent members. Whatever the case, the size of this list of names indicates how hard Paul was working to establish a relational basis for his first visit to an established church.

1 Corinthians has the next longest closing section (16:1-24). It consists mainly of instructions for the collection for Jerusalem (16:1-4) and travel arrangements for himself, Timothy and Apollos (16:5-12). While these might seem to be matters of mere practicality, they do serve to bring the preceding discussion back down to earth by reminding his audience of their obligations of almsgiving and hospitality. In a sense these matters provide neutral ground for Paul and those addressees he has felt obliged to oppose during the course of the letter. However, we may draw some evidence from this section regarding the tenseness of the relational situation.

Firstly, when making arrangements for the collection, which he presents in rather imperative terms ("...you should do as I instructed the Galatians...", 16:1), he makes a point of deferring to the Corinthians concerning how this is to be conveyed to Jerusalem: they can select their own delegation, and possibly even decide if it is appropriate (αξιον) for Paul himself to be included, although he is apparently keen to be so.[10] It would seem that on this financial matter in particular the apostle is very anxious to avoid offending his audience.

Secondly, while he has earlier included a very heated threat to visit them "soon" for a powerful show-down with his opponents (4:18-21), when he now comes to announcing his actual travel plans (16:5-9) they hardly amount to an imminent arrival. Firstly, he will stay in Ephesus for a while as he has both opportunities and adversaries there (implying that Corinth which also has opportunities and adversaries is not his only concern). Then, instead of coming directly to Corinth, he will travel via Macedonia, and only then "perhaps I will stay with you or even stay the winter..... I do not want to see you now just in passing". Clearly he wants to give the Corinthian community every opportunity to back away from the looming confrontation and to make him welcome of their own volition so that he can feel comfortable about making it a lengthy visit during which he can rebuild his fractured relationships with them.

Thirdly, the visit by Timothy his delegate, sent to remind them of "my way in Christ" (4:17), is now somewhat uncertain: "*If* he arrives" they are to see he has nothing to

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[10]See Dieter Georgi, *Remembering the Poor: The History of Paul's Collection for Jerusalem*, Eng.trans. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1992) 54-57.

fear from them, for he like Paul is doing a work of God, so that he can return to Paul in peace (16:10-11). This sounds rather like sending an ambassador into hostile territory bearing a white flag. Paul has every reason to be anxious for Timothy, precisely because he is his delegate.[11] Hostility to Paul is evidently quite open within the Corinthian congregation, and it appears that Timothy's main function is to test the water some time after the letter has been received in order to see whether Paul's own visit is advisable.

A fourth relational element is introduced into the closing section with the mention of Apollos's reluctance to visit Corinth (16:12). Some of the community there have been represented, even if only in a rhetorical figure of speech, as claiming him as a figurehead authority over against Paul. So now Paul presents Apollos as someone who is open to Paul's strong urging, even if resisting it because he is reluctant to visit those who claim him as their champion. Point made: he is on Paul's side rather than theirs, if sides are to be taken.[12]

A further relational matter (16:15-18) concerns the household of Stephanus, who has been visiting Paul in Ephesus. These community members have the honour of being "the first converts in Archaia" and those associated with them are possibly Paul's strongest allies in Corinth. Paul urges others to "recognize" them and those associated with them: he is clearly pinning his future influence on the leadership of this faction, and trusting that their place in the community's formative history will help them to prevail in the struggle on hand.

The greeting expressed on behalf of "the churches of Asia" is a further element in the relational web Paul weaves to establish his own ethos: by claiming the right to speak on behalf of such a scattered grouping, he is reminding them of the history and standing of his own mission and of the extent of his support outside their own domain. Setting themselves against him would lead to their isolation rather than his, not that anyone outside Corinth wants that: the love conveyed from those churches is warm and genuine, in harsh contrast to the warning which quickly follows (16:22) when Paul takes over the pen to add his personal signature, then inscribes a curse on any "who do not love the Lord", in effect on those who resist the Lord's servant and the love he offers them. Paul is clearly unhappy with his addressees at this point, despite the grace and love he then expresses in formulaic terms (16:23-24).

The overall effect of this letter ending is to establish the seriousness of the relational crisis that has arisen between Paul and this church he had founded. He is not at all confident of their love and loyalty toward him, and hence that they will be well disposed towards what he has had to say in the letter. Given that he ends on that tone of trepidation and uncertainty, we may well allow our knowledge of the ending to guide our

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[11]See the very helpful discussion of the way in which Timothy may well be a target for animosity directed towards Paul in Fee, *First Corinthians*, 821-22.

[12]See Fee, *First Corinthians*, 823-24; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 1332-33.

perception of the underlying tone throughout the letter. It is the writing of a leader who is not at all sure of how much he can command the respect and loyalty of his followers, and who is working hard to shore up his influence under adverse circumstances.

2.4 Closing Paraenesis

Doty identifies a fourth generic component in ancient letter writing: a section of *paraenetic* material in which the writer exhorts the reader to live a worthy life. The distinctive thing about this exhortation is its conventional nature, drawing on traditional materials and commonplaces.[13] Stowers distinguishes two main styles of exhortation, *paraenesis* and *protreptic*, the former defined as "advice and exhortation to continue in a certain way of life" and the latter as "literature that calls the audience to a new and different way of life", while acknowledging that ancient usage of these terms was not always so clear-cut.[14] Fiore, while noting the confusing ancient usage of these two terms and choosing not to distinguish them in his own analysis, does relate them in their literary manifestations to the growth of the "teaching letter" as a device for ethical instruction favoured by philosophers such as Seneca and the Cynics. Fiore emphasizes the relational basis of this form of communication, citing Guillemin who, according to Fiore,

> ...notes that epistolary parenesis owes its success to the letter's friendly tone and that the parenesis is a concomitant of the teacher's friendly relations with the pupils. The letter's familiar and quietly persuasive conversational tone makes the friend present as he acquits himself of the friend's hortatory task. The correspondent in turn relies on the teacher-friend for guidance.[15]

Combining these approaches, then, we may use "paraenesis" to refer to friendly advice making use of traditional materials to exhort readers to continue in a worthy way of life to which the audience already aspires. There is no shortage of such material within the New Testament epistles, and indeed several of these seem to have have paraenesis as their overall genre: James, 1 and 2 Peter, 1 John, and Paul's letter to the Philippians. Other non-Pauline and deutero-Pauline letters exhibit sustantial paraenetic sections immediately before their postscripts: Hebrews 12:1-13:21; Colossians 3:1-4:6; Ephesians 4:1-6:20; 1 Timothy 5:1-6:19; and Titus 2:1-3:11. It is obvious that the paraenetic genre, with its presumption of friendly teacher-pupil relationships, sat very comfortably within the ethos of the early Christian movement and its predominant images of the relations between leaders and other members. It would also seem that as the first century wore on, the giving of advice became such a hallmark of leadership that a writer might be expected to affirm

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[13] Doty, *Letters*, 37-39.

[14] Stowers, *Letter-Writing*, 92.

[15] Benjamin Fiore, "Parenesis and Protreptic," *The Anchor Bible Dictionary, vol.5* (New York: Doubleday, 1992) 163b.

his teaching status in relation to the addressees by at least rounding off his letters in such a frame.

In Paul's letter to the Romans, all of 12:1-15:13 can be seen to fall into this category. We have no reason to believe the recipients of this advice would find anything contentious about it (as he nowhere implies that they are not already aspiring to follows its various precepts); it has many connections with sapiential and philosophic and dominical traditions; and it everywhere assumes that the audience will adopt a friendly receptivity to this discourse. That Paul is able to assume this role of friendly advisor to a whole community of people he has never met suggests that the friendship presumed in this literary form is in itself an artifice, a literary conceit. Genres such as paraenesis provide just such opportunities for a writer in Paul's circumstances to slip into a role on a provisional basis. He does not have an established relationship with the addressees as a basis for adopting the role of trustworthy mentor, but his apostolic status would imply his suitability for that role in Rome, given the opportunity, just as he has in fact proved in practice elsewhere. Hence the substantial paraenetic section in the second half of this letter of introduction; he is strutting his apostolic stuff in a literary tour de force. Successfully, no doubt, given the subsequent history of the letter.

Paraenesis is less prominent in Paul's other undisputed letters: 1 Thessalonians (4:1-12 and 5:12-22) and Galatians (6:1-10 and perhaps 5:16-26) have closing sections of paraenesis, but it is virtually absent from Philemon and the Corinthian corpus. Is that absence significant? On the one hand, we should take note that some non-Pauline epistles (2 Thessalonians, 2 and 3 John) also lack paraenesis. Over against this, however, we must set Paul's general need to assert his apostolic status, for which purpose paraenesis seems to have been such a useful instrument. On balance, I think that its absence from each of these three letters (Philemon, 1&2 Corinthians) is significant, and that it should be explained in relational terms.

In the case of Philemon, such an explanation is quite straightforward. In seeking the release of Onesimus, Paul has carefully adopted the strategy of addressing Philemon as Φιλήμονι τῷ αγαπητῷ καὶ συνεργῷ ημῶν (v.1), a loved one and fellow worker, and has explicitly refrained from exerting any apostolic authority over him (v.8). By treating Philemon as having equal status within the movement (a gracious fiction, normalised by politeness conventions, which we shall examine later), Paul leaves him free to respond positively to the request without any loss of face. Hence it would be quite out of place and counter- productive, in the context of this letter with its very clearly defined goal, to adopt the superior mentoring relation implied by the paraenetic genre.

The absence of paraenesis from 2 Corinthians is made complex by the very factors that have led to questions about its compositional integrity: there is a strong scholarly consensus that in its received form it has been compiled by editing two or three separate

letters, all originally from Paul.[16] One of the strongest lines of evidence supporting the theory of that composite nature is relational. Midway through the epistle Paul asserts that as a result of Titus' return from visiting them he is now completely assured of their heartfelt "obedience" (7:15) in response to his previous challenging letter (7:8), so that now "I rejoice because I have complete confidence in you" (7:16). Nevertheless, Chapters 10 to 13 are confrontational and argumentative in tone and the epistle closes with a threat (13:10) that Paul may have to visit them with a "severe authority" if they fail to respond to his admonitions, leading many scholars to suppose that this section is in fact the heart of the "severe letter" referred to earlier. Between these two sections, in Chapters 8- 9, is a fundraising letter supporting the Jerusalem collection whose tone implies no past nor present conflict between the writer and his audience. Of these three putative letters, only the first ends (at 2 Cor.7:16) in a tone that would make a concluding paraenetic section appropriate, and maybe that original letter had one, discarded in the process of compilation.

1 Corinthians has a closing paraenetic section, but it is comparatively minuscule:

> Γρηγορεῖτε, στήκετε εν τῇ πίστει, ανδρίζεσθε, κραταιοῦσθε. πάντα υμῶν εν αγάπη γινέσθω.
> Stay alert, stand firm in faith, act like men, be strong. Do everything in love. (16:13-14)

Its position in the letter, slipped between the closing travel plans and Paul's commendation of Stephanus' household, gives it the appearance of an afterthought, or a conventional formula slipped in by an editor to make the epistle conform to expectations, or maybe a lead into the following commendation. But however we look at the epistle as a whole, it is notably lacking in paraenesis as we have defined it. What may we conclude from this fact?

It seems reasonable to postulate that paraenesis was an important mode of communication between Paul and the churches he had founded, on the basis of its frequency in his letters to such churches noted above. Its importance for him as a natural expression of his leadership and status within the Gentile mission has been further supported by the prominence given to this genre in his letter to the Romans, in which he was attempting to establish his status in the eyes of a group who had no direct experience of his leadership. I have found ready explanations for the absence of paraenesis in Philemon and 2 Corinthians. It follows that the virtual absence of paraenesis in 1 Corinthians is a significant fact inviting explanation. The relational dimensions of paraenesis offer the most fruitful line of inquiry, suggesting that the nature of the conflicts providing the occasion for this epistle made it inappropriate for Paul to adopt the

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[16]For a summary of the considerations supporting this hypothesis, see C. K. Barrett, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973) 11-21. For a contrary view, Ben III Witherington, *Conflict and Community in Corinth: a Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995) 328-33.

mentoring role necessary for paraenesis, despite his preference for including this genre in his letters. That is to say, *the lack of paraenesis here is in itself prima facie evidence that the addressees, or a significant portion of them, are not merely in conflict with one another but also with Paul,* and are thus denying him the recognition that would allow him to use paraenesis in this letter. We may therefore adopt that relational hypothesis as a useful hermeneutic tool when we examine the letter as a whole.

2.5 The Letter Body

So far we have examined four generic components of Pauline letters, all of which are characteristically found at the beginning or end of the composition. What remains in the middle is generally termed the Letter Body; it is here that the central business of the communication takes place. The question before us is what generic factors, if any, influenced the composition of this part of Hellenistic letters. Unfortunately, this is where answers from modern epistolary research begin to peter out. Scholars examining the ancient theory and practice of letter writing are able to identify various formal elements when they appear within individual letters, but there has been little success in locating more general patterns within which these might be arranged or that might govern their relations with one another.[17]

John Lee White wrote a dissertation attempting to identify generic structures within Hellenistic letter-bodies and to apply these to the Pauline corpus.[18] This was based on earlier work done by his advisor, Robert Funk, identifying a characteristic formula, which he called the "apostolic parousia", marking the end of the "theological body" in each of Paul's epistles.[19] White based his analysis on comparative studies of letters found among the non-literary papyrii. Unfortunately, the results he adduces for 1 Corinthians amount to a refutation of this methodology, requiring us to accept that the letter body ends at 4:21 and that all that follows is essentially paraenesis. White's line of argument is too weak to sustain such a novel conclusion: his examination of the putative three-part formula closing the letter body shows a number of significant departures from that norm in the case of 1 Corinthians; and he gives no comparison of the style or substance of the letter before and after 4:21 to confirm this result by demonstrating that the qualitative difference from "theological" letter body to subsequent paraenesis, as proposed by Funk, does in fact occur in this epistle. It would, in fact, be very difficult to argue such a case, and no scholar seems to have subsequently attempted to do so. White's study seems to constitute a terminus in

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[17] Doty, *Letters*, 55 - 63, lists six such formal elements: apocalyptic; catalogues and lists; catechesis; confessional formulae; hymnic materials; and judgement.

[18] White, *Form and Function*, cited above p22 n.6.

[19] Robert W. Funk, "The Apostolic Parousia: Form and Significance," *Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox*, Ed. W.R. Farmer, C.F.D. Moule, and R.R. Niebuhr (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1967) 249-68, especially 263 n.1.

scholarly attempts to define the letter body as a genre defined by formal characteristics and applicable to all of the Pauline corpus. A major flaw in his methodology may lie in his choice of "the common Greek letter" as represented in the non-literary papyri as the most appropriate starting point for defining the basic genre influencing Paul's writings.[20] It is possible that he might have found more instructive formal parallels among more "literary" epistles.

Stanley Stowers has produced a taxonomy of the Hellenistic letter corpus based on six broad categories of relationship and purpose: letters of friendship; family letters; letters of praise and blame; letters of exhortation and advice (divided into seven sub-types); letters of mediation; and accusing, apologetic and accounting letters.[21] No correlations are attempted between these categories and formal elements such as Doty has listed. Where Stowers' work may prove most useful to us is in his analysis of the ethos and relational presuppositions inherent in these characterisations, and particularly in his insight into the dominance given to the ideal of friendship as a generic norm.

> The letters of more educated people and literary letters are especially characterized by the ethos and conventions of Greek friendship. Classical Greek culture privileged friendship between male peers as the highest form of social relationship. The epistolary theorists assumed that the letter of friendship was both the most basic and highest form of letter writing. Consequently the ethos and language of Greek friendship shaped Greco- Roman letter writing as a whole although that of upperclass writers more than others. The ethos of friendship was largely expressed through a set of standard themes and commonplace expressions: the letter is a friendly conversation; friends reciprocate in all things; friends will sacrifice for one another; friends are frank with one another; through the letter, friends are together though physically apart (1 Cor 5:3; 1 Thess 2:17; Col 2:5); the letter contains an image of the writer's character; the letter is a consolation for a friend's absence; expressions of joy upon receiving a friend's letter; expressions of longing for a friend (2 Cor.1:16; 1 Thess.3:6-10; Philem.22; 2 John 12; 3 John 14).[22]

The normalization of friendship as the relational ideal underlying all of the letter types postulated by Stowers has lived on into modern times in our stylized forms of address ("Dear John") and closing ("Yours sincerely") as required formalities, no matter what the relation between writer and addressee or the tone of the letter between these endearments: to omit these is taken as a lack of common civility, even when the rest of the letter may be cold or angry in tone. It is important for us to realize that a sprinkling of the friendship commonplaces listed by Stowers above may well have been required as a matter of civility, and that to modern readers they may mask an underlying conflict or negativity in the relationship.

The most difficult aspect of this generic feature for my present purposes is that all of the letter types described by Stowers above, and the analyses of ancient theorists which

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[20] White, *Form and Function*, xi.

[21] Stowers, *Letter-Writing*, 49 - 173.

[22] Stanley K. Stowers, "Greek and Latin Letters," *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (New York: Doubleday, 1992) 292a.

he cites, share this generic assumption of friendship as the relational basis for the communication. Even letters of blame or rebuke must be expressed in forms treating the friendship as intact. There are no generic forms especially appropriate to a friendship breakdown. How do you write a letter to someone who no longer wants you as a friend? How do you offer guidance to someone who no longer respects your advice? On the surface of the letter you must write as if the friendship and respect were unchallenged, but beneath this veneer the reality of the communication must be markedly different if it is to succeed. By and large, you are going to have to *argue* your case, to persuade your opponent, to win back your friend... and that, as we shall see, aptly depicts the task faced by Paul in his first letter to Corinth.

Which brings us to the matter of rhetoric. The letter genre, because it was based on an assumption of friendship and goodwill, has no generic features to mark the degree or manner of *argumentation* present in the discourse, and nor was there any social need for it to do so in the Hellenistic environment: argumentation belonged in the generic domain known as rhetoric.[23]

In deriving his letter types, Stowers gave some consideration to the rhetorical categories dominant within the Greco-Roman education system, but his analysis takes no account of actual patterns of argumentation in defining those types, and nor could he, for the reasons given above. The inherent relational stereotyping adopted within the ancient epistolary genre leads us to realize that this genre had a very limited influence in structuring the letter bodies of complex epistles such as most of those in the New Testament corpus. For more specific hermeneutic help, New Testament scholars have increasingly sought to identify generic structures of argumentation, with the help of the ancient teachers of rhetoric.

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[23]For this reason epistolary theorists treated clever or serious argumentation as inappropriate in letters: see the quotations from Pseudo-Demetrius and Pseudo-Libanius in Jeffrey T. Reed, "Using Ancient Rhetorical Categories to Interpret Paul's Letters: A Question of Genre," *Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference*, eds Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht, JSNT Supplement Series 90 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993) 302.

CHAPTER 3

GENRE SOURCE TWO: ANCIENT RHETORIC

In recent decades, analysis of New Testament texts using categories drawn from ancient rhetorical theory and practice has become increasingly common, to the point where many exegetes feel able to use such terminology without needing to justify and define their methodology. Many exegetes who have adopted this methodology look back to the pioneering work of the classicist George Kennedy and the commentaries of biblical scholar H.D.Betz. These in turn were part of a wider awakening of American academic interest in rhetoric as the art of persuasion and the formal theory of argumentation which drew much of its impetus from the 1971 publication in English of *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.[1] This work argued for the recognition of a "universal rhetoric" based on the foundational work of classical rhetorical theorists but incorporating subsequent developments in the ongoing rhetorical tradition of Western European culture, and taken to incorporate principles of argumentation that are integral to human rationality across all cultures. This "New Rhetoric" has its proponents among New Testament scholars,[2] and I shall draw on some of its theoretical insights later. However, its contentious claim to universality has not won wide support, and most proponents of the application of rhetorical criticism to New Testament exegesis prefer to

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[1] C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1971). For a survey of the rise and influence of American rhetorical studies see Thomas H. Olbricht, "The Flowering of Rhetorical Criticism in America," *The Rhetorical Analysis of Scripture: Essays from the 1995 London Conference*, eds Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht, JSNT Supplement Series 146 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997) 79-102.

[2]See, in particular, Folker Siegert, *Argumentation bei Paulus; gezeigt an Röm 9-11*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neun Testament, 34 (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1985); and three essays in the JSNT Supplement Series : Jeffrey A. Crafton, "The Dancing of an Attitude: Burkean Rhetorical Criticism and the Biblical Interpreter," *Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference*, eds Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht, JSNT Supplement Series 90 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993) 429-42; Lambert D. Jacobs, "Establishing a New Value System in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 5-6 as Persuasive Argument," *The Rhetorical Analysis of Scripture: Essays from the 1995 London Conference*, eds Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht, JSNT Supplement Series 146 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997) 376-87; Thomas H. Olbricht, "Classical Rhetorical Criticism and Historical Reconstructions: A Critique," *The Rhetorical Interpretation of Scripture: Essays from the 1996 Malibu Conference*, eds Stanley E. Porter and Dennis L. Stamps, JSNT Supplement Series 180 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999) 108-24.

keep their focus on the theory and practice of rhetoric found in ancient Greece and Rome on the grounds that this is more consistent with a historical-critical approach to exegesis. As a matter of genre criticism, this amounts to a principle of giving priority to diachronic over synchronic identification of genres, an approach with which I concur in this present study.

George Kennedy's *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism*[3] lent the authority of a specialist in ancient rhetoric to the proposition that rhetorical genres were so pervasive in the first-century Hellenistic world that their influence on New Testament writers should be a methodological presupposition. The fundamental premise undergirding rhetorical criticism of the New Testament is a belief that Hellenistic culture in the first century was thoroughly permeated with the theory and practice of classical rhetoric, as a result of the dominance of rhetorical tuition in the common education system for several centuries.[4] Even if New Testament writers were to some extent antipathetic to the values and social hegemony of this cultural force, its pervasive influence among their Gentile audiences, and indeed its widespread acceptablility within contemporary Judaism, meant that they were forced to adapt it to their purposes (assuming they had some degree of choice about its influence upon themselves) in order to communicate effectively.[5] The question remains, however, of the extent to which revolutionary forces within the early Christian movement might have set themselves against this feature of the dominant culture, as they did against others, and nowhere more so than in the mission of the apostle Paul.

3.1 Pauline Theology Against Rhetoric?

The idea that first-century Christians in general, and Paul in particular, would have found the use of Greco-Roman rhetoric congenial has met with a good deal of suspicion, particularly in the light of Paul's strongly counter- cultural stance in the early chapters of 1 Corinthians. An early attempt to counter such resistance was made in 1986 by a leading proponent of rhetorical criticism, Hans Dieter Betz.[6] Betz addressed "...the peculiar fact

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[3] George A. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1984).

[4]Studies investigating the influence of rhetorical theory and practice within Greco-Roman culture include: H.I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, trans. George Lamb (London: Sheed and Ward, 1956); Donald Lemem Clark, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education* (New York: Columbia UP, 1957); George A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1963); G.W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (London: Oxford UP, 1969); and Robert W. Smith, *The Art of Rhetoric in Alexandria: Its Theory and Practice in the Ancient World* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).

[5] Burton L. Mack, *Rhetoric and the New Testament*, Guides to Biblical Scholarship (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990) 30-31.

[6] Hans Dieter Betz, "The Problem of Rhetoric and Theology according to the Apostle Paul," *L'Apôtre Paul: Personnalité, style et conception du ministère*, Ed. A. Vanhoye, BETL 73 (1986) 16-48.

that in several of his letters Paul appears to be bothered by rhetoric, as if rhetoric or certain kinds of rhetoric pose a fundamental threat to his proclamation and theology."[7] This appearance is only substantial in the Corinthian correspondence, according to Betz, where it is related to the distinctive way in which

> ...the Corinthians did not simply accept the gospel Paul gave them, but went ahead and interpreted that gospel in terms of their hellenistic religiosity.... Searching for wisdom, as Greeks are expected to do (1 Cor.1:22), the Corinthian Christians focused their attention on things like prophetic inspiration and ecstasy, and experiences such as Paul describes in 1 Cor 12- 14 became the standards for the Christian life. The relationships between Christians and non- Christians became regulated (or unregulated) in conformity with the ideas of hellenistic religious enlightenment in a thoroughly polytheistic environment (1 Cor. 8:1 - 11:1).[8]

Betz sees Paul's approach to this problem as affirming the high value which the Corinthians' place on "speech and knowledge", a pairing of attributes that Paul must have known were prominent in the great rhetorical tradition from Isocrates to Cicero.[9] For Paul, the problem lies in *false* claims to possess these attributes, and in looking in the wrong direction for their source and validation. His affirmation, ϕτι εν παντὶ επλουτίσθητε εν αυτῳ, εν παντὶ λόγῳ καὶ πάσῃ γνῶσει (1 Cor.1:5), is a thanksgiving to God for gifts given to them *in Christ* by means of his own proclamation of the gospel. As we have already noted, the opening thanksgiving to this letter withholds all praise for the Corinthians' response to God's generosity; as Betz puts it, "First of all, a term for praxis, which we should expect in the *exordium*, is conspicuously absent."[10] From this and other evidence, he concludes,

> In other words, the deficit Paul states with regard to the Corinthians (see 1:7) concerns their maturity (see 3:1 ff.) in the practical conduct of their church life, not "eloquence and knowledge". There should be a synthesis of eloquence, knowledge and practice, however, if any claim to perfection such as the Corinthians evidently make (cf. 2:6; 3:1,18; 4:8) is to be sustained. Paul's letter with its advice on the practical matters in the church is designed to bring the Corinthians' praxis (ἔργον) up to the same standards as their "eloquence and knowledge"[11]

Those standards, however, are not simply those mandated by their surrounding culture and its rhetorical norms, but are rooted in the divine origin of their spiritual giftedness. Their rhetoric itself must be redefined, as must their concepts of λόγος and σόφια, so that the former becomes identified with ο λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ (1:18), which is the κῆρυγμα (1:21) expressing the true wisdom of God.[12] Betz's reason for this conclusion is that Paul divides the hearers of the kerygma into the lost (οι απολλύμενοι)

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[7] Betz, "Rhetoric and Theology," 21.

[8] Betz, "Rhetoric and Theology," 24 - 25.

[9] Betz, "Rhetoric and Theology," 28 - 32.

[10] Betz, "Rhetoric and Theology," 33.

[11] Betz, "Rhetoric and Theology," 33.

[12] Betz, "Rhetoric and Theology," 34 - 35.

and the saved (οι σωζόμενοι), and that only for the saved is the kerygma received as wisdom: indeed for them it is "the power of God" (δύναμις θεοῦ) rather than merely the spoken expression of human wisdom, while for the lost it is the opposite of wisdom (σοφία), namely foolishness (μωρία, 1:18). The outcome of Paul's use of these key terms in the first chapter, says Betz, is a dualistic rhetorical theory developed in 2:1- 12:

> The difference is indicated by the introduction of technical terms of rhetoric, when Paul says that his "speech", that is, his kerygma, did not occur "in [or: by] persuasive words of wisdom" (εν πειθοῖ[σ] σοφίας [λόγοις]) but "in [or: by] a demonstration of spirit and power" (εν αποδείξει πνεύματος και δυνάματος καὶ δυνάμεως, 2:4). In other words, rhetoric itself is split up into two different kinds: the rhetoric of persuasion and the rhetoric of demonstration of spirit and power. Notably, these distinctions can also be traced to the debates by philosophers and rhetoricians about rhetorical theory.[13]

That ancient debate was over whether rhetoric was a mere craft (τέχνη) of persuasion indifferent to truth and morality, or whether it could draw on deeper resources of reason claimed by philosophy. But while Paul would side with the philosophers here, he would not consider them adequate to the task of comprehending and expressing the gospel, as the kerygma proclaims the mystery of God (τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θεοῦ, 2:1), and therefore the speech expressing it must be revelatory rather than simply persuasive.[14]

Betz offers a specific Hellenistic cultural parallel for this model of revelatory rhetoric, in the ancient mystery religions, which placed highest value on the persuasive power inherent in inspired symbolism.

> As the very term "kerygma" indicates, its rhetoric is of a kind akin to that of the mystery religions. In fact, the cult formula "Christ crucified" (Χριστὸς εσταυρωμένος, 1:23; cf.2:2) is a word- picture and a symbol which, as Paul points out in Gal. 3:1, is to be painted before the eyes of the hearers. It makes its impact not by persuasion but by the peculiar forces expanded [sic.] by symbols.[15]

It seems to me that Betz's analysis of Paul's opening argument in this epistle is essentially correct in its exposition of his ideological (that is, theological) critique of popular rhetorically-moulded cultural norms using terms drawn from the discourse of that rhetorical tradition. Other scholars, not so happy to associate Paul with the mystery religions, have sought to characterise Paul's distinctive grounds of argumentation in terms more congenial to Jewish and Jewish Christian cultural sensibilities. Duane Litfin in his analysis of the same chapters in 1 Corinthians in the light of the rhetorical tradition argued that Paul sought to displace the model of preacher-as-*orator*, whose task is to persuade the audience by any acceptable means, with that of preacher-as-*herald*, whose responsibility was to deliver a message rather than to argue a case.[16]

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[13] Betz, "Rhetoric and Theology," 36.

[14] Betz, "Rhetoric and Theology," 37.

[15] Betz, "Rhetoric and Theology," 37 - 38.

[16]Duane Litfin, *St Paul's Theology of Proclamation: 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Greco-Roman Rhetoric*, Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994) 248.

Given that Betz and Litfin agree that Paul wanted to distance himself from the role of orator-as-persuader, it might seem strange that both find so much significance in classical rhetoric as a key to understanding his writings. For Litfin, rhetoric functions mainly as that which Paul had to combat in 1 Corinthians, defining the significance for much of his terminology, but nevertheless he is forced to admit that Paul frequently slips into a persuasive rather than proclaiming mode in his writings. The best explanation for this fact is probably to be found in Litfin's insistence that we cannot assume a direct connection between Paul's preaching and writing styles.[17] Nevertheless he offers three alternative explanations for those who maintain that we can assume this, usually on the grounds that the letters are "recorded speech". Those alternatives are that Paul was being artfully deceptive in his disavowal of persuasion, that his theory of communication was simply inconsistent with his practice, and (Litfin's preferred option) that he entered only partially into the process of persuasion.[18]

Betz, unlike Litfin, had a major interest in affirming the value of rhetorical genres for the analysis of Paul's writings: before writing this essay, he had published two commentaries widely acclaimed as exemplars of rhetorical exegesis.[19] He might be supposed to have avoided this inherent conflict of interests with his opening assertions that his essay is about "the problem of the relationship between rhetoric and theology as Paul sees it", and not about "the problem of the kind of rhetoric Paul uses in his letters .... a problem completely unresolved, and even undiscussed, as yet."[20] However, this distinction is placed under some strain by the conclusion he reaches, that Paul puts forward "the rhetoric of demonstration of spirit and power" to replace "the rhetoric of persuasion": we are left wondering how Betz can find the theory and practice of ancient rhetoric such an informative guide to the writings of a man who so thoroughly rejected it as a means of communicating his gospel. Three considerations might help.

Firstly, Betz was analyzing this as a situational argument with particular reference to the church in Corinth, as we noted above. Nevertheless, Paul's devaluing of rhetoric is put forward as a universal principle: it is difficult to read its vehement rejection in 1 Corinthians 1-4 as something that applied only to the immediate situation where it was being misused, while he was completely at ease with using it elsewhere.

A second approach would be to distinguish sharply between Paul's approaches to proclaiming the gospel and writing letters, so that whether or not he and his audience were conscious of his use of persuasive techniques in his written communication, and even

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[17] Litfin, *Theology of Proclamation*, 256 - 58.

[18] Litfin, *Theology of Proclamation*, 259 - 62.

[19] Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia*, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979); and *Hans Dieter Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9: A Commentary on Two Administrative Letters of the Apostle Paul*, Ed. George W.MacRae, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985).

[20] Betz, "Rhetoric and Theology," 16.

other more direct contexts, his whole point in these chapters is, ironically, to *persuade* the Corinthian believers that their faith had been induced by proclamation rather than persuasion. That seems much more likely to be the case.

Further help could come from clarifying Betz's use of the term "rhetoric" itself: sometimes he uses it to mean "the theory and practice of oratory/preaching" and sometimes "the theory and practice of persuasion". Only the former use prevents "the rhetoric of persuasion" from being a pleonasm, but the classical tradition universally favours the latter. Betz would have done better to have reserved "rhetoric" for describing Paul's persuasive communication, and to have described what the apostle is doing in 1 Corinthians 1- 4 as distinguishing rhetoric from proclamation, as Litfin has done.

Having thus distinguished the issue of how Paul saw himself as a preacher from how he communicated persuasively in his letters, we must now address the question of how that written communication was influenced by rhetorical genres, and in particular the issue of the extent to which those genres may have supplied formal structures within the epistles. Betz's commentaries have now been joined by a throng of other commentaries, monographs and shorter studies from scholars seeking to carry such research forward. This does not, however, indicate the establishment of a widespread consensus among New Testament scholars that the application of ancient rhetorical categories to New Testament writings is unchallengeable nor acceptance that its practice is governed by clearly established principles. Discussion of that general methodological debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation, so I propose to adopt a working assumption that the jury is still out and that we must examine any putative rhetorical analysis on its merits, according minimal credence to any claims of established consensus regarding its principles or results. An overview of the ongoing status of this debate among New Testament scholars can be gained from papers presented to three conferences on rhetorical critism published by Sheffield Academic Press,[21] and in a manual on the discipline assembled by the same chief editor, Stanley Porter.[22] While these publications present a range of views expressed by practioners of rhetorical analysis, many of the essays contributed constitute a sustained critique of this methodology by scholars who do not share its central tenets, so we should be careful to consider the claims presented by advocates of rhetorical analysis themselves rather than as represented by their critics. A substantial challenge to Betz's flagship commentary has been mounted by Philip Kern in a recently published dissertation

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[21]*Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference*, eds. S.E.Porter & T.H.Olbricht, JSNT Supplement Series 90, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993; *The Rhetorical Analysis of Scripture: Essays from the 1995 London Conference*, eds. S.E.Porter & T.H.Olbricht, JSNT Supplement Series 146, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997; and *The Rhetorical Interpretation of Scripture: Essays from the 1996 Malibu Conference*, eds. S.E.Porter & D.L.Stamps, JSNT Supplement Series 180, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 222-248, 1999.

[22]*Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C. - A.D. 400*, ed. S.E.Porter, Leiden: Brill, 1997.

examining ancient rhetoric in general and its applicability to Galatians in particular.[23] Kern's discussion of rhetorical species in his fifth chapter is particularly apt and confirms some of my own approach below. Another extensive critique mounted on more sympathetic terms by a scholar committed to the enterprise has been presented by Dean Anderson, whose work I will also draw on in my subsequent discussion.[24]

3.2 Formal Rhetorical Structures

Ancient rhetorical theorists distinguished three species of rhetoric corresponding to the three most typical public settings in which their students might be required to compose and deliver speeches: the juridicial speech for occasions of trial before a judge or jury, the deliberative speech delivered in the context of a political assembly, and the epideictic speech composed for memorials or public celebrations. As these three prototypical contexts demanded characteristic approaches and emphases, the rhetorical schools arranged their instruction in speechmaking, and their theorizing about the craft, under these headings. Whether the actual practice of speech- making outside that structured curriculum distinguished the three categories enough for them to constitute universal genres is a moot point. It is also open to dispute whether they covered the whole field of rhetorical practice between them. Nevertheless, biblical scholars adopting these categories as a foundation for their analyses feel enough confidence in their universality to use them as the fundamental rhetorical genres dominating the argumentative structure of New Testament texts.

The question before us is whether each of these genres had its own distinctive formal structure. They certainly had some formal elements in common. Burton Mack proposes the existence of a "standard form" for all rhetorical speeches.

> The standard form for the rhetorical speech consisted of (1) an introduction (*prooimion, exordium*), (2) a statement of the case (*diegesis, narratio*), (3) the supporting arguments (*pistis, confirmatio*), and (4) a conclusion (*epilogos, conclusio*). The introduction acknowledged the situation, addressed the audience, and established the ethos of the speaker. The statement of the case rehearsed the circumstances, clarified the issue (*stasis*), and established the proposition with a reason (*aitia, ratio*) or by appeal to one of the final topics. The argumentation arranged the evidence and supplied examples construed according to customary strategies from the topics. In a judicial speech the argument could also anticipate the proofs of one's opponent and refute them. The conclusion summarized the argument and pressed for its acceptance. It might include impassioned style, exhortation, spelling out the consequences of a decision, or advice.[25]

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[23] Philip H. Kern, *Rhetoric and Galatians: Assessing an Approach to Paul's Epistle*, Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series 101 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998).

[24] R. Dean Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*, Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology 18 (Leuven: Peeters, 1999); along with his useful glossary, *R. Dean Jr. Anderson, Glossary of Greek Rhetorical Terms Connected to Methods of Argumentation, Figure and Tropes from Anaximenes to Quintilian*, Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology 24 (Leuven: Peeters, 2000).

[25] Mack, *Rhetoric*, 41.

Beyond those common formal, elements further argumentative devices characteristic of different species might be distinguished.[26] The whole point of Mack's description of these typical schemas is the expectation he shares with other proponents of rhetorical criticism that such formal structures are followed to some extent in the New Testament writings. That expectation has given rise to a great number of studies and commentaries during the last decade, setting much of the research programme for the literary analysis of the whole corpus. Within the field of research into 1 Corinthians, several major studies have now appeared claiming to define the genre, structure and style of the epistle as a whole or in particular parts in terms of formal rhetorical categories. [27] Among these are studies on the discourse on ειδωλόθυτα, Chapters 8 -10.[28] It is clear that if we accept the premises upon which this body of work is founded, these studies offer a definitive resource for determining the generic constraints guiding Paul's argumentation in this discourse. The most fruitful means of examining those premises is probably to pay close attention to the study that has proved foundational for most of the others, that published by Margaret Mitchell in 1991.

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[26]See Mack, *Rhetoric*, 42-48.

[27]Notably, Wilhelm Wuellner, "Paul as Pastor: The function of Rhetorical Questions in First Corinthians," *L'Apôtre Paul: Personnalité, style et conception du ministère*, Ed. A.Vanhoye, BETL 73 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1986) 49-77; J. Smit, "The Genre of 1 Corinthians 13 in the Light of Classical Rhetoric," *Novum Testamentum* 33.3 (July 1991): 193-216; Litfin, *Theology of Proclamation*; Margaret M. Mitchell, "Rhetorical Shorthand in Pauline Argumentation: The Functions of 'The Gospel' in the Corinthian Correspondence," *Gospel in Paul: Studies in Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for Richard L. Longenecker.*, eds L.Ann Jervis and Peter Richardson, JSNT Supplement Series 108 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994) 63-88; Ben III Witherington, *Conflict and Community in Corinth: a Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995); Rollin A. Ramsaran, "More Than an Opinion: Paul's Rhetorical Maxim in First Corinthians 7:25-26," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 57.3 (July 1995): 531-41; Rollin A. Ramsaran, *Liberating Words: Paul's Use of Rhetorical Maxims in 1 Corinthians 1-10.* (Valley Forge: Trinity Press International, 1996); John R. Lanci, *A New Temple for Corinth: Rhetorical and Archeological Approaches to Pauline Imagery*, Studies in Biblical Literature (New York: Peter Lang, 1997); Frank W. Hughes, "Rhetorical Criticism and the Corinthian Correspondence," *The Rhetorical Analysis of Scripture: Essays from the 1995 London Conference*, eds Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht, JSNT Supplement Series 146 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997) 336-50; Anders Eriksson, *Traditions as Rhetorical Proof: Pauline Argumentation in 1 Corinthians*, Coniectanea Biblica New Testament Series 29 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1998); Anders Eriksson, "Special Topics in 1 Corinthians 8-10," *The Rhetorical Interpretation of Scripture: Essays from the 1996 Malibu Conference*, eds Stanley E. Porter and Dennis L. Stamps, JSNT Supplement Series 180 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999) 272-301; and Raymond F. Collins, *First Corinthians*, Sacra Pagina 7 (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1999).

[28] Khiok-Khng Yeo, *Rhetorical Interaction in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10: A Formal Analysis with Preliminary Suggestions for a Chinese, Cross-Cultural Hermeneutic* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1995); Bong-Mo Song, *The Pauline Concept of "Weakness" in 1 Corinthians and Its usage within the Context of Paul's Resolution of the Opposition Between the Strong and the Weak in 1 Cor 8:7-13*, PhD. dissertation (1997), Microform, UMI 9735180; J. Smit, "The Rhetorical Disposition of First Corinthians 8:7 - 9:27," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 59.3 (July 1997): 476-91; J. Smit, "'Do Not Be Idolaters': Paul's Rhetoric in First Corinthians 10:1-22," *Novum Testamentum* 39.1 (Jan 1997): 40-53;

3.3 Rhetorical Structures in 1 Corinthians? Mitchell's Analysis

Margaret Mitchell's *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation* (1991), the published form of a PhD dissertation researched under Betz's supervision, has become established as a landmark rhetorical analysis of 1 Corinthians. It contains a very clear statement of her goals in its opening paragraph.

> The subject of this inquiry is the overall genre, function and composition of Paul's first letter to the Corinthians. The thesis which will be propounded, on the basis of an exegetical investigation including a rhetorical analysis of the text, is that 1 Corinthians is a single letter of unitary composition which contains a deliberative argument persuading the Christian community at Corinth to become reunified. 1 Corinthians is throughout an argument for ecclesial unity, as centered in the πρόθεσις, or thesis statement of the argument, in 1:10: "I urge you, brothers and sisters, through the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, to all say the same thing, and to let there not be factions among you, but to be reconciled in the same mind and in the same opinion." Factionalism, an inherently political problem which is often, as here, intertwined with religious issues and motivations, is combated by Paul throughout 1 Corinthians by employing appropriate political terms and *topoi* about factionalism and the appropriate rhetorical genre for urging its cessation, deliberative rhetoric.[29]

If her monograph has achieved its goal, Mitchell's work will have determined the broad outline of the context I am seeking in my own inquiry. That is, 1 Corinthians 8:6 will take its place within an argument regarding idol-foods which is itself one sub-topic within an overall argument concerning unification of the Christian community in Corinth. Its significance for that argument must then be determined within the constraints set by the ancient genre of deliberative rhetoric in general and the specific contribution it is able to make to the topic of factionalism in particular. Given those constraints, and apparently unaware of anything inherently problematic in the verse *per se*, Mitchell in fact has no problem in determining its function: "The hymnic fragment in 8:6 stresses Corinthian unity in *one* God and *one* Lord, in common opposition to idolators ("outsiders")."[30]

I wish to argue later that this verse stresses something else entirely. As Mitchell's reading of it follows quite naturally from her major claim about the genre and focus of the whole epistle, and as that claim seems have become accepted as a scholarly commonplace

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[29] Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1991) 1.

[30] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 126. Her other references to this verse consistently affirm that its (sole) function in Paul's argument is to express the theological basis for ecclesial unity. cf. 90, 179 n.701, 194, 212 n.135, 241, 252, 254, 262, 267, 268, and 289 n.581.

in the decade since its publication, it is necessary for me now to examine her argument at some length in order to clear the way for my own case.[31]

Her enterprise is an ambitious one, seeking to establish that the epistle has a single dominant theme (Christian unity) which can be used as the presumptive key for interpreting all of its parts. It involves a line of argument which seems to me to depend on three crucial but contentious propositions:

1. The letter body is structured by the presence of one ancient rhetorical genre, deliberative argument, and no other.
2. A given rhetorical genre allows for a finite choice of topics, one of which, the appeal for unity within a body politic, is clearly identifiable throughout this epistle.
3. The argumentative function of any component part of the epistle is equivalent to the contribution it makes to an argument about Christian unity in Corinth.

3.3.1 A Single Genre?

Mitchell's whole case for the unitary composition of the letter rests on the claimed presence of a single rhetorical genre controlling the letter body, and distinguished from the letter- genre as such which is identified by epistolary forms identifiable in the letter opening and closing.[32] Differentiating her own approach from that Stowers and Aune, who identify different rhetorical genres within the letter-body, Mitchell writes, "Here, too, the shape of the argumentative whole is not sufficiently considered so that parts of the letter are assigned different genres".[33] She then goes on extend the same criticism to George Kennedy:

> Kennedy, although seeing 1 Cor as "largely deliberative", considers it to contain "some judicial passages," such as 1:13- 17 and ch.9 (*New Testament Interpretation,* 87), but again, individual passages within a larger work do not have their own *discrete* genre. They must be seen in relation to the rhetorical whole.[34]

What she means by "the rhetorical whole" is made apparent elsewhere:-

> The rhetorical unit to be examined should be a compositional unit, which can be further substantiated by successful rhetorical analysis. A preliminary definition of the limits of the

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[31]A measure of the hegemony achieved by Mitchell's argument can be taken from the respect accorded to her monograph and the adoption of its central position in subsequent commentaries such as Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 75 - 77; Richard B. Hays, *First Corinthians*, Interpretation: A Biblical Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997) 9, 21;and Collins, *First Corinthians*, 17 - 20, 69. This trend has been halted in Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000) 111 - 20, which seeks to subsume rhetorical analysis within a preferred linguistic Speech Act theory. The only major critique of Mitchell's case from within the canons of rhetorical criticism that I know of is in Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*, 254 - 65. I shall use to Anderson's critique to supplement my own below.

[32] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 22 n.5.

[33]Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 13 n.44.

[34] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 13 n.44.

> literary unit is of course a first step in form criticism, and indeed all literary criticism. In the case of 1 Corinthians, rhetorical analyses which render conclusions about the argumentative structure and rhetorical genre of selected portions of the extant letter are inadequate to the extent that they do not demonstrate why that portion is to be regarded as an independent literary unit with its own genre and structure. The rhetorical genre and function of each part is determined by the compositional whole and cannot be correctly determined apart from it.... The present study, in demonstrating that 1 Corinthians as it presently stands is a cohesive deliberative argument, defends the compositional integrity of the letter.[35]

This methodology is circular in its logic. Mitchell proposes to use a rhetorical analysis of the letter's argumentation to support its compositional integrity. However, she rules out, *a priori*, any competing rhetorical analyses that do not first demonstrate (on non-rhetorical grounds) the compositional integrity of the rhetorical units they identify, unless the unit concerned is the letter as a whole. Nowhere does Mitchell feel obliged to demonstrate the compositional integrity of the epistle, because it can be taken for granted until proved otherwise. That is, if you want to identify rhetorical sub-genres within the epistle, you must first establish separate literary units on non-rhetorical grounds: she maintains that it is invalid to identify rhetorical units unless you have independent evidence to suggest these are also compositional units. But if you follow Mitchell's procedure and amass evidence for a rhetorical shape to the letter body as a whole, this supports its integrity as a compositional unit!

Her argument at this point rests on a prior assertion that no ancient writer could possibly compose a letter incorporating more than one rhetorical genre. It is difficult to know on what basis Mitchell supports this rather novel literary theory. Although she does refer in footnotes to some ancient literary theorists in relating style to subject matter and genre,[36] she provides no discussion of her theory of a single genre in relation to that ancient material, nor in relation to modern genre theory. The unsupported supposition that ancient literary theorists would have supported her position is rendered rather implausible by her opposition on this point to Kennedy, an eminent authority on ancient rhetoric.[37] However, we can go further to assert that the single genre principle upon which she relies had earlier been decisively refuted in a major study by Francis Cairns, in which he not

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[35] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 15 - 17. That this passage is spread over three pages indicates how much of Mitchell's discussion at this point takes place in footnotes, one of which adds the comment, "By the 'compositional whole' I mean the original text as it was created." (16 n.53)

[36] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 13 n.46.

[37]We might note how categorical Kennedy is in his analysis at the point Mitchell cites above: "Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians is largely deliberative, though it contains some judicial passages, for example 1:13-17 claiming that he had not created friction in Corinth and chapter 9 defending his rights as an apostle. Second Corinthians, on the other hand, is largely judicial except for chapters 8 and 9, which are deliberative." Kennedy, *NT Interpretation*, 87. Signficantly, Kennedy is a classicist and literary critic, displaying a use rhetorical categories that is uneffected by form criticism.

only established that ancient poems commonly contained more than one distinct genre but also described the process of "inclusion" by which this took place.[38]

A further fundamental flaw in Mitchell's approach to ancient genres should be pointed out. While her discourse on methodology in Ch.1 makes much of her diachronic and therefore historical/critical approach to rhetoric,[39] her actual treatment of the subject seems to have no diachronic dimension: while the ancient rhetorical handbooks, speeches and letters she refers to are drawn from a time span of at least half a millenium, and include a transition from Greek to Roman cultures, she does not address the issue of possible changes in theory or practice during this period. We may contrast this with Mack who, as we have seen, postulates the development of a standard speech form out of the judicial and deliberative genres described by Aristotle.[40] Given the ambitious nature of Mitchell's project, these deficiencies in her handling of genre theory, which is central to her case, must be seen as seriously compromising the validity of her first central proposition.

Jeffrey Reed's short study examining the relation between epistolary and rhetorical genres arrives at a conclusion which we may adopt as a counterstatement to Mitchell's proposition concerning single genres:

> The greatest danger when categorizing Paul's writings is the propensity to describe a single typology to an entire letter. Just as the author of Επιστολομαίοι Χαρακτήρες speaks of a "mixed" (μικτή) type of letter, Paul also enmeshed various forms of epistolary and rhetorical traditions into his letters. To describe, not prescribe (according to ancient rhetorical theory), Paul's argumentative strategy seems to be the safest methodological approach when classifying his letters. One must be wary of doing in genre studies of Paul's letters what James Barr rightly accused scholars of doing in lexical studies of the Bible, viz. "illegitimate totality transfer". Just as we should not transfer all the various meanings of a word onto its use in a particular context, so also a complete system of rhetoric should not be imposed *tout de suite* upon our understanding of Paul's distinctive use of the epistolary genre.[41]

3.3.2 Is 1 Corinthians Deliberative Throughout?

Mitchell spends her second chapter establishing some key features of the deliberative genre. After giving an extensive bibliography of ancient rhetorical and *epistolary* sources, she outlines her purpose in the chapter:

> On the basis of these resources, this investigation will demonstrate that deliberative argumentation was characterized by four things: 1) a focus on future time as the subject of deliberation; 2) employment of a determined set of appeals or ends, the most distinctive of

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[38] Francis Cairns, *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1972) 158 - 76.

[39] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 6 - 8.

[40] Mack, *Rhetoric*, 41.

[41] Jeffrey T. Reed, "Using Ancient Rhetorical Categories to Interpret Paul's Letters: A Question of Genre," *Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference*, eds Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht, JSNT Supplement Series 90 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993) 314.

> which is the advantageous (τὸ συμφέρον); 3) proof by example (παράδειγμα); and 4) appropriate subjects for deliberation, of which factionalism and concord are especially common. Because each of these four elements of deliberative rhetoric is found in 1 Corinthians, this is a clear indication that 1 Corinthians employs that rhetorical species in its argumentation.[42]

The first of these points is dealt with only briefly in Mitchell's treatment; the generic focus on future time is established only by quotations from Aristotle and Quintillian, and the "overwhelming future emphasis" of 1 Corinthians is asserted rather than demonstrated. Nor is there any attempt to compare the variation in past/present/future focus across actual examples of ancient speeches and letters in each of the three rhetorical genres. Aristotle's dictum as to appropriateness is taken as indicative of actual practice.

The appeal to τὸ συμφέρον has a more important place in Mitchell's case. She takes up Aristotle's dictum that the appeal to advantage is the most important argument in deliberative rhetoric, with a qualification drawn from other ancient theorists that this does not necessarily mean one's own advantage (i.e., the audience's), but may often be the advantage of another or of the group. This is then supported with evidence that a considerable number of speeches and letters which she identifies as deliberative contain this as a central motif. We may accept the proposition that an appeal to advantage in one form or another is a common characteristic of ancient deliberative rhetoric, although we are given no argument concerning its non-occurence or scarcity in the judicial and epideictic genres and thus should not accept the implication that the presence of such appeals indicates the presence of the deliberative genre. Applying this element to 1 Corinthians, Mitchell makes much of the five occurrences of τὸ σψμφέρον or its cognates in the epistle. She fails to comment on why there are *only* five such occurrences, if this is such a central term, and why their distribution (6:12; 7:35; 10:23; 10:33; and 12:7) is so uneven and does not include the opening section (1:10-4:21) in which the central topic of concord/disunity (as she maintains) is dealt with most explicitly.

Mitchell's argument establishing her third distinguishing element of deliberative rhetoric, the important place given to proof by example, establishes that the combination of proof by example with a call to imitate those examples (which is such an obvious feature of this epistle) is characteristic of deliberative rhetoric, although she acknowledges in an excursis that it can well be argued that paraenesis shares this same characteristic.[43] She dismisses the possibility, argued by others, that 1 Corinthians is paraenesis rather than deliberation on the grounds that the former deals only with generalised moral exhortation while the latter focuses on arguing for particular courses of action. This distinction is important for her case, for she also acknowledges that paraenesis, unlike deliberative rhetoric, does not require "any defined or logical structure".[44] Once again, she does not

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[42] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 23.

[43] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 50-53.

[44] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 53.

examine the place of proof by example in the other rhetorical genres, despite noting that Wuellner took it to be an indicator of epideictic rhetoric in 1 Corinthians. We must conclude that Mitchell has not established that this prominent feature of the epistle must be taken as evidence for her proposition that the letter- body as a whole is a deliberative speech.

The fourth argument offered in her second chapter seeks to establish that there is a finite set of approved subjects for deliberative argument in the ancient rhetorical tradition, of which "factionalism and concord" is one of the most common in the literary record. It is not difficult to establish the ubiquity of this topic, but once again Mitchell does not address the question of whether it had any place in other genres besides deliberation, an omission which further weakens her case.[45]

3.3.3 An Appeal for Concord Throughout?

However, the crucial stage of Mitchell's argument, for my present purposes, is her identification of factionalism and concord as the dominant theme of 1 Corinthians, an exercise to which she devotes the whole of her third chapter. She wants to establish that this topic is the underlying subject in each section of the epistle, rather than only the first as others have maintained (her motivation being that that each rhetorical genre allows for only one topic per speech: she aims to prove that the epistle has the form of a single speech and is thus a unitary composition). Her third chapter, then, is an attempt to argue that what other scholars may have identified as separate topics should rather be read as proofs of the general proposition argued in the first:

> ....that the content of 1 Corinthians is a series of arguments ultimately based on the subject of factionalism and concord, political entities appropriately treated by deliberative rhetoric. This is of course not to deny that many other actual subjects are treated in the various sub-sections of the argument (idol meats, spiritual gifts, the resurrection, etc.). What I shall show is how Paul's treatment of each of these subjects is rooted *by him* in the overriding concern for concord.[46]

It seems important to highlight the radical nature of Mitchell's proposal here. In order to establish the unity of the epistle as a single speech, whose form and content are defined by the genre of deliberative rhetoric, she is willing to argue that in the situational

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[45] In fact in a footnote discussing the question of which texts should be classified as deliberative arguments on the topic of concord she displays the largely subjective nature of the judgements involved: having characterised Welborn's work in which he cites twenty such texts as "an important contribution", she then remarks: "While this list accords with many of the works I consider to be examples of deliberative arguments on the subject of concord, some of these texts do not fit the description." Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 63, n.207 She then proceeds to reject four of Welborn's examples outright, casting doubt on one further (strangely, classifying it as *both* deliberative and an απολογία) and suggesting two better examples closely related to those examined. Clearly, the correlation between the occurence of this topic as the main theme in a text and the rhetorical genre of the text is not clear enough to render the topic a distinctive marker of the genre.

[46] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 65 including n.1 - emphasis original.

context Paul addresses in Corinth, only one of the subjects he addresses is of "overriding concern", and that his treatment of the others is dominated by that concern. That is to say, the underlying message when he is dealing with these topics is, "Whatever you end up doing about incest, lawsuits, marriage, idol foods, or spiritual gifts, or whatever you come to believe about the resurrection, it is more important that you stick together than that you agree with my position on each of these issues."[47]

To modern ears, Mitchell's proposal to read the whole epistle as an expression of the combined values "unity and compromise" has some inherent attractiveness, and indeed it might appear to be supported by Paul's self-characterisation as becoming "all things to all people" (9:22), but is it really an adequate analysis of Paul's basic stance in this letter? Mitchell's commitment to this proposition leads her into considerable eisegesis, especially in her reading of those sections where correct behaviour seems to occupy the centre of Paul's attention and unity is only peripheral if not completely out of view. This tendency is most obvious in her reading of 10:1-22, Paul's typological application (proof by example) of the Pentateuchal wilderness narrative to present issues of idolatrous worship and sexual immorality. It is obvious that Paul treats these as non-negotiable boundary issues in which the behaviour of individual members establishes the basis for remaining within a holy community, as Mitchell acknowledges: "As with ancient Israel, one clear limit of behaviour can be set: no Christian is an idolator ... all Christians should not tempt the Lord and should not grumble".[48] Nevertheless she is compelled to find a place somewhere for the unity theme, in order to maintain her general thesis:

> All Israel was united at the beginning in *common* baptism, *common* experiences and *common* spiritual food and drink. But despite this auspicious beginning, tragedy befell the community when factions appeared and sought their own advantage over that of all Israel.[49]

In my view, this constitutes a serious misreading of what Paul is doing with his repetition of πάντες in 10:1-4. Rather than setting up a "unity versus self-seeking factionalism" contrast, this quantifier is used to stress the severity and impassibility of divine judgement on aberrant behaviour, resulting in exclusion of transgressors from the community: all community members received the benefits of the initiatory experiences, but not all survived subsequent judgement of their boundary-crossing attitudes and behaviour. They were judged for their unholiness, not their disunity, and there is no suggestion in either Paul's text nor the original scriptural narratives that factionalism and

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[47]In case this appears more than a slight exaggeration of Mitchell's position, her actual words are: "In these sub-arguments Paul arranges his proofs logically and topically, as he takes up the assorted subjects of Corinthian contention one by one, in each case urging the course of unity and compromise he proposed in 1:10." Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 204. Given that 1:10 contains no term that may be rendered "compromise", it is plain that for Mitchell this is an essential implication of raising concord to a status of "overriding concern".

[48] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 253.

[49] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 252 (emphasis hers).

individual advantage seeking were causative or motivating factors in their behaviour. On the contrary, Paul supplies his own, more Jewish explanation, for their behaviour: they became επιθυμητὰς κακῶν (10:6), "desirers of evil", who found these temptations intrinsically attractive.[50] In similar fashion, Mitchell then goes on to read 10:14-22 as primarily a call for "cultic unity" rather than simply as a prohibition of idol-worship as an intrinsic evil.

I maintain that by reading 1:10 as the opening of a letter body which is of a fundamentally different genre to the letter- opening preceding it, Mitchell has elevated that exhortation to a thematic preeminence within the epistle which distorts her reading of that verse itself as well as of the wider letter. Specifically, I wish to argue that the exhortation to unity within the Corinthian community is meant to be read in the context of the concerns already signalled in the letter opening, and in particular in relation to three major themes, each of which is of more fundamental importance than the theme of concord: God's calling upon them to be his own possesion, a holy people; their connection with, and duty of concord with, the church in every place; and the responsibility they bear for their spiritual gifts. These three might indeed be coalesced into the first, so that the call to unity takes place within a prior call to truly become what they potentially are: God's holy people. The nature of that holy calling, that is of their unity with God, is the preoccupation of the epistle, within which the call to concord always takes its place. This is true even of the first topic, 1:10 - 4:21, which, although it begins with a call for concord, uses the fact of factionalism mainly as evidence of the audience's spiritual immaturity (3:1- 4) and concentrates on clarifying the nature of true wisdom, spirituality and leadership among God's holy people. His logic in these chapters is that if they straighten out their thinking about these matters, then concord will follow.

A second, more theoretical reason for rejecting the hegemony Mitchell accords to the theme of factionalism and concord is that it seems to involve a category mistake. It is one thing to acknowledge that a call for unity is a recurrent theme woven throughout the various subjects treated in the epistle, but quite another to argue that this constitutes the fundamental subject, or even the sole objective towards which Paul strives at such length. Mitchell, for all her investigation of the occurrence of this theme in Greco-Roman writings, overlooks the fact that within that culture it is a "topos" (commonplace) in rhetorical terminology, rather than a "topic" (subject to be treated) as in modern parlance. No one had to argue for concord at any great length (as opposed to short exhortations urging unity), as it was an agreed cultural value. Mitchell herself virtually acknowledges this at one point:

> One of the *universally recognized political values* in Greco-Roman antiquity was that of ομόνοια, which was discussed in a wide variety of literary genres. But arguments which seek to persuade an audience to end their party strife and live in unity in the future are

[50]I shall give a much fuller discussion of this passage later, in Section 2.4.3.

> deliberative. This lofty ideal of ομόνοια was not only applied to city-states, but even to small, less formal political and social units. Paul's letter to the political body (εκκλησια) at Corinth, which urges them to end their factionalism and become reunited, employs the appropriate rhetorical species, deliberative rhetoric, for treating this subject.[51]

Universally recognised political values, if that is indeed what they are in a particular society, are *appealed to rather than argued for*. But deliberation is all about contentious issues, and particularly about alternative courses of action concerning which the audience has genuine differences of opinion. If the issue is, "In the present situation X, should we do A, B or C?", an orator arguing for A and against B and C is engaged in deliberation, but if he argues that the audience should show more unity of mind, he is not deliberating but doing something else: "paraenesis" or "reproof" would be more appropriate generic terms than "deliberation" for such an appeal to a common value. Another way of expressing this is to say it is unlikely that ancient political bodies engaged in serious debate on policy options such as "Should we act in concord with one another or would it be more advantageous for us to be at one another's throats?" Once again, Mitchell herself provides us with a basis for critiquing her own work when she insists on the importance of distinguishing deliberation from paraenesis:

> The two forms are related in some way, but they are not identical ..... The deliberative speeches and letters are not moral exhortation, but rather situation-centered arguments for a person or a group of people to follow a particular course of action (often related to public policy). That is what deliberative rhetoric is.[52]

On this basis, I maintain that Mitchell has seriously misinterpreted the function of Paul's appeal for unity in 1 Corinthians. When he introduces his letter body in 1:10 with an appeal for concord and an end to factionalism, this could not possibly have been heard by his audience as the announcement of a contentious course of action for which he intended to argue at length, implying that some of them would explicitly maintain the superiority of some alternate policy. Rather, he would be understood to be beginning the substance of his discourse by appealing to common ground, or rather by confronting them with the fact that they were not living up to a commonly held value. Given all that Mitchell has correctly written about the place of concord as an established political value, this probably represented relatively safe ground from which Paul could begin his first topic. Everyone would agree that they should be united: it is the *fact* of their disunity, based on the reports he has received, that he uses to confront them, arguing from that evidential ground to the more contentious conclusion that they are not as spiritual, nor as secure in their status before God, as they suppose. That conclusion, in turn, does provide a foundation for his subsequent arguments on other topics, and in that sense the opening topic encompasses those which follow it. But this is far from saying that 1:10 has an

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[51] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 63 - 64 (emphasis added).

[52] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 52.

equivalent rhetorical status as πρόθεσις, either for the immediate topic or for the whole epistle.

3.4 Conclusions: Rhetorical Genres and 1 Corinthians

What place should be given, then, to considerations of genre based on ancient rhetorical theory and practice in the exegesis of 1 Corinthians? The lengthy consideration I have just given to Margaret Mitchell's work arises from the fact that I share some of her fundamental methodological convictions: that the theory and practice of Greco-Roman rhetoric provided one pervasive source of genres influencing the oral and written discourse of Paul's world; that the identification of such genres is an historical undertaking based on the examination of ancient sources of theory and practice, taking precedence over synchronic rhetorical and linguistic studies; and that analysis of argumentative structures can expose the underlying unity in what might otherwise seem to be fragmented or illogical discourse. I have argued against the major conclusions she has drawn concerning this epistle: that it has the overall genre and form of a deliberative speech; that it constitutes a deliberative argument for concord over against factionalism; and that the rhetorical function of each component within the epistle is to support that one argument. In place of those conclusions, I would like to proffer several rhetorical propositions which I hope to confirm in the course of subsequent argument and exegesis.

3.4.1 Genres and Forms

Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish between (i) classifying a discourse as *deliberative in type* and (ii) identifying its *form* as that of *a deliberative speech*. Each of these is an important aspect of literary genre, but they do not always coincide. The former, which modern linguists might call "discourse type", was a mode of analysis used by rhetorical theorists based on the rhetorical situation and the manner in which a speaker addressed his audience: to the extent that he was advising or persuading them about future options for action, then his discourse should be classified as deliberative, regardless of the form it took. A deliberative *speech*, on the other hand, was a generic entity which must exhibit certain minimal formal requirements if it was to be recognized as such: in particular, the speaker was required to explicitly state the course of action he wished to recommend before proceeding to argue in its favour and against alternatives. It is that requirement that has led Mitchell to identify 1:10 as πρόθεσις for the epistle: what better candidate exists? Likewise this requirement stands in the way of anyone wishing to argue that the epistle contains more than one deliberative speech: what other section begins in similar manner? But by discarding the notion of epistle-as-a-speech, deliberative or otherwise, we leave ourselves freer to characterise it as predominantly deliberative in *type*, if we wish, and as Mitchell's arguments in her third chapter could support. A further

consequence follows, in the light of my earlier rejection of Mitchell's single-genre dictum. By taking our focus away from formal aspects of rhetorical genres we are better able to identify the presence of multiple genres, rhetorical and otherwise, within ancient epistles such as Paul's, and to appreciate the complex ways in which they interact. There is no need to demarcate the letter body as the boundary within which an epistolary genre is replaced by a rhetorical one. Indeed, epistoliary generic features may be identified at any point in the letter, as Mitchell herself had done in an earlier article.[53]

Rejection of single-genre analysis of the letter body also allows us to recognise what we have always known, that 1 Corinthians in particular contains a sequence of "topics" or "sections" that seem to stand largely on their own as separate discourses, even though there is some carry- over of themes and tone linking them together. It is the relative autonomy of these sections that has prompted much scholarly discussion about compositional integrity, the influence of previous communications between Paul and Corinth, and the possibility of editorial interpolations. To recognise that distinctive autonomy is not to take a position on any of those issues, but merely to recognise that Paul appears to have constructed the letter body from a "shopping list" of topics he needed to deal with at the time. Nor is it to rule out the real possibility that the order in which these appear is entirely of his own choosing, rather than dictated by incoming reports and correspondence from Corinth: he does indeed seem to have interspersed difficult topics in which he needed to counter audience resistance to his message with easier ones in which his position was more acceptable, as I argue below. Furthermore, we may find several traces of thematic "carry over" in which positions established in an earlier section are implicitly assumed and built upon later.

To mark the semi-autonomous nature of these topics/sections, I propose to refer to them henceforth as "discourses", with the implication that each is separate enough to be regarded as a distinct unit, with its own predominant discourse type. That is to say, we should recognise that as Paul addressed each of these separate topics, the rhetorical situation shifted somewhat, in two aspects at least:

1. Those challenged or comforted by his position altered with each issue. Sometimes this was explicitly marked, with those confronted becoming the direct addressees of the discourse, as is the case in Chs. 8-10, where those claiming freedom to eat idol-foods regardless are always referred to in the second person, and those they regard as "weak' in the third.
2. The mode of discourse may change in response to the nature of the challenge presented by the topic. I shall deal with this aspect in the next sub-section.

[53] Margaret M. Mitchell, "Concerning ΠΕΡΙ ΔΕ in 1 Corinthians," *Novum Testamentum* 31.3 (July 1989): 229-56.

3.4.2 Deliberation: A Complex Genre

The ancient characterisation of deliberative discourse as containing "advice or persuasion" provides another useful polarity to direct our analysis of the epistle. It suggests that we should recognise that in a lengthy composition such as 1 Corinthians, its predominantly deliberative nature encompasses a complex variation in the rhetorical situation and tone as Paul moves along a continuum from some matters in which he can issue commands, to others in which his audience is open to and even seeking his advice and further to other matters in which not only does he need to argue the merits of his case but also to defend his own ἦθος in relation to the topic under discussion. Thus we should recognise that some topics, although of great importance to Paul, do not seem to require argumentation: the case of incest in Ch.5 is dealt with in a commanding tone, because the problem is community inaction rather than approval of the aberrant behaviour (5:1,2). Even the questions about marriage, although complicated and requiring a lengthy treatment in Ch.7, are actually dealt with as a series of prescriptive judgements, because he has been asked for his advice (7:1). At the other end of the deliberative continuum, we should recognize that there is a positive correlation between the lengthy treatments Paul gives to some topics and the strength of resistance to his viewpoint he perceives among significant sections of his audience. I would certainly want to argue that the three longest discourses belong at the argumentative end of the scale. The first is the opening discourse on the close relation between concord, wisdom and spirituality (1:10 - 4:21): the whole thrust of his argument here is to challenge the spiritual status accorded within the community to those who place a high value on social status, wealth and education and a low value on the cohesion of the community of faith. The relative social prominence of this group, the established Hellenistic cultural values normalising their stance, and their subtle disparagement of Paul's own status, make a lengthy, subtle and multi- pronged argument against their position unavoidable, if it is to be challenged at all. The penultimate discourse on spiritual gifts (12:1 - 14:40), of similar length to the first, is again one in which those whose competitive behaviour and attitudes Paul wishes to confront have entrenched their position as the norm within the ecclesia, even though it is destructive to community cohesiveness: again, their hand is strengthened by wider cultural beliefs and attitudes and can only be overcome by lengthy and complex argument. The discourse on the matter of foods offered to idols which most concerns us (8:1 - 11:1) is the next longest. I shall argue below that it likewise is a complex argument for a rather simple principle whose unacceptablity to a strongly entrenched segment of the community (roughly the same as those targeted in the first discourse) makes it necessary for Paul to construct a subtle, complex and lengthy argument to support it.

3.4.3 Argumentation: The Search for Agreement

In all our consideration of ancient rhetoric and argumentation, we would do well to take on board a very basic insight put forward by Perelmann and Olbrechts- Tyteca: that argumentation as such always involves establishing grounds of *agreement* with the intended audience:

> Our analysis of argumentation will deal first with what is taken as the starting point of arguments and afterwards with the way in which arguments are developed through a whole set of associative and disassociative processes. This division of the subject is indispensible to our examination and should not be misunderstood. The unfolding as well as the starting point of the argumentation presuppose indeed the agreement of the audience. This agreement is sometimes on explicit premises, sometimes on the particular connecting links used in the argument or on the manner of using these links: *from start to finish, analysis of argumentation is concerned with what is supposed to be accepted by the hearers.*[54]

Indeed we should recognize this principle as the defining characteristic of argumentative discourse, distinguishing it from other modes of address used by Paul such as instruction, advice, proclamation, and paraenesis. In each of those modes, the speaker has been accorded, or is assuming, some degree of authority over the audience. Argument only comes into play to the degree that the speaker must address the audience as equals or superiors. This distinction is fully in accord with the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition: the three rhetorical genres arose from archetypal situations in which a citizen might be required to address an assembly or tribunal composed of his social superiors or peers,[55] in each case arguing for rather than assuming his ἦθος, his right to speak on the subject at hand, as well as working to win the audience's assent to his substantive case point by point. Rhetorical education *per se* did not train rulers in how to give commands, nor teachers in how to instruct their pupils. The speech itself constituted the accepted means of winning assent, and required an assumption of that assent being provisionally withheld, and often contested by rival speakers. I regard this historical fact as the greatest impediment to the use of the ancient rhetorical genres as tools for the structural analysis of New Testament writings, which are permeated throughout with a sense of divinely mandated authority: the writers always assume some degree of authority in relation to their intended audiences, within the shared ἦθος of the Christian movement. This precludes any New Testament author adopting an *overall* rhetorical structure. Without some assumed authority, none of the New Testament authors would have begun their compositions; but this does not mean that they were able to maintain that assumption unwaveringly throughout, especially in Paul's case.

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[54] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 65, 65 (emphasis added).

[55] Thus Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (1.3.2) characterizes the audience: "Now it is necessary for the hearer to be either a spectator [theoros] or a judge [kritēs], and [in the latter case] a judge of either past or future happenings. A member of a democratic assembly is an example of one judging about future happenings, a juryman an example of one judging the past. A spectator is concerned with the ability [of the speaker]." Aristotle, *Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, George A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991) 47-48. Kennedy's parentheses.

We might well recognize that Paul's preference is to speak with authority, although his self-image requires him to do so ever so gently. But this does not mean that he was always *able* to do so: it is obvious from this letter alone that there were some matters on which his authority was resisted, if not outrightly repudiated, within the Corinthian congregation, and that his discourses dealing with such matters are of necessity argumentative, with Paul marshalling all his resources of λόγος, ἦθος and πάθος to win the assent he seeks. Indeed it seems ironic that the first discourse, in which he reminds his Corinthian converts of the Spirit- endorsed proclamatory mode of speech by which he first won their assent to the gospel (2:1- 5), is one in which he needs to argue his case at great length. That ironic reminder is in effect a rebuking acknowledgement of his need to address them in argumentative mode in order to regain their assent concerning the low value of rhetorically established "wisdom": that is to say, argumentation! Nevertheless he does argue, as he is obliged to do, and does so with good grace, not only in that discourse but in some others including the one dealing with idol-foods, as I shall demonstrate below.

Another consequence of recognising argumentation as a mode of discourse in which the speaker seeks to build on points of agreement with the audience is that it leads us to recognize that some of the assertions Paul makes in his arguments are there because they represent points of agreement with the addressees which may be concessionary rather than central to Paul's convictions. Such a recognition will direct us away from futile attempts to classify every statement as a face-value expression of the fundamental position of either Paul or other participants in the situation and lead us to enquire rather about what the writer's purpose is in the argument and how the various components in an argument work together to advance that cause.

Having agreed with both Mitchell and Kennedy that the predominant genre of 1 Corinthians 8-10 is deliberative, I have also argued for the possibility of genric complexity, where one or more other genres are contained within the overall one. Identifying such genres should be subject to these guidelines:[56]

1. Genre identification is a historical-critical process: it involves postulating that a given historical community of readers (including the original writer and audience) were familiar

[56]These are my formulation, summarizing my reading of the literature: E.D. Hirsch, Jr, *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1967); Cairns, *Generic Composition*; Mary Gerhart, "Generic Studies: Their Renewed Importance in Religious and Literary Interpretation," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 45.3 (Sept 1977): 309-26; Robert Champigny, "Semantic Modes and Literary Genres," *Theories of Literary Genre*, Ed. Joseph P. Strelka, Yearbook of Comparative Criticism, VIII (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978) 94-111; John J. Collins, "Introduction: Towards the Morphology of a Genre," *Semeia 14* (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1978) 1-20; John Reichert, "More Than Kin and Less Than Kind: The Limits of Genre Theory," *Theories of Literary Genre*, Ed. Joseph P. Strelka, Yearbook of Comparative Criticism, VIII (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978) 57-79; D. A. Russell, *Criticism in Antiquity*, Classical Life and Letters (London: Duckworth, 1981); Alastair Fowler, *Kinds of Literature: An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1982); Mary Gerhart, "Genric Competence in Biblical Hermeneutics," *Semeia* 43 (1988): 29 - 44; George A. Kennedy, "Rhetoric Defined: The Genres of Rhetoric," *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C. - A.D. 400*, Ed. Stanley E. Porter (Leiden: Brill, 1997) 43-50.

with the genre, and could have identified its presence in the text.

2. Literary-critical identification of multiple genres should be constrained by the consideration that genres are social conventions enabling efficient communication by leaving much unsaid. For each genre we identify, we should ask what it tells us about the body of assumed knowledge alluded to by the author through adoption of this genre.

3. Genres are never blended, but retain their identity within the mix: at any point in the text, only one genre is operative.[57]

In the case of 1 Corinthians 8-10, such genric complexity is an actuality, as it is readily apparent that Paul uses several distinct argumentative genres drawn from diverse cultural sources. I shall attempt to show, in the remainder of this study, that the predominant genre is deliberative rhetoric appealing to φρόνημα (Greek common sense, see 1 Cor.10:15), interspersed with inclusions of two other very important genres of argumentation: one appealing to the Jewish scriptures, and the other to the established κηρύγμα.

[57]On this point, Mitchell and the literary critics are all agreed, although it follows directly from defining genre as a mode of discourse: while we could say that when one structural form is contained within another both can be seen to be operative, the same does not work for included genres, where the whole point is the ability of an audience to identify what mode the discourse is in at any point. See Cairns, *Generic Composition*, 158-76 for a description of *inclusion* in particular.

CHAPTER 4

GENRE SOURCE THREE: INTERPRETED SCRIPTURE

It must by now be a commonplace of Pauline scholarship that the Jewish scriptures were of great importance to the apostle. Recent work has higlighted the frequency with which he refers to the scriptures, both explicitly and by implication.[1] Some studies have focused on the extent and nature of the corpus treated by Paul as αι γραφαι[2]. Others have investigated the range of interpretative techniques employed by Paul in his use of scripture, whether to throw light on his relationship to rabbinic exegetical method or to inform present-day hermeneutics[3]. The most comprehensive recent study, covering all of these aspects, is that of Dietrich-Alex Koch, *Die Schrift als Zeuge des Evangeliums* examining both the various uses to which Paul puts scripture and the understanding of scripture he displays in doing so.[4] Studies focused on Paul's use of scripture in 1 Corinthians in particular can also be divided into those examining specific textual or

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[1]Studies of Paul's explicit references to scripture include E. Earle Ellis, *Paul's Use of the Old Testament* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1957); D. Moody Smith, "The Pauline Literature," *It Is Written: Scripture Citing Scripture. Essays in Honour of Barnabas Lindars*, Ed. D.A Carson and H.G.M. Williamson (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988) 265-91, and Christopher D. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature*, SNTS Monograph Series (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992). Discussion of implicit references has been recently reignited by Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1989): see the critiques by Evans, Green and Beker, with Hay's response, in *Paul and the Scriptures of Israel*, eds. C.A.Evans & J.A.Sanders, JSNTSS 83, (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993).

[2] James Barr, "Paul and the LXX: A Note on Some Recent Work," *The Journal of Theological Studies* 45.2 (Oct 1994): 593-601; W.D. Davies, "Canon and Christology in Paul," *Paul and the Scriptures of Israel*, Craig A. Evans and James A. Sanders, JSNT Supplement Series 83 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993) 18-39;

[3]See A.T. Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology* (London: SPCK, 1974), especially Chs. 7– 11; Richard Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1975) 104 - 32; James W. Aageson, *Written Also For Our Sake. Paul and the Art of Biblical Interpretation.* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993).

[4]Dietrich-Alex Koch, *Die Schrift als Zeuge des Evangeliums: Untersuchung zur Vervendung nad zum Verständnis der schrift bei Paulus*, Beiträge zur Historischen Theologie 69 (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1986).

thematic connections,[5] and those attempting to deal with patterns more broadly characteristic of the epistle.[6]

For my present purpose, the most important issue arising from this variety of critical approaches to Paul's use of scripture concerns the need to decide whether it is most appropriate to adopt a maximizing or a minimizing stance when it comes to identifying the influence of scripture within his discourse. A maximizing approach emphasizes the central importance of Israel's scriptures to Paul: above all, he is a Jew who understands, and constantly needs to validate, his gospel and mission in the light of scripture. It postulates that an internal dialogue with scripture is going on for Paul at all times, whatever emerges onto the page, and seeks to explain otherwise problematic aspects of the text on that basis. One form of this approach involves listening for intertextual "echoes" of scripture within Paul's text. Another is to regard him as engaged in a rabbinical dialogue with scripture and its Jewish tradition of interpreters, and hence to analyse his writing according to the canons of rabbinic exegesis.[7] While each of these requires us to postulate some degree of competence in the same genres on the part of his audience for effective communication to take place, that requirement can be forestalled to the extent that we locate Paul's internal dialogue as an essential component of the discourse. Despite or even because of his clear sense of divine commissioning as apostle to the gentiles, Paul remained a devotee of the God revealed in scripture, and needed constantly to validate his mission in terms of God's faithfulness to the covenants he had made with Israel.[8] A minimizing approach, at the other extreme, would identify a reference to scripture only when it is specifically signalled

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[5]Such studies are numerous. Recent examples include Gail R. O'Day, "Jeremiah 9:22-23 and 1 Corinthians 1:26-31: A Study in Intertextuality," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 109.2 (Summer 1990): 259-67; Brian S. Rosner, "The Function of Scripture in 1 Cor. 5,13B and 6,16," *The Corinthian Correspondence*, Ed. R. Bieringer, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 125 (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1996) 513-18; and B.J. Koet, "The Old Testament Background to 1 Cor. 10:7-8," *The Corinthian Correspondence*, Ed. R. Bieringer, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 125 (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1996) 607-15;

[6] Some recent examples: C.J.A Hickling, "Paul's Use of Exodus in the Corinthian Correspondence," *The Corinthian Correspondence*, Ed. R. Bieringer, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 125 (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1996) 367-76; T.L. Brodie, "The Systematic Use of the Pentateuch in 1 Corinthians: An Exploratory Survey," *The Corinthian Correspondence*, Ed. R. Bieringer, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 125 (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1996) 441-57; and V. Koperski, "Knowledge of Christ and Knowledge of God in the Corinthian Correspondence," *The Corinthian Correspondence*, Ed. R. Bieringer, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 125 (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1996) 377-96;

[7]Studies supporting such an approach, although not necessarily to an extreme: W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology*, 4th ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980); Peter J. Tomson, *Paul and the Jewish Law: Halakha in the Letters of the Apostle to the Gentiles*, Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamenum 3: Jewish Traditions in Early Christian Literature 1 (Assen/Minneapolis: Van Gorcum / Fortress Press, 1990); Peter J. Tomson, "La Première Épître aux Corinthiens comme Document de la Tradition Apostolique de Halakha," *The Corinthian Correspondence*, Ed. R. Bieringer, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 125 (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1996) 459-70.

[8]A major theme in N. T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992);

by the use of citation markers, when the language is unmistakably identifiable as a quotation, or when there is an explicit reference to a particular passage or narrative. In my view, it is important to retain a flexibility in our approach, from a perception that Pauline texts differ from one another and even vary internally in the place given to scripture. Galatians and Romans, focused largely on relating the gentile mission to God's covenanted faithfulness to Israel, can be readily identified as the epistles in which Paul seems most preoccupied with scripture, and in the latter case, where his audience is largely unknown to him, it would be possible to argue that Paul's inner dialogue with scripture comes much more to the fore.

However, in the case of 1 Corinthians, I have already argued, largely on literary grounds, that Paul's discourse is fundamentally *argumentative* in nature: that while there are some topics on which he seems to expect a readiness to agree from his audience, the overall tone of the epistle is dominated by a few topics, including the one on ειδωλόθυτα, on which he finds it necessary to persuade rather than instruct the congregation at Corinth. In persuasive discourse, one looks for arguments that will appeal most strongly to one's audience rather than to oneself. How does this effect his use of scripture in the current topic? There is no doubt that scriptural topoi appear in this discourse, particularly at 9:8-10, 9:13 (dubiously), 10:1-11, and 10:18, and I shall discuss these shortly. However, given the nature of the topic, this seems to be a rather *minimal* appeal to scripture: using verse-units as a rough and ready unit of proportion, we have a maximum of 16 out of the 74 verses (22%) discussing what scripture has to say on the issue, and most of these appear in one passage quite late in the discourse. That proportion might appear unexceptional on other topics, but the issue in this discourse has been labelled ειδωλόθυτα by Paul: "things offered to *idols*", a value-laden term which presupposes a distinctly Jewish critique of pagan cultic practices.[9] I now want to suggest that Paul has reason to minimise his use of scripture as he argues in support of what is essentially a scripturally-determined position.

4.1 "Idolatry": a Scriptural Concept

My perception that Paul deliberately avoids the explicit use of scripture to condemn idolatry early in this discourse is based on the fact that he leaves his central assertion in the second half of Chapter 8, that participation in idolatrous worship will

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[9]So Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians: a Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, trans. Leitch James W., Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) 139 &n.6; Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 357 n.1; against Paul Douglas Gardner, *The Gifts of God and the Authentication of a Christian* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994) 15-16, who argues that ειδωλόθυτα is a Christian term, with Paul's use here a very early example. Gardner fails to consider the significance of ειδωλον, which has a pedigree at least as old as the LXX, where it is found in 29 books as a translation of 15 Hebrew nouns, giving them a negative connotation not always evident in the originals. Data drawn from Edwin Hatch and Henry Redpath, *A Concordance to the Septuagint and the other Greek versions of the Old Testament*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1906) 376.

damage the weaker brother (8:10-11), entirely unsupported until Chapter 10. It is apparent that those among his audience who feel comfortable about being seen reclining at table in an idol's temple (8:10) believe that they are doing themselves no harm. After all, they are only there to eat, and presumably to socialise. They are further reassured by their slogans telling them that their eating or not eating food is a matter of indifference to God (8:8), and that there is really only one God anyway (8:4). For the moment, Paul lets those beliefs stand and concentrates on the effects on another brother, hypothetical or otherwise, who while lacking their clarity of belief, follows their outward example of eating in the temple precincts but does so as an act of idol worship (8:10). The end result, Paul asserts, is his destruction:η συνειδησις αυτῶν ασθενὴς οὖσα μολύνεται ...(8:7b) and, απόλλυται γὰρ ο ἀσθενῶν....(8:11a). *Idol-worship results in defilement and destruction for the worshippers*. It is hard to believe that the "wise" Christians who eat with their friends in pagan temples share the intensity of Paul's conviction on this point, yet he leaves this crucial point as an unsupported assertion, for the moment. This fact demands an explanation.

One common line of interpretation sees the destruction in v.10-11 as either consisting in, or resulting from, the defilement of conscience in v.7.[10] However, if this were Paul's meaning it would simply invite the retort that the "weak" should follow the "wise" in developing consciences that are untroubled by such behaviour.[11] By treating the discourse, 1Cor.8-10, as a whole, however, it becomes plain in Ch.10 that Paul regards the destruction as the intervening judgment of God in response to idolatry.[12] The belief that idolatry will result in divine punishment is peculiarly scriptural and Jewish, and it is this conviction that Paul holds in check until Ch.10.

We know from 1 Thessalonians 1:9 that Paul's initial presentation of the gospel in Greece had included a challenge to "turn to God from idols" and henceforth to serve "a true and living God": which is to say that he demanded some degree of acquiesence to the standard Jewish ideology that all pagan cultic activity was debased and that Israel's

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[10]So Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians*, The International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T.& T.Clark, 1911) 169-72; C.K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 2nd ed. (London: A.&C. Black, 1971) 194-96; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 148-49 and Gardner, *The Gifts of God*, 197.

[11]It would appear that this is the belief of the "wise", as opposed to Paul, and that they are actively seeking to "build up" such strength-of-conscience by inviting the "weak" to accompany them to such temple-feasts. Thus Fee, *First Corinthians*, 386-87; and Khiok-Khng Yeo, *Rhetorical Interaction in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10: A Formal Analysis with Preliminary Suggestions for a Chinese, Cross-Cultural Hermeneutic* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1995) 192.

[12]So Fee, *First Corinthians*, 387-88; and Raymond F. Collins, *First Corinthians*, Sacra Pagina 7 (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1999) 326. Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000) 653-54 engages in a lengthy discussion of recent opinions without revealing whether he thinks this is eschatological destruction or not.

revelation of God was the definitive truth.[13] From the fact that Paul is able to give the present topic this perjorative label in his opening statement (8:1) , and to repeat it or a cognate term at 8:4, 8:7, 10:14, and 10:19, we may conclude that the Corinthian audience were accustomed to the Jewish critique of pagan religion, at least to the extent of accepting this terminology.[14] However, that acceptance may well have depended to some extent on Paul's softening of the *Jewishness* of this critique by enlisting the help of philosophical critiques of pagan religion and non-Jewish use of εἴδωλον as a term of disparagement.[15] We can be certain that his missionary strategy included avoidance of unnecessary cultural friction: when in this very discourse, at 9:21, he tells his Corinthian audience, τοῖς ἀνόμοις ὡς ἄνομος, μὴ ὢν ἄνομος θεοῦ ἀλλ' ἔννομος Χριστοῦ, ἵνα κερδάνω τοὺς ἀνόμους , he is reminding them that he has made concessions to their cultural sensibilities, within limits set by Christ.[16] If he is less Jewish at heart than his Jewish converts might suppose (9:20), he is likewise more Jewish and less Greek than his gentile flock in Corinth have realized thus far. In particular, his personal conviction about what constitutes proper, Christlike behaviour in regard to εἰδωλόθυτα is more distinctively Jewish than some of them have hitherto been willing to accept as an authoritative model. The intense antipathy he harbours towards pagan cults is displayed in the first half of Chapter 10, where it appears in his use of the narrative of Israel's apostasy in the desert as a horrific example of what

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[13] Ernest Best, *A Commentary on the First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians* (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1988) 85-87 argues, as have others, that this verse contains a traditional pre-Pauline formula drawn from a Jewish-Christian missionary tradition. For argument against Best's position, see Charles A. Wanamaker, *The Epistles to the Thessalonians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990) 84-86. Much of this debate is about whether some or all of 1 Thess.1:9-10 constitutes a definitive statement of Paul's gospel proclamation in Thessalonica, or whether it expresses either a part of that proclamation or a summation of its results. My argument requires only that this statement be acceptable to the converts in retrospect. Johannes Munck, "1 Thess. 1:9-10 and the Missionary Preaching of Paul," *New Testament Studies* 9 (1963): 95-110 puts forward an interpretation of 1 Thess.1:9 that is suggestive for the Corinthian converts as well: "that the Thessalonians, who were formerly gentiles, found it difficult to grasp that what human beings such as the apostles said to them was the will of God and Christ's commandment, which must simply be obeyed, and not argued about." (109).

[14]There can be no doubt of the importance of this issue for the self-definition of Second-Temple Judaism, as reflected in the surviving writings of the period. One scholar concludes, "Repudiation of idolatry is probably the most common form of resistance to gentile culture in Judaism." Scot McKnight, *A Light Among the Gentiles: Jewish Missionary Activity in the Second Temple Period* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991) 23. See also Emil Schürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the age of Jesus Christ*, ed. & rev. Fergus Millar & Matthew Black Geza Vermes (Edinburgh: T.&T.Clark, 1979) Vol.2, 81-83; E.P. Sanders, *Judaism: Practice and Belief, 63BCE-66CE* (London: SCM Press, 1992) 242-47, and Moshe Halbertal, "Coexisting with the enemy: Jews and pagans in the Mishnah," *Tolerance and Intolerance in Early Christianity and Judaism*, Ed. Graham N. Stanton and Guy G Strousma (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998).

[15]For a pathway into that gentile critical tradition, see the references in Hans Conzelmann, *Gentiles - Jews - Christians: Polemics and Apologetics in the Greco-Roman Era*, 2, M. Eugene Boring (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1992) 136 n.4.

[16]Paul was by no means alone in this approach. Conzelmann, *Gentiles - Jews - Christians*, 135-233 provides an overview of the extent to which many second-temple Jews were prepared to adapt the expression of their faith to make it acceptable within Greco-Roman culture. On Jewish prosletyizing in general, see Schürer, *History of the Jewish People*, 150-76.

can go wrong once you compromise with other cults, leading to the climatic exhortation in 10:14: Διόπερ, αγαπητοί μου, φεύγετε από τής ειδωλολατρίας.. The worship of idols is something to flee, a seductive destroyer of God's people. My point here is that for the first two chapters in this discourse, Paul keeps the intensity of his feelings on idolatry under restraint, apart from his initial choice of terminology and his assertion about its destructiveness.

For what reason? I suggest that this a deliberate rhetorical strategy in this discourse, consistent with his earlier missionary strategy of becoming "all things to all people". That is, he is well aware that his convictions on this matter are distinctly Jewish: only Jews feel so strongly about non-Jewish cultic activity, and what feels like strong convictions from within the Jewish cultural circle may look more like bigotry from without. Paul's success as a missioner to gentiles has come from his ability to view that cultural divide from both sides and frame his communication to avoid offending cultural sensibilities needlessly (10:32). Scripture, especially in its Greek translations, is rich in its condemnation of all that it classifies as "idolatry", and Paul's seven-fold use of this perjorative terminology in the first thirteen verses of the discourse is clearly designed to leave his gentile audience in no doubt that he fully shares the common Jewish evaluation of pagan cults, but apart from that he avoids using scripture as a source of topoi until he is well past halfway through his argument. It would have been easy to call upon Deuteronomy or Isaiah for authoritative denunciations of those who make and worship idols. However, scriptural passages crafted to strengthen Israel's boundaries against encroaching cultures and their cults have a different credibility when heard by those already committed to living within those boundaries than when used as arguments persuading others to make them their own. If "idolatry" is regarded by gentiles as essentially a matter of Jewish religious particularity, then quoting scriptural condemnations of pagan religious activity may even run the risk of devaluing scripture itself, of exposing his converts to the thought that scripture sometimes expresses Jewish cultural intolerance rather than the inspired transcendence of that culture that has informed Paul's mission to gentiles.

We may conclude that Paul's choice not to bring the full guns of scriptural condemnation to bear on the issue of ειδωλόθυτα was a matter of rhetoric rather than principle. As we shall see, his explicit references to scripture are mostly quite general in nature rather than focusing on detailed exegesis. Nevertheless, he chooses them carefully, introducing them as topoi where they will have maximum effect. I shall now examine the three passages in this discourse in which an appeal to scripture is used, not only in order to establish the contribution they make to Paul's overall argument, but also to show how they relate to the dominant deliberative genre.

4.2 Workers' rights: oxen, altar servants and all the lowly and weak

In Chapter 9, the middle section of this discourse, Paul is occupied with a lengthy defence of the rights that undergird his apostolic ministry. At one point in this section, 9:9, he makes an appeal to scripture to support his argument: εν γὰρ τῷ Μωϋσέως νόμῳ γέγραπται, **Ου κημώσεις βοῦν αλοῶντα.** My present purpose is to identify the genres interacting here. I wish to argue that one subsection of this passage, 9:8-12, is a case of one argumentative genre, an appeal to the words of scripture, being contained within another, a self-defence in the genre of judicial rhetoric that occupies the whole of 1 Corinthians 9. Once we accept the idea of genre inclusion,[17] this should not be difficult to establish, nor particularly controversial.

The generic nature of Chapter 9 as juridical rhetoric is signalled at 9:3, Η εμὴ απολογία τοῖς εμὲ ανακρίνουσιν εστιν αὕτη, by means of the technical term απολογία.[18] Thiselton helpfully comments,

> Both η εμὴ απολογία, **My statement of defence**, and the dative participle τοῖς εμὲ αναφρίνουσιν, **to those who investigate me**, are legal metaphors. The noun απολογία is technically *a speech of defense* (as in Acts 22:1; cf. 1 Pet.3:15, *ready to make a defense to anyone*), but in the context of a semijudicial **investigation** of someone under scrutiny is best translated **statement of defence**.[19]

There is some debate among the scholars over whether Paul actually carries on with such a statement of defence, and for how long.[20] Given that we do not have to show that a discourse has to have the *form of a judicial speech* to be in the judicial genre, it is my view that this genre continues to the end of chapter 9. Raymond Collins provides a good basis of support for this contention in his commentary on the chapter.[21] He characterizes 9:4-14 as Paul's defense of his apostolic rights marked by the use of the first person plural, and the remainder of the chapter as a return to the first-person appeal of 9:1-2 building on that defence. In doing so, Collins emphasizes the unity between the two sections: the first *defends* his claim to the rights of an apostle, while the second *explains* his practice of not making use of them.[22] I do not think that this difference is significant enough to signal a shift away from a mode of self-defense, especially as from 9:15 the

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[17]See in particular Francis Cairns, *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1972) 158-76, cited already in my critique of Mitchell.

[18] Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 152, n.12 gives this trenchant note, inviting a line of investigation that he follows no further: " 'Apology': a juristic term; Plato (Socrates); Acts 22:1, etc. For the dative cf. 2 Cor 12:19." Fee, *First Corinthians*, 401, n.22 gives the definition "a speech or writing in reply to accusations", adding further references to Josephus and Xenophon.

[19] Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 675, his emphases.

[20]Some actually argued that it referred *backwards* to the three rhetorical questions in 9:1-2, but this view has not become established. For discussion and refutation, see Fee, *First Corinthians*, 401,n.21.

[21] Collins, *First Corinthians*, 327-63.

[22]Collins, *First Corinthians*, 344.

discourse focuses even more squarely on Paul's own behaviour. On the contrary, it is only at this point that his defense really becomes *self*-defense as such. There is no ground for supposing that the rights of all apostles in general were under attack, but rather that he needed to defend his apostolic status from doubts raised by his failure to claim those rights.

Rather than signal an end to the defense, Paul's switch back to a focus on his own behaviour at 9:15 should be taken as confirmation that the metaphorical courtroom is still in session. In the first half of his defence, Paul argues for his interpretation of the legal principle applicable to the charge, in this case the rights of an apostle. This then provides the grounds for his explanation of his own behaviour in the second half, which we could summarize as an argument that it is nobler and more Christlike to forego those rights in some circumstances than to make use of them. These exemplify the two main ingredients of any advocate's argument: legal principles and their application to particular cases.

One feature that stands in the way of such a categorization of the whole chapter for some readers is its last four verses, 9:24-27. Hays comments,

> Those who try to read chapter 9 as a defense of Paul's apostleship unrelated to the idol food problem have great difficulty explaining how verses 24-27 fit into the defense. The presence of this material at the end of the chapter shows clearly that the purpose of the unit as a whole is hortatory rather than apologetic. Paul is presenting his own pattern of renouncing rights as exemplary and calling the Corinthian *gnōsis*-boasters to follow suit. Thus, we see that 1 Corinthians 9 is an artful piece of rhetoric that accomplishes two purposes simultaneously: explaining Paul's controversial renunciation of his rights and suggesting that renunciation as a model to be imitated.[23]

I agree entirely that Paul has these two purposes in this chapter, but do not agree with the logic of Hays' second sentence above. It would only follow if we slipped into the modern use of 'apologetic' to convey humble deference before an accuser, rather than retaining the technical sense as defined above. In the ancient world there was an established motif of the noble figure called to judgment before an unworthy tribunal who displays his superior character and lack of intimidation by not only accounting for his own behaviour but also exhorting his accusers to amend their ways, for their own good. For examples, we only need think of Plato's portrayal of Socrates' conduct of his capital trial, virtually an archetype in Greco-Roman culture; and John's portrayal of Jesus might well be seen in the same light. To finish your case with an exhortation that urges your audience to become more like you, when the issues are very serious, may well be a more effective way to conclude a judicial self-defence than to make a cringing plea for justice, and would certainly make you feel better about how you displayed yourself in the face of your

[23]Richard B. Hays, *First Corinthians*, Interpretation: A Biblical Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997) 149.

accusers. Paul's way of ending his self-defence in this chapter is thus a noble display of ἦθος, which is an essential ingredient in each of the rhetorical genres.[24]

Turning back to the scriptural citation included in the first section of this chapter, we may now see how it functions as the inclusion of one genre within another. Just before this passage Paul has offered three examples drawn from everyday life to illustrate the common right of workers to receive payment for their services: the soldier expects to be paid his expenses, the vineyard worker to take a share of the fruit, and the shepherd to drink milk from the flock (9:7). These operate as analogical 'proofs' of the legal principle that apostles have a right to be paid, not by establishing its truth but rather by illustrating its nature. The audience is already supporting other apostles and does not need to be convinced that this should happen. Paul's argument is over *why* such support should be given, because if he can get them to adopt a better understanding of the principle, then this will enable them to accept his reasons for choosing not to accept their support. That is, he needs to demonstrate that his reason for refusal is actually an outcome of the same principle that would lead him to accept it in other circumstances.

In each of these three cases the employees involved are doing work that generates wealth for their employers: the spoils of war; fruit and wine; milk and other animal products. Surrounded by this wealth, which is generated through their own danger and toil, they have a natural right to a share of the rewards, even though ownership is in the hands of another. It is in everyone else's interests that they are paid properly, lest they be tempted to get their needs met by illicit means: plunder or theft. So by choosing such examples, Paul is inviting his audience to see apostles in the same light, as those whose hard and often dangerous labour produces great benefits for others, and who have a natural right to share in the abundance they produce: material support in return for spiritual benefits (9:11), both of which are integral parts of the abundant resources provided by God for his people. How does *not* claiming those rights follow from this principle? I shall argue in my fourth chapter that this is strongly connected to household and patronage relationships within God's family. In preparation for that argument, I would like to suggest at this point that these three examples imply a degree of responsibility on each of these workers to know what their entitlement is and how it is to be paid out. The soldier on campaign is under orders that entitle him to take his expenses from the spoils gathered; the harvester knows he is allowed to eat grapes as he gathers them and how much he may take home; the herdsman milking a flock is left to fill his own pail. The employer's trust in the worker is an important element in each case, and accountability goes back to the employer rather than to other workers or to onlookers who may not know what the contracted arrangements are. Paul is telling his audience that they are not his employers, nor even of the other gospel-workers whom they do pay, and that while apostles have an expectation

[24]I shall expand my explanation of the threat Paul needed to counter in this defence and why this required a *rhetorical* response in Section 2.5.1, and give detailed exegesis of *topoi* he employs in my fourth chapter.

of reward from their services, this is a contract between them and the Lord whom they serve. How it takes place in each case is a matter between the employer and employee.

The appeal to scripture in 9:9 is placed right in the midst of that argument of principle. What does it contribute that I have not already drawn out of the three other examples? Its rhetorical function is clearly signalled in v.8: Μὴ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον ταῦτα λαλῶ ἢ καὶ ὁ νόμος ταῦτα οὐ λέγει; Having used three examples from everyday life to place the case within the framework of precedents they provide, Paul feels the need to justify this placement as more than his invention made on the basis of natural analogy. Hence he appeals to a decree (Deut.25:4) stating the same principle as a matter of divine law, the law of Moses . The effect of this citation is to not merely to use the threshing ox as one further case of a needy worker that must be allowed to feed from the crop it is harvesting, but to justify the use of such examples as a divinely mandated legal principle: 9:9 ἐν γὰρ τῷ Μωϋσέως νόμῳ γέγραπται, **Οὐ κημώσεις βοῦν ἀλοῶντα.** μὴ τῶν βοῶν μέλει τῷ θεῷ; This is where the mode of argument steps over the boundary separating judicial rhetoric from Jewish legal argument. Jewish law presupposes that "the law of Moses" expresses the legal judgments of God (hence his verbal phrase, μέλει τῷ θεῷ applied to what "is written" in the law of Moses). It is unthinkable to Paul that God would have expressed such a concern only for oxen without intending his people to extend this law into their relationships with one another as well as with their animals. Rather, his focus must have been primarily on humans, and this law's whole purpose is to establish the general principle that those who work in any productive industry must be able to do so in hope of a reward : ἢ δι' ἡμᾶς πάντως λέγει; δι' ἡμᾶς γὰρ ἐγράφη ὅτι ὀφείλει ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ὁ ἀροτριῶν ἀροτριᾶν καὶ ὁ ἀλοῶν ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τοῦ μετέχειν (9:10). The extension of this general law for God's people into its particular application for apostles follows quite naturally: εἰ ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν τὰ πνευματικὰ ἐσπείραμεν, μέγα εἰ ἡμεῖς ὑμῶν τὰ σαρκικὰ θερίσομεν; (9:11). From there is one further short step to Paul's own case: εἰ ἄλλοι τῆς ὑμῶν ἐξουσίας μετέχουσιν, οὐ μᾶλλον ἡμεῖς; (9:12, using 9:2 as his linking premise).

Paul's purpose in this part of his argument can thus be seen: he wants to establish his right to support as a particular application of the apostles' rights, which are themselves a special case of human rights, which are in turn both established by universal custom and principles of equity and also confirmed as God's decree by the law of Moses. While acceptance of the latter basis depends on the audience's recognition and acceptance of Jewish legal logic, this appeal to scripture takes place as one *topos* within a legal argument which is itself conducted within the Greco-Roman genre of a judicial self defense. It is thus a genuine example of genre inclusion.

While the transition into the genre of appeal to scripture is clearly signalled, the transition back into judicial rhetoric is less distinct, chiefly because the second part of the legal argument is announced at verse 12b (nevertheless, we have not made use of this right) then postponed until verse 15 while Paul goes back to complete his exposition of the

legal principle, firstly by citing a scriptural *example* of this principle's application in Jewish law, in the case of the altar servants (9:13), and secondly by his reference to the Lord's command applying it to the apostles and other gospel-workers (9:14). The effect of this arrangement is to ensure that the words of Jesus authorizing his apostles to accept support from those to whom he sends them do not stand on their own but are explained as an extension of a wider principle founded in nature and scripture, before Paul goes on to defend himself against the charge of not following that course. I shall explore his reasons for this procedure later in this chapter.

4.3 Gentile inclusion in Israel: "our ancestors" and the punishment of idolatry

Paul's most extended passage of scriptural exegesis in this discourse is 10:1-11, in which he takes up the example of Israel's ancestors in the desert, adducing the divine judgments that fell upon them for various sins "as a warning" (τυπικῶς, v.11) for his Christian audience in Corinth. This passage falls naturally into two sections: 10:1-6, in which he develops the significant relationship between those in the story and those in his audience; and 10:7-10, in which he lists the various sins involved and their consequences. Verse 11 is a concluding statement re-emphasizing the relationship developed in the first section, giving the passage an overall chiastic form.

The first section of this passage begins in a somewhat deflating tone: Ου θέλω γὰρ υμᾶς αγνοεῖν ... (10:1a). This is probably a standard introductory formula,[25] the use of which is not at all offensive in a situation where the author is about to disclose something the audience could not be expected to know. However its use in a situation such as this (and again at 12:1) where the audience has already indicated they think their knowledge is fairly comprehensive (cf. 8:1) might be taken as a gentle reproof, a reminder that they are comparatively ignorant about some matters, in this case what Jews know their scriptures have to say about God's attitude to idols.

This point made, he then develops some important relational connections between Israel in the desert and the Christians in Corinth. The first of these concerns kinship: the audience are not only αδελφοὶ to one another and to Paul, a relation which might be construed in purely gentile terms, but more importantly they are related as adopted kin to Israel by the characterisation of those who were with Moses in the desert as οι πατέρες ημῶν (10:1). If those who claim γνῶσις regarding ειδωλόθυτα carry some disdain for Jewish convictions on this subject, this phrase serves to remind them that among their foundational experiences as a spiritual community was inclusion in Israel, the people of

[25]See 2 Cor.1:8, Rom.1:13, 1 Thess.4:13, and comments in Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 723.

God.[26] They are just about to get a powerful reminder of how *Israel's* foundational experiences shaped Jewish aversion to idolatry.

The five-fold repetition of πάντες in vv.1-4 serves to emphasize the central lesson Paul wants to draw out of this historical allusion: despite having been recipients of manifold benefits that were delivered miraculously and were therefore demonstrably gifts from God, many of those in the wilderness generation fell into divine disfavour and were destroyed.[27] Neither their membership in a community that is richly blessed by God (1:4-7) nor their individual spiritual giftedness (12:4-11) may be taken as assurances by anyone in the Corinthian audience that they are immune from divine judgment. From this arises the conclusion in v.12: ὥστε ο δοκῶν εστάναι βλεπέτω μὴ πέση, which is used in turn as the grounds for the exhortation that begins the following section, Διόπερ, αγαπητοί μου, φεύγετε από τής ειδωλολατρίας (10:14). Clearly Paul believes that those who feel that idolatry poses no danger to them are sustained in this illusion by a consciousness of their own spiritual giftedness, and he is concerned to break down their false sense of security.

To prevent the "wise" from discounting Israel's earlier experiences as unspiritual and therefore not exemplary (e.g., by taking the formulaic terminology in v.18, Ισραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα, too literally), the repetition of πάντες in 10:1-4 also provides a structure within which Paul can emphasize the miraculous and spiritual nature of those experiences. Each member of the ancestral group had been covered by the protecting and guiding fiery cloud (Ex.13:21-22 and 14:19-20), and each had gone through the sea when it miraculously divided (Ex.14:21-22). In case anyone portrays these as external miracles not affecting the participants' spiritual state, Paul then asserts that they constitute a form of baptism: not Christian baptism, to be sure, but baptism εις τὸν Μωϋσῆν. These two experiences delivered them from their Egyptian pursuers and committed them to their journey through the desert under Moses' leadership in parallel with the way in which the Corinthian community obviously look back to their own baptisms as the decisive events that separated them from their pagan pasts and constituted their sense of community and leadership structures. Paul has earlier downplayed the importance of that linkage between baptism and leadership (1:13-17), to counter a tendency for it to "divide" the leadership of Christ in the community (μεμέρισται ο Χριστός; μὴ Παῦλος εσταυρώθη υπὲρ υμῶν, ἢ εις τὸ ὄνομα Παύλου εβαπτίσθητε; 1:13), but here he uses the audience's construct to his own advantage.[28]

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[26]This presupposes that something akin to the "grafting in" expressed in Rom.11:13-24 was an integral part of Paul's initial proclamation in Corinth.

[27]See also my earlier comments on this feature, against Mitchell's interpretation of its significance, in section 2.3.3.3.

[28]Baptism has many layers of significance in Paul's thought, giving rise to diverse interpretations of "baptised into Moses". See Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 724-25. I have selected the aspect that seems most persuasive *with these particular opponents*.

He then moves on to experiences that are more personal: eating the manna and drinking from the rock. While these events too are miraculous, inasmuch as they involve supernatural provision, Paul construes them as spiritual experiences for the participants. On what basis? Here again there has been much discussion,[29] but I find the following line of explanation most plausible. The wilderness narratives are found in scripture as interpreted texts: long before Paul's time they have been subjected to exegesis which has itself appeared in further scriptural texts which themselves influence subsequent interpretation. Paul's summary story of apostasy in the desert is derived from several sources: one element, the rock that followed Israel in the wilderness, seems to come from contemporary Jewish mythology,[30] but the remainder can best be read as a fusion of several biblical sources: Ex.13-17, Ex.32, Num.11, Num.14, Num.21, Num.25, Ps.77, and Ps. 105.[31]

Exodus 13-17 tells the story of the escape from Egypt through the sea and of the subsequent provision of food and water in the desert. Although the means of provision is clearly miraculous in each case, and the manna is strange to the recipients (Ex.16:15), being "bread from heaven" (Ex.16:4), there is no indication that the bread and water are spiritual rather than natural substances. There is also a passing reference to a nocturnal visitation by quails (Ex.16:13), but it is not clear whether these were part of the food supply or a means of providing manna. The provision of food and water is said to be in response to the congregation's "complaining", (γογγυσμόν, Ex.16:2, 7-9, 12; and 17:3); "quarrelling" with Moses (λοιδορίαν, Ex.17:2,7 and "testing" the Lord (πειράζειν, Ex.17:2,7). However, this source contains no immediate suggestion that God punished them for their attitudes.

Numbers 11 contains another story of a rebellion over the issue of food supplies. This time the people are weary of manna, so the Lord gives them meat in the form of quails, but strikes the eaters down, "the people who had the craving" (τὸν λαὸν τὸν επιθυμητὴν, Num.11:34), "while the food was still between their teeth, before it was consumed." Clearly this meat is not πνευματικὸν βρῶμα on Paul's reading, but rather comes under the category of desired "evil things", κακῶν, in v.6.

The theme of Israel's apostasy is the focus of Ps.77:17-31(LXX), which provides a crucial interpretation of these two narratives, weaving them together into a unified story of God's response, both gracious and angry, to Israel's rebellion and testing in the desert. It depicts manna and bird-meat given virtually together until "the fattest of them" were suddenly destroyed while the food was still in their mouths. It describes manna, the supernatural food, as ἄρτον ουρανοῦ, "bread of heaven" (v.24) and ἄρτον αγγέλων, "angel

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[29]See the useful summary in Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 727-30.

[30] Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 166-67 and n.25.

[31]Here and elsewhere I shall use the LXX numbering for the Psalms, as the Greek versions form Paul's scriptural allusions throughout the letter.

food" (v.25): not just miraculously provided but spiritual in itself, the nourishment of spiritual beings that these mortals were privileged to taste. Clearly this scriptural gloss by the psalmist would provide sufficient warrant for Paul's depiction, πάντες τὸ αυτὸ πνευματικὸν βρῶμα ἔφαγον (10:3).[32]

The "spiritual drink" in 1 Cor.10:4 is harder to explain as an interpretation of the water flowing from the rock. It seems to follow as a parallel from the spiritual food, both being provided miraculously by God for the same purpose, to sustain his people in the desert, and therefore presumably of similar status: if one is spiritual, so must be the other. This logic is backed by a further miraculous necessity, the travelling rock. If the manna was given daily as the people travelled, and was necessary for their survival, then equally they needed a daily water supply. Therefore, the rock must have moved with them, as they did not die of thirst. That much was obvious to believing Jews at large, as the popular myth referred to by Conzelmann above attests, and would have been quite acceptable to an audience of Greeks, for whom miracles as such were not an issue. Now a rock that is able to travel miraculously, and to issue spiritual water (water from heaven), must itself be no natural rock but more like a piece of heaven-on-earth: this follows again from the parallel case of the manna, which arrived directly from heaven, according to the psalm. Moreover, a moving rock is somewhat akin to the moving cloud: a manifestation of God's presence with his people.[33]

Up to this point, Paul's exegesis lies within the bounds of contemporary Jewish thinking. Speculation about the identity of heavenly figures appearing on earth was a standard part of contemporary apocalyptic thinking, to which he was certainly partial, so it is a rather small step for him to draw his own conclusion about the identity of the rock and to expect his audience to make this leap alongside him. Only one being functions for the Christian community as the intermediary through whom the necessities of life are supplied from heaven: unarguably, the rock is Christ! The logic here is primarily functional in its force: he can make this identification, and ask his audience to accept it, because what the rock did for Israel then is equivalent to what Christ does for them now. As Israel depended

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[32]It is beyond the scope of my study to attempt to prove that this Psalm is echoed here (in Hays' sense) by showing that it underlies Paul's treatment of this topic in more ways than this one.

[33]Thiselton's summary noted above includes the place of the Wisdom motif here in some Jewish exegesis, notably Philo and Wisdom, but also reports Kreitzer's reservations about their correspondence with Paul's use here. "Certain differences between the rabbinic and Philonic traditions in relation to 1 Cor.10:4 have recently been explored by Kreitzer; his approach underlines the need for caution in drawing too readily or uncitically on widespread assumptions about Paul's sources and his use of them. Paul certainly drew on Wisdom traditions in the LXX; what part is from speculative material in rabbinic traditions or in Philo remains open to serious question." Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 728.

on that rock to sustain its life, so Christ's people are entirely dependent on him.[34] One further very telling implication remains for Paul to leave in passing: according to the Jewish myth, the rock *followed* Israel in their desert wanderings,[35] rather like a faithful dog or the camp-followers behind an army. While the image of Christ following his people rather than leading them would probably undermine the attractiveness of this metaphor for the "wise", at least it is better than the thought that Israel was following *him* while they got lost for forty years.[36] For Paul this image must have had a further resonance which he intended them to receive: a Christ who faithfully follows his people so he can sustain them as they suffer and learn from their mistakes is one who is not too proud to be identified with camp-followers and others of low status, and whose authority is in no way diminished by renouncing his own rights. It seems that this apparently incidental comment is in fact linked to the centre of Paul's discourse.

The moral Paul wishes to draw from this narrative is expressed in v.5: αλλ ουκ εν τοῖς πλείοσιν αυτῶν ευδόκησεν ο θεός, κατεστρώθησαν γὰρ εν τῇ ερήμῳ. Although God had given such privileges to every one of the Israelites in the desert, these benefits could not be taken by the beneficiaries as assurances that he was pleased with them all, nor that his goodwill would continue in the future no matter how they behaved. In fact, a large number of them died when his anger was aroused against them, on more than one occasion. Paul has talked up the spiritual nature of the benefits received by Israel in order to minimize the differences between their situation and the present case of his audience. On this basis, he then affirms that these matters "became an example for us", τύποι ημῶν εγενήθησαν (v.6) and that, from the fact that these events are recorded in scripture, God intends them to be set before his people as a permanent warning, especially for "those upon whom the end of the age has come".[37] Some in the audience might consider that their privileged position in the new age inaugurated by Christ removes them far from the dangers and consequences depicted in the desert narratives, but Paul asserts that the opposite is the case: at the end of the age, these are realities. If God brought such

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[34]Whether this identification is metaphorical, typological, realistic, or something else, is of course the arguable point, but actually irrelevant to Paul's case. At the end of his survey, Thiselton concludes that Paul " ... may be drawing a cluster of symbolic resonances ... which portrays the all-sufficiency of the living Christ who bestows his mercies (not merely as a source of a static γνῶσις) as continuous provider, sustainer, and guide (imperfect επινον) for **all** those privileged to participate in these blessings." Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 730.

[35]For the rabbinic material, see Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 727 n.41.

[36]Against Thiselton's inclusion of "guide" in his list of Christ's functions, above.

[37] Richard M. Davidson, *Typology in Scripture: A Study of Hermeneutical ΤΥΠΟΣ Structures*, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series 2 (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1981) 193-297 is an extended study of 1 Cor.10:1-13 arguing that Paul's typology in this passage is "not only retrospective, analogical and exemplary, but prospective, divinely designed and prefigurative", that is to say inherent in the ancient events themselves. Paul's construction seems rather to be that the events became revelatory *when they were recorded in scripture* (v.11). See Collins, *First Corinthians*, 366-67; Hays, *First Corinthians*, 162; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 731-32.

consequences upon his people when they were comparatively less privileged than we, and has made sure we know about those events, then shall we not certainly suffer similar consequences if we succumb to the same temptations, which are not peculiar to ancient Israel, but an integral part of our common humanity? (See also 10:13)

The remainder of this passage (10:6-10) lists five sins committed by the wilderness generation, together with the consequences of three of these cases. There are some difficulties in matching each of these sins with specific instances in the wilderness narratives, which I do not intend to discuss in detail.[38] It seems to me that Paul is painting with a broad brush in this discourse, rather than carefully matching particular punishments with specific sins, and that it is the overall punishment that really matters: exclusion from the promised land, which he has specified in v.5, a clear reference to Num.14:16,26-35. That exclusion of all but two of those Israelites who originally left Egypt was brought about by two means: their deaths over the forty years of wandering, or specific acts of divine judgment such as those referred to by Paul. The end result of that long period was that their bodies were "scattered"(κατεστρώθησαν, v.5) in the desert, left behind as the camp moved on. The tragedy for Paul is that they did not all make it through to the goal for which they had set out together, and he believes that the church in Corinth faces a similar possibility. Secondly, it is evident that he is working from an amalgam of interpreted scripture that includes passages from Ex.32; Num.11, 14, 21, 25; Pss.77,105(LXX); and possible subsequent layers of Jewish interpretation which are now problematic for us to identify. These form an indivisible unity in his mind, the scriptural grounds for his conviction that God's people in all ages have been warned by the example of the wilderness narratives, taken as a whole; that they face catastrophe whenever this deadly combination of inter-related sins begins to arise within their community life.

An interpretation of these five deadly sins as an inter-related syndrome should be seen to arise from a conjunction of terminology in the scriptural passages referenced by Paul, rather than by attempting to argue that these were associated together in a Greco-Roman social context.[39] We should remind ourselves that Paul is telling his audience about matters concerning which they are ignorant (v.1) despite their gentile "wisdom", and this is less likely to be an unfamiliarity with the desert narratives than a failure to appreciate their true significance: their status as a *warning* that God's people continue to face a prospect of divine judgment, especially once idolatry appears amongst them. Jews in general tended to have a keener perception than gentiles that God really cares about idolatry *among his own people* even if he tolerates it elsewhere, and is not above

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[38]For such detailed arguments, and coverage of recent debate, I defer to Fee, *First Corinthians*, 450-58; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 733-43.

[39]e.g., Fee, *First Corinthians*, 455; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 738-39 discuss links between idolatry and sexual immorality in Corinth, acknowledging their problematic nature.

decimating them if that is what it takes to keep the community holy.[40] Paul in particular is convinced from his reading of scripture that idolatry is more likely to gain a foothold among his converts if it is accompanied by the other sins depicted in the narratives, some of which may be more evident among them already than others. It is the potential for these to combine as a deadly cocktail of temptations that Paul reads from the narratives, which thus constitute a warning against that very possibility, broken down into five specific admonitions.

The first admonition, in v.6, is εις τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἡμᾶς επιθυμητὰς κακῶν, καθὼς κακεῖνοι επεθύμησαν. "A desire for evil things" is so general that most scholars have read this as a general motivational category subsuming the remaining four sins.[41] However, the occurrence of this terminology in the desert narratives suggests some specific connotations for the sin of επιθυμία. The Numbers 11 story about the fatal provision of meat contains this lexical item four times: Καὶ ο επίμικτος ο εν αυτοῖς **πεθύμησαν επιθυμίαν**... "Now the mixed race among them craved a craving ..." (v.4a), and καὶ εκλήθη τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ τόπου εκείνου Μνήματα τῆς επιθυμίας, ὅτι εκεῖ ἔθαψαν τὸν λαὸν τὸν επιθυμητήν "and the name of that place was Memorial of Craving, for there they buried the people who craved" (v34). In ascribing this fatal desire to ο επίμικτος, the scriptural text explains it as something characteristic of foreigners who join themselves to Israel, which is hardly auspicious for an apostle who specialises in recruiting gentiles into the people of God.[42] It suggests that when it comes to craving food, gentiles have a special propensity for getting God's people into trouble. While this is more likely to have troubled Paul than his audience, his message to them is clear: the ancestors were fed with spiritual food and drink (manna and water) but many were not satisfied and had an evil craving for meat. They got what they wanted, but perished. Just so, if any of the Corinthians are not satisfied with the food and drink given through Christ but indulge an evil craving for idol-meat, this too will cause their destruction.

Paul's second admonition, in v.7, is against idolatry: μηδὲ ειδωλολάτραι γίνεσθε καθὼς τινες αυτῶν, ὥσπερ γέγραπται, **Εκάθισεν ο λαὸς φαγεῖν καὶ πεῖν καὶ ανέστησαν παίζειν** . The scriptural quotation is from Ex.32:6, within the story of Israel's apostasy at

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[40]A sampling of the intertestamental literature: Apoc. Abraham 1:1-8:6; 1 Enoch 99:6-9; Jubilees 22:16-18; Joseph and Asenath 11:7-9, 12:5-6; Sib.Or. 3:9-39; Philo *De Vita Cont. 1:5-9.*

[41] Robertson and Plummer, *First Corinthians*, 203; Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 224; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 167; Wendell Lee Willis, *Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline Argument in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10*, SBL Dissertation Series (Chico: Scholars Press, 1985) 143-47; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 453; Gardner, *The Gifts of God*, 150; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 370; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 731. Against this view, recent scholars who see five related sins here include Wayne A. Meeks, "'And Rose Up to Play': Midrash and Paraenesis in 1 Cor. 10:1-22," *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 16 (1982): 68-69; and Yeo, *Rhetorical Interaction*, 168.

[42]This term also appears in Ex12:38 denoting "a numerous mixed company" joining Israel in the exodus from Egypt; in Ezek.30:5(LXX) as "επίμικτοι and children of the covenant shall fall by the sword"; in Neh.13:3 prescribing the separation of πᾶς επίμικτος from Israel's returnees in Jerusalem; and in Judith.2:20 describing Hollofernes' huge crowd of camp followers.

Sinai, when their offering of sacrifices to the golden calf was followed by a cultic meal, which led them in turn "to play".[43] The "wise" may argue that they are only advocating freedom to eat within the precincts of a pagan temple, not to actually offer the meat in sacrifice, nor to get carried off into an orgy. Paul counters, in effect, that Jews have a very ominous scriptural narrative warning them that these things all tend to go together. If you go to eat, you may soon feel obliged to join your hosts in making the offerings, and it is only one small step from there to joining them afterwards at the brothel.

So his admonition against idolatry is immediately followed by another against sexual immorality: μηδὲ πορνεύωμεν, καθώς τινες αυτῶν επόρνευσαν καὶ ἔπεσαν μιᾷ ημέρᾳ ειϊκοσι τρεῖς χιλιάδες (v.8). The scriptural reference to the 23,000 killed,[44] is from the narrative in Numbers 25, in which "the people" began to have sexual relations (εκπορνεύσαι, v.1) with Moabite women then responded to their call to join them in sacrifices to their god: ἔφαγεν ο λαὸς τῶν θυσιῶν αυτῶν καὶ προσεκύνησαν τοῖς ειδώλοις αυτῶν (v.2). This combination of eating pagan sacrificial food and joining in prayer to their idols was the transgression that aroused God's anger: καὶ ετελέσθη Ισραηλ τῷ Βεελφεγωρ· καὶ ωργίσθη θυμῷ κύριος τῷ Ισραηλ. By means of this indulgence, they consecrated themselves to another god.[45] The danger represented by this narrative is that which comes from too close an association with pagans, not only in its most intimate form, προρνεία, but in any other emotional entanglement which makes it difficult for God's people to refuse an invitation to join pagans in prayer to their gods.

Paul's fourth admonition, in 10:9, is against "testing" the Lord: μηδὲ εκπειράζωμεν τὸν Χριστόν, καθώς τινες αυτῶν επείρασαν καὶ υπὸ τῶν ὀφεων απώλλυντο. The narrative in which snakes were used to punish Israel, Num.21:4-9, does not describe Israel's complaints about their provisions as testing God, but Ps.77:18(LXX) does:

> καὶ εξεπείρασαν τὸν θεὸν εν ταῖς καρδίαις αυτῶν τοῦ αιτῆσαι βρῶματα ταῖς ψυχαῖς αυτῶν καὶ κατελάλησαν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ εἶπαν Μὴ δυνήσεται ο θεὸς ετοιμάσαι τράπεζαν εν ερήμῳ;
> And they put God to the test in their hearts, by asking for food for their souls and speaking against God and saying "Is God able to prepare a table in the desert?"

The Psalm makes no reference to the snakes either, so it could have either (or both) of Num. 11 or Num. 21 in mind when it describes the Israelites' request for meat as a testing, or provocation to God. What it adds to the narratives in doing so is a focus on God's capability as a provider: because they are dissatisfied with their bread-and-water diet, the grumblers scornfully ask if he is not able to do better, that is to set a *proper* table

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[43]Sexual immorality, by implication: see Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 734-35.

[44]Numbers 25:9 actually has 24,000 killed, which probably says something about Paul's memory for numbers. On the various attempts to reconcile this disrepancy, see Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 739-40. Like Fee, *First Corinthians*, 456, Thiselton is untroubled by the discrepancy : the reference is not in doubt.

[45]Βεελφεγωρ, "Lord of Gluttony"? The LXX rendering of בעל פעור suggests that the translators thought so. If Paul had picked up this nuance, it would certainly have strengthened his connection between eating ειδωλόθυτα and sexual immorality.

before them. They are insulting their host: Israel's God is only up to bread and water, whereas they are accustomed to better food from other hosts. The backgound issue is thus, once again, the attraction of other gods. Paul adds a further element: in this admonition, he forbids putting the Lord, that is to say *Christ*, to the test.[46] Just as some Israelites insulted their Lord by their dissatisfaction with his provisions in the desert, so some of Christ's people in Corinth are coming close to insulting their Lord, if they express a dissatisfaction with his table by attending those of his pagan rivals.

The fifth admonition serves to tie these scriptural precedents together even more firmly: μηδὲ γογγύζετε, καθάπερ τινὲς αυτῶν εγόγγυσαν καὶ απώλοντο υπὸ τοῦ ολοθρευτοῦ (10:10). The punishment described in this example, "and they were destroyed by the destroyer" is of no use at all in identifying any particular narrative,[47] and the sin proscribed, "don't grumble", uses a verb found throughout the Pentateuch. We are best to see it as a summarizing warning (more so than the first) with strong links to two key texts: Num.11:1, Καὶ ἦν ο λαὸς γογγύζων πονηρὰ ἐναντι κυρίου, where it opens the first food-complaint narrative; and Num.14:1-35, where it it appears four times in the story of Israel's despairing response to the report of the spies that was the decisive reason so many died in the desert. By this double reference, Paul links his admonitions back to the first against evil cravings, and with the second picks up again his earlier warning (v.5) that his audience, like Israel, may not all make it to their promised land. Grumbling about the food God is able to supply is not too far removed from grumbling about his ability to defend his people against being overwhelmed by their opponents. In one case the grumbling is motivated by desire, in the other by fear, but both are insulting to the one who has called them together as a people, has undertaken to provide for and protect them, and who will faithfully bring them to their destination (cf. 1 Cor.1:7-9).

The five sins proscribed by Paul in this passage can thus be seen to derive their significance in his mind from four key narratives describing Israel's situation in the desert, which is clearly analogous to that of the church in Corinth, the latter being a culturally mixed group needing to clarify their boundaries in the face of pagan cultic activities which they meet up with constantly in their everyday lives. Paul can see this similarity, can recognize that the desert narratives amount to a warning to them now (10:11). Not being so familiar with the scriptures, or so convinced of their relevance, his gentile converts probably feel more comfortable about their situation than Paul does, but that only makes

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[46]There is a text-critical issue here: a number of important texts have κύριον rather than Χριστόν. The United Bible Society prefer the former and the Nestle-Aland editors the latter. See Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (London: United Bible Societies, 1971) 560; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 457 n.34; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 740. A major reason for this preference for Χριστόν is that it is the more difficult reading, or would be if early transmitters understood the text to assert that the Israelites tested *Christ*. It doesn't assert that at all, unless we detect an ellipsis of the object in the second clause, which is not necessarily the case.

[47]See Fee, *First Corinthians*, 457-58; Hays, *First Corinthians*, 165; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 742-43.

them more vulnerable to dangers they have normalized. They must shake off this false assurance, lest they too fall in their own desert: ὥστε ὁ δοκῶν ἑστάναι βλεπέτω μὴ πέσῃ (10:12). He may have just warned them against testing God, but is clearly of the view that it is *they* who are being tested, and that only God can bring them through this trial safely. Hence he moves straight on to an assurance that they will in fact emerge from this and all other temptations successfully, with God's faithful help (10:13).

His concluding admonition is a categorical imperative: Διόπερ, ἀγαπητοί μου, φεύγετε ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλολατρίας. The sum of all this scriptural argumentation is simple: flee from idolatry, avoid it at all costs, stay as far away from it as you can, don't flirt with this deadly danger. Paul's own convictions are here displayed openly, and they are Jewish through and through.

4.4 Israel's "fellowship in sacrifice" and our partnership in Christ

The passage of the discourse extending from 10:15 to 10:22 illustrates more clearly than any other the dilemma in which Paul finds himself as he attempts to argue in support of what is essentially a Jewish conviction about how God's people should behave in the presence of pagan cultic activity, without relying entirely on argumentative modes that are more convincing to Jews than to Greeks. At verse 15, we find an abrupt change in the tone of argument, as though he has suddenly realized that no matter how well he has just convinced himself that there can be no room for compromise with what he can so clearly label "idolatry"(v.14), he may have been talking past some of the audience.

So he makes a new start with an appeal to their rationality: ὡς φρονίμοις λέγω· κρίνατε ὑμεῖς ὃ φημι, "I speak as to thoughtful people: judge what I say for yourselves". This signals a distinct shift in the genre of his discourse from a Jewish world of argument in which scripture is accorded unquestioned authority, back into a Greek rhetorical world in which ultimate authority is left with the judgment of the audience. He has just been addressing them as though they were Jews seeking "signs", unmistakable evidence of God's presence and purpose on which they can found their actions; but now he treats them as Greeks who can only fully place their confidence in a "wisdom" that can convince their inner sense of truth and reality.[48] To convince them, he must provide both types of rationale. The problem is that "idolatry" is not a concept that carries much weight in the religious sensibilities of Greeks, and arguments promoting intolerance (as opposed to skepticism) of pagan religiosity do not appeal to their sense of what is reasonable.

[48]I am taking up the dichotomy between Jew and Greek expressed in 1:22 as a fundamental aspect of the whole letter. On the one hand we should recognize that Paul identifies with both Jew and Greek to some extent, needing both signs and wisdom to satisfy his own sense of truth, even if both of these demands run up against the reality of the crucified messiah. On the other hand he must also have recognized that he was more Jew than Greek, and that this marked him out from his gentile converts, as I am arguing here.

So in asking his Greek audience to judge what he is telling them, and to conclude that it is *unreasonable* for them to attend pagan religious rites when invited, Paul now ventures into dangerous territory. He must quickly support this request by indicating the grounds on which a culturally conditioned tolerance of other cults might be deemed unreasonable. The reason he puts forward is problematic:

> τὸ ποτήριον τῆς ευλογίας ᾧ ευλογοῦμεν, ουχὶ κοινωνία εστὶν τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ; τὸν ἄρτον ὃν κλῶμεν, ουχὶ κοινωνία τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ εστιν; ὅτι εις ἄρτος, ἓν σῶμα οι πολλοί εσμεν, οι γὰρ πάντες εκ τοῦ ενὸς ἄρτου μετέχομεν. (10:16-17)
> The cup of blessing that we bless, is it not a sharing in the blood of Christ? The bread we break, is it not a sharing in the body of Christ? Because there is one bread, we the many are one body, for we all partake of the one loaf.

The key term we must interpret here is the substantive κοινωνία, which I have rendered "a sharing". There are a variety of possibilities for translating this lexical item.[49] It occurs four times within vv.16-19, and only once otherwise in the epistle (at 1:9, in the last clause of the opening thanksgiving: δι ου εκλήθητε εις **κοινωνίαν** τοῦ υιοῦ αυτοῦ Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν.), where it is open to several of these possible renderings. This means that the occurrences in the present passage must be interpreted as a self-consistent unit, according to the reader's judgment of what makes best sense in the context of the present discourse. That in turn requires us to assess how this term related to the social context in which the audience would understand them as an integral part of an appeal to their rationality. Willis outlines the two main historical lines of interpretation:

> Some have interpreted these verses to mean "participation" and have understood Christians to have a part/share of Christ in the eucharist. How this is the case is understood in several ways ... Others have stressed the associative character of κοινωνία. Then it is the "association" with other believers which is the key component in Christian κοινωνία. In this view it is the relationship among the participants which is most important. [50]

Willis points out that the subsequent passage contains examples of sacrificial κοινωνία drawn from three distinct cultic traditions: Christian tradition regarding the Lord's Supper (v.16), scriptural tradition regarding Israel's cult (v.18), and pagan cultic practice and theology (vv.19-20). His subsequent argument is focused on proving that in all three spheres κοινωνία carries an associational rather than sacramental or participatory meaning, and he may be held to have made a strong case.[51]

What he does not do is to carry through on his observation that "Paul begins a transition to reasoning again in 10:15 where he appeals to the Corinthians to consider and accept his reasons for avoiding these cultic associations ... it seems clear that Paul is

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[49]BAGD 4th Edn. 438-49 gives *association, communion, fellowship, close relationship, generosity, fellow-feeling, altruism, gift, contribution, participation* and *sharing.*

[50] Willis, *Idol Meat in Corinth*, 167-68.

[51] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 467, and Hays, *First Corinthians*, 167 both accept that κοινωνία in sacrifice is essentially a bond-forming matter, but see the vertical bond formed with the divine host in sacrificial meals as of at least equal importance for Paul's argument as the horizontal bonding.

honestly inviting the Corinthians to evaluate his arguments."[52] On the one hand he argues that Paul emphasizes the common ground between all three examples of cultic κοινωνια: participation in the fellowship formed around the shared sacrificial meal. On the other he acknowledges that there will be an objection that it is the fellowship that is important and that neither the sacrificial food nor the idol to whom it has been offered are anything in themselves in Christian eyes.[53] This is the heart of the argument to which Paul has opened himself with his appeal to reason in verse15, for there is nothing in the Greek tradition that would support a prohibition of entering into more than one such fellowship group, and this must be doubly so for those who believe nothing is happening in relation to the gods or the offered food in pagan sacrifices.[54] What Willis does firmly establish is that Paul's logic is entirely scriptural: that having begun with the Christian Lord's supper tradition in v.16, [55] he then interprets this entirely in terms of Israel's exclusive covenant relationship formed by means of sacrificial flesh and blood. Commenting on v.18, βλέπετε τὸν Ισραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα· ουχ οι εσθιοντες τὰς θυσίας κοινωνοὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου εισιν; Willis writes,

> This can only mean that in the joint participation of sacrifice and accompanying rites the fellowship of κοινωνια is established and sustained among the worshippers; they are a cultic community ... In Israel's faith and practice the sacrifice served to seal the covenant relationship between YHWH and his people. It also established a relationship among the people who worship YHWH ... It is this relationship to which Paul refers in 10:18... Although Paul does not make the point explicitly here, one aspect of Israel's κοινωνια pertinent to the Corinthian problem was its exclusive character, set over against the pagan world. Paul may assume this aspect of Israel's κοινωνια when in 10:21,22 he warns the Corinthians that violation of the exclusive loyalty God expects may provoke the Lord's (probably Christ's, but perhaps the Father's) jealousy.[56]

We should notice carefully what Paul has done in verses 15 to 18. Having begun with an invitation to judge what he has said (his exhortation to "flee from idolatry" in v.14) on a basis of rationality or common-sense (v.15), he then puts forward what should be unobjectionable grounds from the Christian eucharistic tradition (v.16) which he interprets as a basis for creating unity among those participating (v.17). He has done nothing controversial so far. He then draws on the precedent of Israel's κοινωνια in sacrifice, with all of the exclusive, covenantal associations that carries for him. At this point he pulls himself up, acknowledging that he has shifted his argument to what is common sense to him but not his audience. So he begins again, τι οὖν φημι; "What am I saying?", echoing his invitation in v.15 that they refer to their own reasoning. He knows

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[52] Willis, *Idol Meat in Corinth*, 183.

[53]Willis, *Idol Meat in Corinth*, 189.

[54]As Willis acknowledges: Willis, *Idol Meat in Corinth*, 220.

[55] Hays, *First Corinthians*, 167 correctly identifies this tradition as common ground between Paul and his opponents.

[56]Willis, *Idol Meat in Corinth*, 187 Willis, *Idol Meat in Corinth*, 187 There seems little argument that Paul's grounds in this argument, making attendance at pagan cultic meals at act of disloyalty to Christ, are entirely scriptural in origin. See Fee, *First Corinthians*, 470-74; and Hays, *First Corinthians*, 170.

full well what *they* will say next: that his position implies that there is some sinister reality in pagan religion, either in the food or in the idol itself. There is, after all, a long-established prophetic tradition of mocking idol-worshippers for bowing down to wood and stone, and every clear-thinking Greek knows that physical images are not actually gods. Moreover, as Paul will acknowledge later at 10:26, all foods come from the one true God anyway, and nothing actually happens to them when they are offered to the idol. All of this is common sense, and common ground between Greeks and Jews, so what is Paul's problem here? At this point he abandons his attempt to prove his case from common sense and returns to scripture: αλλ ȣτι ȣ θȣουσιν, δαιμονιοις καὶ ου θεȣ (v.19) is a near quotation from the Song of Moses, ἐθυσαν δαιμονιοις καὶ ου θεȣ (Deut.32:17). Those who make sacrifices to idols are worshipping demons, not God.[57] He has proof-texted his way out of the rhetorical corner into which he painted himself, abandoning his appeal to Greek φρȣνημα. How do we know that pagans offer their sacrifices to demons? Not through any evidence based on their own intentions or reported experience, but solely because scripture says that this is what they are doing. From this point Paul lets his scripturally grounded convictions about idolatry have free expression. He does not want his audience, all beloved converts, to become κοινωνȣὺς τȣν δαιμονιων (v.20b), a fellowship formed by and with demonic forces. It is impossible (ου δȣνασθε) to drink from the cup of demons and of the Lord, to eat at both tables (v.21). Why not, given that some of them are doing it already? Because God will not allow it to go on! Isaiah 65:11 in the LXX is particularly ominous: because Israel has deserted God's holy mountain (on which he has promised them a feast) in order to set a table for demons, καὶ ετοινάζοντες τȣ δαιμονι τράπαζαν, he will give them over to the sword (v.12) . God's servants shall eat and drink, while those at the demons' table hunger and thirst (v.13) The issue here is just the same as in the desert narratives: frequenting the table of another host is an insult to God, implying dissatisfaction with the provisions he has made.

Paul's last riposte in v.22 is also thoroughly scriptural in genre: ȣ παραζηλȣμεν τὸν κȣριον; μὴ ισχυρȣτεροι αυτȣ εσμεν; "Or are we provoking the Lord to jealousy? Are we stronger than he?" The first of these rhetorical questions refers once again to the Song of Moses: Αυτοὶ **παρεζȣ̔ηλωσάν** με επ ου θεȣ, παραȣξυνάν με τοȣ̔ς ειδȣ̔λοις αυτȣν (Deut.32:21) where, as in Isaiah 65, the consequence for their devotion to pseudo-gods is that the Lord will provoke them to jealousy at the hands of those who are not his people, καγὼ παραζηλȣ̔σω αυτους επ ουκ ἐθνει, that is by favouring other nations and allowing them to destroy Israel. The second question is a little harder to locate in scripture, which nowhere presents idolatry as a trial of strength with the Lord. My guess is that Paul still has Deuteronomy 32 in mind, where the judgment visited upon Israel's idolaters is

[57]This belief is found elsewhere in Scripture, of course. See Ps. 95:5LXX, Ps.105:37LXX, Is.65:3,11LXX; and commentary in Fee, *First Corinthians*, 471-72; Hays, *First Corinthians*, 169; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 775.

depicted as a surprising weakness in the face of their enemies (vv.30, 36) and in the LXX is contrasted with the exhortation, καὶ ενισχυσάτωσαν αυτῷ πάντες υιοὶ θεοῦ, "and let all the sons of God strengthen themselves in him".[58]

4.4.1 A Change of Genre

After 10:22, the tone of Paul's discourse changes abruptly. He seems to begin on an entirely different course: Πάντα ἐξεστιν αλλ ου πάντα συμφέρει· πάντα ἐξεστιν αλλ ου πάντα οικοδομεῖ (10:23). What is happening here? Some commentators label the passage from here to the end of the discourse at 11:1 as a concluding summary.[59] Others view it as a change of topic.[60] I do not find either of these approaches convincing. Whatever πάντα ἐξεστιν may signal, it can hardly begin a summary of where Paul has got to so far, given that he has just spent the previous twenty two verses arguing passionately that some things are totally forbidden. And to treat all that follows as a tidying up of unfinished business on less important matters not yet covered, while it might take the change of tone seriously, does not demonstrate any real degree of continuity with the preceding section. Thus Fee begins his commentary on this section with the comment, "Paul has now basically finished his argument with the Corinthians over the assertions in their letter related to attendance at temple meals. But some loose threads must still be tied together."[61] Thiselton likewise: "Paul has covered most of the ground he wishes to address in 8:1 - 11:1".[62]

It would be more accurate to say, "Paul has now fully revealed his own true convictions, and must attend to some major objections that will arise in his audience." For what ensues is no anticlimax, but rather a spirited debate. Here at last the voices of Greek φρόνημα are allowed to surface properly. Paul knows that they must be heard and answered on their own terms if they are ever to be silenced, so now he attempts to do just that. What has happened here is not a change of topic, but a change of argumentative *genre*.[63] He is now in a truly deliberative mode, where only proofs acceptable to Greek

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[58] Collins, *First Corinthians*, 381-82 notes that the targum on Deut.32 interprets idolatry as a trial of strength with God.

[59]So Willis, *Idol Meat in Corinth*, 223; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 382, and Hays, *First Corinthians*, 174.

[60] Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 238 labels it "Nature, Extent, and Limitations of Christian Freedom; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 175 "Idol Sacrifices and Conscience (Freedom)"; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 475 "On the Eating of Marketplace Food"; Gardner, *The Gifts of God*, 172 "Other problems with food (verses 23 - 30)"; Wolfgang Schrage, *Der este Brief an die Korinther Vol.2*, Evangelisch—Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament VII (Zurich & Neukirchen—Vluyn / Solothurn: Benziger & Neukirchener, 1995) 460 "Feiheit und Konflikte beim Götzenopferfleishessen"; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 779 "Freedom and Love: Residual Issues and Recapitulation" (a mediating position).

[61]Fee, *First Corinthians*, 476.

[62] Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 779.

[63]Khiok-Khng Yeo is one scholar who has recognized this change in rhetorical genre, from what he classifies as "aggadic-hermeneutical" rhetoric in 1 Cor.10:1-22, to a "rhetoric of knowledge and love" in this final section, which he also identifies as the genre of the first chapter of the discourse, 8:1-13. Yeo, *Rhetorical Interaction*, 156-211.

common sense are allowed into the debate. As he had done at the very start of this discourse, he gives expression to his opponents' objections, giving a brief response to each that either indicates a line of counter-argument or gives practical advice on how to deal with a specific situation. What signals this genre change is not the origin of the objections so much as the nature of Paul's response: in each case a model of common sense to Greek ears.

To the first objection, Πάντα ἔξεστιν, he gives two separate lines of counter-argument, αλλ ου πάντα συμφέρει and αλλ ου πάντα οικοδομεῖ, and then adds a general precept, μηδεὶς τὸ εαυτοῦ ζητείτω αλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ετέρου. We have already heard from Mitchell how typical these responses are of deliberative rhetoric.[64] They would certainly have signalled to the audience that he was now serious about addressing them ως φρονίμοις . The cursory nature of each response also suggests that this verse is a recapitulation, not of the discourse as a whole, but in the sense that acceptable grounds for each assertion have already been established elsewhere in the discourse. We shall see later that these three values, *advantage, edification,* and *seeking the wellbeing of the other and the whole*, have loomed large in Paul's rhetoric. What is at stake now, however, is whether they combine to support Paul's rejection of all participation in pagan cultic meals. That in turn depends on how well he has already argued that case earlier in the discourse.

The second objection comes in the form of a quotation from Ps.23:1(LXX), implicitly a weighty challenge as to whether his declared position is fully representative of scripture: **τοῦ κυρίου** γὰρ **η γῆ καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αυτῆς.** His way of handling this challenge is to frame its expression with two words of practical advice that show his practice is fully in accord with that fundamental principle. The rhetorical effect of this framing device is to convey that this scripture and others like it constitute no problem for him. His first precept concerns meat sold in the marketplace: Πᾶν τὸ εν μακέλλῳ πωλούμενον εσθίετε μηδὲν ανακρίνοντες διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν. The second specifies how to respond to an invitation to dine with an outsider (presumably *not* in a temple precinct): εἰ τις καλεῖ υμᾶς τῶν απίστων καὶ θέλετε πορεύεσθαι, πᾶν τὸ παρατιθέμενον υμῖν εσθίετε μηδὲν ανακρίνοντες διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν. What you don't know about won't hurt you, and is totally acceptable to God.

But this hypothetical situation leads to a further objection: what happens if the invitation proves to be a moral ambush (εὰν δέ τις υμῖν ειπῃ, Τοῦτο ιερόθυτόν εστιν ...)? There can be only one response consistent with a policy of avoiding all participation in pagan sacrificial fellowship: claim your freedom *not* to eat as a matter of conscience (μὴ εσθίετε δι εκεῖνον τὸν μηνύσαντα καὶ τὴν συνείδησιν). Every Greek will allow the

[64]The first pair of responses in v.23 is certainly one of Mitchell's favourite texts identifying the epistle as deliberative: her index lists 28 page references to this verse alone. Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1991) 338.

nobility of someone sticking to their principles when placed in a compromising situation by another's initiative. Not that it is the Christian's conscience that is truly at risk in such an ambush, but rather that of the one creating the quandary (whether they do so deliberately or not): συνειδησιν δὲ λέγω ουχὶ τὴν εαυτοῦ αλλὰ τὴν τοῦ ετέρου. What is most important in that situation is not the danger of offending the hosts, given that they would understand this was unplanned, but the greater danger of compromising the questioner's perception of your integrity. Above all, the consciousness of the "other" regarding where the Christian community stands must be safeguarded, in order not to create confusion and distrust that would prevent them being won over (v.33).[65]

The final objection arises as a direct response to Paul's emphasis on the supreme importance of protecting the consciousness of the other. It comes in the form of a pair of rhetorical questions:

> ινατι γὰρ η ελευθερια μου κρινεται υπὸ αλλης συνειδήσεως;
> ει εγὼ χάριτι μετέχω, τι βλασφημοῦμαι υπὲρ ου εγὼ ευχαριστῶ;
> But why should my freedom by judged by another's consciousness?[66]
> If I receive (the food) as a blessing, why should I be criticised on account of that for which I am thankful?[67]

This objection gets to the very heart of all that will seem most unreasonable about Paul's stance on this issue. The fundamental values at the heart of Greek culture include a love of individual freedom and personal responsibility. One of those responsibilities was to avoid infringing the freedom of another wherever possible. If ever their Greek φρονεια had something to say, it would be here, in response to the hypothetical situation Paul has just depicted. What can possibly be gained by allowing someone else's consciousness, defective and misinformed as that may be, to be the decisive factor limiting your actions? A policy of doing nothing that could possibly be misinterpreted by others seems like a form of moral imprisonment of the enlightened by the ignorant. This is especially so when it impinges upon a believer's freedom to receive something as innocent as food as a gift from the one God from whom all blessings come. Surely that would amount to a form of spiritual death, a disconnection from the giver of life and all that sustains it? Who could countenance such a course of action? Christ did, of course, in his crucifixion.

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[65]The rendering of συνειδησιν as "consciousness" becomes very important at this point. On Paul's use of this term in the letter, see R.A. Horsley, "Consciousness and Freedom among the Corinthians: 1 Corinthians 8-10," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 40 (1978): 574-89; and Paul W. Gooch, "'Conscience' in 1 Corinthinans 8 and 10," *New Testament Studies* 33.2 (Apr 1987): 244-54.

[66]This rendering depends upon giving γάρ a contrastive sense. This particle has a very wide range of uses, and in dialogue these include at least three that would support me in the present case: (i) connecting with the speaker's previous utterance (in this case the previous objection), (ii) frank dissent from the preceding speaker, and (iii) only a partial or qualified agreement with the previous speaker's words. See J.D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954) 63-64, 74-75.

[67]For a thorough analysis of these paired questions as objections from a hypothetical opponent, within the genre of deliberative rhetoric, see Duane F. Watson, "1 Corinthians 10:23-11:1 in the Light of Greco-Roman Rhetoric: The Role of Rhetorical Questions," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 108.2 (1989): 301-18.

4.4.2 Christ Crucified: the Ultimate Example

From this point on Paul knows that he can carry his argument forward to its conclusion without needing any further direct recourse to scripture, because this final objection, which gets to the very heart of the spiritual issue at stake, can be answered decisively from within the Christian tradition which he shares with his Greek audience, rather than from his own formative tradition of Jewish scripture, which they do not share in the same way.

He begins by enunciating an unexceptional principle: ειτε οὖν εσθιετε ειτε πινετε ειτε τι ποιεῖτε, πάντα εις δόξαν θεοῦ ποιεῖτε. The final clause is totally acceptable to the objectors, because this is just what they claim they would be doing if theywe re to eat the idol-food: they would leave their host and companions in no doubt that they were thanking the one God, and that the idols the food had been offered to had in no way changed the essential nature of food as a gift from the One. The objectors are doubtless very keen to take every opportunity to offer just that witness. What Paul does here, though, is to point out that they can equally glorify God by the assertive act of pointedly *not* eating when confronted with such a situation. That is, they can glorify God by pointedly yielding their own freedom to receive what would be to them a blessing from God, in order to achieve a greater good, the effect this will have on the consciousness of the outsider. Blessings in such a situation do not only come in the form of good food, pleasant company, and the avoidance of potential embarrassments. The situation within a pagan's house is above all, for Paul, a *missionary opportunity*, in which the Christian's chief purpose should be to enable the gospel of Christ to be communicated. It was only by keeping such a focus in similar situations that Paul had won his audience as converts. Now they must learn to take on the same mission, and to conduct it on the same terms:

> απρόσκοποι καὶ Ιουδαίοις γίνεσθε καὶ«Ελλησιν καὶ τῇ εκκλησίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ,
> καθὼς καγὼ πάντα πᾶσιν αρέσκω μὴ ζητῶν τὸ εμαυτοῦ σύμφορον
> αλλὰ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ἵνα σωθῶσιν. (10:32-33)
> You must become blameless to Jews and to Greeks and to the church of God,
> just as I too seek to please everyone in all respects, not seeking my own advantage
> but that of the many, in order that they might be saved.

An injunction to be blameless is well within the bounds of normal Greek values, but its acceptability rather depends on whose opinion counts: to seek to please those who are depraved or ignoble would be ignoble in itself. When presented as a policy of seeking to please *everybody*, not only those one most admires but people of all classes and cultures, it begins to take on a quite unflattering aspect. Claiming to please everybody in regard to every matter is not only hyperbole but sounds like the most craven servility, yet Paul deliberately chooses to present himself in these terms to heighten the effect of his challenge to the audience.

He really wants them to make a crucial shift in their idea of what is φρονεια in this circumstance, to make it more consistent with the gospel they have already taken to heart.

They must accept one premise as entirely reasonable: that in their own experience of being evangelized by Paul, they had found his self-presentation quite acceptable. Even if some of them had subsequently begun to criticise his preaching style for its lack of rhetorical polish, they could not deny it had been good enough to win them over. Now he reveals something to them that they obviously have not thought about, but which forms his second premise: his initial presentation of Christ to them, which they had found convincing at the time, was one that had demanded from him a significant degree of adaptation to *their* ignorance and cultural prejudices. They are Greeks, after all, and he indicates, probably to their surprise, that even Greeks demand a significant degree of adaptation from gospel-bearers if they are to be won over to Christ. The subjection of their personal autonomy to the ignorance of others which they find so objectionable is just what he had in fact done for them, and because he was willing to do it for them they had experienced it as their salvation.

That is not the end of the matter. He is not willing for a moment to allow them to think that this may have been something peculiar to his personal style of evangelism. No matter what some of them may have come to believe under the influence of "wiser" models of ministry, there is no other authentic way of communicating the gospel. This self-abnegation of Paul's is not just his inter-personal style: it is modelled on the very heart of the gospel he is called to communicate, on the very model of the crucified messiah. If anyone ever subjected himself to the ignorant whims of those he was trying to reach, in order to save them, it was Christ. If the audience wants an authoritative model proving the spiritual value of self-abnegation and the benefits it brings to the world, they can look no further than the cross. With Paul's final admonition, the circle of his argument is closed, his discourse complete:

> μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε καθὼς κἀγὼ Χριστοῦ.(11:1)
> Become imitators of me, as I am of Christ.

CHAPTER 5

GENRE SOURCE FOUR: THE FOUNDATIONAL PROCLAMATION OF CHRIST

Up to this point I have been presenting Paul's discourse on ειδωλόθυτα as if it were simply a combination of genres drawn from Greek deliberative and juridicial rhetoric and Jewish scriptural interpretation, and indeed this is largely the case. As the dichotomy in 1:22 indicates at the outset, Paul gives us every reason to believe that he saw the issues that he had to deal with in this letter as largely a product of cultural differences that separated Jews from Greeks in general. I have argued that in this particular discourse, Paul's underlying task is to persuade an audience whose natural culture is Greek that they should embrace a point of view, or at least a code of practice, which is essentially an expression of Jewish sensibilities and hence alien to them. To achieve this, he recognizes that even if he gives free expression to the scriptural grounds that make this such a non-negotiable issue for him, as he does in 10:1-22, in order to persuade them he must also find arguments that will appeal strongly to their own natural sense of what is right and true: he must appeal to their φρονεια, their own common sense as it has been shaped by their cultural upbringing, a culture that is also expressed in the long tradition of Greco-Roman rhetoric. For that reason, the discourse both begins and ends in deliberative mode.

However, there is another very important source of argumentative genres that constitutes the final authority to which Paul appeals, namely the established proclamation of Christ, as the Corinthian audience first experienced it in his own preaching and as it existed independently of him in the traditions of the wider Christian movement.[1] A paradoxical aspect of this genre-source's role in the present discourse is the extent to which it seems to remain largely in the background after being introduced with a reference

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[1]Important studies on the relation between the Jesus traditions and Paul's writings include David L. Dungan, *The Sayings of Jesus in the Churches of Paul: The use of the Synoptic Tradition in the Regulation of Early Church Life* (Philadephia: Fortress Press, 1971); E. Earle Ellis, "Traditions in 1 Corinthians," *New Testament Studies* 32.4 (Oct 1986): 481-502; Peter J. Tomson, "La Première Épître aux Corinthiens comme Document de la Tradition Apostolique de Halakha," *The Corinthian Correspondence*, Ed. R. Bieringer, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 125 (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1996) 459-70; Anders Eriksson, *Traditions as Rhetorical Proof: Pauline Argumentation in 1 Corinthians*, Coniectanea Biblica New Testament Series 29 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1998); and Anders Eriksson, "Special Topics in 1 Corinthians 8-10," *The Rhetorical Interpretation of Scripture: Essays from the 1996 Malibu Conference*, eds Stanley E. Porter and Dennis L. Stamps, JSNT Supplement Series 180 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999) 272-301.

to Jesus' reported words 9:14, until it suddenly reappears at the very end, with his reference to the church of God as a group to be pleased (10:32), and with his appeal to the example of Christ (11:1).

We know from the evidence of the epistle as a whole just how important it was for Paul in this communication with the Corinthian believers to emphasize his connection with, and conformity to, the gospel of Christ as it was proclaimed throughout the Christian movement. In his epistolary opening he had greeted them as an integral part of the wider εκκλησια constituted by all those who called on the name of Christ (1:2). To counter their divisiveness, he had emphasized his essential unity with Apollos and other apostles and the God-givenness of their common gospel and ministry (ch.3). When giving advice on marital matters, he had carefully distinguished between his own judgment and those matters which were already decided on the basis of "a command of the Lord"(7:25): a specific dominical teaching handed down in the Church's tradition. Later he will make another part of that oral tradition (11:23-25) the basis for how he deals with eucharistic malpractices, and will begin his discourse on the resurrection by quoting the apostolic tradition he had received telling of the Lord's resurrection (15:3-7).

Within that established tradition, we may distinguish sayings-of-Jesus and narratives about his career from preaching-about-Jesus as seperate genres. I shall soon argue that an appeal to the latter tradition was actually the most authoritative genre that Paul uses in this discourse. What is somewhat remarkable is that sayings-of-Jesus and Jesus narratives are remarkable for their virtual absence. Two reasons stand out to me. The first may be too obvious: the Jesus movement began, and the earthly ministry of Jesus was entirely conducted, in a Palestinian environment where all outreach was directed to Jews who, while surrounded by encroaching paganism, kept themselves strictly apart from all its cultic manifestations.[2] Situations like those now faced by Paul and his converts in Corinth did not commonly arise. Nevertheless, there were elements in the Jesus traditions that might well be adapted to provide guidance, especially those that portrayed Jesus as beginning to break down the barriers of Jewish particularity that separated his nation from their gentile neighbours. There can be little doubt that those aspects of the Jesus tradition had provided Paul with important guiding precedents as he developed his own gentile mission. Why do they not appear, at least as backgound material, in the present discourse?

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[2]Emil Schürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the age of Jesus Christ*, ed. & rev. Fergus Millar & Matthew Black Geza Vermes (Edinburgh: T.&T.Clark, 1979) 30-52, gives a detailed description of pagan temples built in Palestine, chiefly in Gentile cities, but there is no reason to suppose that if sacrifical cultic activity was allowed in them Jews had any contact with it, or that they would have had any contact with its by-products in the marketplaces. First-century Jews in Palestine " ... would scarcely have tolerated the public performance of pagan worship in their midst." *ibid.,* 40.

5.1 Apostolic rights to support, and Paul's self-funding policy in Corinth

I want to suggest that the Jesus traditions are held at arm's length in this discourse because Paul needs to distance himself from one particular aspect of those traditions that are being used against him by those he opposes over the issue of ειδωλόθυτα. I formed this view on the basis of a study by Peter Richardson.[3] He sets out to explain the connection between 1 Corinthians 9, with its defence of Paul's refusal of financial support, and the rest of Paul's discourse in Chapters 8 and 10. He argues that the offer of support, unlike those Paul had accepted from other churches, must have come with some unacceptable strings attached. From its context here, this was most likely to be connected to the issue of food offered to idols. His hypothesis is that this most probably meant that those in this Christian community who were able to offer that support must have compromised the boundaries separating that community from pagan sacrifices to such a degree that Paul is unable to accept their hospitality.[4] Alternatively, accepting financial support from them might place him under obligation not to criticise their acceptance of hospitality from pagan friends. Whichever is the case, Paul's stand is in contrast to "others" who have accepted financial support for their ministries from those same Corinthian patrons, without expressing any scruples. Richardson's very distinctive hypothesis, which I find most convincing, is that those "others" must have justified their stance by appealing to those parts of the Jesus traditions where Jesus instructs the missionaries he sends out to accept hospitality freely and to eat whatever is set before them.[5]

> This 'word of the Lord' is open to the construction, especially in Luke and Thomas, but weakly even in Matthew and possibly in Mark, that Christian missionaries ought to eat what is offered by the person with whom they stay (Matthew alone is concerned for the host's worthiness), not raising any question about it (as Paul phrases it in 1 Cor. 10:25-30). If the patron – for patronage is the main form of support anticipated in the Q-saying – offers 'defiled' food (see *Gos. Thom.* 14b explicitly, and Mk. 7:15), they are to eat without scruple. This, I suggest, is offensive to Paul, and he holds that it ought to be offensive to others as well ...
> When this difference of opinion arose it may have seemed minor, but it pushes Paul into a corner, for he makes an issue of support and then insists that he is freer in the gospel if he were to accept no support. Against the word of Jesus and, I presume, the strong opinions of some Christians whom Paul is offending by his attacks on their menu, Paul first attacks the question of improper eating practices – the 'dangerous food' of chs. 8 and 10. – and then defends his own practice of not accepting support – his 'boasting' of ch. 9. This two-pronged understanding helps to explain chs. 8-10 quite nicely, for the problem of idol food – food that Paul rejects – is a part of the form of patronal support that offends Paul.[6]

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[3]Peter Richardson, "Temples, Altars and Living from the Gospel (1 Cor.9.12b-18)," *Gospel in Paul: Studies in Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for Richard L. Longenecker.*, eds L.Ann Jervis and Peter Richardson, JSNT Supplement Series (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994) 89-110.

[4]Richardson actually frames this in terms of Paul and Barnabas following a model of ministry based on priestly service in the Jerusalem temple, with an analogous form of cultic purity. This contentious idea is not essential to his argument, as I read it, so I am leaving it out of my summary.

[5]Citing Lk.10:5,7-8; Mt.10:10b,11; Mk. 6:10; and Gos.Thom. 14b. Richardson, "Living from the Gospel," 106.

[6]Richardson, "Living from the Gospel," 106-07.

While there are some aspects of Richardson's presentation that are open to question, his linking of those texts in the Jesus tradition with both Paul's refusal of support and the matter of pagan hospitality, seems inherently plausible, providing a potent line of explanation for why Paul's defence of his support policy gets so much space in the middle of the ειδωλόθυτα discourse.

If the length of Paul's self-defence against his vulnerability in the face of the Jesus tradition is evidence for how important that tradition was to him, its exact *position* in the discourse is also very significant as an indicator of the particular threat it posed to him in relation to the issue of ειδωλόθυτα. He launches into this impassioned απολογία immediately after putting himself forward as an example to follow in this matter: not that he actually asks them to follow him, but rather just states his own committed policy (8:13). It is as though he knows exactly what reaction this will bring from his critics in Corinth. "Oh yes, we were waiting for you to get around to your own custom regarding idol foods, which as we all know is directly opposed to a very specific direction from Jesus that his messengers should accept hospitality wherever it is offered and eat whatever is put in front of them. An unqualified command on the one hand, and a demonstration of the freedom your faith in Christ gives on the other. But you just don't seem to have it at all. Quite frankly, Paul, you are so far off-line on this issue that it casts your whole status as an apostle into doubt." This is a really sore point with him, as his response shows, and something very like that must have been said about him, no doubt in his absence. How does he handle the challenge? One means, as I have already argued, is to present this "command' of Jesus as the outworking of a more general principle of natural and scriptural law. This implies that it should be interpreted in that legal context, with due regard for God's intentions for all of his people, rather than as a distinctive marker of apostolic status. The Lord's intention in giving this command can therefore be inferred from that wider principle; it is to ensure that the workers' needs are met, as a matter of justice among his people. It follows that an apostle's freedom to make use of this right is not an obligation to do so, and that his right to get his needs met is equally demonstrated in his freedom to chose *not* to do what the Lord actually said, should circumstances make that preferable. This claim was probably as paradoxical to his critical audience as it has been to at least one modern reader:

> However, no sooner has Paul referred to this command of the Lord than he asserts in the most unequivocal language that he does not and will not obey it. Hardly what one would expect! ... But not only is Paul found to be customarily disregarding this regulation. Later on in his subsequent correspondence with the Corinthians, after his disobedience has apparently become the focus of a violent controversy, Paul dares to denounce in the most savage way certain other famous apostles (none other than Peter and the brothers of the Lord!) who were proceeding in *accordance* with it.[7]

[7]Dungan, *The Sayings of Jesus*, 3.

This is not a comfortable place for Paul to be, for although he may have truly come to terms with the paradoxical nature of this aspect of his discipleship, others will take more convincing that it is not disobedence. The rationale he follows, in claiming to be μὴ ὢν ἄνομος θεοῦ αλλ ἔννομος Χριστοῦ (9:21), is to elevate Jesus' life and deeds above his words. Whatever the Lord is reported to have said must be interpreted within the even more significant context of what he is known to have done, and even then all of his reported deeds must be understood in the light of the one great salvific fact at the heart of the tradition of proclamation: his self-giving on the cross.

5.2 "Under Christ's law": the authority of dominical/apostolic tradition and example

In order to understand Paul's argumentative strategy, it is helpful to distinguish his *pragmatic* goals from other aspects of his discourse. Pragmatics is now a branch of discourse analysis that pays attention to, and attempts to explain, what language users use language to *do* to one another by means of what they *say*. Another way of defining this field is as the study of interpersonal aspects of language. Historically it arose from a converging recognition among both linguists and philosophers that neither the logic nor grammar of normal language use could be systematically described without taking into account what it achieved as well as what it meant. Further, there has been an increasing recognition in both disciplines that the meaning of real human discourse, as opposed to artificial languages, was actually dependent on and determined by its pragmatic aspects.[8]

While this means that we should always be asking what Paul is trying to achieve in relation to his audience, this is doubly important in the present discourse where we now have reason to believe that he knows he will never get them all to think and feel as he does

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[8]One early philosophical manifestation of this development, Speech Act Theory, provides the linguistic theory informing Thiselton's commentary on this epistle. On pragmatics in linguistics, see Teun A. Dijk, van, *Text and Context: Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse*, Longman Linguistics Library (London: Longman, 1977); Jerrold M. Sadock, "On Testing for Conversational Implicature," *Syntax and Semantics, Vol.9: Pragmatics*, Ed. Peter Cole (New York: Academic Press, 1978) 281-97; Geoffrey N. Leech, *Explorations in Semantics and Pragmatics*, Pragmatics and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary Series of Language Studies, 5 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 1980); Stephen C. Levinson, *Pragmatics*, Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1983); Geoffrey N. Leech, *Principles of Pragmatics*, Longman Linguistics Library, 30 (London: Longman, 1983); François Recanati, *Meaning and Force: The Pragmatics of Performative Utterances*, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987); Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson, *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*, Studies in Interactional Sociolinguistics 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987); Anna Wierzbicka, *Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: The Semantics of Human Interaction*, Trends in Linguistics: Studies and Monographs, 53 (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991); Rodie Risselada, *Imperatives and Other Directive Expressions in Latin: A Study in the Pragmatics of a Dead Language*, Amsterdam Studies in Classical Philology, 2 (Amsterdam: J.C.Gieben, 1993); Jürgen Habermas, *On the Pragmatics of Communication*, Ed. Maeve Cooke, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998); Robert C. Stalnaker, *Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought*, Oxford Cognitive Science Series (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999); and Alan Cruse, *Meaning in Language: An Introduction to Semantics and Pragmatics* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000).

about foods offered to idols, mainly because, even though his converts, they are still Greeks and not Jews. Therefore it is useful to ask if we can identify his realistic goals. What actual outcomes in their behaviour and in their relationship with him does he seem to be working towards in this discourse? I suggest there are in fact two. He will be satisfied on the matter of ειδωλόθυτα if the instructions he gives (to avoid meals in temple precincts and to refrain from knowingly eating food that has been offered to idols) are in fact adopted as behavioural norms by the congregation at large. In relation to himself, he needs to reverse the damage to his authority and influence among the congregation that has been done by the criticism he faces over his own practice of refusing support: to achieve that he must convince the audience that this practice is at least consistent with obedience to Christ.

It all depends on that second goal, as he constructs the discourse at large. His last, climactic sentence is a summary expression of what he wants from them: μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε καθὼς κἀγὼ Χριστοῦ.(11:1) "Become imitators of me, as I am of Christ." That is a very wide demand, but it can be broken down from all that has preceded into at least these specifics:

1. Stop criticizing me for my refusal of financial support.
2. Accept that my personal policy stated in 8:13, διόπερ ει βρῶμα σκανδαλίζει τὸν αδελφόν μου, ου μὴ φάγω κρέα εις τὸν αἰῶνα, is my way of following Christ on the issue of idol foods.
3. Follow my example at least to the extent of avoiding meals in pagan temples and not knowingly eating ειδωλόθυτα.

In rhetorical terms, the crucial factor in this discourse is ἦθος : Paul's personal credibility as an authoritative example of Christlike living. To restore that credibility from the damage done to it over the related issues of idol food and financial support, he has to persuade them to revisit the construction they have placed upon his actions in relation to each issue. His avoidance of food offered to idols has been construed by them as a lack of the freedom he ought to display in response to Christ's direction to his first missionaries: he must reframe this as a more noble freedom to choose not to eat where that will achieve a greater good than eating. They have interpreted his refusal of financial support as disobedience to Christ: he must persuade them that it is actually a higher form of obedience, if not to the Lord's words, then to his example.

To achieve that reframing requires boldness, in this case a reversal of roles from accused to accuser. Immediately after his introduction to the discourse, which has focused on the general topic of γνῶσις , Paul raises a serious accusation against his critics, that their own practice regarding ειδωλόθυτα, far from being more enlightened than his own (the whole point of their γνῶσις claim) is actually doing serious damage to others who do not share their "freedom" (8:9). The spotlight is off his policy for the moment and onto theirs. He now moves swiftly to contrast the effects of their actions not with his own but

with Christ's, and specifically his death on behalf of the hypothetical brother damaged by their actions: ο αδελφὸς δι ὃν Χριστὸς απέθανεν (8:11). The one Christ intended to be a beneficiary of his self-sacrifice is actually being deprived of that benefit because of the influence of other beneficiaries! He drives home his conclusion: this is a sin not only against that brother they dismiss as weak and insignificant, but against the Lord himself, and not over some trivial matter concerning food (c.f. their reported slogans in 8:8 [9]) but against the very heart of his salvific mission. It is they, not Paul, who are the transgressors, and their sin is against the very heart of the gospel.

It is important to correctly identify the argumentative genre operating here as *an appeal to the κήρυγμα*, the established apostolic proclamation of Christ. Earlier, in the first discourse of the epistle, Paul had identified the heart of the gospel, which they had accepted when he first proclaimed it to them, as the crucified messiah: ου γὰρ ἔκρινά τι ειδέναι εν υμῖν ει μὴ **Ιησοῦν Χριστὸν καὶ τοῦτον εσταυρωμένον** (2:2). He does not expect his opponents to dismiss this as merely his own interpretation of the wider movement's message, as his decision was not to *frame* his proclamation in those terms, but rather to focus on that one essential aspect of the message he had received from others.[10] Later, in his resurrection discourse, he will cite, as an essential part of the definitive apostolic proclamation which he had received, the formula ὅτι **Χριστὸς απέθανεν υπὲρ τῶν αμαρτιῶν ημῶν** κατὰ τὰς γραφάς (15:3). Thus both aspects of this proclamation, the centrality of Christ's death and its salvific benefits for "us",[11] are established as fixed *topoi*, quite independent of Paul, to which he is able to appeal against the accusation that he has set himself over against the Jesus traditions. On this basis he has now effectively shifted the terms of debate with his opponents from "Who is most obedient to the words of Jesus?" to "Who is the better example of following the crucified Christ?".

Before that can happen, of course, he actually has to introduce the matter of his own example, which he does at 8:13, creating the immediate need to defend himself, as we have seen. However it is important that he doesn't let a defensive tone continue for too long, as that would suggest a vulnerability to the criticisms he faces, reinforcing their validity. What he needs to do, rather, is to mount an extended argument that will provide multiple grounds for his audience to accept his actions as the Christlike examples he claims them to be. He must convince them firstly that his way is indeed a purposeful surrender of his own rights in order to benefit others, and then he must convince them of

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[9]So Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 381-84; and on balance, Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000) 646-49.

[10]Reading this as a choice of focus: Fee, *First Corinthians*, 92; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 211-13.

[11]I shall explore the nuances of Paul's use of this pronoun to either include or exclude his audience later, in section 3.3.3.

their own obligation to do likewise. Those arguments, which had already begun to appear in chapter 8, occupy most of chapter 9, and carry on into the final section of chapter10. Although they are needed to establish Paul's standing within the community created by a proclamation of the gospel, they are not themselves drawn from that genre, but from deliberative rhetoric, appealing to the common-sense, everyday experiences, and Greek values of the audience's native culture. It could not be otherwise, rhetorically speaking. He will appeal to scripture in 10:1-23, as we have seen, in an attempt to challenge the Corinthians' cultural normalisation of pagan cults, but this may be resisted as Jewish narrowness speaking through him. He can live with that risk in the short term, for the sake of a long-term scriptural transformation of their consiousness, but he cannot at the same time use scripture as his major grounds for establishing the conformity of his own actions with the crucified Christ. That would put his short-term, pragmatic goals at needless risk from any reaction engendered by the educational task. What he needs to do to convince these Greeks of the integrity of his actions, is to make their worthiness a matter of ἦθος , by portraying and explaining them in terms familiar and acceptable within the Greek world.

How he conducts that deliberative argument, and the extent to which it is prefigured by 1 Cor.8:6, is the focus of my ninth and tenth chapters. Before proceeding to that argument, I shall examine the grammatical structures that determine the significance of that verse by defining not only its own inner structure but also its relation to its immediate textual context.

CHAPTER 6

THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT: PARAGRAPH STRUCTURE

My preceding arguments have emphasized the important role played by deliberative argumentation as a means used by Paul to achieve his pragmatic ends in his discourse on ειδωλόθυτα. I now want to demonstrate the vital part played by 1 Cor.8:6 in that deliberative discourse. This demonstration will require me firstly to examine its immediate context at the beginning of Chapter 8, then to show how the grammatical structure of the verse governs its relation to that immediate textual context, and its semantic links with the pre-textual context as a whole. In my final chapter I shall apply the results of that grammatical analysis as I explore the contribution it makes to Paul's development of his discourse on ειδωλόθυτα.

There can be no doubt that 8:1-6 forms a discrete section of the discourse, in which it functions as an introduction of some sort. It is marked out by the announcement of a new topic at the start of 8:1: Περὶ δὲ τῶν ειδωλοθύτων, ... and then by the fact that although this announcement is repeated at v.4, the discourse does not begin to address that topic directly until verse 7. Instead it contains a short but intense discussion about the nature of γνῶσις, from which we may infer that this constitutes a crucial point of difference between the disputants, requiring Paul to address it briefly before he can proceed with more specific aspects of the debate.

The question of how to label this section as a structural or functional unit seems to pose a problem for most commentators, even when they separate it out as a discrete section for analysis.[1] While a former generation of scholars might have been happy to regard it as "theological introduction" or something equivalent, there seems to be a new consensus that what is happening here is much more complex than an abstract theological discussion, or maybe that theology cannot be confined to abstract topics.[2] J. Smit, in a short but pertinent

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[1] Not all do so, however: some commentaries just discuss the chapter without dividing it at all, others make a further division between vv.1-3 and 4-6, and some even make the division after v.7.

[2] Thus while Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians: a Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, trans. Leitch James W., Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) 138, describes its function as " a piece of fundamental theological teaching", Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 363, calls 1-3 and 4-6 "two preliminary words".

study,[3] proposes that the Latin rhetorical term *partitio* is the most suitable term to describe the structure and function of this section.

> Handbooks of classical rhetoric define a *partitio* as a brief, general and complete division which summarizes and outlines the train of thought of the ensuing exposition .... This passage exhibits the main characteristics of a rhetorical *partitio*.[4]

In terms of its literary form, Smit notes that 8:1-6 stands out as a separate unit on the basis of the series of parallelisms it contains, its use of the first person plural (I shall deal with this characteristic below in 3.3.2.1), and "the high number of general indefinite utterances it contains".[5] He notes both the division of the section into two parts, verses 1-3 and 4-6, and that each of these divisions is used to express an antithesis, the first between knowledge and love, and the second between the many gods and lords who stand opposed to the one God and one Lord.

> The literary form of this passage suggests, as many scholars surmise, that in these verses Paul indeed states some general principles, which he will use in his exposition on idol offerings. The bipartate structure indicates that he approaches this subject from two different angles. The antitheses suggest choices that have to be made. Presumably they are the prelude to a deliberative argument, expounding which alternative earns preference.[6]

He then argues that the two divisions within 8:1-6 correspond broadly to the structure of the argument in the subsequent discourse. Those in the audience who claim freedom to attend pagan feasts support their position with a claim to γνῶσις. Paul's characterisation of the issue with the derogatory term 'foods offered to *idols*' and his immediate belittling of their 'knowledge' indicates from the outset that he will argue against their position as harmful, which he does largely in the first half of the discourse from 8:7 to 9:27. Smit then identifies a similar correspondence between the second division of the introduction and the latter part of the larger discourse

> This second part of the introduction also contains a blueprint of a deliberative argument. In answer to the question whether the believers in Corinth may eat of the idol offerings Paul, on theological grounds, weighs two lines of conduct against one another. Eating means partnership with the so-called gods and lords and is therefore strongly discouraged. Abstaining from eating at temple meals and restricting oneself to the supper of the Lord meands exclusive association with the one Lord and the one God; this is an absolute obligation. In the ensuing discussion Paul elaborates this brief sketch of a deliberative argument in a more extended and specified form, namely in 1 Cor.10:1-22.[7]

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[3] J. Smit, "1 Cor 8:1-6: A Rhetorical *Partitio*: A Contribution to the Coherence of 1 Cor 8:1 - 11:1," *The Corinthian Correspondence*, Ed. R. Bieringer, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 125 (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1996) 577-91.

[4] Smit, "A Rhetorical *Partitio*," 587.

[5] Smit, "A Rhetorical *Partitio*," 580.

[6] Smit, "A Rhetorical *Partitio*," 580.

[7] Smit, "A Rhetorical *Partitio*," 587.

While Smit has exposed some essential links between this introduction and the ensuing discourse, his picture seems a little too neat and tidy.[8] As I have shown, the pattern of argument in the discourse at large is far too complex to be divided so neatly. While agreeing with Smit's identification of these two themes, the harmfulness of idol-foods and the absolute loyalty demanded by the one God, as major components of Paul's subsequent argument, I would prefer to see them both operating throughout the discourse. There are also other themes to be considered that link this introduction with the wider discourse, as we shall see later.

With that reservation, however, I can accept Smit's suggestion that the rhetorical term *partitio* is an appropriate label for this introductory section, indicating that its rhetorical function is to prefigure the direction and basis of the argumentative discourse to follow. Whether he would still want me to use this label without accepting that it indicates a division in the subsequent discourse is another matter. For this reason, I shall use the more general Greek term for an introduction, προοίμιον (or its English equivalent 'proem'), which does have the slight etymological advantage of suggesting that the section gives an advance indication of the way ahead, without the same degree of technical exactitude that *partitio* seems to demand.

Further aspects of the unit's function will emerge as I discuss its structure in the following sections of this study.

6.1 Conflicting Cultures

As Smit and others have pointed out, Paul's use of the term εἰδωλόθυτα in his announcement of the topic in the first sentence of the discourse (Περὶ δὲ τῶν ειδωλοθύτων, 8:1) is hardly a neutral way of considering the claims of those Christians who regard attendance at pagan feasts as a matter of spiritual and moral indifference. It is frequently contrasted with the term put in the mouth of a pagan host announcing the sacral nature of the food later in the discourse: Τοῦτο **ιερόθυτόν** εστιν (10:28).[9] Pagans do not refer to the images used to represent their deities as "idols". This is the language developed by the Jewish critique of pagan religion, as I have already pointed out (2.4.1). What we should notice here, in considering this opening section, is the concentrated use of this derisive term and its cognates early in the discourse. Of fifteen such occurrences in the epistle, ten are found in this discourse, and seven of those occur in its first ten verses. Εἰδωλόθυτα,

[8] In fairness, we should also consider that Smit identifies further links in a later article, J. Smit, "The Rhetorical Disposition of First Corinthians 8:7 - 9:27," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 59.3 (July 1997): 476-91.

[9] See Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 139 & n.6; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 357, n.1; and Wolfgang Schrage, *Der este Brief an die Korinther Vol.2*, Evangelisch—Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament VII (Zurich & Neukirchen—Vluyn / Solothurn: Benziger & Neukirchener, 1995) 216.

"foods offered to idols" is found in the singular or plural form four times (8:1, 8:4, 8:7, and 8:10); ειδωλον, "idol" twice (8:4, 8:7), and εἰδωλειον, "an idol's temple" once (8:10). As Smit has argued, this clearly indicates Paul's stance on this issue right from the outset of the discourse. This linguistic fact seems to have been overlooked by those scholars who argued that the apostle sought to adopt a mediating position in which the sacral nature of the food does not concern him.

Not only does his emphasized use of this terminology indicate his stance on the issue, but it also discloses the grounds on which he has based it. As I have already argued in chapter 4, there was a fundamental cultural divide between first-century Jews and gentiles in the way they viewed each other's religious practices. While gentiles held religious tolerance in high regard, whether as a sign of intellectual sophistication or as a matter of goodwill and human solidarity, Jews regarded foreign cultic activity with a deep horror. Their own aniconic cult, together with a long scriptural tradition telling of the horrors that had befallen their nation whenever they copied the cultic practices of their neighbours, meant that they were deeply averse to regarding pagan cults as anything other than degraded and defiling, and their dieties as anything other than demons. There was very little middle ground on which Jew and gentile could meet in common religious activity. Gentiles normally interpreted this cultural barrier as an expression of Jewish hostility, and although Paul indicates through his use of this terminology that he is unable to shift from his inherited convictions, he is equally at pains to overcome any perception of ill-will towards his gentile converts who do not share that cultural inheritance as he opens up the subject that divides them from him.[10]

We should also notice that the scriptural critique of 10:1-22, which I have already argued constitutes the fundamental basis of Paul's convictions on the matter, is strongly prefigured here in both divisions of his proem.[11] His audience thus knows from the outset that he will argue from a thoroughly Jewish mindset, even though the form of the proem also invites them to engage with him as partners in a deliberative discourse. We should now examine the means by which he attempts that engagement.

6.2 Locating the Opposition's Root Position

Οιδαμεν οτι, "we know that", might seem to introduce a statement with which both the author and his audience are in full agreement, but two factors weigh against such a

[10] I am not denying the probablity that the audience was also divided among themselves, with some closer to Paul's position than others. But unless they were Jewish (as a few were), those who adopted Paul's stance would have done so more out of loyalty and obedience to him then from any adoption of Jewish feelings as their own.

[11] Further reasons for resisting Smit's schema.

reading.[12] Firstly, the statement introduced in verse one, πάντες γνῶσιν ἔχομεν, "We all have knowledge" is contradicted before very long in verse 7: Αλλ ουκ εν πάσιν η γνῶσις, "But knowledge is not within everyone". The apparent conflict between these two statements could possibly be resolved by a reading in which those referred to as the "we" who "all have knowledge" in verse 1 are a subset of the "everyone" referred to in verse 7. However I intend to argue later that Paul is using the first person plural very carefully throughout this passage, as generally elsewhere in this epistle, in a way that certainly prevents him including himself with those in his audience who claim to possess special knowledge as a privileged sub-set of the Christian community. As he describes ο αδελφὸς δι ὃν Χριστὸς απέθανεν, "the brother for whom Christ died" as damaged because he is ο ασθενῶν εν τῇ σῇ γνώσει "the one who is weak in *your* knowledge" (v11), we have good reason to look for alternative readings that maintain the tension between verses 1 and 7.

A second consideration involves the meaning of ὅτι in this introductory phrase. This term can be used to introduce a direct quotation, and there is no reason to discard that possibility when it follows the verb οἶδαμεν. Our familiarity with the common English expression "We know that..." introducing indirect speech might serve to mislead us into ignoring other possibilities in the semantics of this Greek particle. That is, the translation can just as readily be rendered as *we know "We all have knowledge"*, and this reading is supported to some extent by Paul's use of οἶδαμεν for "we know" and γνῶσιν for "knowledge". Rendered thus, that which we know (οἶδαμεν) is a proposition about knowledge (γνῶσις), probably a popular maxim, and we "know" it in the sense of being familiar with it rather than necessarily being in full agreement with its contents. Philosophers in the Socratic tradition might have claimed that you can only "know" that which is true, but we have no reason to suppose that Paul is choosing his words here in accordance with their dictates.

We may accept then that Paul is quoting a popular maxim which has probably been used in Corinth in support of the position he is about to oppose. He masks the extent of his opposition initially, in order to minimize offensiveness, by including himself in the "we know..." rather than a blunter "some maintain..." or even "you say...". However, his next sentence makes his distaste for this saying quite apparent: η γνῶσις φυσιοῖ, η δὲ αγάπη οικοδομεῖ : "Knowledge inflates, but love edifies."[13] Whether this is a further well-known

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[12] The view that Paul is quoting a slogan popular among the Corinthian congregation enjoys a widespread consensus. Hurd, who argued that it represented Paul's initial preaching in Corinth, lists twenty-four scholars supporting this view; see John Coolidge Jr. Hurd, *The Origin of 1 Corinthians*, 2nd ed. (Macon: Mercer UP, 1983) 68. Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000) 620 adds a further ten since then.

[13] R. Dean Jr. Anderson, *Glossary of Greek Rhetorical Terms Connected to Methods of Argumentation, Figure and Tropes from Anaximenes to Quintilian*, Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology 24 (Leuven: Peeters, 2000) 125, defines the rhetorical device χαρακτηρισμος, "characterisation" as a bodily description of someone used, among other functions, to poke fun at someone or describe their vices. This seems to fit what Paul does here.

maxim used as a rejoinder, or Paul has just coined it for the occasion, its impact is beyond doubt: the value he places on the knowledge some are claiming to possess is very small. There is even a suggestion of ridicule: that those who have this putative γνῶσις are pretentious figures of self-importance to the very extent that they claim and value their possesion of this attribute[14] What is beyond dispute is that in the second half of verse 1 Paul is distancing himself from an unqualified acceptance of that which he begins by claiming "we know".

Reflecting on the rhetorical significance of this first verse of the discourse, we might ask what can possibly be achieved by such an opening, in which Paul quotes a favourite maxim of those he opposes and then promptly pours scorn upon it. This hardly seems tactful. However, such a reaction might merely show our cultural distance from the apostle and his audience. Another way of viewing this opening gambit is as an invitation to engage in open debate, quite within the normal rules for deliberative argument.[15] I have argued that by announcing the topic in the form περὶ δὲ εἰδωλοθύτον, Paul has declared his fundamentally Jewish stance on this issue, thereby making himself vulnerable to attack. His immediate attack on one of the axioms of the opposition merely evens the score. Now he is committed to carrying on as he has begun, that is by taking the opposing views seriously and undertaking to refute them within the normal rules of debate. It is as though he were to begin by saying, "Yes my stance on this matter is thoroughly Jewish, but I undertake to argue for it on terms acceptable even to Greeks" (Christian Greeks, that is: he needs to use their common ground in Christ, as we have seen).

6.3 Knowing God vs. Knowing About God

Verse 2 continues in the same direction with a further disparaging comment on his opponents'claims to knowledge: εἴ τις δοκεῖ εγνωκέναι τι, οὔπω ἔγνω καθὼς δεῖ γνῶναι, "If anyone seems/claims to know something, he does not yet know as he ought to know". The use of δόκεω here is a little ambiguous, inasmuch as it can generally be translated as

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[14] Paul Douglas Gardner, *The Gifts of God and the Authentication of a Christian* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994) 23-27 argues that the γνῶσις referred to here is the gift of the Spirit mentioned in 1:5, 12:8, and 13:2. However, as Paul places these in such a positive light in those contexts (including 13:2 where the whole point of his argument depends on these attributes being intrinsically good, althoug of lesser value than love), it is difficult to accept that he is so scathing about the effects of that divine gift in this present context. I prefer to conclude that the present reference is to particular knowledge concerning the current issue which Paul the 'wise' claim to have received from God, a claim implicitly lampooned by Paul's response. It is the very claim that a divine enlightenment has led them to justify a tolerant atttitude towards idolatry that has made them ridiculous ("puffed up") in Paul's eyes.

[15] Anderson, *Greek Rhetorical Terms*, 124, gives two alternative definitions of the rhetorical device υποφορά that seem to fit this case. One is the use of "possible objections from opponents stated in non-question form". In the other, "a υποφορά is defined in terms of the speaker suggesting a certain thought and then refuting it. This is said to be appropriate to deliberative speeches. An ανθυποφορά concerns the statement of a thought used by the opponent, and is suited to judicial speeches."

either "seems" or "supposes/thinks/believes"[16], depending on the viewer. We might ask whether Paul means that someone seems knowledgeable in his own eyes or is being exalted by others, but the former interpretation seems more likely, given that Paul ascribes imperfection to the knower rather than to the claimants. Elsewhere in the epistle, γνῶσις is simply accepted and valued as a spiritual gift, so we must take it that what Paul objects to is a *claim* to know something in the present context, which we can see from the next paragraph, verses 4 to 6, is not only a claim to know about idols but even more importantly *a claim to know something about God*.

The third verse constitutes a statement by Paul of a fundamental truth underlying all human knowledge of God: it is really God who knows us, rather than we him. ει δέ τις αγαπᾷ τὸν θεόν, ουτος ἐγνωσται υπ αυτοῦ, "But if anyone loves God, this one is known by him". So the knowledge lampooned as puffery in verse 1 is now seen for what is truly is: not just a pretentious claim to have greater knowledge than others, but an arrogant misunderstanding of the divine-human relationship. Our experience of God occurs within a loving relationship, and any knowledge we gain of God is a personal knowing-of rather than an objective knowing-about.[17] The claims to know about God which Paul finds objectionable must be in tension with that relationship, especially when they conflict with responsibilities towards other community members, as Paul will go on to show later in the chapter and beyond.

We may now conclude that verses 1 to 3 constitute a refutation of the opponents' slogan with which Paul begins the paragraph, πάντες γνῶσιν ἔχομεν. If we are talking about true knowledge of the divine, then it is quite misleading to claim that "we all have knowledge". That maxim, although familiar to both Paul and his audience (οἶδαμεν ὅτι....) is not a sound basis for beginning a discussion involving God, idolatry and food offered to idols. Paul quotes it, offers a brief refutation, then replaces it with a better general statement about the knowledge of God: better not only in that it is less likely to mislead the audience, but also in that it gives a positive indication of the basis on which his subsequent argument will proceed as he indicates responsibilities that are integral to a genuine love for God.

6.4 Slogans vs. Experience

The above analysis of the rhetorical structure of verses 1 to 3 predisposes us to find a parallel pattern in verses 4 to 6. This second paragraph begins, as we have noted, with a

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[16] see BAGD, 201-02.

[17] Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 141 writes, "We expect: 'The man who loves God, knows him rightly.' But the thought is deliberately given a different turn. Here Paul takes his stand upon a widespread religious motif, the correspondence between knowing and being known in the relation of man and God.". See also Fee, *First Corinthians*, 368; and Richard B. Hays, *First Corinthians*, Interpretation: A Biblical Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997) 138.

restatement of the same topic, followed by the formula οἶδαμεν ὅτι.... introducing two conjoint propositions: ουδὲν εἴδωλον εν κόσμῳ, "There is no idol in the world"; and ουδεὶς θεὸς ει μὴ εις, "There is no God but one". Our monotheistic presuppositions, or our perception of Paul's, might well suggest that he could not possibly find anything objectionable about either of these statements, but we should not leave that conclusion unexamined. Several factors are present to justify a deeper examination. For one thing, the initial statements in verse 4 are once again immediately followed in verse 5 by others which appear to contradict them rather baldly: καὶ γὰρ εἴπερ εισὶν λεγόμενοι θεοὶ εἴτε εν ουρανῷ εἴτε επὶ γῆς, "for even if there are those which are called gods, whether in heaven or on earth...", a somewhat hypothetical floating of polytheistic ideas, for sure, but followed by a much more direct affirmation of that reality, ...ὥσπερ εισὶν θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοί, "...just as there are many gods and many lords". There is too much in verse 5 for us to simply accept verse 4 as Paul's view of things. The other possibility suggested by the preceding paragraph is that here too he is quoting from the popular wisdom accepted by some of his audience, in this case two related maxims debunking idolatry, but that he does not accept them as a suitable basis for resolving the issue at hand.[18] Why not?

Verse 5 provides a succint refutation of the first slogan. Ουδὲν εἴδωλον εν κόσμῳ is patently false, inasmuch as common experience tells us that the world is full of idols, whether we conceive their existence to be a heavenly or merely an earthly matter. The slogan may well bring with it an implied philosophical pedigree, suggesting it was coined as a somewhat paradoxical critique of popular religious thinking. Everyone can see with their own eyes that the world is full of idols, but the enlightened have come to understand that these man-made objects represent no divine reality at all. This is a sort of ancient demythologizing, fitting very comfortably into our modern worldview. But Paul wants none of it: its use by his audience in Corinth signals danger rather than enlightenment. To affirm that the idols have no ultimate reality, while strictly true, is one small step away from denying that they have any power, which he intends to show is far from the case. The idols have power in all who are "weak in conscience/consciousness", and potentially in those who think themselves to be "strong" and knowledgeable, as he will later warn them in the strictest of terms (ch.10).

The second slogan, ουδεὶς θεὸς ει μὴ εις, contains a more subtle danger: it is too negative to be allowed to stand as a worthy statement about God from which the discussion may proceed. Its essential statement is a denial of the reality of the many gods, ουδεὶς θεὸς, to which is appended the concession ει μὴ εις. It may not even have the assertive force of "There is indeed one and only one god" as opposed to "There is no god; except one (somewhere / maybe / if you must)". This is far from asserting the reality of the

[18] On the identification of these maxims as slogans used in Corinth, and their possible background, see Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 142; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 629; and Paul Charles Siebenmann, *The Question of Slogans in 1 Corinthians*, PhD dissertation (1997) 234-40, Microform, UMI 9803472.

living God worshipped in Israel and the Christian community, so Paul once again replaces it with the more adequate statement found in verse 6, naming the God of the church and the Lord of the church not only in more proper terms, but in terms that will provide a basis for his subsequent development of the topic, as we shall see later.

There is one further possibility for interpreting these two slogans, equally philosophical as the one suggested above, but syncretistic rather than demythologizing.[19] This reading would render the first slogan, Ουδὲν εἴδωλον εν κόσμῳ, as "nothing in the world is an idol", which is to say, "Jews and their fellow-travellers who insist on branding the religious objects of other cultures as *idols* are mistaken. No sacred object deserves to be dismissed with such a derogatory term, suggesting that it is empty and polluting. What *we know* is that all such objects are means of enabling people of different cultures to worship the One: ουδεὶς θεὸς ει μὴ εις." All roads lead to Rome. Those who have a true monotheistic faith, the true γνῶσις, will not need to label other worshippers as idolaters, but rather will demonstrate their enlightened broadmindedness by joining those of other faiths in worship. There are no *idols* as such in the world, only many different ways of imaging the One.

Such a direct attack on Paul's convictions about idolatry would have constituted a very serious challenge indeed. Is it compatible with the way he conducts his response? It would certainly account for the derisory tone in which he dismisses their claims to 'knowledge' in 8:1-2. Verse 5 would then amount to an acknowledgement that those who worship other objects never call them idols, but rather 'gods' and 'lords', indicating that they sincerely believe that they are valid represenations of the divine, and verse 6 would differentiate Christians from sharing that view, inasmuch as they acknowledge only one image of God as valid, *the Father*, and only one legitimate lord, *Jesus Christ.* This is an intriguing but improbable possibility, as I see it, for which reason I do not intend to take it much further in this study.

This preliminary inquiry into the rhetorical structure of verses 1 to 6 has established a framework for investigating the place of verse 6 within Paul's line of argument, suggesting that its function is to replace an inadequate pair of influential maxims expressed in verse 4 in the light of other considerations, some of which are expressed in verse 5, and others of which are only implicit in the immediate context. That function is assisted by its having been also placed within the context of the first three verses, in which an inadequate general statement about what it means to know God is replaced by an assertion linking that knowledge with a loving relationship. Between them, verses 3 and 6 supply, in effect, a summary reply to two basic questions: "What does it mean to know God?" and "What do we know about God?". In order to address these theological questions and the contribution of verse 6 to answering them, we must move

[19] I am unaware of any scholar who has entertained this possibility, which I find intriguing rather than probable. It deserves a brief airing.

our attention away from that big picture to some grammatical considerations that will enable us to more closely define the relation between verse 6 and its immediate context, and to do that we should form an hypothesis about the verse's likely rhetorical function.

6.5 1 Corinthians 8:6: Θέσις for the Discourse?

What does the place given to 1 Corinthians 8:6 at the end of this introductory προοίμιον indicate about its likely rhetorical function in the discourse? Having now dismissed the reading of those like Thüsing who see verse 4 as the statement of Paul's monotheism on which he will found his subsequent argument, we cannot read verse 6 as adduced in support of that verse. Rather, it appears in opposition to it rhetorically: it replaces verse 4 as a more adequate statement from which to proceed.

There is one major problem: Paul does not seem to make any further use of this verse in the immediately following argument, but rather to ignore it for the moment. The following verse, 8:7, where he begins to discuss the behaviour of those he opposes and their effects upon others within the community, begins by referring back to, and denying, the claim that all possess γνῶσις presented in the first division of the introduction, 8:1-3. One way to explain this would be to see verse 6 as expressing the knowledge not possessed by some of the believers. This is not an easy view to maintain. The verse, if it does express some divinely revealed γνῶσις, does not seem on the surface so mysterious that some believers would have been unable to grasp its basic meaning, to their souls' peril.[20] It seems far more probable that verse 7 does indeed refer back to the "knowledge" claimed by the opponents and debunked by Paul, and that the reason do not have this knowledge is that no-one has it in fact, and that the simple whose consciousness is overcome by the example of the 'wise', to their harm, actually have a truer perception of the idols than those who lead them astray, and worship them as gods, as they had been accustomed to do in their former lives.

All of which means that verse 6 must function as a summary statement on the broadest level rather than providing a launching pad for the next section of the argument. It must be a statement of what "we know" when we know as we ought to know, by loving God (v.3): not everything we know, but everything Paul needs his audience to know that will provide grounds for all that he has to say in the rest of the discourse. What rhetorical label is appropriate for such a statement?

Once again, Dean Anderson provides us with the help we need. In his discussion of the rhetorical term θέσις, he first defines it as "An argumentative treatment of a theme which lacks the specifics of person and circumstances, e.g. whether one ought to marry.

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[20] It certainly contains some *semantic* mysteries as we shall see before long, but those are now our interpretive problem rather than theirs.

The term υπόθεσις is used for a specific case, e.g. whether Cato should marry (on θέσις/υπόθεσις generally, see Quint. *Inst.* 3.5.5-18)."[21] Cicero's treatment of the term helps Anderson fill this definition out:

> In Cic.*Orat.*125 the θέσις, along with αὔξησις, are described as two important forms of *ornatus* (rhetorical ornamentation). Cicero is refering to the discussion of a general question in the midst of a speech. This reflects his views ... that every concrete case (υποθέσις) may be brought back to a general theme underlying it (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 10.2.18) This concept is not only useful in terms of investigating possible arguments (by way of abstract τόποι), but the general underlying theme may also be separately handled in one's speech.[22]

Using Cicero's schema, we now have a rhetorical term that might be used to identify 1 Cor.8:6 as an expression of the θέσις underlying Paul's specific υπόθεσις regarding idol-foods, that they should not be knowingly eaten by Christians. This, of course, will depend upon a demonstration that it does in fact have the syntactic and semantic structures that will enable it to function within the discourse in the manner which its place within the rhetorical structure of the proem suggests it might.

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[21] Anderson, *Greek Rhetorical Terms*, 63.

[22] Anderson, *Greek Rhetorical Terms*, 65.

CHAPTER 7

THE SYNTACTIC STRUCTURE OF 1 CORINTHIANS 8:6

The fundamental fact relating verse 6 to its immediate context is a matter of syntax: that it is actually part of a larger sentence comprised of verses 5 and 6, rather than constituting a complete sentence in itself. Those who make assertions about the prehistory of verse 6, identifying it as a credal or hymnal fragment, are not only offering an interpretation which may be significantly different from its sense as used by Paul in the present context, but they also assume that the syntactic linkage between these two verses is only superficial and that verse 6 could stand on its own without significant alteration. That assumption deserves closer examination, which we shall undertake in the next section.

However, it might be argued that the whole matter of sentence boundaries is rather uncertain, owing to the historical fact that for a significant period in the transmission of the New Testament, the manuscripts were written entirely in upper case letters and without any punctuation, including full stops.[1] This means that whereas a modern author will normally use the conventions of orthography to make many aspects of sentence sense explicit, including sentence boundaries, inter-clausal relationships, iterative force and tonal contours, Paul and other ancient writers, unless writing in a consciously literary style, treated their product as if it were in effect spoken text, relying on their readers and those listening to those readers to supply their own sentence sense in accordance with their common competence in the spoken language.[2] When later copyists and editors came to insert punctuation in the text, they were not restoring it to its original state so much as translating it into orthographic sentence form, and thereby providing a notation to express their own reading of the sense of the text. That interpretative task has continued with all subsequent editions of the text, being an integral part of what Robertson calls "the editor's prerogative."[3]

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[1] Bruce M. Metzger, *The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption, and Restoration*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford UP, 1968) 26-27; Vincent Taylor, *The Text of the New Testament: A Short Introduction*, 2nd ed. (London: MacMillan & Co, 1963) 10; and A.T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament*, 4th ed. (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934) 241-45.

[2] For a discussion of such competence see John Lyons, *Semantics, 2 vols.* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1977) 623 n 624.

[3] The editor indeed has to interpret the text with his punctuation, but certainly good taste demands that the minimum, not the maximum, of punctuation marks be the rule. They must of necessity decide "a multitude of subtle and difficult points of interpretation." [quoting Hort's *Introduction to the Greek New Testament*, p318].....But the editor's punctuation may be a hindrance to the student instead of a help. It is the privilege of each N.T. student to make his own punctuation. Robertson, *Grammar*, 245.

The lack of any notable textual variants for the punctuation of this chapter of Paul's letter indicates that a consensus about their reading of the sentence structure was easily obtained by the early editors. How were they guided? It can only have been by their recognition of the intrinsic syntactic integrity of the text: it made good sentence sense, or good enough that no serious challenge has been mounted to the traditional rendering of the punctuation. The syntactic analysis of verses 5 and 6 offered below seeks not only to confirm that they make good sense when read as a single sentence but also to establish that verse 6, at least in its present form, is syntactically ambiguous on its own.

7.1 Connectives Binding 8:6 to its Neighbours

Gordon Fee has suggested that verses 5 and 6, while belonging together, constitute a syntactic disunity strictly speaking. He states categorically, "Vv. 5-6 together form a single sentence, an *anacolouthon* in Greek (it does not follow grammatically), but one whose sense is clear."[4] However it would seem that anacolouthon, if established, must necessarily obscure the sense of the sentence to some degree, so it will pay us to consider his charge for a moment.[5]

In Fee's reading, Paul accepts his opponents' premise in v.4 as only partly true, that is as only a partial justification for their behaviour, but uses verses 5 and 6 to "both qualify and affirm even more strongly the theological predicate for their behaviour".[6] Hence the γάρ beginning v.5 is simply explanatory and Paul intended to structure his sentence as something like "For even if there are so-called gods, whether in earth or heaven,... they do not really have existence."[7] However, he inserted an interrupting clause ("Just as there are indeed gods many and lords many"), which then distracted him into concluding with verse 6 as its contradiction (one God rather than many gods, one Lord rather than many lords); and thus leaving the concession in the first part of verse 5 in syntactic limbo, speaking.

The key to Fee's reading lies in his restricted interpretations of the particles opening each verse: the conjunctive phrase καὶ γάρ linking verse 5 to its predecessor, and the combination ετπερ ... αλλ linking verses 5 and 6 to each other.

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[4] Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 371.

[5] Fee's charge agrees with E.-B. Allo, *Première Épitre aux Corinthiens*, 2nd ed., Études Bibliques (Paris: J.Gabalda et Cie., 1956) 201, n. A6.

[6] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 371.

[7] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 372.

7.1.1 The Grammatical Relation to 8:4

The connecting particle γάρ is very common in Paul's writing, with 102 undisputed occurrences.[8] In the present epistle, its primary function seems to be connective, avoiding asyndeton and indicating that the discourse as a whole is held together by a web of inferential relationships. An examination of Paul's use of this particle in the first few chapters of the epistle shows that he habitually used it as his preferred connective when building a detailed line of argument, most often to join an assertion with its immediate predecessor. Sometimes, as in 3:2 to 3:4, he uses a series of such successive connections to construct a chain of argument in which each assertion is justified by its successor until he reaches one which can be left to stand on its own feet. At other times, as in 1:26, the connection is not with the previous clause or sentence but with the topic as a whole, γάρ being used to indicate that a new line of argument is being introduced to argue the same general case from additional and separate grounds. The point we must take from this is that while Paul generally uses this particle to join a new sentence to its immediate predecessor, this is not invariably true and should not be assumed in any particular case.

If the pattern of connection is diverse, this is equally true of the nature of the logical relation signalled by this particle. In general we may translate γάρ by the English "for", but even this yields a wide range of possible meanings. If two Greek clauses A and B are connected as "A γάρ B", the connective does not in itself define the logical relationship between A and B. Thus Robertson distinguishes between explanatory and illative uses of this particle, regarding the former as primary, but goes on to say, "The precise relation between clauses or sentences is not set forth by γάρ. That must be gathered from the context if possible."[9] Once again, the early chapters of this epistle illustrate a range of relations signalled by Paul's use of this connective. In Chapters 1 and 2, he uses it twelve times, with seven clearly distinguishable senses: that is, if it takes the form "A γάρ B", then B might be:- (i) empirical evidence to support the truth of A (1:11, 2:8); (ii) a scriptural quotation to support the truth of A (1:19, 2:16); (iii) a general principle providing a rationale for praxis described in A (1:17, 2:2); (iv) a more general case explaining A by inclusion (1:18); (v) an interpretation of A - the expansion of a cryptic statement (1:21); (vi) a causal explanation, showing how a process A works (2:10, 2:14); or (vii) an analogical explanation of A (2:11). Each of these categories describes a different logical relation whose properties must be distinguished in the context, rather than supposing that the general category of "explanation" tells us much about how they work.

A further precaution is in order. Modern conventions of argumentation lead us to presume that when someone offers us B as an explanation of an earlier stated A, it is A

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[8] The exceptions: 14:14 on textual grounds, and 14:34 and 14:35 as part of a probable scribal interpolation.

[9] Robertson, *Grammar*, 1190.

that will be most significant for the ongoing development of their argument, and that B has been introduced only to help us accept or understand A. This convention can be quite misleading when we are reading Paul: only in the first two of the above categories, where B is primarily given to support the *truth* of A, can B be treated as unimportant for the subsequent line of thought. In most other *explanatory* cases, this can be seen to depend on A and B together, or even at times on B alone (see 1:17 and 1:26 among the above cases). All this means, really, is that when Paul expands on something he has just written with a γάρ... clause, the expansion is normally integral to what he wants to say overall rather than an optional extra, and we should treat all such additions as having an ongoing importance until the context convinces us otherwise. In the case of 1 Corinthians 8:4-6, this supports a presupposition that Paul intends his readers to understand verse 4 only in the light of the explanation following.

That view is further supported by the fact that the full connective here is actually the phrase καὶ γάρ rather than γάρ alone. That combination is relatively rare, both in Paul's writings (where it occurs 19 times) and in the New Testament as a whole (38 times). A survey of those occurrences shows that for other writers, the combination is used in a way that does not distinguish it from γάρ used alone: to introduce a reason or explanation for the immediately preceding clause or sentence.[10] It seems that, as we have seen above, Paul was generally content to allow γάρ to function on its own as both connective and explanation-marker, whereas others saw it more as the latter. Why then did Paul use the καὶ γάρ combination, and do so relatively more frequently than others? An examination of its 19 occurences in his writings will suggest that, for him at least, it served to mark a modification in the discourse. We can categorize these occurrences into a three-fold taxonomy.

1. Experiential focusing (the least distinctive mode): following a general statement of principle or belief, the modifying clause serves to turn the generality of the discussion back to the world of experience: either the experience of the audience, or a report of his own experience. Five of the nineteen instances are of this type: 1 Thess.3:4, 4:10; 2 Cor.5:2, Phil.2:27, Rom.16:2. Two further examples in this category carry different connotations of authority, as they refer to the example of Christ: 1 Cor.5:7 and Rom.15:3.

2. Preemptive clarification: following a categorical statement, the modifying clause moves to correct any possible misleading implications and to make it less open to counter-argument. There are six examples of this category: 1 Cor.12:13, 2 Cor.3:10, 5:4, 13:4 (two examples in one verse); and Rom.11:1.

3. Ground-shifting: Paul's most radical use of a modifying clause introduced by καὶ γάρ involves shifting the argument onto new ground, but without emphasizing this break

[10] The nonnPauline occurences:n Mt.8:9, 15:27, 26:73; Mk.10:45, 14:70; Lk.1:66, 6:32, 7:8, 11:4, 22:37, 22:59; Jn.4:23; Acts 19:40; Heb.4:2, 5:12, 10:34, 12:29, 13:22; 2 Thess.3:10.

by the use of a conjunction such as αλλά. There are three instances of this device: 1 Cor.12:14, 14:8; and 2 Cor.2:10.

Where does 1 Cor.8:5 fit into this typology? At this stage of our investigation it is best to leave that question unanswered, apart from remarking that the range of uses of καὶ γάρ described above opens up a number of interesting possibilities for us to consider along the way. They suggest that far from using verses 5 and 6 merely to support the truth of his major statement in verse 4, there is a distinct possibility that Paul is actually distancing himself from the propositions expressed in that verse as it stands in one or more of these ways:

1. By indicating that the statements in that verse are too far removed from actual Christian experience or the authoritative example of Christ to form a suitable basis for the subsequent discussion.

2. By correcting false or misleading implications that others might want to draw from verse 4 as it stands.

3. By shifting the argument away from the direction suggested by verse 4 and onto new ground from which Paul is more comfortable to argue his case.

7.1.2 The Grammatical Relation of 8:5 to 8:6

While he builds his reading on the expectation that verses 5 and 6 must necessarily function as some sort of endorsement of verse 4, Fee's grammatical quibble with the text as it stands, leading to his proposed reconstruction of what Paul may have meant to say when he began verse 5, is also founded on his characterization of the connection between verses 5 and 6 as anacolouthon.[11] This judgment, although unexplained at the point where it is asserted, is later shown to depend on his understanding of the two connectives ετπερ and αλλά, to each of which he assigns senses that do not allow them to function together as a proper connecting pair. He translates the former as "Even if" and describes its clause as a concession,[12] and the latter as "the strong adversative *but*".[13] In English we do not give a sentence the construction, "Even if....., but.....". Nor did they in ancient Greek, but perhaps we should check whether there are other possibilities for understanding and translating these terms before we accuse Paul of not meaning to write what he did in fact set down in his text. Paul is, after all, quite capable of constructing some very complex sentences at times.

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[11] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 371.

[12] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 372.

[13] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 373.

7.1.2.1 The Sense of εἴπερ

Εἴπερ is a particle formed as a combination of the conditional particle εἰ, "if", and the intensifying particle περ.[14] Its sense as a logical connective linking two propositions is by no means uniform, and must be ascertained from the context, as is the case for virtually all ancient Greek particles[15]. In the New Testament it occurs only seven times, if we include a disputed textual variant in 1 Peter 2:3, two of which occurrences are in 1 Corinthians, three in Romans and the sixth in 2 Thessalonians. I shall examine these in order of their increasing proximity to our target text.

The textual variant in 1 Peter 2:3 (quite well supported in the textual corpus but not preferred by the Bible Society editors) reads, εἴπερ εγεύσσθε ὅτι χρηστὸς ο κύριος, where the preferred reading has ει rather than εἴπερ. "If you have tasted that the Lord is good" is too hypothetical a sense for either variant to fit the context, where this clause is clearly intended to provide the solid grounding and motivation for the audience's response to the preceeding exhortation: the clause, apart from the conditional ει/εἴπερ, quotes the invitation "Taste and see that the Lord is good" from Ps.34:8 and implies that membership of a faith-community addressed by such scriptures has normalized experiences of God's goodness which they can recognize as fulfilling that invitation. Hence the sense of either variant must be close to "since", or "as surely": the implicit uncertainty in "if" has been eclipsed by the strong expectation that the condition is in fact fulfilled.

In 2 Thessalonians 1:6, we find εἴπερ δίκαιον παρὰ θεῷ ανταποδοῦναι τοῖς θλίβουσιν υμᾶς θλῖψιν καὶ υμῖν τοῖς θλιβομένοις ἄνεσιν μεθ ημῶν, εν τῇ αποκαλύψει τοῦ κυρίου Ιησοῦ απ ουρανοῦ μετ αγγέλων δυνάμεως αυτοῦ. Once again, "since" is the best reading here, as the writer clearly expects that there will in fact be just such a righteous turning of the tables when the Lord Jesus is revealed in power.

Turning to Paul's own writings, we find that the three uses of εἴπερ in Romans each exhibit a sense in which the condition is expected to be accepted as true by the audience. In Rom.3:29-30 he writes, ἢ Ιουδαίων ο θεὸς μόνον; ουχὶ καὶ εθνῶν; ναὶ καὶ εθνῶν, εἴπερ εις ο θεὸς ὃς δικαιώσει περιτομὴν εκ πίστεως καὶ ακροβυστίαν διὰ τῆς πίστεως. Here there is nothing conditional at all about the connective: he is emphatically asserting that God is in fact one in order to derive his conclusions from that accepted premise. It must be rendered "since", or "because", and is in fact equivalent to the common explanatory use of γάρ: the unity of God explains and necessitates the unity of his dealings with humankind.

Rom.8:9 is almost as definite an assertion: υμεῖς δὲ ουκ εστὲ εν σαρκὶ αλλὰ εν πνεύματι, εἴπερ πνεῦμα θεοῦ οικεῖ εν υμῖν. ει δέ τις πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ ουκ ἔχει, ουτος ουκ

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[14] See J.D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954) 487 n 490; Robertson, *Grammar*, 1153 n 1154.

[15] Denniston, *Particles*, lvi n lviii.

εστιν αυτου. While this conditional clause in combination with its immediate successor deals with the possibility that some of the audience might not have the Spirit of God dwelling in them, Paul immediately asserts that anyone not fulfilling the condition is not "of him", that is of Christ, and thus does not properly belong in the audience. Given Paul's lack of personal relationship with the Roman believers addressed, and the tone of the letter as a whole, it seems most unlikely that he wanted to offend them by raising even the theoretical possibility that their faith community contained some members who were not "of Christ". Rather, his clear intention is to affirm that they are collectively "in the spirit" rather than "in the flesh", precisely because he is confident that the Spirit of God dwells in them.

Later in the same chapter, Rom.8:17, Paul writes, ει δὲ τέκνα, καὶ κληρονόμοι· κληρονόμοι μὲν θεου, συγκληρονόμοι δὲ Χριστου, <u>ειπερ</u> συμπάσχομεν ινα καὶ συνδοξασθωμεν. In this case, the condition expressed in the ειπερ... clause represents a real choice that still lies before both Paul and his audience inasmuch as it requires an ongoing committment to "suffering with Christ" when required to do so as an integral part of inheriting the promises of God with him. Nevertheless, there is no expression of uncertainty about whether they will in fact fulfill this condition, but rather a confidence on Paul's part that both he and his audience will continue to do so. So we might best translate the connective as "provided that..." or "so long as..." in this case.

The remaining occurence of ειπερ, apart from our target verse, is in 1 Corinthians 15:15:- ευρισκόμεθα δὲ καὶ ψευδομάρτυρες του θεου, οτι εμαρτυρήσαμεν κατὰ του θεου οτι ηγειρεν τὸν Χριστόν, ον ουκ ηγειρεν <u>ειπερ</u> αρα νεκροὶ ουκ εγείρονται. Here we may be sure that Paul is using the connective to usher in a counter-factual hypothetical clause, "...if then the dead are not raised." This premise has been supplied by the opposition, and Paul's citation of it is a form of *reductio ad absurdum*: his opponents' beliefs include the resurrection of Christ as a special case, and Paul is accusing them of inconsistency: if they can accept resurrection in one special case, how can they be so categorical about denying its possibility or appropriateness in all others? Does this example then support those who read the first clause in 1 Corinthians 8:5 as another counter-factual hypothesis? We might prudently concede that it does open up that possibility, while pointing out that this fourth example of Paul's usage is significantly unlike the others not only in its contextual significance but also in its being combined with another particle, αρα, "then". The connective here is, strictly speaking, formed by the combination of these two particles, in which the second term signals that the clause arises as a consequence of the preceeding argument: in this instance the opposing argument with which Paul explicitly disagrees. The counter-factual nature of this premise in his judgement is conveyed through that second particle from the context of the broader argument and could well be translated as "If then, as you maintain...". We have no reason to suppose that ειπερ on its own would have allowed Paul's distancing himself from the truth of such a clause, as the combined

phrase has done. Of course Paul sometimes uses ει on its own to introduce a counter-factual conditional, and does so eight times in the course of chapter 15 (verses 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 29 and 32). But the more intensive nature of ειπερ might well have made this problematic without the help of άρα in verse 15 to indicate that the conditional clause did not represent his own opinion but rather followed from the postulates of the opposition.

We are therefore quite justified in concluding that the evidence of the New Testament, and of Paul's usage in particular, suggests that the intensive nature of ειπερ works against its being used on its own to introduce a counter-factual hypothesis: its use in 1 Corinthians 8:5 should lead us to suppose that Paul is more likely to be affirming the truth of the conditional clause which it introduces. This would then lead us understand the clause in a sense consistent with that presupposition.

7.1.2.2 The Sense of αλλά

The other half of the problem of interpreting the connection between verses 5 and 6 involves the sense of the connective particle αλλά: what range of possible meanings should we consider, and how are these effected by its combination with the preceeding ειπερ in verse 5?

Fee's characterisation of αλλά as "the strong adversative, *but*"[16] leads him to translate it as "But" when offering a supposedly more literal translation, even though he has earlier rendered it as "yet" in order to yield a more connected English sentence.[17] This apparent view that only the "but" reading is strictly proper undergirds his whole contention that there is something grammatically incorrect about the construction of verses 5 and 6 as a single Greek sentence. As that perception both reinforces the view that verse 6 had a prehistory before its present textual context and undermines the importance of interpreting both verses as an organic whole, it is important for us to check its validity.

Where two statements A and B are joined in the form A αλλά B, what is the logical relation expressed? Fee's view implies that this relation is essentially "not A but B": the second statement is given as a replacement for the first, which is rejected (as untrue, unsound, or undesirable). I would argue that the relation normally expressed by Paul is an affirmation of *both* A and B. It should be simple enough to test this schema against Paul's own usage from this epistle alone, where αλλά occurs 69 times. We find in fact that 45 of these instances involve an *explicit* denial of A: the particle ου or some equivalent negative term is used at the start of the first propostion to indicate its rejection before αλλά introduces the acceptable replacement. In one further instance (10:19-20) the denial of A is implied by couching it as a series of questions answered in the negative by the B

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[16] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 373.

[17] Fee, *First Corinthians* 372, 369 respectively

statement. But what of the remaining 22 instances (apart from 8:6)? Four of these (6:12, 10:23 twice, 14:17) involve a denial, but it is of B rather than A. Each denies an expected implication: A is true, but B does not follow.

This leaves us with 18 examples (26% of the sample) in which both A and B are affirmed, and the use of αλλά marks some form of contrast between the two statements. In six of these cases, there is very little tension between A and B at all. Four (1:27, 3:2, 4:3, and 15:40) are examples of extension, "A and what is more, B"; one (3:6) is a contrast in relative values, "A, but more importantly B"; and one (12:24) is an analogy involving no contrast at all other than the relative importance of the human and divine actors.

The remaining twelve cases (4:4, 4:15, 6:11 thrice, 7:7, 7:21, 9:2, 9:12a, 10:5, 14:9 and 15:46a) may be rendered "A but nevertheless B", affirming two facts or values but acknowledging that they are in tension in Paul's mind or the audiences's. One of these, 9:2, offers an important parallel to the use in 8:6, actually using the conditional particle ει to begin A:- ει ἄλλοις ουκ ειμὶ απόστολος, αλλά γε υμῖν ειμι: "Even if to others I am not an apostle, yet to you I am". Here two statements are both affirmed but held in tension by αλλά: A = To others I am not an apostle, and B = To you I am an apostle. Both are affirmed as true, although the first is by implication regretable. A similar use by Paul of the "ει A ... αλλά B" form to admit regretfully the fact of A while also affiming the more desirable B, is found in 2 Cor.5:16: ει καὶ εγνώκαμεν κατὰ σάρκα Χριστόν, αλλὰ νῦν ουκέτι γινώσκομεν. This idiom is not only found in Paul's own writings. Col.2:5 has ει γὰρ καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ ἀπειμι, αλλὰ τῷ πνεύματι σὺν υμῖν ειμι; and this tone may also be present in Mark 14:29, ο δὲ Πέτρος ἔφη αυτῷ, Ει καὶ πάντες σκανδαλισθήσονται, αλλ ουκ εγώ. In each of these parallels, the very facticity of the regretable state of affairs admitted in A is the reason or motivation for the strong affirmation B.

I shall later argue for a reading of 1 Corinthians 8:5-6 which has precisely this form of the ειπερ A ....αλλὰ B construction: "Although regrettably A is the case, this is all the more reason for emphasizing that B is also true." At this point we have merely established the grammatical possibility of such a reading by assembling evidence that (i) Paul's use of the form "A αλλά B" normally involves an affirmation of both A and B unless one of these is marked by a negative particle, and (ii) the combination ει ... αλλά (and by extension the intensive ειπερ .... αλλ found only in 1 Cor.8:5-6) is not only grammatically well-formed but capable of expressing a logical relation that is in no way represented by the English "if....but" which Fee considers its most literal translation.

Finally, the difference in perception between Fee and the present writer concerning the well formedness of the connection ειπερ .... αλλ gives rise to differing interpretations of the significance of the fact that some early texts (P^{46}, B, 33, b, sa, Irenaeus) omit the αλλά beginning verse 6. He says that these texts "clean up this awkward sentence"[18] by

[18] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 369, n. 2. Allo, *1 Corinthiens*, 201, n. A6 also comments, "Αλλά (dont l'interposition donne au passage de 5 à 6 un certain air d'anacoluthe) est omis dans B".

this omission. However, we may just as easily claim that this omission shows that far from always having a "strongly adversative" sense, αλλά could be read in this combination in a sense that could allow its omission altogether without changing the logical relation expressed. In English we could render these equivalent possibilities as "Although A, nevertheless B" and "Although A, B", where the nevertheless serves to emphasize the element of contrast or tension inherent in asserting both A and B, but the logico/grammatical relation between the two clauses is indicated adequately by "although" alone.

7.2 Verbless Sentence Structure

Having established that verses 5 and 6 fit together as a well-formed sentence, we shall now consider how well verse 6 might stand on its own, inasmuch as we have seen (in my introductory chapter) that the predominant scholarly opinion is that it had a pre-history within the Christian community before Paul included it in this epistle. I propose to demonstrate that this opinion involves some serious grammatical difficulties, in support of my general contention that the best context in which to interpret verse 6 is its present text.

7.2.1 Translation of "missing verbs"

The most important grammatical fact bearing on the interpretation of this verse must surely be this: although complex in its structure, the Greek contains no verbs, which must be supplied during translation into languages such as English, German and French. Surprisingly, this fact seems insignificant to the commentators, who generally supply several verbs as needed in their translations without feeling the need to justify their particular choices nor to comment on the Greek sentence structure involved. Thus Robertson and Plummer supply the four verbs "is", "come", "tend", and "are" without explanation;[19] Barrett supplies "is", "come", "leads", and "come into being";[20] Conzelmann gives "exists", "come", "move", "exist" and "live";[21] Fee conveys the parallel structure by using "is", "came", and "live" twice each but without explaining where he gets these three;[22] while Senft inserts "il n'en est pas moins vrai que", "il

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[19] Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians*, The International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T.& T.Clark, 1911), translation 167, commentary 167n168.

[20] C.K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 2nd ed. (London: A.&C. Black, 1971), translation 187, commentary 192n194.

[21] Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians: a Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, trans. Leitch James W., Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), translation 139, commentary 144n145.

[22] Fee, *First Corinthians*, translation 369, commentary 371n376.

n'existe qu'", "vient", "sommes" (twice), and "existe".[23] A few other commentators indicate some uncertainty in their translations: Lietzmann inserts an initial unmarked "ist" but sets his subsequent insertions of "stammt", "streben" and "ist" in brackets without explanation;[24] Allo likewise sets off "il ne'est qu'" in brackets, but provides "sont" twice without indication or comment;[25] Orr and Walther supply six English verbs, "is" (twice), "exist" (three times) and "are" without explaining their choices, but note that the subordinate clauses have no verbs in Greek;[26] Grosheide indicates the scarcity of verbs by only supplying three, "is" and "are" (twice), without explanation[27]; and Hays both indicates that verbal sparcity in his "literal translation" using only "are" (twice) and indicates one aspect of ambiguity in the subordinate clauses in a comment.[28] Although the variety of insertions recorded above is prima facie evidence of ambiguity in the text, none of these commentators offers any discussion of why some of these insertions are more certain than others, nor any explanation of the Greek grammatical structures operating here. The way is clear for such a discussion.

7.2.2 Nominal Predication?

Faced with the fact of a passage of verbless Greek which translators need to supply with up to six finite verbs in order to render it smoothly into English, we may consider two main lines of explanation. On the one hand, most languages exhibit the phenomenon of *ellipsis*: for reasons of economy or good style, a speaker or author may choose to omit any word that can be supplied by the audience by inference from the context. On the other (I have just ellided a second use of "hand" for reasons of economy and good style), it is conceivable that a Greek clause may not always need an explicit verb where its English equivalent does. Both of these explanatory strategies will throw some light on this verse, but we must check out the second before offering the first: that is, it would be fallacious to speak of ellipsis where a Greek grammatical structure does not require any verb at all.

Clause formation without the use of a verb, common in many languages but less so in English (although in saying so I have just constructed two), is a regular grammatical form in ancient Greek, where the predicate could consist of a nominal, adjectival,

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[23] Christophe Senft, *La Première Épitre de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens*, Commentaire du Nouveau Testament, Deuxième Série (Paris: Deachaux & Niestlé, 1979), translation 107, commentary 111.

[24] Hans Lietzmann, *An Die Korinther I.II*, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1949), translation 36n38, commentary 37n38.

[25] Allo, *1 Corinthiens*, translation and commentary 201.

[26] William F. Orr and James Arthur Walther, *1 Corinthians: A New Translation*, The Anchor Bible 32 (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1976), translation 230, comment 231.

[27] F.W. Grosheide, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Wm.B.Eerdmans, 1953), translation 187, commentary 192n193.

[28] Richard B. Hays, *First Corinthians*, Interpretation: A Biblical Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997), translation and comment 139.

adverbial or prepositional phrase standing alone. These clauses are often referred to collectively as "nominals" as the boundaries between them are hard to maintain and they have much in common, compared with other clause types. I shall continue this usage. Cases where the verb ειμί is used purely as a copula should also be classed as verbless predications, because the predicate does not change if it is removed: e.g., πιστὸς ο θεὸς in 1 Cor.1:9 could equally have been expressed as πιστὸς ἐστιν ο θεὸς without changing its semantics (although in context this might change its pragmatic meaning). We should thus distinguish the *nominal clause*, a syntactic form more common in some languages than in others, from *verbless predication* which may be expressed either in the form of a nominal clause or with a copula and is common to all languages. A major study of this linguistic universal begins with this generalisation:

> This study of theoretical, typological and diachronic aspects of non-verbal predication starts from the hypothesis ... that all constructions containing a form of the (equivalent of the) verb *to be* on the one hand, and those containing no verb at all on the other, are members of a single class of non-verbal predications. This approach allows for a unified treatment of nominal, copula, locative, existential, and possessive constructions and makes it possible to generalize across languages that do and those that do not make use of one or more copulas in the expression of non-verbal predications.[29]

The nominal clause without a copula was in fact much more common in ancient Greek than in English and other modern languages in the Indo-European family, although this was more true of classical Attic than of Ionic Greek, according to Moulton-Turner.[30] Paul's ready use of the nominal form can be well illustrated without moving far beyond 1 Corinthians. I have already cited one example from 1:9; another is found in the first clause following 8:6. Αλλ ουκ εν πάσιν η γνῶσις, has a verbless prepositional phrase as its main predicate: ουκ εν πάσιν. This in turn is a negative form of a simple sentence in which η γνῶσις is the subject and εν πάσιν is a complete predicate. There is no reason to postulate the ellipsis of anything equivalent to the "is" needed in an English translation: in Greek this is simply not needed to complete the clause. Another example may be seen in verse 4, where each of the embedded clauses ουδὲν εἰδωλον εν κόσμῳ and ουδεὶς θεὸς ει μὴ εις consists of a simple adverbial predicate (ουδὲν / ουδεὶς) applied to a simple subject (εἰδωλον / θεὸς), followed by a qualifying adjunct (εν κόσμῳ / ει μὴ εις): no verb is implied or needed in either case.

These examples are only three of 94 such verbless clauses I have identified in the epistle. Alongside this we may set only 54 other clauses using the verb εἰμι purely as a

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[29] Kees Hengeveld, *Non-verbal Predication: Theory, Typology, Diachrony*, Functional Grammar Series 15 (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992) 1 Hengeveld, *Non-verbal Predication*, 1. Hengeveld is a leading figure in the Functional Grammar school following the pioneering work of Simon Dik. I have found their emphasis on syntactic forms as language-specific ways of expressing semantic predications very helpful.

[30] James Hope Moulton and Nigel Turner, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*, <4 vols.> (Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark Ltd, 1908) III, 294 n 295 Moulton and Turner, *Grammar*, III, 294 n 295. See also F. Blass and A. Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, trans & rev. Robert W. Funk (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1961) 70-72.

copula.[31] It is apparent from these figures that Paul was comfortable with the Attic idiom as a normal syntactic structure, one of two options he had for expressing a verbless predication, rather than using it for occasional special effect. Nor can we presume, as seems common among scholars discussing our present text, that the presence of a verbless clause constitutes any sort of evidence for the presence of traditional formulae, gnomic material, or the like. The nominal clause was a natural part of Paul's everyday language and he used it with grammatical precision, supplementing it in about one third of the cases with a copula or other verbal support as needed to make his meaning clear, to enable him to bring one component of the predicate forward for emphasis, or to emphasize the coherence of longer clauses. The question before us is whether he was expressing such a verbless predication in the paired main clauses of 1 Corinthians 8:6.

From the fact that verse 6 has no verbs, we may infer that either it has no need of them, because of the nominal clause structure discussed above, or else that one or more necessary verbs have been elided and must be supplied from the context. The first option depends on the possibility that the whole structure of this complex sentence arises from the interconnections between a number of verbless clauses. Is this in fact plausible? The tightly structured form of the verse might suggest that this is so, but a closer examination will reveal some real difficulties.

An obvious formal feature is the division of the verse into two parallel sections, each with the structure:

(connective phrase)	(main clause)	(supplementary clauses)
(αλλ ημν)	**(εἷς θεὸς ο πατὴρ)**	**(εξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν),**
(καὶ)	**(εἷς κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς)**	**(δι οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεῖς δι αυτοῦ.)**

The supplementary clauses pose some real problems of semantic ambiguity which I shall put aside for the present in order to focus on the problem of establishing the syntax of the two parallel main clauses. The question before us: can they be properly construed as grammatical constructions in which the predicate is provided not by a verb but by a "pure nominal phrase"? The parallel structure implies that the same pattern exists in each main clause, so we can work with the first and use the second to confirm or refute our results.

Standing alone, the clause εις θεὸς ο πατὴρ can be construed in several ways, depending on how we group its components and assign the grammatical functions of subject and predicate. One major possibility is to read it as the conjunction of two nominal phrases: (εις θεὸς)(ο πατὴρ), which gives two possibilities for function assignment; and the other possibility is the grouping (εις)(θεὸς ο πατὴρ) where the adjective stands alone as either subject or predicate. All of these four options give readings that are very unlikely in the context of Paul's letter.

[31] The data for these generalisations are included in Appendix A, excluding epistolary formulae which although superficially verbless actually require us to supply elided verbs by convention.

Option One. The first has (εις θεὸς)$_S$ as subject and (ο πατὴρ)$_P$ as predicate, where the predication either names (as "The Father") or describes (as "the father") one of the deities within the community's pantheon and the supplementary clauses extend that predicate. Whatever the state of his monotheism, we cannot credit Paul with penning anything that would have him naming or describing his god as one among others: "But for us, one god is the Father....". Applied to the second half of the verse, this construction would give us the translation, "One lord is Jesus Christ", which seems equally implausible in the context, given that Paul does not ever seem to name any other lords, either here or in any other contexts. A theologically more likely reading, "The One God is the Father" would require Paul to have signalled the referential singularity of the first nominal phrase by using the article: (ο εις θεὸς)$_S$ (ο πατὴρ)$_P$ or (ο θεὸς ο εις)$_S$ (ο πατὴρ)$_P$.

Option Two. The second possibility has the functions reversed: (εις θεὸς)$_P$ (ο πατὴρ)$_S$. This is grammatically more regular, given the presence of the article in the second nominal phrase, but yields the translation, "The Father(/the father) is one god", where the subject is extended by the subordinate clauses giving more detail to the identification of this being concerning whom the predicate has already asserted that he is one god. The major difficulty in this reading lies in understanding why Paul or any of his community should want to assert that the Father/father is "one god": *one* as opposed to many father-gods, or *god* as opposed to one or many fathers who are not deities. Applying this construction to the second half-verse gives us "Jesus Christ is one lord" which is even harder to explain: who would have supposed that he might be many? The implausibility of this construction is made further evident in each of the main clauses if we recognize the pointlessness of asserting the singleness of a subject whose particularity is already implied by the article (ο πατὴρ) or inherent in the personal name (Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς).

Option Three. What then of the remaining two constructions, in which εις functions as either subject or predicate in each half of the verse? The latter seems inherently more plausible than the previous two options, given the immediate textual context in which Paul has just referred to a plurality of gods and lords. It makes perfect sense to suppose that the central affirmation in verse 6 is the singularity of the Christian community's God and of their Lord in a world where multiple rivals are named, as verse 5 affirms.

But is that what the construction does? The initial problems here are grammatical: to justify the translation "God is one..." we would prefer the Greek text to appear as "εις ο θεὸς ..." rather than "εις θεὸς ....". This is a matter of style and precision rather than of grammatical necessity, but given the established Greek use of the article to remove ambiguity by distinguishing subject from predicate, it seems strange that this device was

not used to make this meaning clearer.[32]

Furthermore, this construction creates difficulties for our reading of the supplementary clauses, which are tied to the nominal phrase ο πατὴρ by the pronouns ου and αυτόν. Are we to read them as an integral part of an elaborate subject specification (θεὸς ο πατὴρ εξ ου τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν)$_S$? To show how difficult this construction really is to carry through, we can follow its hypothetical development as a progressive elaboration of a simple form.

1. (εις)$_P$ (θεὸς)$_S$ = "God is one"

2. (εις)$_P$ (θεὸς ο πατὴρ)$_S$ = "God the father is one"

3. (εις)$_P$ (θεὸς ο πατὴρ εξ ου τὰ πάντα)$_S$ = "God the father, through whom everything X's, is one". So far, so good: setting aside our need to determine the intrinsic meaning of that subordinate clause, represented as a missing verb X in my translation, it is clear how it might function as a part of the extended subject. But what do we do with the remaining clause?

4. (εις)$_P$ (θεὸς ο πατὴρ εξ ου τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν)$_S$ =(ungrammatically) "God the father, from whom everything X's and we Y for him, is one". The grammatical problem with this reading is that the final clause ("and we Y for him") breaks away from the subordinate construction of its predecessor to stand in paratactic relation to the main clause. In doing so, it signals its importance as an assertion in its own right, and becomes impossible to fit into an elaboration of the subject in the main clause. This would lead us to postulate the following hypotactic reconstruction of this option:-

4A. (εις)$_P$ (θεὸς ο πατὴρ εξ ου τὰ πάντα)$_S$ καὶ (ημεῖς)S (εις αυτόν)$_P$ = "God the father, from whom all things X, is one, and we Y for him". That is certainly possible in the context, especially as an echo of the Shema', ÷κύριος ο θεὸς ημῶν κύριος εις εστιν καὶ αγαπήσεις κύριον τὸν θεόν σου..." "The Lord your God is one Lord and you shall love the Lord your God...". The connecting echo lies in the juxtaposition of a central affirmation of divine unity, "your God is one (Deut)/ for us..God is one (1Cor.)" with a consequent duty or allegiance for the hearers, "and you shall love the Lord your God....(Deut)/ and we are for him...(1Cor.)".

Does this reading work so well for the second half of the verse? The parallel construction would be: καὶ (εις)$_P$ (κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς δι ου τὰ πάντα)$_S$ καὶ (ημεῖς)$_S$ (δι αυτοῦ.)$_P$ = "and (the) Lord Jesus Christ, through whom everything X's, is one, and we Y through him." The main predication in this case is more difficult to make sense of in the

[32] On the established use of the article to distinguish subject from predicate, see William Edward Jelf, *A Grammar of the Greek Language*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Parker and Co., 1881) 137-38; Samuel G. Green, *Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament* (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1912) 178-79; Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, 2, Gordon M. Messing (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1956) 292; Robertson, *Grammar*, 276-78; Maximilian Zerwick, *Biblical Greek: Illustrated by Examples*, 4, trans. Joseph Smith, Scripta Pontificii Instituti Biblici (Rome: Editrice Pontifico Instituto Biblico, 1963) 57-58; and Blass and Debrunner, *Greek Grammar*, 132, 143.

context: while Paul has opened up a discourse in which it is natural to discuss the plurality/singularity of divine beings ("Is God many or one?"), and has referred to the many "lords" in heaven and earth, this does not seem to lead to a parallel question, "Is Jesus Christ one or many?". We could postulate that Paul is just getting carried away by the parallels with the Shema (κύριος .... κύριος εις εστιν, "the Lord ... is one Lord) which now gets transferred onto Jesus as Lord, but this supposes that the early church was content to let sacred language dominate rather than inform its thinking. Before drawing such a conclusion, I would prefer to keep searching for a reading that makes proper sense in its context. Anyway, this construction runs into the same grammatical shortcoming in this second half of the verse as it did in the first: if κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς δι ου τὰ πάντα was meant to constitute the subject, this would be much better signalled by including the article: καὶ (εις)$_P$ (ο κύριος (ο) Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς δι ου τὰ πάντα)$_S$ καὶ (ημεῖς)$_S$ (δι αυτοῦ.)$_P$ Rather than accuse Paul of carelessness in omitting the article, in order to support this reading, it would be better to conclude that he knows what he is doing, and this postulated construction is not it.

Option Four. The remaining construction would have εις functioning as subject in each of the main clauses: "...One is god, the Father..." and "...One is lord, Jesus Christ...". Like the previous candidate, this possibility has an inherent plausibility in the context, in as much as it asserts the singularity of those given these titles within the Christian community. However it retains the same fundamental grammatical flaw as that third reading: the lack of an article as subject-marker. That reading would best be expressed in Greek as ο εις θεος... Whether Paul is constructing this verse *de novo* or taking up a pre-existent credal formula, it seems difficult to accept that his normal care for grammatical proprieties would have allowed that omission. We should evaluate this reading as possible but quite unlikely.

The discussion in this section has been exploring the possibility that verse 6 could stand alone as a grammatical construction formed entirely from nominal clauses. While the third and forth constructions considered seem to make the best sense within the textual context, none of them are without significant difficulties. This suggests that we should consider the major alternative, that the verse needs to be supplied with one or more ellided verbs that may be inferred from the context.

7.3 The Ellipsis of ἐστιν

Supplying verbs for this verse is, of course, just what translators and commentators do whenever they render 1 Corinthians 8:6 into English or similar languages in which verbs are required for good sentence sense. Nor is there any doubt that all engaged in that task would consider that their choice of verbs is governed by their best sense of what the

verse means in context. It is not clear, however, that these choices are ever regulated by any explicit rationale which would provide a basis for assessing the validity of their process and results. I propose to use the following general principles to guide me in my search for the "missing verbs" in verse 6.

1. It is always necessary to distinguish between words elided from the Greek text, which must be supplied by a native Greek listener in order to complete the Greek sentence sense, and those words that must be supplied when translating into English or another target language for which there is no equivalent verbal element in the Greek text. Both of these processes require us to make inferences based on the context, but only the former involves the recovery of Greek words omitted by the author because they could be inferred by the audience from a mutually understood context.

2. The most probable context for supplying an elided term is the immediate preceeding text, and this probability increases with its proximity. That is to say, the most powerful contextual determinants are provided by earlier parts of the same sentence, then earlier in the same paragraph, the same topic and so on backwards in the text.

3. The contextual influence of remote earlier textual elements is increased if they are either a) highlighted elements of the text's general structure such as summary statements or introductions, general statements of principle, recurring elements, or the like; or b) linked with the passage in question by lexical bonding or other direct means.

With these principles in mind, we may quickly identify a word elided from each of the main clauses in verse 6. It is in fact the verb εστιν, which is supplied by the immediate pre-text in verse 5, whose two main clauses each have the verb εισιν at their heart.

v.5 ...εισὶν λεγόμενοι θεοὶ..... "there are those who are called gods..."

....εισὶν θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοί, "there are many gods and many lords"

v.6 ...(εστὶν) εις θεὸς..... "there is one god..."

...(εστὶν) εις κύριος.... "there is one lord..."

One immediate effect of inserting these verbs is to remove the grammatical ambiguity we encountered above when attempting to read the main clauses of verse 6 as verbless predications. This grammatical clarification happens not only because we now have verbs to work with in making sense of the main clauses, but also because these verbs can also fill the subject function in each case, enabling all of the words as they stand in the text to be read as predicate, notably the εις which would seem to be so central to the affirmation of each clause.

Whether that happens, and if so how, will take some unravelling, but before we move on to that task I must acknowledge that finding the ellipsed presence of εστιν in the main clauses of verse 6 is no surprise, of course: no translator has any difficulty in rendering the start of verse 6 as "But for us *there is* one God,...". I have been steadfastly ignoring this possibility so far in order to examine how well the verse may stand on its own: the seeming naturalness with which we all read εστιν into the text serves to hide the

fact that this move is actually highly context-dependent and hence to suppress two major questions:-

A. To what extent must our interpretation of εστιν in verse 6 be governed by the significance of εισιν in verse 5? Given that one of the prime functions of ellipsis is to bind clauses together, we should presume that Paul intends not only the verb to be carried forward, but also something of its significance.

B. Does the context-dependence of verse 6 in its present form undermine the argument of those who postulate its pre-existence as a credal formula, hymnic fragment, or the like? I shall return to this second issue much later, once I have established a credible alternative reading.

7.3.1 The Linking Function of Ellipsis

Ellipsis is a grammatical feature found in many languages. What communicative function or functions does it serve for those who use it? Linguists have identified several general possibilities.[33] The most obvious, and the one most frequently cited as an explanation of the general phenomenon, is the universal tendency to prefer brevity in communication: because speakers'and writers' thoughts often run ahead of their expression, there is a natural reluctance to use two words where one will suffice. However, this is so constant a factor as to be of no explanatory value at all, and while highly abbreviated speech has been recognised as a characteristic of idiosyncratic oral expression,[34] no studies have ever sought to show that ellipsis occurs more frequently at those points in any discourse where the speaker is most hurried. This is probably because of a recognition that ellipsis can create difficulties in comprehension for the listener, so that while it may enable a speaker to express something faster, it may at the same time make the task of communication more difficult, involving some sort of trade-off between compactness and rapid access.[35] Speakers do not only want to get their thoughts out rapidly: their major purpose is to communicate effectively, to have the audience understand them fully while demanding the minimum of effort. The use of ellipsis by a

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[33] Among recent writers, see Wolfgang Dressler, *Einführung in die Textlinguistic*, Konzepte der Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972) 32 - 34, 58; Robert de Beaugrande, *Text, Discourse, and Process: Toward a Multidisciplinary Science of Texts*, Advances in Discourse Process 4 (Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1980) 155 - 58; Robert de Beaugrande and Wolfgang Ulrich Dressler, *Introduction to Text Linguistics*, trans. Robert Beaugrande, de, Longman Linguistics Library (London: Longman, 1981) 66 - 69; Knud Lambrecht, *Information Structure and Sentence Form: Topic, focus, and the mental representations of discourse referents*, Cambridge Studies in Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994) 266 - 69. Some New Testament grammarians, although influenced by linguistic theories of a former era, have reflected on the functioning of ellipsis within koine Greek, drawing on the terminology of ancient rhetoric. See Robertson, *Grammar*, 391 - 95, 1201 - 04; Blass and Debrunner, *Greek Grammar*, 253 - 56; and Moulton and Turner, *Grammar*, III, 294 - 310.

[34] de Beaugrande and Dressler, *Text Linguistics*, 66-69.

[35] de Beaugrande, *Text, Discourse and Process*, 158.

speaker or writer may thus be construed as a request for their audience to make an extra effort to interpret the clause containing the ellipsis in connection with another clause in the text to which it is related. Hence ellipsis may be less characteristic of spoken than of written language, where the reader has better access to earlier parts of the text to recover elided material.

Linguists discussing ellipsis often classify it as a *cohesive* device, a means of increasing connectedness between parts of a text separated by the linear flow of language.[36] If the reference is to preceding text, then such a device is classified as *anaphoric*, and *cataphoric* if referring to text which is yet to come. Cataphoric ellipsis is more demanding on the audience than the anaphoric form, requiring a suspension of understanding until the missing element is supplied. Hence although it is more powerful as a cohesive device, it is used much less frequently than anaphoric ellipsis. There are important discourse-pragmatic reasons for making a further distinction between anaphora involving referential terms and that involving predications,[37] and of restricting our use of "ellipsis" to the latter category, which may then be further subdivided, principally into *gapping* (carrying a verb forward from one clause to another) and *sluicing* (an evocative term suggesting carrying a whole cluster of semantic material forward, a larger predicational unit being read into a subordinate clause or dependent sentence).[38] The significance of distinguishing between these two closely related forms of ellipsis may be difficult to maintain in the Greek language, where a complete sentence may be constituted in one word by a finite verb. Nevertheless it is useful for my present purpose, as I shall shortly raise the question of how much of 8:5 is carried forward into 8:6.

In order to gain a general picture of Paul's use of anaphoric ellipsis, I have examined the early discourses in the present epistle, from 1:10 to 11:1, and have identified fourteen examples, five of which I have classified as gapping and nine as sluicing. These are presented in Appendix B, with the word(s) carried forward in bold type where they actually occur in the earlier clause, and then entered in brackets, modified as necessary, where they are required later. Several generalisations suggest themselves from this material. Firstly, there are not very many examples, given the amount of text involved: anaphoric ellipsis is only one of several cohesive devices used within these discourses. Nevertheless, Paul seems quite at home with this device, almost to the point of preferring its more complex form.[39] One corollary may be drawn at this point: there is no basis for treating such compacted forms of expression as evidence of pre-formed or "formulaic"

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[36] So Dressler, *Einführung in die Textlinguistic*, 34-35; de Beaugrande and Dressler, *Text Linguistics*, 66-71; M.A.K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, 2nd ed. (London: Edward Arnold, 1994) 316-23.

[37] Lambrecht, *Information Structure*, 264-69.

[38] Dressler, *Einführung in die Textlinguistic*, 35; de Beaugrande, *Text, Discourse and Process*, 157.

[39] A much wider study would be required to make anything of that suggestion, which is not vital for my present purpose.

traditional units. Rather, we should accept that there are frequent occasions in which Paul deliberately adopts such forms as the most appropriate style of written language in which to express his own thought, as a natural part of his discourse.

Perhaps the most important feature we should notice is that in each case, there is an essential *logical* relation between the clauses connected by the ellipsis: together they form a new proposition which can be summarized in some such form as "if A then B", "both A and B", "although A, yet B" etc. I have given my analysis of this summary schema in each case in Appendix B. In an argumentative text, we should expect to constantly find such relations, and of course we do throughout 1 Corinthians, most of them not being marked by ellipsis. What we may say, however, is that in each case of ellipsis identified in this sample, such a logical relation is essential. That is, the whole formed is not the same as the sum of its parts, and the ellipsis is one means the author has at his disposal for reminding his audience to consider the following clause in relation to the predecessor to which it is bound. Whether he might have wanted to assert the second in another context without the first is indeterminate.

For example, in 2:10b, τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα πάντα **ερα**υνᾷ, καὶ (ερα**υνᾷ**)τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ, we should not analyse this as a simple conjunction of two completely independent propositions, "The Spirit searches all things" and "The Spirit searches the depths of God". Together they express a proposition that these two processes are really a single processes, so that the revelation of divine mysteries is integrated with other spiritual discoveries, including the workings of the human soul; none of these can be accomplished without the agency of the divine Spirit, a theme that is developed in the surrounding discourse.[40] Likewise, in the second case listed, 2:12a, ημεῖς δὲ ου τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου **ελάβομεν** αλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ εκ τοῦ θεοῦ (ελάβομεν) ... the first clause supplies a crucial constraint on the second, for while some in the audience might be eager to assert their possession of the divine spirit, Paul counters by asserting that the divine spirit must be distinguished from another spirit which he labels "the spirit of the world", implying that they may not have made this distinction. In this context, we may conclude that he would be most reluctant to accept, let alone to affirm, the second clause as a statement on its own right.

Similarly, in the first example of *sluicing*, 1:17a, ου γὰρ **απέστειλέν με Χριστὸς** βαπτίζειν αλλὰ (απέστειλέν με Χριστὸς) ευαγγελίζεσθαι, the essential point to Paul's assertion in the second clause is that his commisioning to evangelize did not necessarily include a commission to baptize. Once again, the significance of the second clause is modified by its attachment to the first and cannot be taken as asserted in its own right. I would like to assert that this general relation can be seen to hold true for all of these

[40] See Fee, *First Corinthians*, 110 ; Raymond F. Collins, *First Corinthians*, Sacra Pagina 7 (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1999) 132-33; and Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000) 255-57.

fourteen cases, and hence to postulate that Paul's use of anaphoric ellipsis in 1 Corinthians has the effect of binding the linked clauses into a single proposition and in doing so implies that the clauses containing ellipsis are not asserted as propositions in their own right but rather within the qualifications implied by the larger proposition.

Applying this principle to the ellipsis of εστιν from the paired main clauses in 8:6 would yield the conclusion that Paul is not setting out here to assert εστιν εις θεὸς ο πατὴρ and εστιν εις κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς as propositions in their own right, but rather as integral parts of a larger proposition that begins in 8:5: ετπερ εισὶν λεγόμενοι θεοὶ ... ωσπερ εισὶν θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοί, ... αλλ ημιν (εστιν) εις θεὸς ο πατὴρ ... καὶ (εστιν) εις κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς. I have already argued that the linking conjuctions, ετπερ ... αλλ can be read here as indicating a relation with the logical form, "Even if A, nevertheless B". I am now moving one stage further by arguing that the ellipsis linking the expression of A and B here indicates that the author is not asserting B in its own right, whether or not he might have done so in another context, but rather is asserting B within the wider proposition of which it forms an integral part. So the assertions that there is one god, the Father... and the parallel assertion that there is one lord, Jesus Christ ... are offered as an apodosis in contrast to a protasis which appears first in the form εισὶν λεγόμενοι θεοὶ εττε εν ουρανῳ εττε επὶ γῆς and then expanded by the addition of a supporting assertion, εισὶν θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοί. The audience is not being asked to consider the clauses in the apodosis as an expression of independent propositions, but as assertions whose significance lies in the context provided by the assertions in the protasis. That is, our interpretation of the main clauses in 8:6 is dependent on how we understand 8:5, and cannot be considered separately.

I shall explore that connection further in the following section, but should first register an important corollary. One of the major questions motivating this study is whether, as has often been claimed, 8:6 is essentially an alien discourse unit inserted into, and not well integrated with, its present textual context. I am now in a position to claim that such views fail to pay due regard to the significance of the presence of ellipsis of predicational elements from this supposedly independent unit and are therefore faulty.

Firstly, any hypothesis that gives this verse an independent life as a traditional formula must also postulate the identity of the missing verb(s). One might retort that this is no issue at all, as there is an obvious candidate: εστιν. However, ideas that seem obvious should often be subjected to further questioning. One question in this case concerns the postulated discourse within the early Christian movement where this formula was developed. Are we really sure that the existence or non-existence of divine beings really occupied these early believers (as opposed to later more philosophically focused disputants) to the extent that it could have given rise to this as an important expression of common belief? Maybe so, but we cannot assume so, and we certainly must not take the present text as evidence for such a supposition, as this would completely beg the question.

A second critical question is this:- What would happen to this hypothesis if it could be shown that the elided material in the present text is not simply represented by the verb εισιν in verse 5 (as I shall shortly argue)? In such a case, the hypothesis would imply that Paul had elided the essential verb from the formula in order to give it a significantly different sense in its present context. The combination of these two critical considerations is weighty enough in my own mind for me to conclude that the hypothesis of the pre-existence of this verse as a traditional formula is highly unlikely.

My next concern is to explore the semantic significance of the ellipsis in more detail.

7.3.2 X "is called" Y

If we presuppose that the main clauses in 1 Corinthians 8:6 assert the *existence* of one God and one Lord we will be understandably confused about the meaning of seemingly similar assertions in v.5 : εισὶν λεγόμενοι θεοὶ ειτε εν ουρανῷ ειτε επὶ γῆς, and εισὶν θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοί. There is no sign that these are quotations from any participant in the discourse whose viewpoints might be opposed to those expressed in v.6. Worse, they are each introduced by conjunctions that appear to affirm rather than deny their truth. The first of these, ειπερ, might possibly be interpreted as introducing a counter-factual conditional, but that possibility is then undermined by the second, ωσπερ, which introduces the second assertion as confirmation of the first. Even if we understand λεγόμενοι as a qualification removing most of the existential import of the first clause, the second clause reads as a straightforward assertion that many gods and lords exist. Such readers then find themselves positing a change in the meaning of existence between v.5b and v.6: in the first instance it means that pagans and others *experience* their gods and lords as real, or that they *believe* in their reality. This is a strange procedure: in the clauses where the verb εισιν actually appears, it is held to express something other than existence, while in the clauses where the ellided presence of εστιν must be inferred from those earlier occurences it is held as unquestionable that it is entirely existential in meaning. Clearly such interpretation involves theological questions (What must Paul be asserting here?) completely overshadowing questions of grammar (Why should Paul use this vital verb in such an inconsistent manner, in such close proximity? Is such inconsistency grammatically possible when the instances are explicitly linked by ellipsis of the actual words involved in the inconsistency?).

7.3.2.1 The significance of λεγόμενοι

Fortunately, there is another way out of this dilemma, and it is offered by further consideration of the word λεγόμενοι. A long-established consensus among commentators has held that this should be rendered as a dismissive qualification ("so-called"/ *sogenannt* /

soi disant / *prétendus*),[41] sometimes supported by citing Ephesians 2:11 and/or *Corpus Hermeticum* 2:14.[42] The attraction of the latter citation for these scholars is in its use of the phrase λεγόμενοι θεοὶ in contrast with μόνος ο θεός, but even if this is used in a dismissive sense (not necessarily so) these texts are not particularly close in time or milieu. The case in Eph.2:11 is closer to 1 Cor.8:5 in both ways, but it does not describe divinities: οι **λεγόμενοι** ακροβυστία υπὸ τής λεγομένης περιτομής, "those who are called uncircumcised by those who are called circumcised ." In fact this example, far from supporting the consensus reading of this term in of 1 Cor.8:5, undermines it in several ways. Firstly, it has no dismissive overtones: no translator feels constrained to render this as "the so-called uncircumcision." Secondly, it makes us aware that λεγόμενοι is in fact not a rare term carrying a very specialised meaning, even if it appears in this exact form only in these two places in the New Testament corpus. Right alongside it in Eph.2:11 is a close morphological variant, λεγομένης, which is obviously used in an identical sense: "commonly called". Both are simply different case forms of the plural present passive participle of λέγω, one of the commonest lexical items in the vocabulary of the New Testament. What happens once we remove the constraints of case and number? Suddenly we find multiple examples (at least 27) of this passive participle in the New Testament, all of them sharing this same sense, "commonly called".[43] Examining these will show just how strange the consensus reading of 1 Cor.8:5 really is. Most involve reporting the commonly used name of a person or place, with no value judgment implied as to whether the speaker or writer thinks this is appropriate.[44] In two cases the writer may be presumed to be approving or even commending this ascription of a name.[45] Two cases possibly

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[41] So Robertson and Plummer, *First Corinthians*, 167; Lietzmann, *An Die Korinther*, 36; Allo, *1 Corinthiens*, 199; Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 191; Senft, *1 Corinthiens*, 107; Orr and Walther, *1 Corinthians*, 233 Ben III Witherington, *Conflict and Community in Corinth: a Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995) 197; Friedrich Lang, *Die Briefe an die Korinther*, Das Neue Testament Deutsch 7 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994) 108; Christian Wolff, *Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther*, Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament 7 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1996) 172; Hays, *First Corinthians*, 139; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 314; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 631, 633.

[42] So Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 143 n.32; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 372; and Wolfgang Schrage, *Der este Brief an die Korinther Vol.2*, Evangelisch—Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament VII (Zurich & Neukirchen—Vluyn / Solothurn: Benziger & Neukirchener, 1995) 239 n.165.

[43] The complete set, as best as I can ascertain: Mt.1:16, 2:23, 4:18, 10:2, 26:3, 26:14, 27:16, 27:17, 27:22, 27:33, Lk.22:1, Jn.4:25, 9:11, 11:16, 11:54, 19:13, 19:17, Acts, 3:2, 6:9, 1Cor.8:5, Eph.2:11(x2), Col.4:11, 2Th.2:4, Heb.9:2, 9:3.

[44] εις πόλιν **λεγομένην** Ναζαρέτ (Mt.2:23); Σίμωνα τὸν **λεγόμενον** Πέτρον (Mt.4:18 = 10:2); τοῦ αρχιερέως τοῦ **λεγομένου** Καϊάφα (Mt.26:3); ο **λεγόμενος** Ιούδας Ισκαριώτης (Mt.26:14 = Lk.22:47); επίσημον **λεγόμενον** [Ιησοῦν] Βαραββάν (Mt.27:16); εις τόπον **λεγόμενον** Γολγοθά, ◎ εστιν Κρανίου Τόπος **λεγόμενος**, (Mt.27:33); η εορτὴ τῶν αζύμων η **λεγομένη** πάσχα (Lk.22:1); Μεσσίας ἐρχεται ο **λεγόμενος** Χριστός (Jn.4:25); Ο ἄνθρωπος ο **λεγόμενος** Ιησοῦς (Jn9:11); Θωμᾶς ο **λεγόμενος** Δίδυμος (Jn.11:16); Εφραὶμ **λεγομένην** πόλιν (Jn.11:54); τόπον **λεγόμενον** Λιθόστρωτον (Jn.19:13); τὸν **λεγόμενον** Κρανίου Τόπον (Jn.19:17); τὴν θύραν τοῦ ιεροῦ τὴν **λεγομένην** Ωραίαν (Acts 3:2); and Ιησοῦς ο **λεγόμενος** Ιούστος (Col.4:11).

[45] Ιησοῦς ο **λεγόμενος** Χριστός. (Mt.1:16); and σκηνὴ η **λεγομένη** «Αγια Αγίων, (Heb.9:3).

involve some degree of doubt or disapproval.[46]

One further case from 2 Thessalonians offers an interesting parallel to 1 Cor.8:5. The writer in this deutero-Pauline epistle depicts a coming "lawless one" who will set himself up in opposition not only to God but to every other object of worship: ο αντικείμενος καὶ υπεραιρόμενος επὶ πάντα **λεγόμενον** θεὸν ἢ σέβασμα, ὥστε αυτὸν εις τὸν ναὸν τοῦ θεοῦ καθίσαι αποδεικνύντα εαυτὸν ὅτι ἐστιν θεός.(2 Thess.2:4). In contrast to the consensus reading of 1 Cor.8:5, πάντα λεγόμενον θεὸν here cannot properly be read as "every so-called god",[47] as its reference includes the one God whose temple is invaded by this usurper. The most natural reading of this passage is that it depicts a tyrant who demands that his subjects worship only him as a deity[48]. In doing so, he displaces all pre-existing objects of worship: πάντα λεγόμενον θεὸν denotes all those who are regarded as divine by their various worshippers, without conveying any judgment about whether they are justified in doing so.

Overall, this survey of New Testament use of the passive participles of λέγω does not support the consensus view that λεγόμενοι θεοὶ in 1 Cor.8:5 should be rendered "so-called gods". On the contrary, it indicates that we should read this modifier as a simple indication of common usage. Various entities are commonly called gods: this is a simple fact. How then might we read this clause in such a light? It is actually very easy to read εισὶν λεγόμενοι θεοὶ ετε εν ουρανῷ ετε επὶ γῆς as a simple reporting of fact, that is of *linguistic* fact. There *are* various beings, whether in heaven or on earth, that are called gods by people living in the Greco-Roman world. *This asserts nothing about the existence of gods, but plenty about the linguistic behaviour of people*.

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[46] Pilate's reported labelling of Jesus as Ιησοῦν τὸν **λεγόμενον** Χριστόν ... Ιησοῦν τὸν **λεγόμενον** Χριστόν (Mt.27:17, 22) is seemingly ironic or taunting; and when Luke reports the name of the synagogue opposing Stephen, τῆς συναγωγῆς τῆς **λεγομένης** Λιβερτίνων ... (Acts 6:9), he is possibly using irony, given that its members are setting themselves against the gospel of liberation. They were, of course, freedmen. Bruce raises the possibility that this is only one of several synagogues named: F. F. Bruce, *The Acts of the Apostles*, 2 ed. (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1952) 155-57. Haenchen is consistent with the consensus I am questioning: "the so-called synagogue of the Libertines and Cyrenians and Alexandrinians ...": Ernst Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary*, Bernard Noble, Gerald Shinn, and R.McL Wilson (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1971) 270, and n.1.

[47] Although RSV and NRSV do so, consistently with their rendering of the same phrase in 1 Cor.8:6. I am tempted to suppose that the translators let their prior opinion about the latter instance overshadow their sense of what is being asserted in the Thessalonian text.

[48] See Ernest Best, *A Commentary on the First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians* (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1988) 285-86, who is influenced by the consensus on 1 Cor.8:5, but resists a similar reading here; and Charles A. Wanamaker, *The Epistles to the Thessalonians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990) 246-47, who shows less resistance to the consensus , suggesting a change in reference during the course of the verse from pagan gods to the one God whose temple is in Jerusalem.

7.3.2.2 Is εισιν Existential?

How we treat the finite verb εισιν in this clause is the major grammatical issue at stake here. The consensus has been driven largely by an assumption that its use here is essentially *existential* : that it asserts the existence of gods. That reading is reinforced by the presence of the following clause, ὥσπερ εισὶν θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοί, which appears to repeat just such an assertion even more baldly, without the modifying λεγόμενοι. However, we should always be very careful when ascribing an existential sense to the verb ειμι , as the verb 'to be' in various European languages has gathered a confusing amount of semantic baggage during the historical development of philosophy. There is a constant danger that this may be projected back onto the ancient Greek term, obscuring its semantics in any text that appears to have philosophical implications. The question "Does God exist?", in particular, has sparked so much philosophical analysis in Western philosophy that it seems very natural indeed to read 8:5 as a statement about the existence of gods and lords, whereas in fact such an interpretation may have been quite foreign not only to normal discourse in the Greco-Roman world, but even to ancient philosophical discourse.

Charles Kahn is a philosopher and linguist who has undertaken a major analysis of the ancient usage of this Greek verb, in order to distinguish its ancient usage from later philosophical accretions.[49] He points out that since John Stuart Mill, an absolute distinction between the existential and predicational uses of "is" has become established as a philosophical doctrine, with adverse effects on our understanding of ancient grammar. He objects to this on two grounds. The first is simply that ancient authors never observed a distinction between existential and copulative uses of the verb. The second is more a matter of theoretical fundamentals.

> .... But there is a graver theoretical disadvantage in the traditional dichotomy between the existential and predicative uses of "to be". It confounds a genuine synactic distinction – between the absolute and predicative constructions of the verb – with a further semantic contrast between the meaning "to exist" and some other meaning or absence of meaning. This fusion of a syntactic and semantic criterion into a single antithesis could be justified only if there were a direct correlation between the two, i.e. only if (1) the absolute use of the verb is always existential in meaning, and (2) the verb "to be" in the predicative constuction is always devoid of meaning, serving as a merely formal or grammatical

[49] Firstly in Charles H. Kahn, "The Greek Verb 'to be' and the Concept of Being," *Foundations of Language* 2 (1966): 245-65, and then in a lengthy monograph which attempted to lay out the same viewpoint within the framework of transformational grammar (Harris, Chomsky, *et.al.*): Charles H. Kahn, "The Verb 'Be'," *The Verb "Be" and its Synonyms: Philosophical and Grammatical Studies (6) The Verb "Be" in Ancient Greek*, Ed. John W.M.Verhaar, Foundations of Language Supplementary Series 16 (Dortrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1973). This more developed theory has been trenchantly criticised, chiefly for its transformational aspects, by the Dutch linguist C.J.Rhijgh in C. J. Ruijgh, "Rapport Critique: Ch. H. Kahn*, The Verb 'be' in Ancient Greek*," *Lingua* 48 (1979): 43-83; and C. J. Ruijgh, "Sur la valeur fondamentale de εἶναι: une réplique," *Mnemosyne* 37 (1984): 264-70. I have found Kahn's earlier article, together with Ruijgh's two, most helpful for my analysis of the present text.

> device for linking the predicate with the subject. But these assumptions seem to me dubious for English, and false for Greek.[50]

Kahn traces the development of 'be' verbs within modern languages which has changed the relationship between the syntax and semantics of such verbs from that pertaining among their ancient equivalents.

> My position, then, is that Mill's dichotomy is applicable to Greek only as a syntactic distinction between the absolute and the predicative construction, and that even from the point of view of syntax the distinction is not as easy to define as one might suppose. But semantically the distinction is worse than useless, for it leads us to take the idea of existence for granted as the basic meaning of the Greek verb. Now if by a word for existence one means simply an expression which we would normally render into English by "there is", then it is clear that the Greek verb *esti* often has this sense. But if we understand the phrase "there is" as representing a univocal concept of existence for a subject of predication, as distinct from the content of the predication itself – as distinct from the "essence" of the subject or the kind of thing is (as we often do, for example, when we read the existential quantifier "(∃x)" as "there is *something* of which the following is true") – if this generalized positing of subject as "real" is what we mean by existence, then I would be inclined to deny that such a notion can be taken for granted as a basis for understanding the meaning of the Greek verb.[51]

As initial evidence for "what may seem the rather scandoulous claim that the Greeks did not have our notion of existence",[52] Kahn points out that in *Metamorphoses* Delta 7, Aristotle distinguishes four basic senses of "to be" in Greek.[53] He then comments,

> Aristotle's procedure here is not purely lexical: he is analyzing ordinary usage in the light of his philosophical conceptions. But my point is that neither Aristotle's own conceptual scheme nor the normal usuage of the verb obliges him to make any place for a sense of *einai* which we would recognize as distinctly existential. Furthermore, in every one of Aristotle's examples the verb is construed as predicative, although the general topic for the chapter is given in the absolute form, "what is". The syntactic distinction between predicative and absolute construction is treated here as of no consequence whatever.[54]

Applying all that Kahn has said to 1 Cor.8:5, I now want to lay out some proposals for how εισιν should be read in this verse.

Firstly, although I have argued that this verb is to be carried forward by ellipsis in order to provide a complete predication in v.6, we are not required to assign it exclusively to either subject or predicate status in either verse. As we have already noted, a finite

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[50] Kahn, "Concept of Being," 247.

[51] Kahn, "Concept of Being," 248.

[52] Kahn, "Concept of Being," 248.

[53] 1) being *per accidens*, or random predication (I.e. "X is Y", without regard to the logical status of subject or predicate). 2) being *per se*, or predication in good logical form according to the scheme of the categories (e.g., when a quality is predicated of a substance). here *einai* is said to have as many senses as there are categories, and Aristotle points out that a construction with 'to be' may be substituted for any finite verb, e.g., "he is walking" for "he walks". 3) *einai* and *esti* may mean "is true", and the negative means "is false". An example is "Socrates *is* musical", if one says this (with emphasis) because it is true. 4) Finally, "being" may mean either being in potency or being in act. "For we might say that something is seeing both when it it is potentially seeing (capable of sight) and when it is actually seeing." Kahn, "Concept of Being," 248-49.

[54] Kahn, "Concept of Being," 249.

Greek verb can provide both of these within the one word. So in the clause, εισὶν λεγόμενοι θεοί, the verb can provide a grammatical subject, through its inflectional form, while also contributing a part of the predicate. The subject, then, would be the unspecified beings who are called gods, and expressed by the third person plural inflection on the verb.

At the same time, the verb begins, but does not have to complete, the expression of the predicate: what is being said about those beings. At the centre of that predicate is an affirmation that they "are called gods", in common usage. We should note that on this reading, both λεγόμενοι and θεοί are within the predicate, which asserts that the unspecified subjects are called gods. What else can εισίν add to this predicate? Aristotle's analysis suggests one possibility, the *veridical* sense, so that the sense of the clause expands to "It is true that there are beings commonly called gods". This veridical sense is really a *modal adjunct* , adding a comment about the speaker's assesσment of the predication, rather than constituting an integral part of the predication itself. However, this sense is not incompatible with other semantic possibilities, but rather implicit in every predicative use of this verb, as Kahn points out:

> I said earlier in criticism of Mill's dichotomy, that the absolute construction of *einai* is not necessarily existential in meaning. This claim has now been vindicated by our discussion of the veridical sense of the verb. For although this sense is quite distinct from the meaning "to exist", it is normally expressed by the absolute construction. Of course it may be found in the predicative construction as well. Consider Aristotle's example: *esti Sokratęs mousikos*, Socrates *is* musical, he really is so. This sense of verity is actually implicit in every assertion, latent in every predicative use of "to be" for a statement of fact. (That is why some philosophers claim that to say of a statement that it is true is simply to make the statement over again). But in any given sentence, the latent veridical value of "to be" may be brought out by emphasis, or by an unusual position early in the clause (as in Aristotle's example). A moment's reflection will show that this is to some extent true even for the English verb "to be" .... But if the veridical value of "to be" is almost never called to our attention in English, that is not the case for the predicative construction in Greek, where an emphatic use of the verb in this sense is often indicated by an unusual position, or even by repetition.[55]

So the position of εισίν at the start of this clause is a probable indicator of this veridical sense, which fits in well with the context: it might be taken as a reluctant admission of fact. However this modal adjunct does not preclude the possibility that the verb may also make a further semantic contribution to the core of the predication itself. The presence of the supplementary clause, ειτε εν ουρανῷ ειτε επὶ γῆς, suggests that a locational sense is also inherent in the predication. To see why this is so, we may call on Kahn once more, as he describes a locative value of this verb, which is quite common in Indo-European languages.

> Thus *einai* is quite normally used for "to be somewhere" (with the place specified by an adverbial word or phrase), to be in the presence of, or remote from, some definite point of reference. The usual dichotomy between the existential and the predicative usage of the verb would require us to treat this locative use of the verb as merely "copulative" ... regardless of whether or not the locative use is more fundamental than the predicative, I

[55] Kahn, "Concept of Being," 253-54.

> would insist that it is closer in meaning to what is usually called the existential sense of the verb. So intimate is the link between these two uses that I would myself prefer to speak in hyphenated terms of the existential-locative sense. For example, nearly all of the uses of the verb in Homer which we would recognize as existential are at the same time statements of place, and it might be urged that the distinctly existential value of the verb derives merely from its emphatic position in the sentence. On this view, a statement of existence is as it were an emphatic (or in some cases a vague and generalized) statement of place: "there is an X" means "here, there, or somewhere in the world is an X".
> .... If existence and location are not *identical* in Greek thought, they are at least logically equivalent, for they imply one another. That is, for the average man, and for the philosophers before Plato ... It was not merely that Greek thought was instinctively concrete: the very notion of *being* had local connotations.[56]

Recognizing this fundamental locative meaning in the first main clause of 8:5, makes the need for the explanatory subordinate clause more apparent. The inherent locative sense in εισιν means that once Paul has used this verb to assert that there are in fact various beings that are commonly termed "gods", it is natural to complete this assertion with an explanation of their location: the deictic element in this verb needs somewhere to point. Paul has his reasons for pointedly locating them in either heaven or on earth which will become more apparent later in this study.

To recapitulate, we may say that the first clause complex in 1 Cor.8:5 asserts that there are indeed beings located in heaven and on earth who are commonly called gods. With that in mind, we may reassess the subordinate clause, ὥσπερ εισὶν θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοί. Under the established consensus, this clause is read as making a stronger affirmation of the existence of "gods" than the first, in which the qualification "so-called" takes away much of its strength. Now that we have removed that supposed qualification from the picture, we get a different view of how this second clause relates to the first: that it is simply a quantifying addendum (apart from introducing κύριοι into the discourse, which I shall attend to shortly). The initial affirmation is actually the stronger of the two, asserting the fact that there is a plurality of beings commonly spoken of as gods, while the second extends that assertion from a plurality to an abundance: there are *many* such beings, and this abundance is a significant factor in the issue to hand. However this reading involves one further semantic process: εισὶν θεοί in the second clause must be equivalent to εισὶν λεγόμενοι θεοί in the first. How can this be so? Only by a form of ellipsis in which the semantic content supplied by λεγόμενοι in the first clause is carried forward into the second, which is then read as "just as there are many (such beings called)

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[56] Kahn, "Concept of Being," 257-58. At this point, Kahn is at complete agreement with Rhijgh, who holds that the fundamental meaning of εἶναι is locative. "À notre avis, la valeur fondamentale de εἶναι est 'y être, être là, être présent'. Elle comporte donc deux traits sémantiques: 'statique' et 'démonstratif-locatif', l'élément démonstratif-locatif pouvant se référer soit déitiquement aulieu du locateur et de la situation de la conversation soit anaphoriquement à un lieu du locateur et de la situation de la conversation soit anaphoriquement à un lieu mentionné ou impliqué dans le context ... La valeur fondamentale d'un lexème est celle qui se trouvedans un contexte ou une situation aussi enutre que possible et à partir de laquelle s'expliquent, le cas échént, ses valeurs secondaires ('valeurs étendues', 'valeurs restreintes', valeurs métaphoriques') ... Noter que la valeur fondamentale n'est pas nécessairement plus fréquente que telle valeur secondaire. Ruijgh, "le valeur fondamentale de εἶναι," 264-65.

gods, and many (beings in similar fashion called) lords ". Even better, we should recognize that the content of subordinate clause is also an important part of the first predication, and as such is also carried forward. The final clause is thus most fully understood as asserting, "... just as there are many (such beings, whether in heaven or on earth, commonly called) 'gods' and many (such beings, whether in heaven or on earth, commonly called) 'lords'. "

This processes of gathering up semantic content from one clause which is carried forward into later clauses, growing as it goes, is just what we have already met under the label *sluicing*, and it might just as well have been termed *snowballing*. While it has been identified as a type of ellipsis, it is actually a natural product of the cognitive process by which meaning is progressively built up in the course of any cohesive discourse. *Every* clause must be understood in the context of all that has preceded it in the discourse, and especially those clauses that are in closest proximity. It is this underlying principle that enables ellipsis and other anaphoric devices to work, rather than *vice versa.*

One further step remains: to apply all of this to our understanding of verse 6, in which we have already established the ellipsis of εστιν linking it to verse 5. If the sluicing process has carried so much semantic material from the first clause into the second, gathered around the verb εἰσιν, then we could hardly expect this baggage to drop off at the boundary between protasis and apodosis. On the contrary, the central predication in that apodosis demands to be read in just that context. We can see this clearly now by setting the contrasting affirmations out against each other.

verse 5 - Protasis	**verse 6 - Apodosis**
Even if ...	**... nevertheless ...**
... in common usage ...	**... for us ...**
... many beings in hea o o e are called 'gods' and	**... there is only on b w c 'God' and one wo c '**

7.4 Ellipsis in the Supplementary Clauses?

Having clarified the syntax and semantics of the main clauses in 1 Corinthians 8:6, we must now examine the remaining grammatical structure in this verse. Each of the two main clauses is extended in the same manner: by the apposition of a specifying name followed by two supplementary clauses, the first being relative and the second coordinate.

(εἷς θεὸς)	**(ο πατὴρ)**	**(εξ οὗ τὰ πάντα)**	**(καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν)**
Main clause	specifying name	relative clause	coordinate clause
(καὶ εἷς κύριος)	**(Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς)**	**(δι οὗ τὰ πάντα)**	**(καὶ ημεῖς δι αυτοῦ).**

There is nothing grammatically problematic about the first of these modifying elements, the addition of specifying names by means of apposition, although the semantics of those expanded noun phrases are very significant for the discourse, as we shall see in the next chapter. The grammar of the four supplementary clauses, by contrast, is rather problematic, generating a considerable degree of semantic ambiguity.

The root of this problem is that these four clauses, like their two principals, are entirely lacking in verbs. Unlike those two, however, it is not at all clear that this lack can be supplied by means of ellipsis, although this difficulty may not be obvious to many readers,[57] probably for a combination of two reasons. The first, as I shall shortly show in greater detail, is that these are in fact prepositional predications, which need no verbs in Greek but are of necessity semantically vague, relying on contextual associations to fill out their meaning. The second is an entirely unexamined assumption that the present textual context does just that by supplying the notion of *existence* to some if not all of these predicates: that the verb εισιν in v.5 is carried forward by ellipsis not only into the main clauses of v.6 but into each of its supplementary clauses. We now have a strong reason for stating that this cannot be the case, as I have shown that in both verses, the central predication is not *existence*, expressed by εισιν on its own in v.5, but *being called something,* expressed by the verbal phrase εισὶν λεγόμενοι, and that it is this particular meaning that is carried forward, firstly into the second main clause of v.5 then into the parallel main clauses of v.6. It is obvious that the sluicing stops at that point. Could anyone make sense of reading an "X is called Y" structure into these clauses? Prepositional clauses do require some filling out from their context, especially in order to translate them into languages that require finite verbs, but their own syntactic and semantic structure controls how this happens.

Earlier in this chapter, when discussing the syntax of the main clauses, I listed the prepositional clause as one of several forms of verbless predication. It is is fact rather common in the Greek of the New Testament, and an integral part of Paul's writing style: 23 of the 94 nominal clauses listed in Appendix A have prepositional predicates. It is interesting that only two of the 54 copula-nominals are prepositional (one in each of 11:8 and 14:22): in each case this clause is one of two placed in direct contrast, the first having a copula and the second without, so that this seems to be one way of emphasizing a contrast. By and large, Paul's prepositional predications do not seem to have any need at all for the copula, compared with his other nominals.

Nevertheless, they generally do require some semantic input from their context, to overcome their inherent ambiguity. Grammarians used to speak of prepositions *governing*

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[57] Commentators giving detailed discussions of the Greek text but *not* noting any difficulty in these constructions include Robertson and Plummer, *First Corinthians*, 167-68; Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 194-95; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 144-45; Schrage, *an der Korinther 2*, 242-45; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 320; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 635-38. Fee, *First Corinthians*, 374 describes them as "propositional phrases" without noting that this entails any difficulty in their interpretation.

cases, as though they exercised some defining role over the nouns to which they were attached. In fact, they add only a small amount of extra semantic definition to the case system in ancient Greek, which is notoriously ambiguous. That ambiguity arises from the low correlation between the use of the inflectional case forms in well-formed sentences (syntax) and the meanings expressed through the choice of those forms (semantics).[58] This problem, which exists across many languages, led some modern linguists to abandon the linkage and attempt to construct grammatical descriptions in which case-rules were treated solely as rules of syntax, the definition of well-formed combinations of word forms without reference to meaning.[59] Their lack of success led others in turn to develop much more nuanced descriptions of *semantic case*, general categories such as Actor, Patient, Location, Purpose, etc., in the hope that these would enable better correlations between case forms and meanings.[60] This work is still in progress, and its results for koine Greek have not been spectacular, although it does provide us with some fresh terminology with which we may discuss old problems.[61] Instead of a former belief that traditional grammatical terminology developed to describe Greek and Latin case sytems was adequate for those languages but quite unhelpful when applied to less inflected languages such as English (a staple fed to those of us who trained as English teachers in recent decades), linguists are now more likely to recognize that case represents one particularly problematic aspect of the relationship between syntax and semantics within widely divergent languages, including English, and that new theoretical models must be developed for them all. Some even choose to retain the traditional terminology as a starting point for this new descriptive enterprise.[62]

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[58] This problem is well known to NT grammarians: see Robertson, *Grammar*, 446-56; and Stanley E. Porter, *Idioms of the Greek New Testament*, 2nd ed., Biblical Languages: Greek 2 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994) 80-83.

[59] Notably Noam Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (Cambridge: The M.I.T.Press, 1965) and his followers developing the theory of transformational or generative syntax.

[60] See C. J. Fillmore, "The Case for Case," *Universals in Linguistic Theory*, Ed. E. Bach and R.T. Harms (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968) 1-88; John M. Anderson, *On Case Grammar: Prolegomena to a Theory of Case Relations*, Croon Helm Linguistics Series (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1977); H.L. Somers, *Valency and Case in Computational Linguistics*, Edinburgh Information Technology Series (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1987); Robert Coleman, "The Assessment of Paradigm Stability: Some Indo-European case studies," *Paradigms: The Economy of Inflection*, Ed. Frans Plank (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991) 197-211; Bernard Comrie, "Form and Function in Identifying Cases," *Paradigms: The Economy of Inflection*, Ed. Frans Plank (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991) 42-55; and Henry Smith, *Restrictiveness in Case Theory*, Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 78 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996).

[61] One recent descriptive study of Paul's case-semantics is Simon S.M. Wong, *A Classification of Semantic Case-Relations in the Pauline Epistles* (New York: Peter Lang, 1997). Unfortunately Wong concentrates on the case-relations of verbs, so he offers us no help for the study of non-verbal predications.

[62] So Barry J. Blake, *Case*, Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994).

In the light of these developments, Stanley Porter proposes a model of case for NT Greek in which the interpreter is required to take account of three levels of case relations.[63] At the most basic level, each case form imposes some degree of restriction on the range of meanings it may be used to express. This is them delimited further by the syntactic relations between the inflected words and other components of the clause or sentence. Further definition must then be sought from the wider context of the discourse, but even then ambiguities may remain. Applying this analytic procedure to the first example of a prepositional predication in Appendix A, εν πειθοῖ[σ] σοφίας, we would begin by noting that the preposition εν in combination with a dative noun phrase is able to express quite a variety of meanings (traditionally identified as Place/Time/Among/In/In the case of/Circumstance/Occasion/ Instrument/ and others[64]). Examining the syntax of the sentence we would then see that is stated in negative form, ουκ εν πειθοῖ σοφίας in explicit contrast to another prepositional phrase using εν, namely αλλ εν αποδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως. This contrasting pair, taken as whole, forms the predicate for the subject noun phrase ο λόγος μου καὶ τὸ κήρυγμά μου. The main semantic constraints provided by the syntax are that the semantic case expressed by εν must be the same in each of the paired clauses, and that it must relate to the subject, namely Paul's preaching. That still leaves us with at least two clear options: we must examine the context to clarify whether εν expresses Manner (how he presented himself to his audience) or Instrument (the means he intended to use to influence them).

The prepositional predicates used in the four supplementary clauses in 1 Cor.8:6 involve similar ambiguities, which I shall expose and attempt to resolve from their textual context in my next chapter.

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[63] Porter, *Idioms*, 81-82, following J. P. Louw, "Linguistic Theory and the Greek Case System," *Acta Classica* 9 (1966): 75-78.

[64] Robertson, *Grammar*, 584-90.

CHAPTER 8

THE SEMANTIC STRUCTURE OF 1 CORINTHIANS 8:6

There are in fact two other semantically ambiguous features of 1 Corinthians 8:6, besides the prepositional predications in its supplementary clauses, which are significant for the interpretation of this verse. One is the key term, τὰ πάντα in the first and third supplementary clauses: does it really refer to the whole created universe, or is some other denotation more probable in the context of this discourse? I shall tackle this question in the course of discussing the first clause. The other ambiguity is more pragmatic than semantic: Does Paul intend to simply include all of his audience in its domain, or is he using it as some sort of subtle interpersonal management device? I shall discuss this issue last, as a way of coming back to some broader issues.

First of all, however, I need to deal with a methodological issue. It concerns my decision not to begin with a discussion of the four supplementary clauses as a whole, in the light of the obvious semantic parallels with Romans 11:36: ȣτι εξ αυτοȣ καὶ δι αυτοȣ καὶ εις αυτὸν τὰ πάντα. It is not only that each sentence should be allowed to stand in its own distinctive textual context rather than dismiss one as less clear than the other which is then used to explain them both (Thüsing's procedure, which I rejected in my introduction). There are in fact two reasons for treating them as substantially dissimilar. The first is that Rom.11:36 is more general in its meaning, with less intrinsic ties to its own textual context. This may render its meaning less problematic if we just except that it has been brought into the text with little specific intent other than to adorn the doxology within which it appears: its meaning is then left as whatever Paul and the audience understood its popular usage to be, and it may not have mattered too much for Paul if these did not exactly coincide. To bring that level of generality over into our reading of 1 Cor.8:6, however, would be to beg the whole question before us, which is whether these same terms are used in the letter to Corinth with more specific denotation.

My second reason for differentiating these two texts is that despite their use of so many terms in common, there is one very important difference in syntax: in Rom.11:36, the subject term τὰ πάντα is held back until the final position in the sentence, after the three prepositional clauses, which are thus incomplete until it appears. This is an example of cataphoric ellipsis (section 3.2.3.1 above), signalling to the audience that they must refrain from interpreting each clause until it is completed by the appearance of the subject, and in this case indicating that the very essence of what is being asserted requires that all three

clauses be interpreted together as one whole. The three clauses in effect express only one proposition. In the four supplementary clauses of 1 Cor.8:6, by contrast, each clause has both subject and predicate, indicating that they stand on their own and should be interpreted in the order in which they appear. Each builds on, and thus depends upon, its predecessors, and their combined effect is cumulative, rather than mutually interdependent. This is why I shall attempt to determine the significance of the first clause without reference to those that follow. To do otherwise would be to misunderstand the sequential, progressive nature of their interrelation, which is why they must be kept at arms length from Rom 11:36, where the natural effects of sequence are nullified by cataphoric ellipsis.

Following Porter's model for interpreting the Greek cases, I shall now examine each of the four supplementary clauses in 1 Cor.8:6 to determine the syntactic and semantic constraints provided by their prepositional predications, before summarizing their combined effect. During the course of examining the predicates, I shall discuss the probable referrents of the subject terms τὰ πάντα and ημεῖς.

8.1 ... εξ οὗ τὰ πάντα ...

As we begin to examine the syntactic constraints on the semantics of this clause, it is useful to note an equivalent non-relative clause which would express the same predication: τὰ πάντα εξ αυτοῦ, making it clearer that the subject of the relative clause is τὰ πάντα and the predicate is formed by the prepositional phrase εξ ου. The relative form serves to express the function of this clause, which is to modify and extend the nominal phrase in the main clause on which it depends: ο πατὴρ.[1] This phrase is in turn a modifier, identifying or naming the referent of the one and only being whom "we" call θεός, so the full equivalent non-relative predication would be τὰ πάντα εκ (τοῦ) θεὸυ ο πατὴρ. If it were in that form, its semantics could possibly be affected by the following coordinate clause, καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτὸν, but its relative status binds it firmly to its head in the main clause, and it is that head-plus-relative combination that provides the referent for that coordinate clause.

Accordingly, we must interpret this first prepositional predicate as it stands in the text up to that point, in the context of a discourse about the issue at hand. In the next chapter I shall consider the social context in which these terms might make their fullest contribution to the discourse, but it is important to focus first on ways in which the textual context, that is to say the pre-text, has provided horizons within which statements such as τὰ πάντα εκ τοῦ θεὸυ would most naturally be interpreted.

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[1] Stanley E. Porter, *Idioms of the Greek New Testament*, 2nd ed., Biblical Languages: Greek 2 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994) 245, 248-49 describes such a modifying use as one of the two main functions of the relative clause in Greek.

One of the more helpful ways of framing the interpretive issue here is to speak of the *activation state* of various discourse referents.[2] While we might establish that a range of alternative denotations for a given expression are possible within a specific socio-cultural context, coherent discourse would be impossible unless participants are able to track which of these have already been activated earlier in the conversation or text: otherwise we get the irritating phenomenon of people "talking past each other." Once one or more members of a set of possible referents have been used in a discourse, coherence requires that the introduction of new referents for the same expression be introduced with some sort of marker acknowledging the change of meaning; and that the most recently used of such members of the set be taken as *activated* and presumed to be still the one in use. That is an ideal of course, and one of the arts of conversation is an ability to track and /allow for some degree of incoherence. In written texts, however, we expect the author to take the trouble to use language so as to maximize coherence, given that the discourse is a one-sided production, lacking the interruptions, topic-changes and negotiations of meaning that are normal features of conversation, especially conflicted conversation. When an author asks us to attend to their written text, which is like being asked to listen to someone without interruption so that you can take what the speaker is thinking as a whole, an implicit part of the contract is that the text will have maximum coherence. Readers, in return, are asked to credit the writer with having gone to the effort of being as coherent as possible, to keep a track of what has been written before when interpreting any given passage, and backtracking if necessary in order to refresh their memory. All of which means that when Paul writes the ambiguous clause εξ ου τὰ πάντα in 1 Cor.8:6, we should do him the honour of assuming that he is writing a coherent text and means his audience to pay some attention to what he has previously written as they interpret his words.

8.1.1 ἐκ θεοῦ

The preposition εκ combines with the genitive form of the noun or noun phrase to express quite a variety of semantic cases.[3] Robertson gives a general definition, "The word means 'out of,' 'from within,' not like από or παρά. It stands in contrast to εν."[4] He then

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[2] See Knud Lambrecht, *Information Structure and Sentence Form: Topic, focus, and the mental representations of discourse referents*, Cambridge Studies in Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994) 93-105.

[3] Robertson argued that "It is now accepted by the comparative grammars that in Greek two cases appear under the form of the genitive: the genitive proper and the ablative", A.T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament*, 4th ed. (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934) 491-92, and classified εκ as entirely ablative in its case-relations (ibid., 596). This consensus has not lasted very long, as it has no syntactic manifestation: see Porter, *Idioms*, 81.

[4] Robertson, *Grammar*, 596 Porter states the contrast with εν less categorically: "There is also semantic overlap with the proposition εν, in the sense that εν may be used of the realm out of which (εκ) something originates." Porter, *Idioms*, 154.

describes six variations on this general description under headings which are in effect semantic cases: Place, Time, Separation, Origin or Source, Cause or Occasion and Partition.[5] Like most other Greek prepositions, εκ has a wide variety of possible uses.

There are in fact three instances of the phrase εκ θεοῦ or its pronomial equivalent appearing as a predicate before 8:6 in this text. The first is in 1:30: **εξ αυτοῦ** δὲ υμεῖς εστε εν Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ, ὃς εγενήθη σοφία ημῖν από θεοῦ, δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ αγιασμὸς καὶ απολύτρωσις. The pronoun here refers to God, forming an anaphoric link with the preceding clause, ... ὅπως μὴ καυχήσηται πᾶσα σὰρξ ενώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ. The immediate textual context at this point is a discourse on the inappropriateness of human boasting before God, so that verse 30 asserts that the fact that the audience (υμεῖς) is "in Christ", with the benefits of wisdom, righteousness and holiness he brings to them, is entirely due to God, rather than because of some factor in which they might boast (v.31). To counter the human tendency to boast, whether this be in their own achievements or in their social status and connections, scripture shows that God has a policy of choosing "nothings" as his people. On the one hand, this shames other supposed benefactors who tend to associate with, and give to, those who are already "something" and thus able to return the favours in some way. On the other, it means that those who see themselves as beneficiaries of God's generosity, as the audience do, cannot take this as a sign of their worthiness or intrinsic value, since God has deliberately chosen them on the grounds of their nothingness. The very fact that they are chosen attests that they are among τὰ μωρὰ τοῦ κόσμου ... τὰ ασθενῆ τοῦ κόσμου ... τὰ αγενῆ τοῦ κόσμου ... τὰ μὴ ὄντα (vv.27-28): the foolish, weak, lowborn, nothings of the world. All that they now have of the desired attributes of σοφία, δικαιοσύνη, αγιασμὸς and απολύτρωσις, has come to them as a result of their being in Christ, who has *become* those things for them από θεοῦ. It is little wonder that Thiselton translates εξ αυτοῦ ... here as, "It is as a gift from him...".[6] While this refers primarily to their being in Christ, a condition granted because of their nothingness and hence completely gratuitous, it results in a further gifting, from God, of all those qualities they lacked. Returning then to the broad semantic cases, this predication has the general sense of Source, with the particular sense of source of a gift.

The second instance is found shortly after this, in 2:12: ημεῖς δὲ ου τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου ελάβομεν αλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ **εκ τοῦ θεοῦ**, ἵνα ειδῶμεν τὰ υπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ημῖν· As in the first example, the semantics of this phrase are focused on God as the source of a gift, in this case the spirit they have received. The sentence makes an explicit contrast between two possible sources of this gift: the world or God. Because the latter is the actual source, this leads to a corollary, that it has a God-related purpose (as

[5] Robertson, *Grammar*, 597-99.

[6] Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000) 188-89.... against Conzelmann and Fee, who interpret this predicate as expressing God's *action.*

opposed to meeting some end determined by the world): to enable them to attain a particular sort of γνῶσις , namely a knowledge of further gifts coming to them from God. From his later discourse on spiritual gifts in Chapters 12-14, we may take it as a point of agreement between Paul and his audience that they had good reason to see themselves collectively as richly endowed in this realm. Paul's point both here and there is that as spiritual gifts are indeed *gifts* by nature, their giver may be presumed to have given them with certain purposes in mind rather than for the recipients to use merely for their own self gratification. "Understanding the gifts" here thus carries a sense of future accountability to the giver. In the ancient world, accepting a gift normally placed the recipient under obligation to the donor, as we shall see later.

The third instance of this predicate in 1 Corinthians before 8:6 is found in 5:2: θέλω δὲ πάντας ανθρώπους εἶναι ως καὶ εμαυτόν· αλλὰ ἕκαστος ἴδιον ἔχει χάρισμα εκ θεοῦ, ο μὲν ουτως, ο δὲ ουτως. Here Paul is writing about his celibate state as something he would like everyone to share, but he acknowledges that it is in fact a special gift from God, χάρισμα εκ θεοῦ, which is not given to all. Although each believer is endowed with gifts from God, they do not all have this particular one and in fact they all differ from one another, a theme he will pick up again in Chapters 12-14.

We may conclude that the pretext is univocal in its use of this predicate: up to this point in the text Paul has used εκ θεοῦ rather sparingly but always with the same sense of *God as the source of gifts.* This should lead his audience to a presume that, unless the present context indicates otherwise, a further clause of the form "X εκ θεοῦ" probably means that X is a gift from God. This is not to say, of course, that Paul never uses it in any other sense. Its one further occurrence in the epistle, at 11:12, conveys a different, if problematic, sense of Source: ὥσπερ γὰρ η γυνὴ εκ τοῦ ανδρός, ουτως καὶ ο ανὴρ διὰ τῆς γυναικός· τὰ δὲ πάντα εκ τοῦ θεοῦ. This however comes *after* 8:6, and therefore has a different status as context than the pre-textual occurences (a principle not often followed by commentators). Later parts of the text form part of the context only in the sense that they indicate possible or even habitual uses by the same author, unless they are explicitly connected with the present passage by some cataphoric device signalling to the audience that they should wait for that later part of the text to indicate or confirm how they should understand the present part. They are thus on a par with other writings by the same author, although those addressed to the same audience at about the same time, on similar topics or continuing the same discourse would be most significant among those.

I have listed all such predications in Paul's undisputed letters in Appendix C, along with the single instance of the related predicate εκ Χριστου (i.e. they are related by the time we get to the end of 8:6). Of these eleven further instances of εκ θεοῦ, nine clearly use the predicate in the sense of Source of something coming from God: authorization (2 Cor:2:17), competence (2:Cor.3:5), power (2:Cor.4:7), a dwelling (2 Cor.5:1), new creation (2 Cor.5:18), of resurrection (2 Cor.13:4), of righteousness (Phil.3:9), a particular

persuasion (*not* so: Gal.5:8), and approval (Rom.2:29). As six of these nine are found in the Corinthian correspondence, it appears that Paul needed to make an ongoing theme of his communication with this particular church, just how much he and they had received from God.

There are only two significantly different instances, in which God is possibly presented as *our* source, as opposed to being the source of benefits we receive from him. In Rom.11:36, as an integral part of a concluding doxology, Paul includes this sentence: ϐτι εξ αυτοῦ καὶ δι αυτοῦ καὶ εις αυτὸν τὰ πάντα, which everyone recognizes to have close parallels with theological formulae found in various writers, including Philo and the Stoics.[7] Its generality and present doxological function mean that there is little in its context that helps define the scope of its terms, although we might note that the immediately preceding discourse has been focused on God's unfathomable purposes in history, and in particular on his election of both Israel and the gentiles. That would support an interpretation of all three prepositional predications in this verse as salvific in scope, and of τὰ πάντα as referring to the sum total of God's mysterious purposes and actions.[8] This would then be one further instance of εκ θεοῦ having the sense "source of all that comes to us", although the "us" is here extended beyond the Christian community. In the less likely case that Paul intends the introduction of a well-known formula to extend the horizon of the doxology beyond the matters he has been discussing to the widest view of God's creative purposes, then εξ αυτοῦ probably has a very general sense of Source that includes the meaning "our source".[9]

The remaining instance of εκ θεοῦ is found later in the present epistle, at 11:12: ϐσπερ γὰρ η γυνὴ εκ τοῦ ανδρός, οϑτως καὶ ο ανὴρ διὰ τῆς γυναικός· τὰ δὲ πάντα εκ τοῦ θεοῦ. Paul uses the two prepositions εκ and διὰ to convey the contrast between man-as-source and woman-as-source and to suggest that the former is more like God-as-source than the latter. The idea of man being the source of woman can only refer to the Genesis 2 narrative, in which Eve was created from Adam's rib: it seems Paul found this a more appropriate model of humanity's relation to God as our source than the mundane business of gestation and birth. However nothing much can be read from this regarding the semantics of εκ τοῦ θεοῦ, as the whole purpose of the sentence is not to assert this difference between modes of origin, but rather to complete the statement of man and

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[7] James D. G. Dunn, *Romans 9-16*, Word Biblical Commentary 38B (Milton Keynes: Word Publishing, 1991) 701-02 gives a full listing of these. See also Ernst Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans*, trans. and Ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapid: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1980) 318-21.

[8] C.H.Dodd sees it quite aptly as an expression of "... faith set against a background of ignorance. *Omnia exeunt in mysterium.* The religious consciousness, after its highest flights of speculation, returns to the simple 'numinous' feeling of awe before the Mystery." C. H. Dodd, *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans*, The Moffatt New Testament Commentary (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932) 188.

[9] The fullest discussion of such general theological formulae in the Greco-Roman world is still E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos: Untersuchung zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede*, 4th ed. (Darmstadt, 1956), where the Rom.11:36 formula is discussed in pp.240-250.

woman's mutual need for each other by asserting their common origin in God. We are all dependent on God for our existence. [10] This then is the sole instance of Paul using this prepositional predicate to assert that God is *our* source rather than the source of what we receive.

We may conclude that Paul's overwhelmingly habitual use of this predicate expression is to describe God as the source of various things that we receive as his people. This is certainly so in the three instances within the pre-text before 1 Cor.8:6, in each of which the "things" involved are represented as gifts, gratuitous benefits. With this in mind, I shall now turn to the denotation of the subject term in this clause.

8.1.2 Τὰ πάντα

Traditionally, the subject term in the first and third supplementary clauses has been read as denoting the whole of creation, usually on the grounds that this Greek phrase has just that meaning as an established usage in Greco-Roman literature.[11] Thüsing acknowledges that this phrase is used in various senses by Paul and must be interpreted according to each context.[12] Neil Richardson, following Thüsing's lead, raises the possibility that its denotation is different in the first and third clauses.[13] However, everyone seems to agree that in the first clause at least, the subject phrase τὰ πάντα refers to the whole creation.

I wish to raise a different possibility: that it denotes no more than the sum total of all the various benefits and dispensations that come to "us" from God: a generalised reference set, some of whose members we have already met as referents in the three εκ θεοῦ predications earlier in the epistle. That is, I propose that this subject term is so vague in its semantics that its particular denotation in each instance must be deduced from more clearly defined terms in the context. The term πάντα, used as a substantive with or without the article, is in fact very common in Paul's vocabulary, occuring 35 times in this epistle alone. I have listed each of these occurrences in Appendix D. The most obvious initial

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[10] It is doubtful that this verse says any more than that, and hence we have no grounds for taking the subject-term τὰ πάντα in its last clause to refer to the whole of creation rather than to humankind. I shall return to this point below.

[11] So Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, 240-50; Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians: a Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, trans. Leitch James W., Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) 144; Wolfgang Schrage, *Der este Brief an die Korinther Vol.2*, Evangelisch—Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament VII (Zurich & Neukirchen—Vluyn / Solothurn: Benziger & Neukirchener, 1995) 241-42; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 635-36. Only Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, "1 Cor., VIII,6: Cosmology or Soteriology?" *Revue Biblique* 85 (1978): 253-67 has seriously challenged this view of the term's provenance.

[12] Wilhelm Thüsing, *Per Christum in Deum*, 3rd ed., Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen (Münster: Aschendorff, 1986) 226-30.

[13] Neil Richardson, *Paul's Language about God*, JSNT Supplement Series.99 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994) 297.

inference to be drawn from this body of data is that Paul's habitual use of this term is not significantly different from what the dictionary definitions would lead us to expect: this is simply one form (accusative singular masculine nominative and accusative plural noun) of the lexical item πᾶς, πᾶσα, πᾶν, "all / every / everything",[14] and Paul uses it to denote to a great variety of referents, as appropriate to the predication within which it appears. Does its use with the article mark out a more specialised use? Eight of the thirty-five cases in the epistle have the article (plus two textually doubtful cases in 2:15 and 15:28.) These eight do not seem different in kind from the others; indeed in one case (15:27) the article appears with only one of three uses of this term within the verse where all three must have the same referent. All thirty three cases (apart from the two in 8:6, that is) stand equally as witnesses to Paul's use of the term. The cases in the pre-text have the additional status of possibly influencing the audience's understanding, as well as our own.

In each of the seven occurrences before 1 Cor.8:6, there is no great difficulty in understanding the denotation of this general term from the intrinsic nature of the predication in which it occurs, with a little help from the immediate textual context. The first case, τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα πάντα ερευνᾷ, καὶ τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ (2:10), is actually the most difficult. Commentators venture several interpretations of the term's denotation,[15] but none suggests that it means the created universe. In 2:15, ο δὲ πνευματικὸς ανακρίνει [τὰ] πάντα, it obviously means "other (unspiritual) people". The two instances in 2:15 and 2:16 are in the same sentence and share the same denotation. The reference in that case is clearly very wide-ranging, but the context requires us to read it as something like "everything we will encounter that has been encompassed by salvation".[16] It cannot be rendered "the world", because κόσμος is actually one of its constituent examples. Finally, the triple occurrences in 6:12 have to be read as "all behavioral options" or something equivalent.

We may conclude that the textual context preceding 8:6 has done very little to indicate a specific denotation of τὰ πάντα in the first supplementary clause of this verse,

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[14] BAGD 631-33.

[15] e.g., Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 66 suggests the benefits of salvation; C.K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 2nd ed. (London: A.&C. Black, 1971) 74, and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 256 think it means God's salvific purposes; while Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians*, The International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T.& T.Clark, 1911) 44, and Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 111 see it referring to God's own wisdom, so that καὶ in the next clause is equivalent to "that is".

[16] Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 80 reads this sentence as an expression of the Stoic principle, " 'All things belong to the wise man' i.e. he is lord over all that comes to him from without." Raymond F. Collins, *First Corinthians*, Sacra Pagina 7 (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1999) 166, agrees, commenting that in Paul's use, this maxim "sums up the Corinthians' claims to freedom, wisdom, and power." Fee, *First Corinthians*, 154, on the other hand, characterizes the five referents (apart from the apostles) as "the ultimate tyrannies of human existence, to which people are in bondage as slaves." Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 326 agrees with Fee. All read this expression and its context in soteriological rather than creational terms.

apart from providing some very general associations with God's saving purposes and actions. It has certainly done nothing to suggest a focus on the created world as such. Therefore the occurrence in 8:6 is open to receive whatever denotation will best make it fit into its particular context in the minds of the audience. It does not have the sort of definiteness that would nudge our understanding of the predication into a cosmological framework. If anything, the use of τὰ πάντα as subject would contribute a rather general reference from the pre-text to the scope of God's salvific actions and purposes. This could only reinforce the salvific associations carried by the predicate, which we saw above.

8.2 ... καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν ...

The second supplementary clause has the syntactic form of a coordinate clause, standing in paratactic relation to the principal clause αλλ ημῖν εις θεὸς ο πατὴρ (quoted here in its fullest form including the connective αλλα and modal adjunct ημῖν). This grammatical structure indicates that, in contrast to the previous relative clause which served to extend the denotation of the noun phrase ο πατὴρ, the second supplementary clause stands out as making an important assertion in its own right, alongside the principal clause. So the assertive force of the clause could be shown by contracting the first half of the sentence into the form αλλ ημῖν εις θεὸς (ο πατὴρ ...), καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν. This also emphasizes the close link between the two first-person plural pronouns, ημῖν and ημεῖς, which must therefore have the same referents.[17]

Nevertheless this syntactic relation to the principal clause does not make this second supplementary clause *semantically* independent of the first, for two reasons. The relative clause, together with its head ο πατὴρ, extends the meaning of the noun phrase to which the pronoun αυτόν in the predicate of the second clause refers. Given that such use of a pronoun is one of the main anaphoric devices used to link a clause semantically with preceding discourse, all of that extended meaning is carried forward into this coordinate clause.[18] The second semantic link between the first two supplementary clauses is provided by the antithetical relation between their two prepositions, εκ and εις : they are antonyms.[19] Their close proximity in this sentence means that we cannot interpret them independently: for instance, if the first has a directional sense such as "out of" then the second must mean "into". Moreover, this dependency is not mutual, but controlled by their sequential relation: the sense of the first preposition controls that of the second, within any constraints imposed by other elements of the predication in which the second is found.

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[17] I shall discuss the significance of this fact in 3.3.4 below.

[18] See my discussion of anaphora and *sluicing* above.

[19] For that relation in general, see Porter, *Idioms*, 151-56.

That other element in this case is the pronoun αυτόν, referring to the one (who is called) θεός. Together they form the predicate εἰς αὐτόν (equivalent to εἰς θεόν) which is applied to the subject of the clause, ημεῖς, to complete the clause. What constraints might that predicate phrase as a whole apply to the semantics of the preposition within it? When we look to the text of 1 Corinthians for guidance, we find that it does not offer much help; nothing closely equivalent to the phrase εις θεόν is found anywhere in the pre-text, and only one loosely similar instance afterwards, at 10:31: ειτε οὖν εσθιετε ειτε πινετε ειτε τι ποιεῖτε, πάντα **εις δόξαν θεοῦ** ποιεῖτε. We might regard this as a possible reference back to the phrase in 8:6, expounding one aspect of being εις θεόν : that if we are εις θεόν then it follows that whatever we do about eating and drinking should done for God's glory. However that application of this present clause, if it is such, comes later in the discourse and can only confirm rather than supply signficance to the earlier phrase. We might also look further afield, to find other indications of Paul's possible habitual use of such phrases, looking not only to his other letters but also to any instances of εις Χριστόν or equivalent expressions, given that the fourth of these prepositional predications affirms that Christ plays a mediating role in our εἰς θεόν relation, as we shall see in my next section.

I have collected all such instances in Paul's letter in Appendix E. The first observation we must make concerning this evidence is that it is rather meagre: there are only thirteen examples in the whole corpus. So Paul uses this preposition only rarely in relation to either God or Christ. However we cannot leap to a conclusion that those few uses must be highly significant indicators of its use in the present case, as in fact a variety of semantic cases are expressed in these few examples. When the predicator is a verb (eleven times) or a nominal phrase (three times) the prepositional phrase has an ancillary, modifying role in relation to the verb or noun phrase which is its head, and the semantic case it expresses is determined by the sense of the head. The only other instance of a prepositional predication using εἰς is found in Rom.11:36 which, as I have already argued when discussing the prepostition εκ, is too semantically vague to offer us much help.

Appendix E classifies the data into four groups according to my reading of the semantic case expressed by εις in each instance, with the predicators conveying that case identified in a comment after each entry. We may conclude that two such cases, Purpose and Inclusion, are predominant uses which might therefore be carried over as prime alternative candidates when we interpret the two instances of εις θεόν occurring on its own as a prepositional predicate.[20]

[20] For reasons already discussed, I am not going to follow Thüsing's procedure of doing that first for Rom. 11:36 and then carrying those results over into 1 Cor.8:6, no matter how many similarites these two verses contain. Each of these two most undefined cases must be interpreted in its own context, making use of the semantics of more definite uses of the phrase in question in other cases can be shown to apply to its own textual situation. Otherwise it would be just as valid to interpret the use in Romans on the basis of its use here: either way the procedure is arbitary, unless we also adopt the assumption, as Thüsing does, that the more concise nature of the Rom.11:36 formulation makes it a clearer expression of an original Hellenistic credo. But that would beg the very question of the verse's pre-existence that I, with others, have raised.

All four semantic cases shown in the appendix, along with any other possibilites not elsewhere used by Paul, are of course at least initial candidates for Paul's use of the preposition in the present instance. The two less-used cases, Patient and Relation, can be ruled out very quickly on the grounds that each requires the use of specific verbs that will indicate their meaning. The first case indicates that an Agent X does something indicated by the verb to the Patient of that action, Y. The second means that the subject X stands in a particular relation specified by a verb of further nominal phrase, to Y. The two more frequent cases, however, are able to stand on their own without further assistance. So we have two suggested possibilites: that ημεῖς αυτόν means either that we are included in God, in some relational sense, or else that God constitutes our purpose.

Those two candidates, and any others that might arise, must of course then be evaluated in terms of how well they fit into the constraints set by the antonymous relation εις has with εκ in the previous clause. Given that we have established that this most probably expresses the case Source (of gifts and benefits), we would need to show that the case expressed by εις is closely related to that. That is, there must be some clear relation between God being the source of all our benefits and the idea of him constituting our purpose, or alternatively of our inclusion in him, in his purposes or in the community of those who receive his benefits. To investigate what either of these ideas would mean in the contest of the present discourse will take me the whole of the next chapter. Before that, however, we have further semantic relations to decode from this sentence that will assist our task.

8.2.1 Inside Knowledge: ημεῖς

One further aspect of the second supplementary clause (καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν) deserves mention in passing. The first-person plural pronoun ημεῖς has a pragmatic function in this clause that provides a significant link with the pre-text. It has, of course, appeared in dative form within the modal adjunct αλλὶ ημῖν at the start of the verse, and there is a general agreement that in both places it refers to Paul and his audience, together with all other members of the believing community: the Christian movement has a distinctive set of beliefs and a special purpose. I would like to suggest that we should recognise a further layer of *pragmatic* meaning inherent in this pronoun, which it has inherited from its use in the pre-text.

One of the subtleties of the first-person plural pronoun in Greek, as in English, is that a speaker can use it either to include or to exclude the audience. In a discourse where the predominant tone is argumentative and the personal relations strained, it takes on an interpersonal function of marking agreement or disagreement, closeness or distance

between speaker and audience.[21] For instance, "We think such and such" means one thing when it is used to remind the audience of a common belief, but something else entirely when "we" includes only the speaker and those who side with his position, and is set over against a contrary position which some or all of the audience have espoused. In such cases of disagreement, "we" tends to be used alongside "you" to mark the differences between the parties.

Paul has used it in both senses in its many occurrences in the pre-text, which I have set out in Appendix F, along with all uses of υμεις that are used to distance the audience from the writer or from some other group (such as the apostles or the wider Christian movement) with which the writer identifies. The twelve cases in the pre-text where ημεῖς includes the audience can be seen to share some common themes: inclusion in Christ and the Church, the receipt of spiritual gifts, and security of relationship with God. There are twelve other verses in which ημεῖς (twelve times) or υμεῖς (sixteen times) is used to convey differences between the writer and the audience. This happens first in 1:10-12, where he is confronting them with their reported disunity, and his tone is one of rebuke. The second case, 1:23, contrasts his preaching of Christ crucified with their own cultural predilection for wisdom. The third, in 2:16, where he claims, "we have the mind of Christ" applies only to those who are spiritual (v.15), and he goes on to pointledly exclude them from this group in 3:1, the fourth case. In the section from 4:1 to 4:8 there is an extended use of these pronouns to emphasize the differences between Paul the other apostles as a group and those in Corinth who misunderstand their ministry, climaxing in the heavy irony of verses 8-10 where the service and suffering of the apostles is contrasted with the prosperity claimed by some of the audience. 5:1-2 uses υμῖν ... υμεῖς ... υμῶν rather pointedly to ascribe a joint responsibility to the congregation for the πορνεια they have tolerated in their midst, in contrast to Paul. The remaining occurrences in the pretext occur in the first section of chapter 6, where he is rebuking them for taking one another before the civil courts: the second person plural is used pointedly here to distinguish them as a group that is failing to live up to its potential as future judges of the world. In most of these cases, the use of the pronoun is syntactically optional, and can therefore be taken to express emphasis.

Comparing the two categories displayed in the appendix, we can see that their occurrences are somewhat mingled, although not confused. The overall pattern seems to be that Paul swings constantly from including them in all the blessings of being within the community of Christ's people, and reminding them of aspects of their thinking and behaviour in which they have distanced themselves from its established norms. The cumulative effect is to undermine their over-confidence in their own spiritual standing,

[21] I have not yet found a commentator who considers this aspect of the pronoun and its significance for the epistle. Therefore this section of my argument is a kite-flying exercise, an excursus mapping out a potential line of investigation for another study.

which seems just what Paul intended. It also means that by the time the audience reach 8:6, they may not be sure whether he means to include them when he uses the terms ημιν ... ημεις . That subtle ambiguity in the sentence is an important pragmatic element of the communication here at the start of the present discourse. It leaves them with a choice as they consider all that he is about to write: will they continue to hold onto the slogans expressed in v.4, along with the underlying attitudes they serve to justify, as the grounds on which they deal with the issue of ειδωλόθυτα? If so, they will resist Paul's substitution of v.6 as a better statement of what "we" believe, and with it the special relation its second supplementary clause suggests between "us" and God through Christ. Paul has bundled the issues of belief and allegiance together in a single rhetorical package, inviting his audience to accept or reject it as a whole.

The keystone binding this construction together is provided by the third and fourth supplementary clauses, and expressed in the second half of the verse.

8.3 ... δι οὗ τὰ πάντα, καὶ ημεις δι αυτοῦ

As I have argued in an earlier chapter, the most important *topos* to which Paul will appeal in this discourse is provided by the example of Christ, and in particular the example of his self-abnegating relinquishment of his own rights for the benefit of others. The gospel bearing on ειδωλόθυτα, as with every other issue, is *Christ crucified* (1 Cor: 2:2). Every other principle must be interpreted in the light of that proclamation which the audience accepted when they became Christ's people in Corinth.

Similarly, the second half of 1 Corinthians 8:6 binds all that Christians have to say about God and the gods to that same figure. All that "we" say about the one being "we call" Θεός, naming him as ο πατήρ, acknowledging that τὰ πάντα all come from him, and affirming that "we" are εις αυτόν, is inseparable from the fact that "we" also call one and only one being κύριος , the very specific person Jesus Christ. All that we claim to know of God, whether it be his oneness, his fatherly nature, or our relation to him in that role, comes about in, or is moulded by, the context of the community of faith which Jesus founded and in which he is present as Lord. So the primary function of this second half of the verse is expressed through its principal clause, καὶ εις κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστός. However, that is not where it ends. The two supplementary clauses that follow carry the theme of Christ's mediating role beyond generalities about God to the specific relational aspects of faith expressed in the first two supplementary clauses, εξ ου τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεις εις αυτόν. These are not left to stand on their own as affirmations, but are implicitly qualified by what Paul writes about Christ: δι ου τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεις δι αυτοῦ.

The relation between the third and fourth supplementary clauses and the first two is signalled by their exact structural parallels: εξ ου τὰ πάντα is matched with δι ου τὰ

πάντα, and καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν with καὶ ημεῖς δι αυτοῦ. It follows that the second member in each related pair modifies the first, so that the affirmations expressed are the same as if Paul had written, τὰ πάντα ἐκ ο πατήρ δι Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ and καὶ ημεις εἰς ο πατήρ δι Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ. In other words, our whole relation with God, all that comes from him and how we are to him, is mediated through Christ; and all of this is expressed by means of the prepositional predications using the key term διά.

This preposition nearly always expresses some form of mediate or durative relation, loosely translatable as 'through", when coupled with the genitive.[22] Some of those relations are of triple valency, involving a relation between three terms (three referring expressions).[23] So a verb "v" which can be applied to two nouns or noun phrases X and Y to form a predication of the form "(X) v (Y)", a double-valency relation, might also be used to form a triple valency relation involving a third term Z: "(X) v (Y) (δια Z)." If the predicator is formed by a nominal phrase instead of a verb, a similar relation can still be expressed: "(X) (Y) (διά Z)."

Paul uses διά in triple-valency relations in several places in his writings to express the mediating role played by Christ in relation to God. I have listed these in Appendix G, grouping them to make their correspondence with the two occurrences in 1 Cor 8:6 apparent. Rom.5:11 appears in both sets, as it contains separate parallels. I have identified the three terms in each relation by enclosing them in brackets, with superscripted labels identifying the corresponding terms: Π for (terms corresponding to) τὰ πάντα, H for ημεῖς, Θ for θεοῦ/θεὸν, and K for κύριου/κύριον. Some of these bracketings are nested, and one of the two predications in 5:11 has a blank ( )$^{\Theta}$ bracket to indicate the ellipsis of one term (which its appearance in the earlier clause made possible).

What conclusions, if any, can we draw about the relations Paul expresses in these two forms? Once again, I have to acknowledge that the sample is quite small, yet it does seem to yield enough examples of each construction to enable us to give them a place as evidence supporting hypotheses I have already formed above.

Considering the examples in the first set, these data may be seen as a sampling of all that comes to "us" from God through Christ: victory (1 Cor.15:57), reconciliation to himself and righteousness (2 Cor.5:18), obtaining salvation rather than wrath (1 Thess.5:9), righteousness based on faith (Phil.3:9), judgment of human secrets (Rom.2:11), righteousness bestowed on believers by grace (Rom3:22,24), and reconciliation once again (Rom.5:11). Each of these examples can be clearly seen to be soteriological in its purview, and their collective witness may thus be taken as offering a slight degree of confirmation

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[22] BAGD, 179-81; Robertson, *Grammar*, 580-83; F. Blass and A. Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, trans & rev. Robert W. Funk (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1961) 119-20; and Porter, *Idioms*, 148-50.

[23] On valency and case relations, see H.L. Somers, *Valency and Case in Computational Linguistics*, Edinburgh Information Technology Series (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1987).

of my reading of τὰ πάντα in 1 Cor.8:6 as a reference to all the benefits and dispositions Christians receive from God through Christ: *for us* ... all things come from God through Christ.

The second set throws a similar degree of light on the final clause in 1 Cor. 8:6, where semantic ambiguity lies around the denotation of the predicate εἰς Θεόν. We have already seen that Paul's other uses of this phrase suggest the semantic cases Inclusion and Purpose. These further instances help to fill out our sense of those general semantic cases, as Paul used this construction elsewhere. 2 Cor.1:19-20 specifies one aspect of our purpose: to give the "Amen for glory" to God through Christ. In 3:4 of the same epistle, "We have confidence towards God through Christ," which might be read as expressing a benefit from God, has a God-ward aspect (πρὸς τὸν θεόν) and can be even more fittingly read as expressing our duty of making a faith-filled response to God's grace. Philippians 1:11 speaks of our purpose as to be "filled with the fruits of righteousness which (grow) through Christ to the glory and praise of God." The five references in Romans display four closely related qualities of Christian response to God through Christ: thanksgiving (1:8 and 7:25), "boasting in God" (5:11), fruitbearing (7:4), and rendering glory to God for ever (16:27). We might classify all of these examples of the Christian-to-God-through-Christ relation from Paul's letters as conveying aspects of *appropriate response.* As such, they add further definition to either of the two more general semantic cases Purpose and Inclusion which we earlier identified as possible senses of the prepositional predicate εἰς Θεόν.

Reviewing this enquiry into the semantics of the four supplementary clauses in 1 Corinthians 8:6, we may conclude that the progressive effect of these propositional predications is to suggest a series of affirmations, each building on and confirming the sense of its predecessors. The first, εξ ου τὰ πάντα, affirms that God is the source of "everything", with the most likely denotion of that general referential term being "everything that comes to us as his people", with the further implication that this means "every benefit.." The second clause, καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν, suggests a consequence of the first: that we through being recipients of those benefits, are thereby cast into a God-ward relation that can be best characterised within the general semantic cases Inclusion and Purpose. The third and fourth clauses specify Christ as the mediator through whom all those benefits come, and through whom therefore the consequences of our being beneficiaries are defined. This general field of meaning has been established in the case of the first clause on the basis of substantial evidence from the discourse of the pre-text. The other three, which lack such weighty precedents in the pre-text have nevertheless been shown, on the basis of parallels elsewhere in Paul's writings, to fit best into the semantic frame established by the first.

The meanings established are, of course, very general. They amount only to a suggestive framework which we might well hope would convey far more to its original

audience than it does immediately to us. To fill out that original meaning further, we must now turn to the social context within which this discourse took place.

CHAPTER 9

DIVINE PATRONAGE IN THE CORINTHIAN CHURCH

Throughout this study I have been exploring the possibility of reading 1 Corinthians 8:6 as an integral part of the text in which it is found. I began to explore that textual context (in chapters two to five above) in order to determine what interpretive horizons it might provide for this verse, concluding that the discourse in which it is found, on the topic of ειδωλόθυτα, contains a mixture of three major genres: Greek deliberative argument, Jewish scriptural interpretation, and Christian traditional proclamation and teaching. I also argued that on this topic Paul struggles to provide deliberative and traditional arguments in support of a position which is actually dependent on scripture, while also defending himself against a related criticism that appeals to the tradition of Jesus' words.

My sixth chapter examined the immediate textual context of the verse, 1 Cor.8:1-6, concluding that the paragraph is a deliberative introduction opening up the topic in a fashion appealing to the rationality of his audience, and that if verse 6 were an integral part of the text's discourse then its most likely function would be to provide a summary statement of the grounds on which Paul intended to argue his subsequent case: that it should act as a *thesis* for his argument. My seventh and eighth chapters then examined the grammatical structures inherent in the verse and linking it to its immediate textual context, concluding that its syntax and semantics combine to tie it firmly into its present textual context. Syntactic and semantic analysis also led me to conclude that the fundamental assertion in the verse is conveyed through the cumulative effect of its four supplementary clauses, which combine to depict God as the unitary source of a variety of benefits and dispositions provided to Christians through Christ, and to assert that receipt of these imposes obligations on the recipients.

To complete the picture of what this very general statement might have conveyed to Paul's audience as a thesis signalling the fundamental grounds and direction of his subsequent argument, we need to examine the social context of this discourse.

9.1 The Social Context of the Corinthian Church

Study of Paul's epistles has been greatly enhanced recently by extensive study of the social context in which he wrote, and one of the most influential results has been the

emergence of *social stratification* as a key issue.[1] Wayne Meeks has established an accepted starting point for scholarly discussion of social stratification within the Pauline churches.[2] He distinguishes two useful measures, *rank* and *status*, the first being clearly defined and the second much more complex but potentially more useful. There were seven legally distinct "orders" or "estates" (*ordines)* in Roman society, with a clear ranking of power and privilege. At the top of this hierarchy was the senatorial aristocracy, followed by the equestrian order, then the decurional order able to take office within municipal and provincial bureaucracies , the plebeians (in Rome only), the freeborn (*ingenui)*, freedmen *(liberti)* and finally at the bottom of the pile, slaves *(servi)*. As the first three orders constituted only about 1 percent of the population, Meeks finds little use for the others as a means of discriminating among the rest of the population.

> The "orders" (*ordines*) or "estates" of imperial Roman society ... were clear-cut, legally established categories. The two most important and enduring ones were the senators and the knights: the *ordo senatorius* and the *ordo equester*. In addition, the families whose members had served or were eligible to serve in the councils or senates of the provincial cities constituted a local order in those places. These orders, and the steps that led to them, the cursus honorium, were of tremendous importance to the ambitious elite of the Roman empire. Yet, given that these three top *ordines* comprised considerably less than 1 percent of the population, the category does not have much discriminatory power for the sorts of groups we are investigating. To include as formal *ordines* also the *plebs* (in Rome) and the *ordo libertinorium* would be only slightly more useful than adding "and everybody else."[3]

That is to say, the significance of the distinctions between the lower orders was largely reduced by variations in the factors that gave rise to the other measure: *status*, a multi-dimensional phenomenon taking account of variations in ranking in several different categories, namely "ethnic origins, citizenship, personal liberty, wealth, occupation, age, sex

[1] For a general view of social structures in the Pauline churches I take the present consensus in social-scientific criticism to be built on the foundations established by such studies as: E. A. Judge, *The Social Pattern of Groups in the First Century: Some Prolegomena to the Study of New Testament Ideas of Social Obligation* The Tyndale Press, 1960); Robert Banks, *Paul's Idea of Community:The Early House Churches in Their Setting* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmanns, 1980); J.Paul Sampley, *Pauline Partnership in Christ: Christian Community Commitment in Light of Roman Law* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980); Ronald F. Hock, *The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980); Gerd Theissen, *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth*, trans. John H. Schutz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982); Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale UP, Stanley K. Stowers, "Social Status, Public Speaking and Private Teaching: The Circumstances of Paul's Activity," *Novum Testamentum* XXVI.1 (Jan 1984): 59-82; Other valuable studies focused on the social Corinth include: Peter Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the* Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2.Reihe 23 (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1987); William Baird, "'One Against the Other': Intra-Church Conflict in 1 Corinthians," *The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John in Honour of J.Louis Martyn*, eds Robert T. Fortna and Beverly R. Gaventa (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990) 116-36; John K. Chow, *Patronage and Power: A Study of Social Networks in Corinth*, JSNT Supplement Series (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992); and David G. Horrell, *The Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence: Interests and Ideology from 1 Corinthians to 1 Clement*, Studies of the New Testament and Its World (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996).

[2] Meeks, *First Urban Christians*, 51 - 73.

[3] Meeks, *First Urban Christians*, 55.

and public offices or honours".[4] The main point we should note here is that while an individual's birth-given *ordo* was relatively fixed, the other status-determining factors allowed much more opportunity for social mobility. For instance, we cannot simply say that all slaves shared the same social status at the bottom of the heap: some of the slaves in the household of Caesar Augustus had such wealth and authority that even senators were obliged to honour and obey them. Voluntary slavery may well have been one of the fastest means of social advancement available to those in the lower orders, provided you chose the right master.[5] That is an extreme case however: It is perhaps best to say that Corinth, with its recent history of resettlement by Roman freedmen and economic migrants from other parts of the empire, coupled with its notable success as a commercial and cultural centre, offered its lower classes a special opportunity to rise in social status, especially by economic means. "Freedom" in this context would always carry some of the connotations of that opportunity.

Compared with our modern Western social structures, however, the social situation in Corinth should be characterized as much more hierarchical overall, and with much less opportunity for advancement to higher social status. How then did this affect the composition of the Christian movement to which Paul wrote this letter? The consensus among scholars has shifted during the twentieth century from Deissmann's opinion that the movement attracted a disproportionate number of low-status converts towards that expressed by Meeks:

> A Pauline congregation generally reflected a fair cross-section of urban society. Moreover, those persons prominent enough in the mission or in the local community for their names to be mentioned or to be identifiable in some other way usually—when we have evidence to make any judgement at all about them—exhibit signs of a high ranking in one or more dimensions. Although the evidence is not abundant, we may venture the generalization that the most active and prominent members of Paul's circle (including Paul himself) are people of high status inconsistency (low status crystallization). They are upwardly mobile; their achieved status is higher than their attributed status.[6]

Meeks' theory concerning status inconsistency is contestable,[7] but his report of the

[4] Meeks, *First Urban Christians*, 55; and in distinction from Theissen's position, 70. See also Horrell, *Social Ethos*, 65 - 68.

[5] See Dale B. Martin, *Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity* (New Haven & Yale UP, 1990) 1 - 49.

[6] Meeks, *First Urban Christians*, 73.

[7] The consensus associated with Meeks' position has recently been attacked, and Deissmann's view re-argued by Justin J. Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and Survival* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988); see critical reviews by Dale B. "Review Essay: Justin J. Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and Survival*," *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 84 2001): 51-64; and Gerd Theissen, "The Social Structure of Pauline Communities: Some Critical Remarks on J.J. Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and Survival*," *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 84 (Dec 2001): 65-84; and Meggitt's response, Justin J. Meggitt, "Response to Martin and Theissen," *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 84 (Dec 2001): 85-94. Meggat's thesis constitutes a direct challenge to *economic* aspects of the established around Meek's position. His thesis in general is that the Pauline churches did not include members the very highest social classes, which were also the very wealthiest (with which Meeks would agree) and that all members experienced *poverty*, defined as "an absolute rather relative phenomenon. It is present where the basic essentials necessary for supporting human life are not taken for granted but are a continuous source of anxiety." (Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and Survival*, 5). Although adopting P.Garnsey's definition, "The poor are those living near subsistence level, whose prime concern it is to obtain the minimum food, shelter and clothing necessary to sustain life, whose lives are dominated by the struggle for physical survival" (Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and*

scholarly consensus is reliable, and would encourage us to assume that Paul's audience in this letter has the same mixture of social strata in its composition as the wider Corinthian society, with the exception of the very richest and poorest.[8] A corollary is that this stratification has brought some of the tensions from that wider society into the congregation where they are now further sharpened and transformed by contact with the movement's more egalitarian social ideals as we see reflected, for example, in 1:26 – 29; 4:8 – 13; and 11:20 – 22.

Within the discourse on ειδωλοθύτα, social stratification may be taken to constitute a formative dimension of the underlying conflict. Given that public cultic activities were an essential means by which Greco-Roman societies constituted themselves, and that responsibility for and benefits from participation in such activities was not evenly spread across all social strata, we may conclude that the impact of any group withdrawal from participation would be felt differently by high and low status Christians. Those with high status had most to gain from participating, and most to lose if their freedom to do so was lost.[9]

In the remainder of this chapter I will argue that the social context of the discourse on ειδωλόθυτα does in fact include one social construct, *patronage*, that provides an integrated

Survival, 5) Meggitt does not attempt to demonstrate that such a preoccupation within the Pauline churches is evident in the correspondence, although he does argue in his final chapter that economic aspects of church life addressed in the epistles should be interpreted as a "survival strategy". Most importantly for my own study, he allows that Paul's use of such terms as ευγενής, δυνατός, and πλούσος in 1 Corinthians implies the presence of degree of economic disparity within the audience. "The words are far more imprecise than has been allowed. they are indeed socially descriptive, it is impossible to be certain what exactly they describe. By itself (sic.) words in 1 Cor 1:26 can tell us nothing concrete about the social constituency of the congregation he addresses except that a small number were more fortunate than the others. How much more fortunate it is impossible to determine ... the apostle soon forgets the distinction that he has drawn and refers to *all* of the Corinthian *all* of the called, in the subsequent two verses, as foolish, weak, despised, nothings." (Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty Survival*, 105-06). We might well counter that Meggitt is over-reading vv. 27-28, a fault he has just found in readings of the previous verse. Paul's point, surely, is that in choosing so many of low social rank, God has scant regard for the higher status of the few drawn from more privileged circumstances. Paul's intention there, elsewhere in the epistle, is to persuade his audience to adopt a similar evaluation of status differences among themselves.

Theissen's measured response to Meggatt emphasizes the very real differences in wealth among those below the elite classes. "The crucial question, however, is how to make a sociological classification of the great majority of city population, which was situated below the class of the decurions, that is, the politically powerful families. is no doubt that most Christians belonged to this urban majority. According to Meggitt, this majority was a homgeneous mass, struggling for survival and earning not much more than was necessary for subsistence, and less than that. The social homogeneity of so many people is extremely unlikely in sociological terms. Such a mass must have been socially structured. And there is indeed evidence for such significant socio-economic differences within them ..... At all events there were huge differences of prosperity between the common people below the decurions, which may explain why these common people distinguished between the rich and the poor among themselves ..... Both in reality and in its interpretation there existed distinctive social differences among population below the local power elite, even if all groups were far removed from the huge possessions and the of the imperial upper class."(Theissen, "Social Structure," 72-73).

[8] See further Theissen's earlier detailed argument concerning the social stratification of the Corinthian Christians the second chapter of Theissen, *Social Setting*, 69 - 119.

[9] So Horrell, *Social Ethos*, 108, shifting the issue away from Theissen, Willis and Gooch who differed on the poor had opportunities to eat meat apart from those provided by sacrificial occasions. That argument does seem to lead anywhere useful, and it seems more fruitful to focus on the differing *social* consequences involved differing strata in the various occasions of participation or withdrawal dealt with by Paul.

interpretation of the four prepositional predications in the subordinate clauses: εξ ου τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτὸν ... δι ου τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεῖς δι αυτοῦ. I shall argue that an interpretation of these predications as an expression of a patronage relation is further supported by the common-use semantics of two key terms, κύριος and πατήρ, and that these terms should also extend our interpretive horizon beyond patronage to include the closely related semantic field of *family* relations. *My hypothesis is that the combined fields of patronage and family, as found throughout Greco-Roman culture, constitute the major conceptual and valuational domain within which Paul argues his case in this discourse, and that the communicative function of 1 Corinthians 8:6 is, accordingly, to activate that domain within his audience's consciousness as he begins his argument on the topic of εἰδωλόθυτα.*

9.2 Patronage in Greco-Roman Society

While versions of the patron-client relationship can be identified in most societies, both ancient and modern, in Roman society it had a distinctive and central influence. The most important recent study of patronage in Greco-Roman culture is that of Richard Saller.[10] While previous historians such as M.I.Finlay had minimized the importance of patronage within Hellenistic culture, chiefly because of the lack of Greek equivalents to the terms *patron* and *client*, Saller argued convincingly that even within Roman society such terms were regarded as demeaning to those who were subordinate in these relationships, and hence avoided: patrons were better termed 'benefactors', gifts and favours referred to as 'benefits', and clients called 'friends'.[11] Many similarly nuanced circumlocutions were also used, but everyone knew what they all meant: these all pointed to formal relationships involving benefits and obligations. Moving beyond the presence or absence of such terminology, Saller redefined patronage in functional terms, beginning with a quotation from the French historian, J. Boissevain:

> One specialist on the subject has offered the following definition: 'Patronage is founded on the reciprocal relations between patrons and clients. By patron I mean a person who uses his influence to assist and protect some other person, who becomes his "client", and in return provides certain services to his patron. The relationship is asymmetrical, though the nature of the services exchanged may differ considerably.' Three vital elements which distinguish a

[10] Richard P. Saller, *Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982). For extensions and responses to this seminal study, see the essays collected in Andrew Wallace-Hadrill ed., *Ancient Society* (London: Routledge, 1989), including another by Saller. Other valuable studies of Greco-Roman patronage outside biblical studies include Thomas Brian Andersen, "Patrocinium: The Concept of Personal Protection and Dependence in the Later Roman Empire and the Early Middle Ages," Ph.D. dissertation (New Fordham University, 1974); Georges Fabre, *Libertus: Patrons et Affranchis À Rome* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1981); and Phebe Lowell Bowditch, *Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage* (Berkeley: U of P, 2001).

[11] The effect was never to reduce distinctions of social rank. Such *amici* were subdivided into *superiores, pares*, *inferiores* and *clientes* to indicate the relative status between friends. Richard Saller, "Patronage and Friendship Early Imperial Rome: Drawing the Distinction," *Patronage in Ancient Society*, Ed. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (London: Routledge, 1989) 57.

> patronage relationship appear in this passage. First, it involves the *reciprocal* exchange of goods and services. Secondly, to distinguish it from a commercial transaction in the marketplace, the relationship must be a personal one of some duration. Thirdly, it must be asymmetrical, in the sense that the two parties are of unequal status and offer different kinds of goods and services in the exchange – a quality which sets patronage off from friendship between equals.[12]

So whenever these three factors are present as features of any society, we may identify a form of patronage, the postulate being that this is a widespread if not universal social feature across different societies. Seneca, Paul's contemporary, certainly thought that patronage was a universal social phenomenon: his longest essay is on this subject, dealing with it mainly from the viewpoint of an aristocratic patron faced with the necessity of conferring benefits on his subordinates, includes this broad generalisation:

> De beneficus dicendum est et ordinanda res, quae maxime humanum societatum alligat. What we need is a discussion of benefits and the rules for a practice that constitutes the chief bond of human society.[13]

Seneca's report of the central importance of patronage within Roman society has been confirmed by modern scholars. Matthias Gelzer gave this description in 1912:

> The entire Roman people, both the ruling circle and the mass of voters whom they ruled, was, as a society, permeated by multifarious relationships based on *fides* and personal connections, the principal forms of which were *patrocinium* in the courts and over communities, together with political friendship and financial obligation. These relationships determined the distribution of political power. To maintain their rights citizens and subjects alike were constrained to seek the protection of powerful men.[14]

Gelzer's judgment has generally been confirmed by later historians. Wallace-Hadrill summarizes the evidence for the importance of patronage as a characteristic feature of Roman culture:

> Numerous passages ... tell the same story: that the Roman noble felt himself almost naked without an entourage of dependants, which he expanded to the best of his ability, and who acted as the visible symbol of his social standing. Patronage was central to the Roman cultural experience, in a way that it was foreign to the Greek cultural experience. It represented a vital part of conscious Roman ideology, of their image of how their world both was and ought to be.[15]

If patronage was such an important bond in Roman society, then we must assume that Corinth as a Roman colony had its social structures thoroughly permeated by the powerful

[12] Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 1.

[13] *De Beneficiis*, I.4.2. Text and translation from the Loeb edition, p.18. That Seneca thought it entirely to extend the patronal model to divine-human relationships can be seen at IV.1.5.

[14] 1969 translation from German original, quoted in Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage in Roman Society: Republic to Empire," *Patronage in Ancient Society*, Ed. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (London: Routledge, 1989) 68.

[15] Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage," 65 Perhaps he would have been better to have written, "the classical Athenian cultural experience" or even "Greek democratic ideals": as Veyne, Ste.Croix and others have shown, these were from representative of socio-economic reality throughout the hellenistic world.

networks of influence which it fed.[16] This is not to say that patronage was a cultural feature thrust upon unwilling Greeks by their Roman conquerors and colonists.[17] Several major recent studies have established the economic basis of patronage as an integral feature of an economic system common to many ancient societies and termed "euergetism" or "the gift economy" by some theorists.[18] Romans were distinctive in formalising the system and placing a high value on it, despite protests against its abusive aspects from some of their writers and philosophers.

The significance of patronage as an integral component of the social context of the New Testament has been underlined in several studies, the most important of which for our present focus is John Chow's monograph on 1 Corinthians.[19] Chow puts forward the hypothesis that many otherwise disconnected problems that Paul addressed in this epistle can be much better understood when they are seen as at least partly an expression of the social power of patrons both within and outside the Christian community. Which is to say that those opposed to him were united by their allegiance to powerful patrons, and that Paul's fundamental conflict with the congregation arose from his deliberate stance of financial independence which left him as an outsider to the influential patronage networks that were powerful determinants of others' actions.

[16] The social reality of first-century Corinth as an amalgam of Roman and Greek cultural forces has been amply demonstrated in such studies as J. Wiseman, *The Land of the Ancient Corinthians*, Studies in Mediterranean Archeology Vol.L (Göteborg: Paul Aströms Förlag, 1978); J. Wiseman, "Corinth and Rome I: 228 B.C. – A.D. 267," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms Im Speigel der Neueren Forschung II, 7/1* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1979) 438—548; Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, *St. Paul's Corinth: Texts Archaeology* (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1983); and Donald Engels, *Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model the Classical City* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1990).

[17] The question of the ethnic origin of its first-century inhabitants of the colony, and in particular of the those identifying themselves as Romans (descended from the colonisers) or Greeks (descended from the original inhabitants and other Greek imigrants), is of little consequence for our present purposes. Corinth truly embodied "Greco-Roman society" in the sense that both sides of this fusion were of equal importance for all its Rome, the military conqueror, had long ago been culturally subjugated by Hellenism, and its colonisers, from indifferent social backgrounds, would have seen their emigration to Corinth as an opportunity to take on a more Greek identity in one of Greece's most prestigious locations: for this reason Paul has no problem in characterising Gentiles as "Greeks" when discussing the cultural issues in Chapters 1—4 of this epistle. We are in danger of overlooking the Roman component of the mix, that is of ignoring the extent to which provincial culture and institutions had been transformed by their adaptation to Roman imperialism. For recent work that danger in New Testament scholarship, see the collection of articles in R. A. Horsley ed. *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society* (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1997) and idem., *Paul Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation,* Essays in honour of Krister Stendahl (Harrisburg: Trinity International, 2000). For a good example of earlier New Testament scholarship taking the empire seriously, see Dominique Cuss, *Imperial Cult and Honorary Terms in the New Testament* (Fribourg: The University Press,

[18] See Paul Veyne, *Bread and Circuses: Historical Sociology and Political Pluralism*, (abr.&int.) O. Murray and (trans.) B.Pearce (London: Penguin Press, 1990); G.E.M. Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests* (London: Duckworth, 1981) 341-43, 364-66; Bowditch, *Economy*, 31-63.

[19] Chow, *Patronage and Power* and John K. Chow, "Patronage in Roman Corinth," *Paul and Empire: Religion Power in Roman Imperial Society*, Ed. Richard A. Horsley (Harrisburg PA: Trinity Press International, 125. Also of importance: Judge, *Social Pattern*, 30-39; Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth*; and David Arthur DeSilva, *Honour, Patronage, Kinship & Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000) 95-156.

> When the problems inside the church dealt with in 1 Corinthians are viewed in the light of the convention of patronage in Roman Corinth, we can attribute important aspects of these problems to the presence, influence and activity of some who functioned as patrons of the church. It is likely that Paul's conflict with some of the Corinthians resulted partly from Paul's refusal to accept money from the church which, in effect, constituted a violation of the convention of friendship or patronage and which would therefore be seen by some at least to bring dishonour to the rich patrons in the church. The divisions at the Lord's table probably reflect something of the same distinctions between patrons and inferiors. It may also be assumed that the tensions in the church were caused or exacerbated to some extent by competition among patrons in the church. ... It is possible that the litigants were powerful patrons who had a better chance of redressing damage or making personal gains through litigation. The case of immorality might have arisen when a rich and influential patron sought to acquire more wealth through uniting with his stepmother. ... It has been argued in a convincing way by Theissen that those in the church who ate meat were members of the patronal class. I suggest further that those who ate at table in an idol's temple were likely also to be some powerful people in the church who, for reasons of ambition and/or obligation, found it difficult to give up their connections with more powerful patrons in the colony. In addition, the practice of a vicarious baptism for the dead may also be understood in this light.[20]

Whether or not Chow may be taken to have established the significance of patronage in all of the above cases, I am convinced that he has correctly identified the most important common factor uniting the various cases Paul handles in this discourse on ειδωλόθυτα.[21] Firstly, he identifies the case described in 8:10, that of a Christian "seen dining" in a pagan temple, as the problem precipitating the discourse.[22] Then, building on foundational insights from Gerd Theissen,[23] he postulates that the members of the Christian community who were most likely to get themselves into this position were the socially "strong", whose wealth and social standing not only put them in the position of patrons to many within the church but also made them most susceptible to pressure from the wider society obliging them to participate in pagan cultic occasions.[24] He also makes a connection between the socio-economic "strength" of these people and the likelihood that these were the most likely group among the believers, by reason of their education and self-interest, to identify themselves with a "wise" sophistication discounting the reality and significance of pagan cults and their objects of worship.[25]

[20] Chow, *Patronage and Power*, 142.

[21] Meggitt, although including Chow in those whose work he opposes, takes up an ambiguous position on the possibility of patronage relations between members of the Pauline churches. On the one hand, he is at pains to that neither Paul nor others among his audience could have been clients of patrons within the truly wealthy (Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and Survival*, 79, 147, 167-68), yet he also affirms that various Caesars had clients the rabble frequenting cookshops (Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and Survival*, 110), that "patronage ties extended throughout the different strata of Roman society and its language could be applied to relationships between a variety of classes"(Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and Survival*, 147), that Christian economic mutualism had the effect "freeing the small number of congregants that might have been involved in patronage ties from exploitative relationships with members of the élite classes."(Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and Survival*, 175), and that in at least case (Phoebe in Rom. 16:1-2), Paul actually describes one member of the audience as his patron, προστάτις. (Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and Survival*, 146-48).

[22] Chow, *Patronage and Power*, 142.

[23] Theissen, *Social Setting*, 121-43.

[24] Chow, *Patronage and Power*, 146-57.

[25] Ibid., 154.

The great strength of this hypothesis is in the range of problematic features in this discourse it is able to explain. Firstly, it leads us to an integrated picture of the social situation behind the three cases cited by Paul in these three chapters: the believer "eating in the temple of an idol" (8:10), the temptation to engage in idolatrous worship (10:14), and the believer hosted by an unbeliever (10:27). Each of these cases was more likely to be experienced by Christians located higher on the socio-economic scale, and each can be related to the obligations inherent in the patronage relations by which such advantages were maintained. Patronage was both product and cause of an hierarchical social network in which all except those at the extreme ends participated as both patrons and clients.[26] Those who had the strongest socio-economic position within the church, so that they were able to offer patronage to other members, were sure to be clients of even more powerful patrons in the wider society.[27]

The duties (*officia*) of clients may be divided into the provision of specific gifts (*munera)*, services (*operae*), and *obsequia*, the public demonstration of appropriate forms of respect.[28] *Obsequia* were less rigidly defined than other duties, allowing for at least a semblance of spontaneous expression by clients, but commonly included attendance, when invited, at feasts and other celebrations hosted by the patrons.[29] These celebrations would frequently include a cultic dimension that served to express thanks for the patron's generosity and prayers for his wellbeing.

In such a cultural context, patronage is also the most natural way to understand divine-human relations. In popular religion in the Greco-Roman world the fundamental activity was not theological speculation but securing benefits from divine powers, and discharging the obligations inherent in that process.[30] In Greco-Roman society, in which patronage constitutes one of the most prominent structures of social cohesion, this means that religious belief and affiliation were conceived as extensions of the human patronage system: the gods functioned in their lives as super-patrons to whom they looked for all the same benefits supplied by human patrons, and the duties owed to the gods by their human clients were also similar. From Boissevain's definition of patronage above, we can see that divine-

[26] Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage," 77.

[27] To understand the pervasiveness of patronage in Roman society, we need to think not only about relationships between those at opposite ends of the spectrum, but about the multifarious links which involved men of all levels, rising to virtual social parity with the 'patron'. Nor is there always a clearcut distinction between patrons clients, since one man's client is another man's patron. Such links are highly fluid and informal in character. Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage," 77.

[28] Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 15-21; Jane F. Gardner, *Being a Roman Citizen* (London: Routledge, 1993) 23- Andrew Borkowski, *Textbook on Roman Law* (London: Blackstone Press, 1994) 95-97.

[29] Chow, *Patronage and Power*, 73-74.

[30] This is, of course, the central point in Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, "1 Cor., VIII,6: Cosmology or *Revue Biblique* 85 (1978): 253-67. As he argues his case entirely on a form-critical basis, by postulating contexts in which this formula might have been used in early Christian worship rather than by relating it to its present textual context, I have not been able to make much use of his article in my own study. My purpose is to argue for a very similar conclusion regarding the meaning of this verse, but on entirely different grounds.

human relations are pre-eminently suited to fulfil his criteria: in all religions human beings tend to seek assistance and protection from the divine realm; they offer worship (typically framed as "service": c.f., Greek λατρεια) and other services in return; and the relationship is invariably seen to be asymmetrical, with the human partners expressing their total powerlessness and dependence.

As the supreme patron of imperial Rome, the one person who was no man's client, the emperor stood at the head of the imperial pyramid of benefaction and obligation, the one human being through whom all power and wealth was dispersed to lesser humans, and upon whose wellbeing and beneficence all others depended.[31] This made him godlike: in Roman eyes not a god *per se* during his lifetime, but rather the chief client of the gods, whose patronage of the human race was mediated through this one favoured client, who was idealised as an exemplar of *pietas*. Hence he was frequently portrayed at the centre of cultic activity, not as an object of worship but in a supreme priestly role, offering sacrifices and receiving benefits on behalf of all his subjects.[32]

We should not regard the cult of Caesar as something imposed by the Romans upon conquered Greeks. The evidence points rather in the opposite direction: to a genuine reluctance by the early Roman emperors to accept divine honours heaped upon them by their subjects in the Hellenic world.[33] Recent research by the classical historian S.R.F.Price emphasizes that far from being a peripheral part of Hellenistic religion, the imperial cult became central and integral to Greek religion under the empire.[34] Price's study is based on archaeological evidence gathered from throughout Asia Minor, but he contends that it is applicable for Greco-Roman society in general. The picture of the imperial cult that emerges from his data is of a religious movement embraced by all levels of society and inseparable from all other manifestations of public worship. Wherever he looks for evidence of popular religious practice, be it in architecture, religious images, coinage, sacrificial practice or public festivals, he finds the figure of Caesar, either on his own or as an essential accompaniment of the other gods. It is almost as though the emperor had increasingly become the essential mediator between the gods and his subjects, the most tangible and incarnate manifestation of the divine.[35]

[31] Veyne, *Bread and Circuses*, 292-419; Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage," 78-81; Richard A. Horsley, "The Gospel Imperial Salvation: Introduction," *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, Ed. Horsley (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1997) 10-24.

[32] Richard Gordon, "The Veil of Power," *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, Ed. Richard A. Horsley (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1997) 126-37.

[33] For an account of this resistance, with particular reference to the title "Lord" and its equivalents, see Cuss, *Imperial Cult*, 53-63.

[34] S.R.F. Price, "Rituals and Power," *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, Ed. A. Horsley (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1997) 47-71.

[35] S.R.F. Price, *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984), especially 101-233.

Price explains the ubiquity and popularity of the imperial cult as a genuine response by colonised Greeks who sought to make sense of their subjugation by casting Caesar into the role and status given earlier to their own emperors when their city states were subjugated by Greek imperialism. So while Romans tended to postpone full deification of their emperors until their deaths, Greeks needed to treat them as gods during their lifetimes, in order to reconcile themselves to the awesome power that had overcome them and to mitigate their humiliating subjugation. Caesar must be seen not only as the favourite of the gods, but as one of them. The last two paragraphs of Price's book give an apt summary of the function and importance of the cult for the Hellenised Roman empire:

> Many societies have the problem of making sense of an otherwise incomprehensible intrusion of authority into their world. The Greeks were faced with the rule first of Hellenistic kings and then of Roman emperors which was not completely alien, but which did not relate to the traditions of the self-governing cities. They attempted to evoke an answer by focusing the problem in ritual. Using their traditional symbolic system they represented the emperor to themselves in the familiar terms of divine power. The imperial cult, like the cults of the traditional gods, created a relationship of power between the subject and ruler. It also enhanced the dominance of local elites over the populace, of cities over other cities, and of Greek over indigenous cultures. That is, the cult was a major part of the web of power that formed the fabric of society.
> The imperial cult stabilized the religious order of the world. The system of ritual was carefully structured: the symbolism evoked a picture of the relationship between the emperor and the gods. The ritual was also structuring; it imposed a definition of the world. The imperial cult, along with politics and diplomacy, constructed the reality of the Roman empire.[36]

It is plain that, accepting Price's evidence for the ubiquity of the imperial cult in all pagan Greek religious observances by the first century C.E., we must take this into very serious consideration in the course of examining the significance of ειδωλοθύτα for Paul and his audience. *Indeed I would argue that the inescapable presence of the imperial cult in Corinth is an overarching social reality dominating his discourse on this topic and that the circumspection with which he feels obliged to deal with that unnamed presence goes a long way towards explaining both the length and the convoluted nature of Paul's argument.*[37]

Rhetoric is another aspect of the cultural transformation of Hellenism under the Roman empire. Much of the rhetorical criticism of the New Testament examined earlier seems to operate on an assumption of the uniform influence of rhetoric over time and throughout all Greco-Roman societies. One school of rhetorical criticism characterises

[36] Price, *Rituals and Power (1984)*, 247-48. Cuss too had earlier presented the imperial cult in the Eastern a genuine indigenous response of conquered peoples who had always treated their supreme rulers as divine: *Imperial Cult*, 30-35.

[37] I shall argue below that κύριος in 1 Cor 8:6 carries strong connotations of patronage and family relations, and intended to signal that Paul will carry forward his ensuing argument in those terms. It is important to emphasize this is not a reductionist interpretation of the term's significance, but rather that we must recognize that those relations provided the symbolic basis for theological metaphors. I have just outlined the central place taken by Caesar cult within Corinthian civic life, explaining this in patronage terms: all human-divine interaction was conceived as a patronage relation, with Caesar being the chief intermediary between gods and humankind. In social context, ημιν ... εις κύριος Ισοῦς Χριστός constitutes a covert but unmistakeable assertion that *Jesus and Caesar* is the one intermediary between the one God and humankind.

rhetoric's ancient Greek development as a means of promoting the viewpoints and interests of the rich and powerful, and argues that under the Roman empire it was entirely appropriated for that purpose.[38] That is, rhetoric was now devoted to the cause of legitimising the Roman empire's use of power and to normalising the values of those who gained most from that regime. If we recognise rhetoric as the public discourse of the privileged and powerful, then we may also become more attuned to any indications of a private discourse of resistance issuing "from below", covert and coded so as to avoid repression, and expressing the interests and viewpoint of the weak and disadvantaged. No colonised people built a successful resistance to Roman power by criticising it openly. It follows that if Paul's gospel had an element of resistance to Roman power, its expression would be coded and covert, at least in comparison to the freedom with which he attacked Jewish and Greek cultural norms. I wish to argue that whether or not this was the case, his rhetoric against patronage in the present discourse is couched in terms that minimize its potential to be recognized as an explicit attack on the cohesion of the empire.

The whole system of benefits and obligations was essentially one of *mediated* patronage: A was the client of B who was client of C .... who was the client of Caesar, who was client of the gods. When A accepted B's invitation to a feast, he did so not only as an expression of his obligations to B, but indirectly as an acknowledgement of the place both shared in the whole network, and of their common commitment to that whole. Conversely, to absent himself too frequently from such occasions would not only call into question his gratitude to B, but would be seen as subversive of the common good. Now if A and B were both Christians, A might well have the luxury of only being expected to attend feasts that were organised so that there was no conflict of religious scruples, no hint of paganism either in the venue or in the prayers and thanksgivings offered.

However, when B was summoned to C's feast, C being his pagan patron, the situation was much more fraught, especially if A or his friends were watching. Feasts thrown by rich patrons were commonly quite public affairs: in order to make a display of the host's status, it was essential that the general public were able to observe the quality of his invited guests, and it was a client's duty to allow himself to be part of this spectacle. Paul's discourse strongly suggests such a situation: 10:27 raises the possibility of a Christian being invited to dine by an unbeliever and indicates that it may be a problematic matter of choice (εἰ τις καλεῖ ὑμᾶς τῶν απίστων καὶ θέλετε πορεύεσθαι). One aspect of the problem is that the Christian has not been told whether or not the food that will be served has come from a temple, and Paul's advice is that there is no need to know, unless someone else makes an issue of it. The other component of the problem is that there may be no shortage of other guests or spectators present who are

[38] For an overview of this critique, see Neil Elliott, "Paul and the Politics of Empire: Problems and Prospects" in Horsley ed., *Paul and Empire*, 27-33.

motivated to test the scruples of the Christian guest by doing just that.[39] Feasts hosted by rich patrons were commonly quite public occasions, because the host's status was demonstrated by the quality of his invited guests, which meant that the general public must be enabled to observe them. Being put on display in such a manner meant that acceptance of an invitation from one's patron was more a duty than a pleasure, without the added prospect of having one's loyalties examined in public.

Chow's hypothesis thus provides a powerful line of explanation answering the question of why Paul is so argumentative (as opposed to directive) in dealing with this topic. It postulates that the behaviour being challenged in this query from Corinth, no matter who has raised it, is not the aberrant misdemeanour of an individual but that of a powerful group within the community who until this point have considered their practice to be normal, as we can deduce from the fact that Paul gives no indication that he has previously made a ruling on this matter. His whole approach is one of indicating his own personal policy quite early in the discourse (8:13) and then challenging them to work out their own in a responsible manner (culminating in 11:1).

Furthermore, members of this group are "strong", not only in their own estimation, but in the eyes of other community members who either are indebted to them as clients, or feel disadvantaged by the political influence such patronage relations have given them within the community.[40] Paul would clearly find himself disempowered in that political contest: although he has carefully avoided becoming the client of anyone at Corinth (9:11-12), many among his audience have not, and now owe their patrons the *obsequium* of excusing their behaviour. The "wise", that is to say, are not only the (comparatively) rich and powerful, but all those who owe the "strong" the favour of adopting an ideology that justifies their continuance in the social and cultic relationships that maintain their power. The desire and ability of rich and powerful patrons to buy the "wise" approval of philosophers they acquire as clients goes back a long way in Greek culture. Whatever the philosophical origin of the slogans Paul quotes in 8:4 and 10:23 (=6:12),[41] we can be sure that there were many lowly

[39] Meggett objects to such a reading, following Barrett, that "the greatest reason for assuming that verses 28ff. to the protestations of a Christian and not a pagan, is the difficulty in understanding how (and indeed why) for a pagan's conscience could be an issue. What scruples would the Christian have offended by eating the (Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and Survival*, 113). As I have already argued above (4.4.1), this hypothetical situation not involve anyone's *scruples* as such, but rather the potential convert's *consciousness* of the Christian's when faced with a pagan challenge.

[40] The point is frequently made that this label is not actually used of any group in the audience at any point in epistle. Nevertheless, many exegetes find some such term necessary to describe the social reality reflected in of the discourses. I would justify its use here from Paul's challenge in 10:22b, μὴ ισχυρότεροι αυτοῦ εσμεν; functions as a bridge between the preceding scriptural topoi and the following Greco-Roman slogans. This would not work unless those Paul rebukes with it prided themselves on their *strength* in their own terms.

[41] See Rollin A. Ramsaran, *Liberating Words: Paul's Use of Rhetorical Maxims in 1 Corinthians 1-10.* (Valley Forge: Trinity Press International, 1996) 47-63; Raymond F. Collins, *First Corinthians*, Sacra Pagina 7 (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1999) 313-14, 243-44; and Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000) 628-30, 640-41.

members of the Corinthian congregation who found that adopting them provided one way of climbing out of "weakness" with the help of approving patrons. Paul's challenge on that ideology must be done very carefully, because both the strong and the weak stand to suffer from the policy he is proposing. We should not simply view the strong as having great political power within the believing community which they are likely to use to resist the policy he wants to establish: they are also those who are most likely to suffer the direct backlash when patronal links with the wider society are put under strain. He must also tread carefully because he risks damaging those whose real socio-economic disadvantage in the community is masked by the "wisdom" with which they have attached themselves to more powerful members. The whole community needs to move forward together on this issue, preserving their mutual solidarity as their ties with those outside come under strain. Because they may well come to suffer in this potential upheaval, in Paul's view they need to keep the example of their crucified founder in sight and, like him, to know the true source of their benefits and obligations. I shall now argue that this is precisely signalled in 1 Corinthians 8:6.

9.3 Benefits and Obligations: εξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν

We have previously seen that the four subordinate clauses in 1 Corinthians 8:6 combine to form an integrated semantic network in which their prepositional predications must be interpreted consistently; which is to say *within a unified semantic field*. What I now want to argue is that their combined effect, in a first-century Greco-Roman social context, is to evoke strongly the semantic field of patronage: any audience drawn from that setting would naturally assume that this verse was making a very distinctive assertion about patron-client relations. As I began to do in the previous chapter, we can analyse this effect in terms of four interacting dyadic relations between the four predications.

1. εξ οὗ τὰ πάντα ... ημεῖς εις αυτόν. Coming first, as it does in the sentence, this dyad requires an interpretation connecting the first assertion that "everything" is "from God" with the assertion that we are "to/for God". More accurately, both of these assertions are within the domain of the preceding modal pronoun ημῖν. This serves to distinguish "our" situation from that of the implied *others* in verse 5, who call many beings "gods" and relate to them as we do to the one God. That is to say, τὰ πάντα are "from" those they regard as gods, and they themselves are "to/for" those beings. What is the connection between the "from" and the "to/for"? In the first-century Greco-Roman world one link would be presumed before all others: the relation between benefits received and obligations owed. "Everything for us is from person X" implies that X is the source of everything that comes our way, and we hope these things are benefits. The invariable consequence of benefits are obligations to our benefactor ... "and we (consequently) are (obligated) to him." So the first assertion in the focus of this verse is that God is our sole patron from whom everything comes, and we owe him an undivided allegiance.

Everything depends on the divine partner in the relation: all that comes into the lives of the devotee, be it good or evil, has a divine source: εξ ου τὰ πάντα. The appropriate response, indeed the only way to survive in the face of such a power imbalance, is by adopting a stance of total submission and allegiance: to become an uncompromised client of the divine partner: καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν. It is the consequential nature of the relation between the first and second subordinate clauses supplied by reading them as expressing patronage that makes this reading so probable. The common ground here between Christians and polytheists is the use of patronage relations (benefits entailing obligations) to depict divine-human interaction, but whereas the pagans may have their bets spread over several horses, so that their obligations to any particular god are less that absolute and this is construed as appropriate in the circumstances, for monotheists the relationship takes on an uncompromising tone. The one God is the source of everything, and *consequently* we are totally devoted to him: he has or should have, our undivided allegiance.

2. εξ οὗ τὰ πάντα ... δι οὗ τὰ πάντα. In this dyad, the significant relation is between the predications signalled by the two prepositions εξ and δι in the first and third subordinate clauses. The common material in the predications is expressed by the repetition of τὰ πάντα, "everything", which also serves to connect these two clauses. The difference between the two predications is expressed by the prepositions: while "everything" is εκ one referent (the one God), it is also διά another (the one Lord). Interpreting this dyad within the semantic field of patronage, we can see that it serves to modify the initial assertion that, for Christians, all benefits come *from* a single divine source by asserting further that we do not receive these benefits directly, but *through* someone else, namely Jesus Christ. Given that the main clause to which this modification is attached asserts the uniqueness of that someone else, the subordinate clause asserts that we have *only* one such intermediary. All things come to us from God, through Jesus Christ and no one else. We are totally dependent on that one source and that one line of supply, and by the same token are totally independent of all other claimant sources and intermediaries.

3. δι οὗ τὰ πάντα ... ημεῖς δι' αυτοῦ. The third dyad is formed by the combination of δι ου τὰ πάντα in the third subordinate clause and ημεῖς δι' αυτοῦ in the fourth. Its effect is to ground the all-important final clause in the assertion of the second subordinate clause, in parallel with the first dyad: just as εξ ου τὰ πάντα leads to the consequence ημεῖς εις αυτόν, so this implication of consequence is transferred from its primary referent, the source of τὰ πάντα, to the second referent, the intermediary. If we read the first dyad as expressing a patronage relation, so must we read the third: if the first invokes a logic connecting a source of benefits to consequent obligations for those who receive those benefits, then the same logic implies that if those benefits are received through an intermediary, then the obligations must be discharged through that same intermediary. The vital importance of this conclusion is further reinforced by the fourth dyad.

4. ημεῖς εις αυτόν ... ημεῖς δι' αυτοῦ. The fourth semantic dyad is formed by the relation

between the second and fourth subordinate clauses. The significance of the final clause, which constitutes the climax of the sequence of assertions in this verse, is emphasized both by its final position in the complex sentence and also by its paratactic form. While we could establish a transfer of consequent *obsequium* from the source of benefits to the intermediary by means of the third dyad in itself, the existence of the fourth and the syntax of its expression make this transfer inescapable. Having interrupted the smooth relative-clause structure of the first subordinate clause to make an emphatic, paratactic assertion of the consequence, καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν, Paul repeats this treatment in the second case: καὶ ημεῖς δι' αυτοῦ.

The effect is to constrain the audience's interpretation of the final clause in two ways. Firstly, it leaves no doubt that it is to be understood specifically as an extension of καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν: Whatever the audience understands when they hear that they are εις θέον, must also be extended in a consistent manner to their understanding of what it means to be δι' Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ. If they have understood the first predication as an expression of patronage obligation, then this understanding must also apply to the second: the obligation exists in a particular form: through Christ. Secondly, the paratactic form and final placement of this clause serve to emphasize its focal importance: this is the part of the sentence conveying new information. This is the most important assertion of all, the one he wants to leave ringing in their ears as he goes on to deal directly with the practicalities of ειδωλόθυτα : we are not only εις θέον, although he has asserted this in an emphatic manner, but even more importantly, we are εις Θέον ... **δι' Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ**.

The combined effect of these four semantic dyads now becomes quite clear: it asserts a *mediated patronage*. We have already seen that in the Roman patronage system, individual patron-client relations did not occur in a vacuum but within a network of such relations. If A is the client of B, and B of C, then A and C have an indirect patronage relation mediated by B. At the top of the human hierarchy sat Caesar, patron of all within the empire, although this patronage was mediated through a small number of direct clients.

In that social context, and with patronage associations activated by the first two subordinate clauses, this second semantic dyad (εξ ου τὰ πάντα ... δι ου τὰ πάντα) makes an unmistakable assertion. The Christian community within the empire finds itself interacting every day with a patronage network in which all benefits are in theory derived from Caesar, through intermediate patrons. The *obsequia* owed to immedate patrons are thus ultimately debts to Caesar, and something as insignificant as an invitation to dinner with a "friend" has the potential to become a test of loyalty to the empire, with a refusal acquiring overtones of treason. Such a construction is of course somewhat extreme, but that is just how such systems of coercive domination work: insecurity and paranoia are their stock-in-trade. A Christian receiving an invitation to share a meal in the precincts of a pagan temple is placed under extreme pressure to comply, and is highly motivated to accept a line of rationalisation that will minimise the faith community's traditional critique of such involvement as compromising with idolatry. Paul's assertion counters this directly: for *us*, there is only one

supreme patron, the one God, and this patronage is not mediated through Caesar and his household but through Jesus Christ alone. As a consequence, Christians within the empire are not only freed from patronal obligations to Caesar, but they are obligated to render that *obsequium* to another, their true Lord. This is the subject to which I will turn in my following section.

9.4 Mediated Patronage: εις κύριος

A key term in 1 Corinthians 8:6 is κύριος in the second main clause, where it is used in the affirmation "For us... there is one lord, Jesus Christ". While my grammatical analysis has already established that this affirmation is being made, I have until now left aside any semantic investigation of what the term is most likely to signify in this textual context.

In the Christian tradition, the use of "lord"and its translational equivalents has become heavily theologised. Although used in a common sense akin to "master" in reference to other people, when applied to Jesus it has, like "Christ", become an integral part of his official title, "The Lord Jesus Christ". Outside of that particular reference, it is also a theistic title, used as a proper means of addressing (as "Lord" or "O Lord"), or referring to (as "The Lord"), the deity in general. That divine title is, in turn, quite properly traced back to Jewish usage, in which the Hebrew and Greek equivalents were frequently used as reverent substitutions for יהוה, the divine name. In that theological context, it is quite natural for Christian scholars to read καὶ εἷς κύριος in 1 Corinthians 8:6 as "and one Lord" where the capitilization of "Lord" indicates that it retains its ancient scriptural connotations. It is those connotations, of course, that combine with other aspects of the semantics in this verse to set up the theological problems with which this study began.

We cannot *presume* that these scriptural connotations were in the foreground for Paul and his audience in the context of this discourse, just because he speaks of Jesus in a context that also speaks of God. Unless particular theological connotations can be shown to be semantically activated by the discourse itself, we must also remain open to an interpretation in which theological meaning is based on the common and therefore presumptive usage of κύριος in everyday life. Of course, all talk about God is theological, by definition. What I mean here is that we must ask whether Paul is using the social constructs of normal life (family, patronage) to inform his audience about their relation to God, or appealing to other, more distinctively scriptural, concepts to illumine normal life. [42] Commenting on Bouset's derivation of New Testament usage of κύριος from exclusively Oriental-hellenistic religious origins, Oscar Cullmann gave this caution some time ago:

[42] Neither has preference in principle, but in this case I am arguing for the former on the basis, as I have already argued, that these social constructs are strongly indicated by the syntactic and semantic structures of the sentence are examining. Following through on that indication, I am now attempting to demonstrate that those constructs been effectively activated in the semantics of this key termin the pre-text, and that they are crucial to our understanding of the subsequent discourse structure.

> In the first place, we must not forget the obvious fact that in the Hellenistic world, too, *Kyrios* was used not only in connection with certain *religious* conceptions, but also (as the equivalents in all languages suggest) in the general sense of 'master' or 'owner'. Especially as an address, *Kyrie*, it often became fixed as a mere form of politeness which meant nothing more than the French *Monsieur*. Bousset's thesis suffers because he does not consider the connection between this secular use and the specifically religious use either of the Greek word or its Semitic equivalents ... This is why he can deny that there is a bridge from the general expression of the superiority or ownership of a person called *Kurios* to the absolute concept of the rule of the *one* divine *Kurios*. In point of fact one does see a development from the first to the second use in the writings of early Christianity.[43]

It would be a mistake, in my view, to react to Bousset and others identified as "the-history-of-religions school" by mirroring his error: by adopting a presumption that all New Testament use of κύριος terminology is based on scriptural religious precedents unless its everyday connotations are too obvious to ignore. Like Cullmann, I would prefer to explore fully the continuities between religious and secular usage of theological terminology, both in the New Testament writings and in their scriptural precedents. In each case, we should seek an interpretation that makes most sense in its textual and social context.

9.4.1 Κύριος in the Textual Context

In Section A of Appendix H I have set out the 36 occurrences of κύριος in 1 Corinthians before 8:5-6, classifying them into 5 categories according to their most probable use. Section B applies those same categories to the ensuing discourse on ειδωλόθυτα. The purpose of this analysis is to gain a picture of the overall pattern of distinct uses to which Paul had already put this key term before the passage on which my enquiry is focused and to see how this pattern is carried forward into the present discourse.

The first category identifies the occurrence of this term in clearly identifiable quotations from scripture. There are only two such examples: 2:16 quoting Is.40:13, and 3:20 quoting Ps.93:11(LXX) without significant adaptation of the verbal forms. In each case the original κύριος is used as a translation of the divine name, יהוה, and Paul retains its reference to God, with no possibility of it referring to Jesus. He also retains the distinctive form by which the LXX normally renders the tetragrammaton: Κύριος without the article.

There is one instance in the ensuing discourse that falls into this first category: 10:26, τοῦ κυρίου γὰρ η γὴ καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αυτής. This is an exact quotation of Ps.23:1 (LXX), except for the insertion of the connecting γὰρ.[44] As in the pre-textual examples, κύριος here refers to God alone in the scriptural text and there is nothing in Paul's argument that indicates he wants to extend that reference to Christ.

[43] Oscar Cullmann, *The Christology of the New Testament*, trans. S.C.Guthrie and C.A.M.Hall (London: SCM 1963) 196.

[44] We should note that the presence of the article in the genitive τοῦ κυρίου in the LXX is not an exception to the general principle of translating the tetragrammaton in anarthrous form but probably marks the presence of the particle ל in the original form: ליהוה.

The second category consists of those instances in which the distinctive form εν κυρίῳ is used. It is not obvious whether these refer to God or to Christ, or to both in combination. As in the first category, this form lacks the article, which might suggest a reference to God, but we might also consider that this form is a technical term denoting membership in the faith community, the community constituted by those who have responded to the gospel of Jesus Christ. In the first case, 4:17, if we detect a parallel between the relative clause in which he affirms of Timothy, ὅς εστιν μου τέκνον αγαπητὸν καὶ πιστὸν εν κυρίῳ and the following clause in which he refers to τὰς οδούς μου τὰς εν Χριστῷ [Ιησοῦ], then εν κυρίῳ could have either meaning: that Timothy stands out among those in Christ's community as one who is Paul's beloved and faithful child who knows how Paul acts within that community; or that Timothy has become such a child by divine action and knows what Paul has demonstrated to be his way of acting within that divine will. In the second case, 7:22a, ο γὰρ εν κυρίῳ κληθεὶς δούλος, the modifier εν κυρίῳ in this subject-phrase is clarified by a slightly less direct parallel: the clause is completed by the predicate απελεύθερος κυρίου εστιν, which is paralleled in the following clause by the predicate κληθεὶς δούλός εστιν Χριστοῦ, and we must conclude that it means "in Christ". In the third case, 7:39, Paul's qualification of the widow's freedom to remarry, μόνον εν κυρίῳ, probably means only among Christ's people, but there is also a possibility that it is intended to denote the ruling authority of a κύριος and should be rendered "only in the will of God" or "only as led by the Spirit".[45] The possibility of this will-of-God reading in each case should caution us against reducing this expression to a mere formula for community membership, which might just as well have been expressed as εν Χριστῷ or another equivalent form. At the very least we should say that the form reminds the audience that those who are in the Christian community are expected to live within the will of God, as those who have Christ not just as community founder but as κύριος. I shall follow up that dimension of signification shortly.

Two closely related examples in the ensuing text fall into this second category: the final rhetorical question in 9:1, ου τὸ ἔργον μου υμεῖς εστε εν κυρίῳ; "Are you not my work in (the) Lord?", and the second clause in the following verse, 9:2, ... η γὰρ σφραγίς μου τῆς αποστολῆς υμεῖς εστε εν κυρίῳ. These instances support a will-of-God rather than community-membership interpretation of εν κυρίῳ. The series of questions in 9:1 seems to be building a rhetorical crescendo of evidence that Paul's ministry is divinely authenticated, leading to the final clause as a conclusion which is expanded in the next verse: that they must accept his divinely appointed status as an apostle, not just as an abstract principle but in relation to them in particular. As in the pre-textual examples, the reference may be either to God, whose authority is expressed, or to Christ as agent of that authority, or to both in combination. Either way, Paul is appealing to their experience of his ministry as community-founder, demanding their acknowledgement that both his work and its results were manifested according to the will of God.

[45] For a discussion of recent readings, see Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 604.

The third category consists of the six instances in the pre-text where Paul has used κύριος in a purely relational sense, affirming *whose* κύριος someone is, and equally *who* is κύριος of a given party: X is κύριος of Y. In each case in the pre-text that someone X is Jesus, and the other party Y is "us": Paul and his audience. In one case, 1:3, the genitive ημῶν is missing from the phrase κυρίου Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ, but an ellipsis is implied and the missing word is supplied from the preceding coordinate phrase, θεοῦ πατρὸς ημῶν. It is significant that each of these six cases occurs in the first ten verses of the epistle. It seems that Paul felt the need to establish that commonality in relating to Jesus Christ as *our* κύριος is the foundational principle on which he will address his audience throughout the letter. One further case, quite different from these six, should nevertheless be included in this category, even though its difference makes its connection with the others rather dubious: in 2:8, the crucified Christ is described as τὸν κύριον τῆς δόξης. The second party in this relation is "glory"; we may read this as a Hebraism equivalent to "the glorious lord" or as an expression of the Greek habit of using this genitive constuction to denote a relation with things as well as people, making Christ the owner of glory, the one in charge of its allocation. Only in this latter reading, which I regard as more probable on balance in the context of 2:6-9, is the construction relational.[46]

The ensuing discourse contains two such relational uses of the term. The third clause in 9:1, ουχὶ Ιησοῦν τὸν κύριον ημῶν εώρακα, recalls the six cases in the letter-opening in its identification of the shared relation to Jesus as "our lord" in the course of asserting that Paul, unlike his audience, has actually seen him. The point of making that relation explicit within this particular assertion is no doubt to suggest that the relation, while shared by all, does not put Paul on the same footing as the audience, but rather gives him a special role in mediating the relation to them. The effects of that mediation are made explicit in the following clause, as we have seen. A second relational use in the present discourse is found in 9:5 in the expression οι αδελφοὶ τοῦ κυρίου, which is a fixed expression referring to Jesus' historical kinship relations. In this instance, τοῦ κυρίου is a functional equivalent of the proper name. We might summarise the over-all effect of this category of uses of κύριος before and during the discourse on ειδωλόθυτα by saying that it serves to remind the audience that they share a relation with someone they call κύριος and to anchor that term very firmly in the historical figure of Jesus, to whose authoritative example Paul will appeal so strongly in the climax of his argument at 11:1.

Fifteen of the thirty-six cases in the pre-text, plus another three that are somewhat problematic, belong in the fourth category, in which ο κύριος is depicted as acting as master or owner in relation to someone or something, or of others relating to him as one does to a κύριος. Whether the term refers to God or Christ is not made explicit in any of these

[46] τὸν κύριον τῆς δόξης occurs only here and has spawned diverse interpretations: see Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 247-48. At least I have Augustine on my side in reading this as an objective genitive: *On the* 1:12:24.

instances, as the emphasis is on some aspect of the relation rather than on specifiying the participants: role-assignment among servants (3:5), evaluating their performance (4:4), authorizing or forbidding marriages and divorces (7:10, 7:12), alloting conditions of service (7:17), manumitting slaves (7:22), giving instructions to subordinates (7:25a), delegating authority (7:25b), and receiving the undivided services of subordinates (7:32-35). The three instances in 6:13-14 and 6:17 are of dubious classification, but I have placed them here as most probably referring metaphorically to the marital relation, in which the husband is κύριος of the wife.[47] The importance of this fourth category for my study is that, more explicitly than the second, it establishes the extent to which Paul's use of the term in the pre-text has emphasized qualitative aspects, *what* it means for him that we have a κύριος , rather than merely repeating his initial identification of that person or honouring him with a divine name. For instance, in the first of these cases, 3:5, Paul belittles the significance of differences of status between Apollos and himself on the grounds that any differences in their functioning are solely due to the choices made by another, their common κύριος: the significant actor is their lord, and their status and service is that of fellow servants, διάκονοι. On the same grounds, it follows that Paul's line of accountability is solely to that master: in 4:4 he asserts ο δὲ ανακρίνων με κύριός εστιν as the grounds for maintaining that even his own self-approval is unreliable. His inability to pass a definitive judgment on his own actions stems from the fact that those actions are performed not to please himself but another who bears the specific role of κύριος in relation to him and therefore has the sole right to determine whether his service is satisfactory. In these and each of the cases in this category, the κύριος acts and relates to others in particular ways *because* he is a κύριος, and while Paul augments the secular connotations of that term with scriptural motifs, the secular qualities of the term are essential to his usage. So by the time we come to 8:6 and are told there is only one κύριος, we know he means there is only one who has such qualities in relation to us.

The subsequent discourse has three closely related instances of the term in 10:21-22 which I have tentatively placed in this category, although this classification is very problematic: ου δύνασθε ποτήριον κυρίου πίνειν καὶ ποτήριον δαιμονίων, ου δύνασθε τραπέζης κυρίου μετέχειν καὶ τραπέζης δαιμονίων. ῃ παραζηλοῦμεν τὸν κύριον; μὴ ισχυρότεροι αυτοῦ εσμεν. Their proximity means these three instances must all carry the same sense, and that sense must enable the two sentences to be read as a unity: whatever the reason for the incompatibilities refered to in the first sentence, this reason must be related to the two clauses in the second and be compatible with their inter-relationship. The first sentence asserts, "You cannot drink from the lord's cup and the cup of demons; you cannot eat from the lord's table and the table of demons." The natural retort, "Why not?" is answered

[47] Against the flow of recent discussion, I think that the underlying motif in this passage is the marriage relation, which Christ the κύριος / husband is joined body and spirit to the church as bride. If we preserve the integrity of relation (by not visiting prostitutes in the present issue) God will maintain that marriage bond in the resurrection. this reading, the "price" paid for us is a bride-price rather than to do with slavery. For a summary of contrary readings, see Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 458-79.

by two rhetorical questions that imply the paired assertions: to do so would be to incite the lord's jeolousy, and to imply that you are stronger than he. The most natural line of interpretation is to read κύριος as the standard Jewish rendition of the divine name, and is supported by several facts: the anarthrous form of the term in the first sentence; the established Jewish critique of idolatrous feasting as demonic;[48] the ancient depiction of יהוה as a jealous god (specifically in regard to idolatry, the attractions of "other gods"), and some traditional Jewish exegesis depicting apostasy as a trial of strength with the deity. Furthermore, it comes shortly after the section appealing to the apostasy and idolatry of Israel in the desert. This reading would place these instances into the first category, and although it seems highly plausible, it is not without difficulties. Why are the demons also referred to in anarthrous form, if this is so significant? Why is this form abandoned in the third instance? And who would seriously contemplate a trial of strength against the deity?[49] (Paul's final question is rhetorical, the μή demanding a negative answer, implying that they are entering such a contest unwittingly.) It seems to me that although the scriptural motifs are certainly present for Paul, he may also be combining them with other associations from the contemporary Greco-Roman social context in order to convince his non-Jewish audience.[50] That is, although the genre of the discourse in Ch.10 up to v.20 is undeniably scriptural interpretation, as I argued in an earlier chapter, this does not mean that κυριου in v.21 is used solely in the predominant scriptural sense as the proper name of Israel's God. The strongest reason for resisting such a totally scriptural interpretation is the undeniable connection between this verse and Paul's later treatment of "the Lord's supper" in 11:17-34, where the term is used with specific reference to ο κύριος Ιησοῦς (11:23).[51]

So we are left looking for a logic behind the prohibition expressed in 10:21 that appeals to Greco-Roman social norms. One possibility is that since attendance at a patron's table was a demonstration of loyalty expected of clients, this may also have entailed a commitment to avoid giving the same courtesy to those who were recognized as the patron's

[48] See Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, trans. Leitch W., Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) 173, n.35 for references, noting in particular Deut. 32:17, Ps.95:5(LXX), Ps.105:37(LXX, =Jub.1:11).

[49] Brian S. Rosner, "'Stronger Than He?' The Strength of 1 Corinthians 10:22b," *Tyndale Bulletin* 43.1 79, explores the biblical background of such language.

[50] While admitting its difficulties, recent commentaries do not seem to look beyond the scriptural background of passage: See Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Commentary on the Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 472-74; Wolfgang Schrage, *Der Brief an die Korinther Vol.2*, Evangelisch—Katholischer Kommentar Zum Neuen Testament VII (Zurich & Neukirchen—Vluyn / Solothurn: Benziger & Neukirchener, 1995) 446-48; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 381-82; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 776-79.

[51] This may well be one case where Paul is using ο κύριος in a *transitional* manner, in which connotations to the divine Lord in scripture were progressively transferred to Jesus when the particular circumstances See the christological studies of Cullmann, Dunn *et al.* The circumstances encouraging such a transitional use are (postulated) sensitivities and loyalties that patronal hospitality has in common with Israel's cult. I am that Greeks observing that the exclusivity of Israel's sacrificial meals might have understood this in terms of the loyalties expected from their clients by patrons.

rivals, and a breach of this protocol recognized as a provocation, a declaration of independence from the patron that amounted to a social trial of strength. Alternatively, their behaviour might have involved breaching master-servant or even intra-familial protocols. If any such associations are truly present here, then Paul's argument in these two verses amounts to this: "Why do you treat the Lord in a manner you would avoid with an earthly κύριος ?"

The fifth category is really a sub-set of the fourth, and consists of six occurrences of the term in three passages of the pre-text where ο κύριος is depicted as exercising a judicial function: either in his future personal *parousia* (4:5), or in the visitation of Paul as his agent of judgment (4:19), or in the manifest presence of the divine spirit acting in judgment (5:4-5). I have separated these out not only because this motif is a distinctly scriptural/apocalyptic modification of the social relation but also because judgement provides an important topos in the subsequent argument, even though this term is not actually used in this sense there. These six occurrences are very important precursors of 8:6, for they serve to activate the aspect of divine judgment inherent in the scriptural use of this term without using it as an equivalent of the divine proper name. That is, one of the central functions accorded to God in scripture was judgment of the world in general and his people in particular. That judicial role was one of several functions commonly associated with κύριοι in general, and contributed to the suitability of this term for Jews to use as a euphemism denoting the divine name. That judgmental function can therefore be associated with God by the use of this term whether or not it is used as the proper name: to say (cross-linguistically) that יהוה is κύριος is not a pleonasm but actually conveys information about how Israel's God relates to others, and how he functions in such relationships.[52] Some of those divine functions, *themselves metaphorical extensions of human κυρεία*, have already been activated by Paul's use of the term earlier in the text, so that when we get to εις κύριος in 8:6 we know that it implies "one judge" among other associations drawn into the discourse from common usage. I shall explore such common usage further in the next major section, 9.4.2. in the meantime, one further matter must be dealt with.

9.4.1.1 Excursis: Κύριος in Paul's Pre-Textual Proclamation in Corinth.

The question arises as to whether we should consider Paul's use of the term κύριος not only in the pre-text of the present epistle but also in the more fundamental context provided by his earlier use of this term in his initial proclamation of Jesus in Corinth. Textual evidence for such usuage could be sought not from any where in the Corinthian corpus.

Such an investigation might seem like a natural extension of that conducted in Chapter 5 above, where I argued for the ongoing importance of that established proclamation as a source of argumentative *topoi* within the discourse on ειδωλόθυτα. Here the focus would be

[52] So Cullmann, *Christology of NT*, 199-203.

on the significance of such expressions as Κύριος Ιησοῦς (1 Cor.12:3), μαράνα θά (1 Cor.16:22) and Ιησουν Χριστὸν κύριον (2 Cor.4:5) which could be considered to preserve fragments of that initial proclamation that would necessarily effect the semantics of the term κύριος in 1 Cor. 8:6. However, I have serious reservations about the propriety of such a course, which come from three directions.

Firstly, it is clear to me that any attempt to posit a pre-history for such textual fragments involves a degree of speculation that I am earnestly attempting to avoid throughout this study. Indeed it would presume to do to those texts the very thing I am setting out to demonstrate is unnecessary for 1 Cor.8:6, namely to posit that they cannot be adequately interpreted as an integral part of their present textual contexts, thereby undercutting their value as evidence for a distinctive pre-textual usuage. Only in the second of these three examples, involving the transliteration of an Aramaic expression, is such a status clearly indicated by the text itself.

Secondly, none of these examples can be clearly seen to offer a semantic picture that is significantly different from that which we have already drawn from the pre-text, let alone that they might combine to give us unitary glimpse of an earlier proclamation of "Jesus as Lord" that must be presupposed when interpreting all other uses of κύριος in the epistle.

In 1 Cor.12:3, the expression Κύριος Ιησοῦς stands over against the preceding Ανάθεμα Ιησοῦς so that the two expressions must be interpreted as a pair, leading to a natural interpretation of them as avowals of allegiance and rejection respectively. If we interpret Κύριος Ιησοῦς as a credal statement ("Jesus is Lord" in some sense other than the essentially relational confession, "Jesus is my lord" or at the most "Jesus has been made lord of all") then we are also obliged to attempt a parallel interpretation of Ανάθεμα Ιησοῦς. If one has a place within Paul's original preaching in Corinth, then the other must have a similar provenance, perhaps as a standardised formula of rejection.[53] In any case, the pairing of these two expressions requires us to read κύριος in this present context as a predicate, and as an antonym of ανάθεμα, rather than as a portmanteau word carrying a fixed theological content drawn from Israel's heritage or elsewhere.

The sentence μαράνα θά ("Our lord, come!" or "Our lord has/will come") in 1 Cor. 16:22 clearly signals its provenance as an Aramaic formula, having a significance which must have been conveyed to the audience prior to its use in the epistle, whatever its use here conveys.[54] Its independence as a standard formula within diverse strands of first-century Christianity is also attested by its occurence outside the Pauline corpus (Rev. 22:18 and

[53] Thiselton, in an exhaustive analysis of the many scholarly interpretaions of this pairing, has identified twoelve distinct variants. Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 917-27. The most significant division among these is between readings that seek to justify a *confessional/credal* reading of Κύριος Ιησοῦς and those do not.

[54] For discussion of that provenance and significance, see Eduard Schweizer, "Jesus, the Lord of His Church," *Australian Biblical Review* 19 (Oct 1971): 52-57; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 1347-52. Anders Eriksson, *Traditions as Rhetorical Proof: Pauline Argumentation in 1 Corinthians*, Coniectanea Biblica New Testament 29 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1998) 279-98 mounts a weighty argument for the significance this Aramaic expression as an integral part of its present textual context in the final three verses of the epistle.

Didache 10:6). However, that very diversity raises the question of whether Paul's use of this expression at Corinth might have been significantly different from that attested in other authors. In any case, we have little reason to suppose that the early Church's use of the Aramaic מרן conveyed some distinctive semantic content for "Lord" that would colour their application of κύριος to Jesus: its use seems to be confined to this formulaic prayer as such,[55] and even there the specific sense of "lord" is well within the semantic field we have already identified within the pre-text.[56]

The third example that might be used to establish a distinctive "already preached" semantic content for κύριος in Corinth presents itself more persuasively, inasmuch as it explicitly describes the content of Paul's preaching: ου γὰρ εαυτοὺς κηρύσσομεν αλλὰ Ιησοῦν Χριστὸν κύριον, εαυτοὺς δὲ δούλους υμῶν διὰ Ιησοῦν (2 Cor.4:5). The main question is whether κηρύσσομεν is used here to denote the fixed content of Paul's habitual preaching, in which case Ιησοῦν Χριστὸν κύριον is a credal formula waiting to be unpacked, or whether is is simply another freshly-coined expression that should be interpreted in its present context, that is as a response to the charge that Paul preaches "himself". In this latter case (which should be prefered in principle on the grounds that it fits perfectly well into the textual context), it simply affirms that the person presented in the preaching is Jesus Christ rather than Paul, and that both the content and context of the preaching imply that the preachers have the status of δούλοι in relation to the audience, whereas both preachers and audience are required to relate to Jesus as κύριος. Far from bearing witness to a distinctive theological content for κύριος, this example locates its semantics firmly within the everyday dyad of master and slave.[57]

While the results of considering these three examples does not encourage me to expect that there is much to be gained from any further investigation of the possible semantics of κύριος within the pre-textual proclamation of "Christ as Lord" in Corinth, my third ground for avoiding any further investigation along those lines is more principled and fundamental. Along with Leander Keck, [58] I have come to see the futility of attempting to encapsulate the christology or christologies in the New Testament within a few key terms such as κύριος. To

[55] As a prayer, it is found in each case within a wider formulaic form in which it is preceded by a statement of law. The overall function is to express a covenant relation between the church and its Lord in which obedience rewarded with blessings and disobendience will be punished at his coming in judgement. Schweizer, "Jesus, the Lord of His Church," 53-57; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 1350-52.

[56] "... *mare* was not the normal expression for the lordship of God. It can be used as an expression of reverence, our "My Lord" or as the designation of a heavenly prince, an angel and so on. This enabled Jewish Christians to Jesus *mare*, Lord, without violating their creed that they daily repeated, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the is one", becase the *adonai* of hte Old Testament was clearly distinguished from the *mare* Jesus." Schweizer, the Lord of His Church," 52.

[57] Thus Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1985) 106- against C. K. Barrett, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973) 133-34.

[58] Leander E. Keck, "Toward the Renewal of New Testament Christology," *From Jesus to John. Essays on and New Testament Christology in Honour of Marinus de Jonge*, Ed. Martinus C.de Boer, JSNT Supplement Series.84 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993).

do so is to confuse semantics with significance, words with concepts.[59] We should never suppose that the early church could have taken a word with such a rich semantic field as κύριος has and turned it into a loaded technical term which could express all that they ever meant when they proclaimed "Jesus is lord". Rather, we must begin by describing the semantic field within which it already existed in common culture, and then ascertain what the word is being used to assert about Jesus in particular cases. When such a term is enclosed within the context of a particular discourse, then the accumulated semantics of that discourse act to provide further constraints on the term's interpretation, which is what I have been investigating in the pre-text of 1 Cor.8:6.

We may conclude that having begun his epistle with a pointed, even laboured identification of *who* ο κύριος of the Church is, by the time he gets to 8:6 Paul has fleshed out many aspects of what this figure does and how we relate to him *in that role*. While some of those aspects are peculiar to the Christian community's distinctive, scripturally informed thinking about Jesus, they are also natural extensions of the wider use of this term and its associated role definitions within Greco-Roman society.

9.4.2 Κύριος in the Social Context

Κύριος was a common dyadic term used within everyday social relations: in normal use, it implied the existence of another term, normally in the genitive case. To describe someone as a κύριος was to say that he was κύριος-of-someone, or κύριος-of-something. The most obvious of these uses, for modern observers, was as one term in a master-slave (κύριος - δούλος) relation. Less obviously, it was also used within the field of family relations to ascribe the status of being in charge, whether this be in charge of other people, or having rights of ownership or control over property.[60]

It is instructive to compare the semantic field of κύριος with that of the Latin term *dominus*. Firstly, they share common ground in the master-slave (*dominus-servus*) relation. It is not quite as clear that κύριος and *dominus* were applied in equivalent ways to other household relations. The Greek term is known to have some particular familial connotations in ancient Athens that do not apply to Roman society and do not attach to *dominus*. As a general principle we might well suppose that the use of established terms within social relations would tend to express an adaptation to contemporary local social conditions rather than preserving the connotations of a pre-existing social and legal order. This means that we

[59] "To begin with, title-dominated study of New Testament Christology reflects an inadequate view of language, because it assumes that meaning resides in words like "Lord" ..... an alternative pointed James Barr in the right direction when he declared that "it is in sentences that real theological thinking is done"(James Barr, *The of Biblical Language* [Oxford: Oxford UP, 1961] 234). Furthermore, where titles dominate the scene, the between a word and a concept is blurred. A word is identical with a concept only if it is a technical term which no synonyms." Keck, "Renewal of NT Christology," 331.

[60] Among the lexicons of classical and koine Greek, see the entries in Liddell-Scott, 400; Moulton-Milligan 365- and BAGD 458-60.

should expect the application of the Greek term κύριος to social relations in the Roman colony of Corinth would begin to reflect the semantics of the Latin *dominus* to some extent. Within household relations, this would mean the dilution of associations specific to the legal and social system of ancient Greek city states: although it was used as a familial term, *dominus* never acquired the "head of a household" meaning that was so important a connotation of κύριος , although there has been at least one attempt to argue that *domus* meant the domain within which a *dominus* exercised his control.[61]

Conversely, we might expect the Greek term to begin to acquire connotations reflecting the social realities of life in the Roman colony, and in this respect the Latin term has one special area of application that is highly suggestive for my own study: its common use by clients to acknowledge their relation to a patron. One of the daily rituals around which Romans organized their social relations was the early morning *salutatio*, in which clients expressed their respect and gratitude by calling at each of their patrons' houses and paying their respects in a public manner. The number and quality of such callers was a highly visible indicator of a patron's status.[62] The manner in which the client greeted the patron was apparently held to be particularly significant and failure to address him as *domine* could lead to the withdrawal of all *beneficia*: this was particularly true for many of those at the lower end of the hierarchy, for whom this daily round became virtually a dole-queue.[63] The development of *dominus* as a term by which clients could acknowledge their dependent status in relation to a particular patron was aided by two features. Firstly, a significant proportion of patronage relations were formed by the manumission of slaves: under Roman law, a freedman was necessarily the client of his former master,[64] so that his continued use of the term despite his new status was a polite acknowledgement of his ongoing obligation. At the same time its more familial and less servile connotations than alternate Latin terms such as *erus, imperator* and *patronus* mitigated the indignity of this form of address, especially for those clients who had never been slaves of their patrons.[65]

What I would like to suggest is that in the social context of a Roman colony, it is highly probable that κύριος would be used by some people in this sense. Do we have any evidence of its being used as a patronage term in the first century?

[61] Ernout (1932), cited in Richard P. Saller, *Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family*, Cambridge Studies in Population, Economy and Society in Past Time 25 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994) 80.

[62] Saller, *Patriarchy, Property and Death*, 91, n.63; Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 128-29; Chow, *Patronage and Power*, 74-75; Saller, "Patronage and Friendship," 57-58.

[63] Jérôme Carcopino, *Daily Life in Ancient Rome: The People and the City at the Height of the Empire* (London: Routledge, 1941) 171-73.

[64] Andersen, "Patrocinium," 5-8; Fabre, *Libertus*, 125-27; Alan Watson, *Roman Slave Law* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1987) 35-45; Gardner, *Roman Citizen*, 7-51.

[65] Consideration of the recorded use of such terms for social roles when used as terms of address, in the vocative case, has recently been undertaken for both Greek and Latin in two groundbreaking studies by Eleanor Dickey. compare her results for κύριε and *domine*, see Eleanor Dickey, *Greek Forms of Address from Herodotus to* Oxford Classical Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 100-01, 106-07, 235, 237, 273; and Eleanor *Latin Forms of Address: From Plautus to Alpuleius* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002) 77-99.

The New Testament writings, and in particular the gospels, do contain narrative material in which such connotations can be detected in common usage. If we examine only the title ο κύριος, this does not stand out very clearly. Luke uses it frequently to refer to Jesus in a manner suggesting that for him it has become a conventional christological title ("The lord did such and such...). John hardly uses it at all before Chapter 20, where it seems to be loaded with post-resurrection status. Mark and Matthew use it only once (Mk.11:3 = Mt.21:3), where it appears in Jesus' own words, but this one instance is very interesting. His disciples, sent to acquire a colt for Jesus to ride into Jerusalem, are instructed to go to a specific house where a colt is tethered, to loose and take it away as though they have rights to it, and if challenged to declare, Ο κύριος αυτοῦ χρειαν ἐχει. What right is Jesus asserting here, by this pointed use of ο κύριος ? We might read this as a divine right, in the absence of any obvious social relation: neither Mark nor Matthew seem to present Jesus as someone with a retinue of slaves or even servants, and nor do they suggest he has ownership rights within this or any other household.[66] Patronage, however, offers a further possibility, that Jesus was acting as a patron calling in an obligation, a pay-back for benefits given to members of this particular household at some earlier point in his ministry. He had met the needs of many supplicants who had approached him for help in matters of life and death, and now by declaring his own need, was activating his right for support in lesser matters.

This picture of Jesus as a benefactor approached by supplicants presenting themselves as would-be clients becomes a little more apparent if we consider the much more frequent vocative form, κύριε, in the gospels. In the gospel narratives, we frequently find stories of people in need approaching Jesus for help and addressing him as Κύριε.[67] Translators frequently resort to rendering this as "Sir" or an equivalent expression of polite deference, in recognition that the contexts do not support divine connotations nor any fixed social relations. However, it is useful to consider the possibilities offered by interpreting this as patronage terminology. Applying Boussevain's three criteria for identifying a patronage relationship, we are looking for the reciprocal exchange of goods and services within an unequal non-commercial relationship of some duration. In each case, Jesus is clearly presented as of higher status, and there is no question of commercial transaction, but it is not so obvious that this is a reciprocal exchange nor that a long-term relationship is involved: indeed, the supplicants are generally represented as helpless strangers. This apparent difficulty is lessened, however, as soon as we consider such interactions as attempts by the supplicants to *enter into* a patronage relationship with Jesus. By addressing him as "lord" when seeking his help, they are in effect

[66] Vincent Taylor, *The Gospel According to St Mark: The Greek Text with Introduction, Notes and Indexes,* Thornapple Commentaries (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1966) 454-55 develops an extended argument leading to his conclusion that ο κύριος must have been the colt's owner and that he must have been present with Jesus, as no other realistic option is available. He did not consider patronage.

[67] Mark has only one such instance: 7:28. Matthew has more: 8:2, 8:6-8, 8:25, 14:28, 15:22, and 15:25 Although patronage relations figure large in Luke/Acts, this vocative tends to have master-servant or domestic connotations in view, except for 5:12. John uses κύριε in this way most frequently of all: 4:11-19, 4:49, 5:7, 6:68, *et al.*

offering him in return the recognition and honour which was the chief reciprocal benefit expected by patrons from their comparatively impoverished clients. Gospel writers presenting Jesus as someone approached by others seeking benefits in exchange for addressing him with the honours normally given to patrons by their clients may be understood as doing so in order to establish his honour and status within his social context.

I would argue that the above considerations are enough to establish the probability that Paul would have expected his audience to recognize connotations of patronage in his assertion that they have only εις κύριος, given the fact that this construct has already been activated by the prepositional predications in the two preceding subordinate clauses, and that we have seen κύριος used with the connotations of "master" earlier in the epistle. Alternatively, we could accept them as further evidence for the range of social meanings in the semantic field of this term. In fact the very range of social connotations that could be attached to this noun in the normal course of daily life in Greco-Roman society means that the presence of this term at the heart of 1 Corinthians 8:6 allows us to identify the presence of at least one other very significant social construct referred to by this verse: *family*, used both as kinship group and as household.

The possibility of interpreting this verse in terms of *both* patronage and family arises because of the very close relationship between these two components of Greco-Roman social structure.[68] I have already argued that the language of slavery was easily transferable to patronage relations because of the patron-client relations created by the manumission of slaves. Slavery was in itself an integral part of household structures in both Greece and Rome, so that slavery and patronage could be considered to be means by which family relations and household structures were extended beyond the natural limits of the nuclear family. In fact, the idea of *extended family* in that social context cannot be properly confined to kinship relations, because both Greeks and Romans used familial terms in ways that included slaves and clients to some degree.[69]

Because κύριος was a term with very significant familial connotations, and as it actually follows πατήρ in 1 Corinthians 8:6, a term with even more specific family connotations, I shall now turn to the field of family relations in order to draw out this further dimension of the verse's significance.

[68] An important methodological principle must be noted here, relating to the matter of polysemy (On which, see *alia* Barr, *Semantics*, 147). Whenever we interpret the use of a term in context, we are obliged to chose the most probable sense drawn from the various possiblities presented by its semantic field: if it means one thing, then it doesn't mean any of the others. Unless, as I am now argung in the present case, we can show that two or more of those possibilities are so closely related that is reasonable to suggest that the writer would not expect his distinguish between them.

[69] Judge, *Social Pattern*, 31; S.C. Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 204-07; Saller, *Patriarchy, Property and Death*, 80-88; Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: Representations and Realities* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997) 17-23; Cheryl Anne Cox, *Household Interests: Marriage Strategies, and Family Dynamics in Ancient Athens* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998) 168-208.

CHAPTER 10

GOD'S FAMILY IN CORINTH

The Christian tradition has now had two millennia of using "Father" as a personal name for God, and "The Father" as a term belonging to trinitarian theology, all of which tends to distort the view of New Testament scholars when we read ο πατήρ in 1 Corinthians 8:6. We need to lay those traditional associations aside in order to obtain a clearer sense of Paul's actual use of this term and its cognates.

10.1 ο πατήρ ... a Relational Term

An examination of all the occurences of the semantically equivalent pair πατήρ/πατρός and their cognates in the undisputed Pauline epistles yields results that may surprise those who are more accustomed to applying "Father" as a proper name to God rather than the relational term "father". It is almost as though the term has developed a specialised theological use that has allowed it to be used without any relational connotations, as though in God's case it is possible to be called "Father" without necessarily implying "Father-of-X". This evolution in terminology must have begun very early in the Christian tradition, and it would be easy to demonstrate that it could have drawn support from the surface of the New Testament text in several places, including some of Paul's own expressions. However it is quite another thing to assume that this later development is in any way supported by what Paul means to convey in any instance. In fact, the evidence from his writings points entirely in the opposite direction.

10.1.1 πατήρ / πατρός in the Pauline Corpus

I have set out the data for the following analysis in Appendix I, classifying each instance of this term according to two categories. Group A are all the instances in which "father" refers to God, with the remainder in Group B. Each of these sets is further sorted into three subsets: those in which "father" is the first term in a relation in which the second argument has a plural or group referrent, those in which it refers to an individual, and those that have no explicit second argument. This yields six sets A1, A2 ....B3, with the last set (B3) empty. Some of these classifications appear doubtful to me, as I acknowledge in my discussion below.

Several conclusions seem to stand out from this arrangement of the evidence. The most obvious is that in the vast majority of cases πατήρ/πατρός are relational terms. Within the seven undisputed epistles in the Pauline corpus, they and their cognates occur forty times, apart from 1 Corinthians 8:6. Thirty-three of these are explicitly relational: "father" appears in the form "father of ..." or in another form that makes the referent of the other argument in the relation clear. Four further instances are of doubtful classification: in three it seems highly probable that someone named in the sentence is the intended referent, although the syntax does not make this explicit,[1] and in the fourth the vocative form suppresses grammatical expression of the implicit relationship.[2] In the three remaining cases where it seems to be used as a name, it is applied to God (set B3 is empty: he never uses "Father" as a name for a human being). Does this mean that Paul had begun to apply it as a non-relational term in the special case of God?

Again the evidence makes this unlikely. Of the forty total occurrences, in twenty-three the father referred to is God: so there are sixteen explicitly relational uses, four doubtful, and only three in which the term seems to be used as a name. It would be reasonable to conclude that the relational use represents the theological norm, and that the three apparent exceptions should be read as a kind of shorthand. At the least, the onus should be placed on those who wish to argue that this is not the case.

A further conclusion can be drawn from my classification of the explicitly relational instances into group and individual second arguments. In Paul's application of this term, the other argument in the relation, whether explicit or not, refers to a group far more often than to an individual: in the "father of X" relation, X refers to an individual in only seven of the thirty-three explicitly relational cases. Four of these are cases in which the relation is between a human father and a specific individual, so that the singularity is entirely determined by the concrete situation. The remaining three refer to God as "father" and in two cases the individual named in the second argument is "our lord Jesus Christ" in which the "our" component seems to create room to include "us" with Christ in that relation.[3] I conclude that Paul's habitual application of πατήρ / πατρός to God was relational, and that the second argument in this relation almost invariably denoted a group rather than an individual.

From this it is reasonable to postulate a further corollary, based on an assumption that in describing God as "father" or "the father", this term retained its natural semantic associations for Paul and his audience. That is, if he applies "father" to God in the relational

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[1] 1 Cor.15:24, which I deal with later in this section; Rom.6:4, where "by the glory of the Father" may imply "his father"; and Phil.2:11 where the process of glorifying Christ described seems to imply "*his* father" again (see Jean-Francois Collange, *The Epistle of Saint Paul to the Philippians*, A. W. Heathcote [London: Epworth Press, 1979] 108).

[2] Gal.4:6: see A.T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament*, 4th ed. (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934) 26, 465; and F. F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1982) 198-200.

[3] The exception is 2 Cor.11:31, a form of oath: but this may by implication include both Paul and the audience with Christ in this relation.

sense "father of a group", then that group is a *family*, either literally or metaphorically. We are entitled to presume in every instance, until convinced otherwise, that when Paul calls God "Father", he is implicitly referring to the existence of some group that is related to God as family. It remains now to see how such an assumption might inform our reading of 1 Corinthians.

10.1.2 πατήρ / πατρός in 1 Corinthians

How does this general pattern hold in 1 Corinthians, apart from 8:6? There are five other instances of πατήρ / πατρός and cognates in this epistle, three coming before 8:6 and two after. In each case the term "father" is used in a strongly relational sense (father-of-X) and in the first four cases represents a group.

> χάρις υμίν καὶ ειρήνη απὸ θεοῦ **πατρὸς** ημῶν καὶ κυρίου Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ. (1:3)
> Grace to you and peace from God our father and (our) lord Jesus Christ.

Here God is characterised as "our" father, where the reference for this pronoun has just been defined in the previous verse as "the church of God that is in Corinth.....together with all those in every place who call on the name of our Lord Jesus Christ." God is the father of that church. Behind that explicit relation lies an implicit corollary: their shared relation to God as father constitutes the group as *family*. Paul's opening greeting to his audience in Corinth characterizes them as having a familial relationship with him, with one another, and with the wider Christian movement. While those relations are only implicit at this stage, he will draw heavily on their implied obligations during the epistle.[4]

> εὰν γὰρ μυρίους παιδαγωγοὺς ἔχητε εν Χριστῷ αλλ ου πολλοὺς **πατέρας·** εν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ διὰ τοῦ ευαγγελίου εγὼ υμάς εγέννησα. (4:15)
> For even if you have countless teachers in Christ, nevertheless you do not have many fathers: but I became such (a father) to you in Christ Jesus through the gospel.

This is clearly relational in focus: Paul stands in an exclusive relation of "father" to the audience: he is their father in Christ Jesus through his past ministry of gospel-preaching which brought them into existence as a community. The logic of this assertion draws on the social metaphor of fatherhood: an individual may have many teachers, but only one birth

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[4] I have not yet found a commentary noting the familial implications of "God *our* father" in this opening greeting, although several characterize it as a departure from Paul's more frequent formulation "...the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" without explaining its significance. In fact, an examination of opening greetings in the seven undisputed epistles shows that the form πατρός ημῶν occurs in Rom.1:7, 1 Cor.1:3, 2 Cor.1:2, Gal.1:3, Phil.1:2, and Philem.3: in each of the epistles except 1 Thessalonians. I take this as a precautionary lesson in not accepting other scholars' statistics, as well as in the importance of screening out preconceptions formed while reading the deutero-Pauline literature.

father. His preaching generated their existence as a group, so he can claim that metaphorical role. He proceeds to draw out implications for their father-child relations with himself.[5]

> «Ολως ακούεται εν υμίν πορνεία, καὶ τοιαύτη πορνεία ἥτις ουδὲ εν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, ὥστε γυναίκά τινα τοῦ **πατρὸς** ἔχειν. (5:1)
> It has been heard that immorality exists among you, and such immorality as is not among the heathen, that some one has his father's wife.

This is an entirely relational, non-metaphorical use of πατρός: the offender is related to his victim as actual son to father. That relationship carries inherent obligations, including those prohibiting the dishonour that is being visited upon his father by this son.[6]

> Ου θέλω γὰρ υμάς αγνοείν, αδελφοί, ὅτι οι **πατέρες** ημῶν πάντες υπὸ τὴν νεφέλην ἦσαν καὶ πάντες διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης διήλθον (10:1)
> I do not want you to be ignorant, brothers, that our fathers were all under the cloud and all passed through the sea.

The emphasis, once again, is relational: by referring to the Israelites of the exodus generation as "our fathers", Paul includes his Corinthian audience in those who share the obligations and sanctions inherited from those ancestors. This of course relies on the long-established characterisation of Israel's identity as an extended family rooted in common ancestry.[7]

> εἶτα τὸ τέλος, ὅταν παραδιδῷ τὴν βασιλείαν τῷ θεῷ καὶ **πατρί,** ὅταν καταργήση πάσαν αρχὴν καὶ πάσαν εξουσίαν καὶ δύναμιν. (15:24)
> Then is the end, when he will hand over the kingdom to (the/his) God and Father, having destroyed every ruler and every authority and power

Here the term relates Jesus to God as *his* father, from whom he has received the kingdom he now yields back to its source.[8] Of the five occurrences, this is the least explicitly relational and with the most potential to be read in an objective-theological sense ("the God"

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[5] On Paul's use of the father-child relation here, see Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, trans. Leitch James W., Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) 91-92; Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 185-86; Wolfgang Schrage, *Der Este Brief an die Korinther Vol.1*, Evangelisch—Katholischer Kommentar Zum Neuen Testament VII (Zurich & Neukirchen—Vluyn / Solothurn: Benziger & Neukirchener, 1991) 354-57; Christian Wolff, *Der Erste Brief Des Paulus an die Korinther*, Theologischer Handkommentar Zum Neuen Testament 7 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1996) 93-94; Raymond F. Collins, *First Corinthians*, Sacra Pagina 7 (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1999) 192-93; Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000) 369-71;

[6] On the relationships represented here see Fee, *First Corinthians*, 200-01; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 385-87.

[7] On ancestral relations and the church's inclusion in Israel's self-identity, see Schrage, *An der Korinther 1*, 388; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 723-24.

[8] This Greek construction is problematic. According to Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 1231, there are only two proper alternative translations: either "to his God and Father" or "to him who is God and Father". The context seems to give more support to the former. So Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians*, The International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T.& T.Clark, 1911) 344-55; and Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 271 n.79.

and "the Father"), but even then it can be understood as retaining relational aspects: as implying that he is God and father of the kingdom, or of those within the kingdom.

We may cautiously conclude that whenever Paul used the term "father" in this epistle, he retained its normal connotations within the field of family relations, and that these may be presumed to have some role in 8:6, unless we have reason to think otherwise. "For us, there is one God, *the father*" can be taken to mean that we relate to God as father, that he is *our* father, and that as a corollary we are a family, *his* family. I shall now review how important that church-as-family construct is in this epistle: firstly in the pre-text, and then in the subsequent discourse.

10.2 Family Relations in the Pre-text

The likelihood that Paul's audience could be expected to interpret ο πατήρ in 1 Corinthians 8:6 as an evocation of family relations would be greatly increased if those relations had been strongly "activated" in the preceding text. I shall now present evidence showing that this was in fact the case. There are three categories of evidence to consider: the use of familial exhortation throughout the pretext; the previous use of language specifically describing the audience as a family; and the concentration of family issues in the immediately preceding discourse.

10.2.1 Preceding use of Familial Exhortation

The vocative αδελφοι (or its feminine form) occurs twenty one times in 1 Corinthians, eight of these occurences coming before Chapter 8. As Fee notes, in his comments on its first occurrence in 1:10, the total is the highest number in any of Paul's epistles, although proportionately the occurrence is higher in the Thessalonian letters.[9] While he notes that seventeen of these occurrences are found at a shift in the argument, he and most commentators acknowledge that Paul uses it to affirm kinship ties, sibling relationships and other familial relations as the basis for the appeals in the immediately following discourse, although Schrage also emphasizes its formal connections with Greek paraenetic traditions.[10] Conzelmann comments, "The emphatically 'paraenetic' opening of the correspondence does not conflict with its being addressed to 'brothers'; exhortation is a constitutive part of brotherly relationships."[11] Of the same passage Barrett writes, "This address is no formality. The appeal rests upon the fact that they are *brothers* to him and to one another."[12] For

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[9] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 52 and n.22.

[10] Schrage, *An der Korinther 1*, 134.

[11] Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 31-32.

[12] C.K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 2nd ed. (London: A.&C. Black, 1971) 41.

Thiselton, "Paul performs this act of request ... as one member of a family to another".[13] Collins connects this use of familial language with the fact that the church met in homes, which would provide a concrete setting encouraging such terminology:

His lexical choice, αδελφοι, "brothers and sisters," suggests the nature of the relationship that binds Paul to those Christians, but it represents more than a merely conventional or metaphorical use of language. In Paul's time Christians gathered together in their homes ... In this context Paul's writing and other early Christian use of such kinship language as "brothers and sisters" must be seen as a reflection of the setting in which they came together. It is in the home that kinship language, the language of the family, truly belongs.[14]It is worthwhile to give a brief review of the cumulative effects of this form of familial appeal as it occurs in the text before Chapter 8. I will now set out the eight texts under consideration with a brief description of the immediate context in each case.

1:10 Introducing the topic of divisions and an appeal to end them
1:11 Citing his source of information, that they are quarreling
1:26 Reminding them of their lowly status, which he shares
2:1 Reminding them of his low-key proclamation of the gospel among them
3:1 Declaring that they were spiritual infants (at least formerly)
4:6 Contrasting the lowly service of the apostles with the audience's boasting
7:24 Exhorting them to accept their present status, slave or free, as called by God
7:29 Exhorting them to an attitude of detachment from transient worldly status and roles

What do these vocatives have in common? Robertson and Plummer long ago noted that αδελφοι is "used in affectionate earnestness, especially when something painful has to be said (vii.29, x.1, xiv.20, etc.)",[15] and this seems a good starting point for discussion. We might in fact extend their epithet "painful" to "shameful", given what we now know about the crucial importance of honour and shame as social dynamics shared by all members of ancient extended families.[16] That is to say, shame falling on one family member is shared by all. Most of the above occurrences, the first six, involved shame to some degree: σχίσματα (1:10) were widely regarded as defects in political life, and this is increased somewhat when the divisions have become the subject of a third-party report (εδηλώθη γάρ μοι ..., 1:11); in a status-valuing society to remind an audience of their low status on three counts (1:26), while not *morally* shaming, is hardly an affirmation of their worth; in a society valuing rhetorical sophistication, a reminder that they had been converted by his notably unsophisticated proclamation (2:1) is a further challenge to their self-esteem, which he takes even further

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[13] Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 1124.

[14] Collins, *First Corinthians*, 70.

[15] Robertson and Plummer, *First Corinthians*, 9.

[16] See David Arthur DeSilva, *Honour, Patronage, Kinship & Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000) 171-72; and for a comprehensive overview of the honour system as it intersected with various social groupings, including family, Bruce J. Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981) 25-70.

when he characterises them not ως πνευματικοῖς αλλ ως σαρκίνοις, ως νηπίοις εν Χριστῷ (3:1); and when he contrasts the obedient service exhibited by Apollos and himself (4:1-5) with the audience's implied puffery (ἵνα μὴ εις υπὲρ τοῦ ενὸς φυσιοῦσθε κατὰ τοῦ ετέρου, 4:6b - see 8:1) then his use of shame as an admonitory device is overt, requiring him to explain that his intention is to create familial closeness rather than shameful distance: Ουκ εντρέπων υμᾶς γράφω ταῦτα αλλ ως τέκνα μου αγαπητὰ νουθετῶ[ν] (4:14).

We might well conclude that sometimes when Paul raises some matter that will involve shaming his audience, he uses this form of address to soften the impact by emphasizing that he too shares their shame as a brother, a family member carrying the family's shame with them and seeking to do something about it.[17] When he contrasts their shameful attitudes with his own example in 4:6, αδελφοί diminishes the distancing effect: he is after all talking about differences within the family. When he describes his own low-status behaviour (non-rhetorical preaching), this vocative in 2:1 serves to decrease their distancing of themselves from it; they are after all the beneficiaries of this preaching, which has made them family members in the first place. And when he exhorts them to adopt attitudes that are difficult rather than shameful (7:24 and 7:29), this term once again emphasizes the possibility of doing so: if he their brother can adopt this stance in each case, so can they.

The impact of this vocative term, in each case above, depends upon its evocation of the social construct *family*. The eight occurences of αδελφοί before 8:6 all serve to keep that construct activated in the consciousness of the audience up to that point. We should also note that this effect is further heightened by the distribution of these occurences in positions of textual prominence: twice in quick succession at the start of the first discourse; and twice near the end of the discourse immediately preceding Chapter 8.

However, the semantic effect of this repetition upon how the audience would most naturally interpret ο πατὴρ in 8:6 is minor compared with two further ways in which family associations have been evoked in the pretext.

10.2.2 Specific Characterisation of the Audience as a Family

In three of the preceding discourses, Paul has dealt with the issues before him by treating his audience in the Corinthian church as a family and invoking relevant family values as *topoi* in his argument. The first instance of this pattern is found in 4:14–19, where Paul claims the role of spiritual father διὰ τοῦ ευαγγελίου in relation to the audience, whom he addresses as his beloved children: τέκνα μου αγαπητά. He then proceeds to develop implications from this metaphor. Firstly, other mentors such as Apollos cannot be fathers too, so they must be household slave-teachers:[18] μυρίους παιδαγωγοὺς ἔχητε εν Χριστῷ αλλ ου

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[17] Sometimes, but not always: Chapters 5 and 6 involve shame quite explicitly, as I discuss below, and Paul uses αδελφός to describe participants, but not as a vocative directed at the audience.

[18] For a discussion of the role of παιδαγωγός, see Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 370.

πολλοὺς πατέρας (4:15). Secondly, if he is their father, then they are expected to model themselves upon him (as opposed to others): παρακαλῶ οὖν υμᾶς, μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε (4:16).[19] And finally, if they have not yet learned how to act as good children, they have one brother who does, namely Timothy: διὰ τοῦτο ἔπεμψα υμῖν Τιμόθεον, ὅς εστίν μου τέκνον αγαπητὸν καὶ πιστὸν εν κυρίῳ, ὃς υμᾶς αναμνήσει τὰς οδοὺς μου τὰς εν Χριστῷ (4:17)(shades of the patriarch Joseph in Genesis 37: no wonder Timothy might not be welcome among them!). It is plain that the rhetoric of this paragraph is entirely dependent upon the audience's acceptance of the family construct as an appropriate model for their relationships with Paul and thus with one another, as the commentaries have generally reflected.[20]

The second time Paul explicitly uses the church-as-family construct as a rhetorical topos is at 5:11, following his discourse on the man who has taken his father's wife. While that topic (to which I shall return in the next section) is literally concerned with a family, he ends his instructions about how his audience is to deal with that case with an analogy drawing on the scriptural metaphor of leaven (5:6-8) which he then applies more generally by stating this principle:

> Εγραψα υμῖν εν τῇ επιστολῇ μὴ συναναμίγνυσθαι πόρνοις , ου πάντως τοῖς πόρνοις τοῦ κόσμου τούτου ἢ τοῖς πλεονέκταις καὶ ἅρπαξιν ἢ ειδωλολάτραις, επεὶ ωφείλετε ἄρα εκ τοῦ κόσμου εξελθεῖν. νῦν δὲ ἔγραψα υμῖν μὴ συναναμίγνυσθαι εάν τις αδελφὸς ονομαζόμενος ἢ πόρνος ἢ πλεονέκτης ἢ ειδωλολάτρης ἢ λοίδορος ἢ μέθυσος ἢ ἅρπαξ, τῷ τοιούτῳ μηδὲ συνεσθίειν. (5:9-12)
> I wrote to you in the letter not to associate with immoral persons, not all the immoral of this world, nor the greedy and rapacious nor the idolatrous or else you would have to leave the world. Rather I wrote to you not to associate with anyone who is named "brother" who is immoral or greedy or idolatrous or abusive or a drunk or a thief, not even to eat with such a person.

Paul evidently has two distinct types of association in view here. On the one hand, we have the Christian community's everyday social and commercial interaction with an imperfect and immoral society: such contact is an inevitable and necessary part of their life and mission. Christians are not to distance themselves from such contacts with ordinary humanity. But once someone bears the name "brother", the standards are raised. What is going on here? I suggest that once again, the crucial social construct involved is *family.* "Brother" is a family term in its most literal, everyday sense, no matter what metaphorical extensions it underwent in some voluntary associations. For someone to claim the status of "brother" within the Christian community is to claim family membership, and we have seen that of all the social institutions in Greco-Roman society, the family was the one whose survival was most dependent on maintaining its boundaries. Failure to discipline or disown a

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[19] "The ideal of the obedient son obeying his father's injunctions and learning from the older man's memories is a standard theme in the orations": Cheryl Anne Cox, *Household Interests: Property, Marriage Strategies, and Family Dynamics in Ancient Athens* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998) 79.

[20] See Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 114-17; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 91-93; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 183-90; and Collins, *First Corinthians*, 192-95.

rogue family member laid the whole family open to shame, poverty and even death. The survival and wellbeing of the family must always be placed above the freedom of an individual member, whose family membership carried with it an obligation to subordinate their individuality to the needs of the whole.[21] The family on the other hand had an obligation imposed upon it by the wider society: it must be responsible for exercising judgment upon its own members. 1 Cor.5:12–13 is a clear reflection of this delegation of responsibility for judging those "inside" the family.[22] The exclusion of evildoers from the Christian community Paul advocates here would be a natural consequence for the audience, once they perceived themselves as a family; which is precisely why Paul uses the phrase τις αδελφὸς ονομαζόμενος, "someone identified as a brother" here. If you carry the family name in front of a watching world, you must not bring shame upon it; and if you do, the family disowns you, leaving you to take your chances in the world outside its protection. He closes with an excommunication formula from Deuteronomy, where the context once again was Israel-as-family.[23]

Paul's third clear use of the family as a topos prior to 1 Corinthians 8:6 is found in Chapter 6, when he deals with the issues of litigation before unbelievers. His audience had seen nothing exceptional about the legal actions taken by some members against others, and obviously considered the lawcourts to be quite appropriate for such actions, which may well have concerned financial disputes or other "secular" matters. Why is Paul aghast then? Once again he frames this as "brother against brother", αδελφὸς μετὰ αδελφοῦ (6:6), thereby indicating that this is a *family* matter, and that someone within the family should be wise enough to act as arbiter between brothers, διακρῖναι ανὰ μέσον τοῦ αδελφοῦ αυτοῦ (6:5). Family honour is at stake here: in ancient Greece, families were expected to sort out all intra-

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[21] "The Athenian male was constantly preoccupied with maintaining the honour of his family members – his parents and his siblings.": Cox, *Household Interests*, 79.

[22] The survival of "primitive" systems of family jurisdiction within Greek, or specifically Athenian, jurisprudence is a matter of some controversy: on the juridicial powers of an οἶκος and its κύριος see S.C. Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 63, 81n., 244, 277. However, the jurisdiction of the *paterfamilias* under Roman law seems much clearer: according to Jane Gardner, one of the fundamental principles of Roman law is "...the autonomy of the individual *familia*: an autonomy breached by the state, so far as the conduct of the internal affairs of the *familia* is concerned, only where this may be felt to endanger the stability of other parts of society." Jane F. Gardner, *Being a Roman Citizen* (London: Routledge, 1993) 179.

[23] Commentators who pick up the family connotations of Paul's argument here are rare: see Richard B. Hays, *First Corinthians*, Interpretation: A Biblical Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997) 87; and Collins, *First Corinthians*, 217-18. It may be that one reason for this general oversight is biblical scholars' familiarity with the Israel-as-family construct in the OT scriptures, which they may tend to read as a very loose metaphor rather than as literal kinship language based on genealogy and common ancestry. This biblical idea of extended family is then treated as more extended than family. Regardless, these scriptural associations were probably more important for Paul than for his Greco-Roman audience: they would have interpreted such scriptural language in terms of their own experience of kinship and extended family structures, which therefore become more important for his rhetoric than any intertextual echoes we might now detect.

familial disputes.[24] If they failed to do so and needed to call in the help of other societal institutions, this would be an admission of family dysfunction, of the family's unreliability as a social and jurisdictional unit within the wider legal polity, and a sign of its imminent demise. Such a family could not be relied on to keep its own affairs in order and thus pull its weight in society. In the case of the Christian family, its members carry expectations that one day soon they will sit with Christ as judges of the world, a ridiculous claim if they can not even govern their own family realm. Finally Paul drives his point home in v.8 with a reproach directed at the disputants within the family, accusing them of wronging their own brothers: αλλὰ υμεῖς αδικεῖτε καὶ αποστερεῖτε, καὶ τοῦτο αδελφοὺς.. With this three-fold use of αδελφός within this paragraph, the familial connotations are hard to miss.[25]

10.2.3 Family Issues in the Immediate Pre-Text

The third general factor influencing the semantics of πατὴρ in 1 Corinthians 8:6 is the nature of the subject matter of the chapters immediately preceding Chapter 8: they contain an extraordinary concentration of discussion of literal family matters. The more remote of these topics is at the start of Ch.5, the case of the man who has taken his father's wife. Whatever the nature of the forbidden relation (for instance, was she his stepmother?), it is undisputable that his actions have brought shame upon his literal family, as well as the church family. The audience receiving Paul's discourse on this topic are thinking about family issues.

Of even more influence on the semantics of 8:6 is the fact that virtually all of Ch.7 is on marital relations, a familial topic whatever else it may be. Only verses 17 to 24 move away from this focus into more generalised statements of principle. Otherwise Paul methodically lays down one instruction after another regulating the possible variations in marital arrangements. That is, his focus for thirty-two of the thirty-eight verses immediately preceding Chapter 8 is on the central relationship zone within family life, which is at its very heart between man and woman. The fact that this relationship is devalued by Paul relative to the over-riding claims of Christ does not act to diminish the semantic effect of this discussion. When the audience come to hear Chapter 8, their heads are full of marital, which is to say

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[24] "To sum up briefly, the ancient Athenian strove very hard to present a united front of himself and his father: certainly, in public, father protected son and son protected father in conflicts with political or social rivals. In fact, the father could wield such authority that feuds among his sons, his son's descendants, or their collaterals erupted and were aired in the lawcourts only after his death. Ties between father and son could be strained, however, over property concerns, even though such quarrels were considered bad form and the forgiveness of fathers was a cultural given (Dem. 25.88-89). Sons, for their part, were reluctant to admit that such arguments ever occurred and justified them only on the grounds of incompetency. Despite these arguments, sons in the orations and historical sources maintain an image of steadfast loyalty, a loyalty that solidified their claims as heirs and as citizens." Cox, *Household Interests*, 87-88. While this comment is based on classical Athens, it deals with an enduring or fundamental feature of family culture that can be assumed to carry through into later periods and other locations, more than if it were a reflection of *political* arrangements in the ancient city state.

[25] Nevertheless, most commentators seem to focus only on the *unrighteous* aspect of the secular courts, including unequal access for rich and poor litigants, ignoring their extra-familial element. Honorable exceptions: Hays, *First Corinthians*, 95; and Collins, *First Corinthians*, 228, 234.

family issues, especially as these are relativised by the greater loyalty owed to God. So God and the family are both tied together in the associational frame when six verses into the next chapter Paul comes up with the clause ημίν εις θεὸς ο πατήρ. I would argue that they are all set up to understand "the father" as a familial term.

10.3 Family Relations in 8:6 and the Subsequent Discourse

It is one thing to demonstrate the most probable semantic field activated for ο πατήρ by the pre-text, but the interpretation assumed by the audience as a result of that pre-conditioning must be confirmed by the subsequent discourse. I have previously argued that the argumentative structure of the introductory paragraph in which 8:6 is found must predispose the audience to regard it as an expression of the conceptual macrostructure underlying the discourse being introduced. This presupposition must also be confirmed by the discourse that follows. In my view the audience has been set up to expect that the family will play a significant part in Paul's discussion of the issues surrounding ειδωλόθυτα. I have already summarized the argumentative shape of that discourse, but will now revisit it to emphasize the significance of family ideation.

10.3.1 Family Responsibilities

I have previously argued that Paul's pragmatic goal in this discourse is to persuade his audience in Corinth to adopt his own policy of subordinating his freedom of choice to the scruples of others, following the pre-eminent example of Christ. It remains now for me to point out that when he introduces this policy in the second paragraph of his discourse, immediately following 8:6, he begins by couching the argument in terms favoured by his opponents ("knowledge" versus "weak conscience") but moves the discussion away from there by adopting language that is pointedly familial.

> απόλλυται γὰρ ο ασθενῶν εν τῇ σῇ γνώσει, **ο αδελφὸς δι ὃν Χριστὸς απέθανεν**. (8:11)
> οὕτως δὲ **αμαρτάνοντες εις τοὺς αδελφοὺς** καὶ τύπτοντες αὐτῶν τὴν συνείδησιν ασθενοῦσαν εις Χριστὸν αμαρτάνετε. (8:12)
> διόπερ ει βρῶμα σκανδαλίζει **τὸν αδελφόν μου**, ου μὴ φάγω κρέα εις τὸν αἰῶνα, ἵνα μὴ **τὸν αδελφόν μου** σκανδαλίσω. (8:13)

Recent English translations in their search for gender-inclusiveness have reinforced the established scholarly tendency to read "brother" as an associational term for membership of the Christian community, and in the process have buried the cumulative effect of Paul's fourfold repetition of the term here.[26] Commentators have generally been freer to give a more

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[26] So NRSV renders these four occurences in turn, "believers","members of your family", "their" and "them", getting it right in the second instance but fudging it in the others.

literal rendition of Paul's language, noting the emphatic nature of the repetition, but without making much of this being an appeal to ancient family values.[27]

Examining 8:11–13 as displayed above, it is easy to see a chiastic pattern involving the attitude taken by various parties towards the person with a weak conscience. Christ's position is described first: he owned this person as his brother and followed through on his kinship obligations by dying for him. Paul outlines his own attitude as the third component of the chiasm, repeating τὸν αδελφόν μου to emphasise his willingness to own that relation: in effect, "I willingly acknowlege him as *my* brother .... and while I may not be called on to die for him, at least I will go so far as to give up any particular food for his sake, if that is what it takes to save him." Paul's opponents on this issue have labelled the person who objects to their freedom to eat ειδωλόθυτα as "the weakling" (ο ἀσθενῶν), in effect disowning him as a full member of the family of faith and thus avoiding any responsibility for his fate. They are certainly not *this* brother's keeper, and in no way answerable for his actions. Their attitude and their consequent actions are clearly shown by contrast to be sinful, not just for their effects on that brother, but as shameful to all their brothers (αμαρτάνοντες εις τοὺς αδελφοὺς) that is, as shameful to the family.

The key exegetical issue in my reading of this passage lies in how we read ο αδελφὸς δι ὃν Χριστὸς απέθανεν in 8:11. If we read "brother" as equivalent to "member of the faith community", then Paul is saying that Christ died for each member of that community, including this one. He would then be open to this rejoinder, "Actually we are not too sure such a person truly belongs among us, his faith is so weak. Furthermore, if we give ground before his ignorant scruples, how does this help his faith? We would actually be doing him a disservice." Such a line of reasoning seems to lie behind what, in my view, is a good deal of scholarly confusion regarding Paul's position on this issue. I want to suggest that taking the *family* associations of this terminology more seriously leads us towards a simpler resolution, and that we should start by reading this key phrase as an assertion that Christ died for this person *because he owned him as his brother.*[28] That is, not "our brother, for whom Christ died", but "Christ's brother, for whom he died." Or not in the first instance, anyway. Christ

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[27] Those who *do* note that this is an appeal to family loyalties include Hays, *First Corinthians*, 142; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 323; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 657. However, none of these writers refers to particular obligations between family members found in ancient social systems.

[28] Admittedly, I might be accused of importing a particular reading of Rom.8:29 into the text here: that the present community of faith are those whom God foreknew to be Christ's brothers: εἰς τὸ εἶναι αυτὸν πρωτότοκον ἐν πολλοῖς αδελφοῖς. Christ thus fits into the role of first-born who gives himself redemptively for those who are already foreknown to be his brothers. On God's foreknowledge of these brothers, see C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, Harper's New Testament Commentaries (New York: Harper & Row, 1957) 169-70; Ernst Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans*, trans. and Ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapid: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1980) 244-45; and James D. G. Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, Word Biblical Commentary 38A (Milton Keynes: Word Publishing, 1991) 484-85. My justification for adopting a similar reading of the present text, however, is my perception that later in the same discourse at 1 Cor. 10:28, the "someone" presenting their scruple is almost certainly an unbeliever whose salvation Paul places before his own rights (10:33): that is, he is a *potential* brother, and the case is not materially different from that postulated in 8:10-13.

owned this weak one as his brother, and acted accordingly. Brothers are expected to die for one another. Christ did this for the weak one, and for Paul, and for the opponents, and on the same basis, that they are all his brothers. As a consequence, they are family, and have no option of disowning one another: if they do, as the opponents are doing in effect, they are sinning against the family as a whole (αμαρτάνοντες εις τοὺς αδελφοὺς),[29] and against Christ in particular (εις Χριστὸν αμαρτάνετε). Kinship is a given fact, not a choice, and it is the language of kinship that Paul uses to place obligations upon his audience in this passage.[30]

Another way to frame the key issue here is to say that kinship and its responsibilities are determined not by some intrinsic relation between siblings, but by their common relation to the head of the family. That relation was normally a fact of birth, but not necessarily so: one could also enter the family by adoption, or even as a slave. Under Roman law, the essential relation was not parentage but governance.[31] Applied to Paul's discourse, this principle would mean that subjection to the leadership of Christ as κύριος is the essential characteristic defining membership within the Christian family, so that all of Paul's audience have the ongoing challenge of proving their own inclusion by their obedience to Christ's leadership. It also implies that it is *Christ's* acknowledgement of any individual as a brother that alone establishes him within the family circle: he is "the brother for whom Christ died", and no other family member is able to dislodge him from that status.[32]

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[29] For this as sinning against the fellowship as a whole, see Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 196; and Fee, *First Corinthians*, 389.

[30] I seem to be rather alone here, although I take general support from the emphasis on kinship in Hays, *First Corinthians*, 142; and Collins, *First Corinthians*, 323. Commentatators reading ο αδελφὸς in v.11 as "the believer" or equivalent term for community membership include Ben III Witherington, *Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995) 200; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 655. That trend is further influenced by recent German scholarship, which seems preoccupied with form-critical questions here, and with the connection between v.11 and other NT forms of the statement "Christ died for us"(1 Cor.15:3): see Hermann Probst, *Paulus und der Brief*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchingen Zum Neun Testament, 2.Reihe 45 (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1991) 138-49; and Wolfgang Schrage, *Der Este Brief an die Korinther Vol.2*, Evangelisch—Katholischer Kommentar Zum Neuen Testament VII (Zurich & Neukirchen—Vluyn / Solothurn: Benziger & Neukirchener, 1995) 266. However Wolff, *Der Erste Brief*, 182 does reflect on the significance of Paul changing the τις of v.7 into the "brother" of vv.11-13, but this makes him a Glaubensgenosse, a "co-religionist" rather than family member.

[31] "Everyone who was in the power of a *paterfamilias* was related to him and to one another. This form of relationship was known as *agnatio*. The agnates remained in this relationship even if the *paterfamilias* died. Thus, the test of *agnatio* was subjection to a common *potestas*, whether actual or hypothetical, I.e., all those who were in the power of a *paterfamilias*, or would have been if he had been alive, were agnatically related ... Most agnates were blood relations (i.e., cognates) but there were some exceptional cases. For example, a child adopted from another family became the agnate of his adoptive family. Conversely, a child given in adoption, or emancipated, lost his agnatic ties with his natural family." Andrew Borkowski, *Textbook on Roman Law* (London: Blackstone Press, 1994) 103.

[32] The practice of *adoption* in Greco-Roman society is also relevant to the issue of family membership, and its significance for Paul is shown in Gal.4:5 and Rom.8:15. However, it does not appear in the present epistle and seems of marginal importance for my present discussion. See J.M. Scott, "Adoption, Sonship," *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters*, G.F. Hawthorne, R.P. Martin, and Reid, D.G. (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1993) 15-18.

10.3.2 Family Roles

A key element of Paul's argument in 1 Corinthians 8–10 is his concern to establish the *authoritative* nature of the examples set firstly by Jesus and secondly by himself, especially as this involved giving up their own rights for the benefit of others: meaning that in a world of plural models, we should pay more heed to some exemplars than to others. I wish to argue that an underlying social construct rendering this plausible is the differentiated and unequal roles held by differing members of Greco-Roman families, and will now give some support for that position.

Beside kinship and its obligations, the family construct in Greco-Roman society had structural aspects that we associate with the term "household", οἶκος/οικια. The fullness of the semantic field associated with these two terms reflects the crucial role played by the family in Greek society.[33] The cognates found within that field reflect an integrated symbolic world in which the house, those who inhabit the house, building the house and the life of its inhabitants, and the differentiated roles of those inhabitants, are all related concepts rooted in the realities of family life in Greek society. W.K.Lacey characterised the family as

> ...the most central and enduring institution in Greek society. City-states rose and fell, democracy and oligarchy fought, foreign conquerors came and went, but the family remained stubbornly entrenched as the fundamental institution of the Greeks. ... [In the era of the city-states] the *polis* was no more and no less than the sum total of its families. ... The all-pervading role of the family has the result that there is scarcely any topic in Greek civilization in which the family is not concerned.[34]

The Greek conception of family was generally larger than the modern nuclear family, although it could at times have just that scope. Sarah Pomeroy, building upon Lacey's foundations, provides a more nuanced definition of the range of this term as it should be used to describe ancient Greek social structures: "In short, an Athenian man was a member of three types of family simultaneously: one consisted of his associates in political activities, another largley male kinsmen, and the third of all his male and female kin."[35] This three-dimensional family structure had clear functional connections with social features specific to the Greek city states. Firstly, its separate public face supported a political constitution in which citizenship and thus legal identity was defined purely in terms of membership of a recognized family grouping, that is of an οἶκος within an established phratry.[36] This enabled clear definitions of everyone's rights and obligations regarding economic responsibilities, transmission of property, military and political roles, and the begetting and rearing of children. It served to define and limit citizenship to those born into established families, and

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[33] The complexity of this semantic field as it appears in and around the New Testament can be clearly seen by examining the 26 headwords connected with these roots in BADG, 556-61.

[34] W.K. Lacey, *The Family in Classical Greece*, Aspects of Greek and Roman Life (London: Thames & Hudson, 1968) 9.

[35] Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: Representations and Realities* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997) 18-19.

[36] Pomeroy, *Families*, 67; Lacey, *Family*, 16 - 17.

the key requirement for a family's survival was its ability to certify the paternity of its children.[37] The Greeks were endogamous, preferring to marry within their kinship groups,[38] which greatly simplified the preservation of the οἶκος from one generation to another: that is not only of the people but of their joint interest in citizenship, land and other property rights. The role of men as the public face of their families required women to remain private which, along with the early age of female marriage,[39] met the men's need to guarantee the legitimacy of their children and thus preserve the integrity of the οἶκος.

> Greek society was (and is) patriarchal: the master of the *oikos* was the head of the family, its kyrios, as its governor, governing the slaves as master, the children as a sort of king because of their affection for him and his greater age, his wife like a political leader, differing from normal political leadership only in that this relationship does not involve change of leaders ... Headship of a family, (κυρίεια) and the status of *kyrios* is an important feature of all Greek family life.[40]

The close tie between the two key terms, οἶκος and κύριος, founded on these universal associations within family life, extended to their use throughout Greek political life in the city-states, and continued through the Hellenistic period to the first century C.E. and beyond.[41]All of these structural features are relevant when we come to consider what it meant for someone in ancient Greek culture to belong to an οἶκος.

As is common with the richly developed terminology surrounding such complex social constructs as the family, it is sometimes difficult to determine where metaphorical use begins, or for our purpose, where family connotations are no longer present. What we do know is that this semantic field is well represented in Paul's vocabulary, within this epistle and elsewhere. Paul has previously characterised his audience as θεοῦ οἰκοδομή (3:9), which in the context must be read as "God's building", in line with the parallel metaphor, θεοῦ γεώργιον, "God's cultivated field". He then proceeds to develop the metaphor of house-building until he has them depicted as the temple in which God is the inhabitant (3:17). However in Ch.4, he mixes this metaphor somewhat, characterising himself and the other apostles as υπηρέτας Χριστοῦ καὶ οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ, "Christ's assistants and stewards of God's mysteries." This moves the metaphorical focus from the sacred building to its inhabitants, in particular those who are responsible for its sacral functions. The next verse carries this semantic slide further, moving on to the faithfulness required from stewards in general, not just of temple servants: ωδε λοιπὸν ζητεῖται εν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις, ἵνα πιστός τις ευρεθῇ. (4:2) From that point, the temple image fades from view: Paul is now talking about the church as a household, in which stewards such as himself have a special line of accountability to its head, ο κύριος. What I have described as a mixture of metaphors is in fact

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[37] Lacey, *Family*, 100.

[38] Pomeroy, *Families*, 9.

[39] Mostly aged 14-15: Pomeroy, *Families*, 5. On female privacy, see ibid., 78—82.

[40] Pomeroy, *Families*, 21.

[41] Lacey, *Family*, 217 - 36.

testimony to the complete integration in Paul's symbolic world between what we would term "house" and "household".[42] It is natural to conclude that the image of church-as-house-to-be-built is so congenial to him for the very reason that church-as-household is already established as one of his fundamental constructs.[43] That construct plays a vital role in his discourse on ειδωλόθυτα, drawing firstly on role differerentiations within a household, and secondly on a household's economic arrangements.

10.3.2.1 Household Role Differentiation

We have seen that in Chapter 4 Paul has already established his position that he and the other apostles have distinctive roles as υπηρέται and οικονόμοι within God's establishment, that the authority and accountability vested in their roles are fundamentally God's business to determine, and that the audience should acknowledge the benefits they have received through this arrangement rather than presuming to criticise it. I have also argued that the fundamental social model determining the shape of that establishment is the household. I now wish to extend that a little by arguing that the family / household model of the church by its very nature would be expected to include people at various stages of maturity, carrying different levels of responsibility for the wellbeing of the whole, and with differentiated roles that are a relatively fixed part of the social order.[44] A Greco-Roman family was not a free association of equals: the role differentiations within it were givens, determined primarily by the historical facts of procreation, order of birth and gender, with a small range of variation in those roles being possible at the discretion of the leader of each household, its κύριος. The network of relationships within a household was largely shaped by

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[42] On the change from sacral to household metaphors, see Fee, *First Corinthians*, 158-59; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 336. However Collins, *First Corinthians*, 167-71sees the metaphors here as drawn from civic rather than household roles. I maintain that those civic titles are themselves based on the metaphorical construction of civil society as an extended family.

[43] Here I am in serious disagreement with David G. Horrell, "From αδελφοι to οἶκος θεοῦ : Social Transformation in Pauline Christianity," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 120.2 (2001): 293-311. Horrell quite rightly identifies αδελφός as "kinship language used by Paul to promote solidarity and mutual regard among members of the congregations" (302) and also notes "However, it would seem fair to say that when οἶκος, is used to describe the human household, it often denotes some kind of structured and stratified group"(298). I disagree when he draws an implication that the kinship language "assumes and promotes the relationship ... as one between *equal* siblings." (299, emphasis added, as siblings were often quite unequal in ancient societies), and when he moves from observing that Paul never uses οἶκος to describe the Christian community to the inference that he prefers to avoid the structure and inequalities associated with that term. I am arguing that the image of the church as a structured household is implicit in 1 Corinthians, inasmuch as members differ in their gifts (Chs 12-14) and in their degrees of responsibility/authority (Chs.3-4). An unstructured kinship group in which no authoritative roles such as apostleship are acknowledged is one in which members will inevitably compete to establish new defacto status markers: a major problem at Corinth. Horrell is wrong to set kinship over against household in Paul's image of the church.

[44] So Peter Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2.Reihe 23 (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1987) 135-36.

those pre-determined roles.[45] Individuals did not experience themselves as having much freedom to choose their roles: the opportunities for decision regarding marital status and slavery that Paul discusses in 1 Corinthians 7 (especially 7:21: δούλος εκλήθης, μή σοι μελέτω· αλλ ει καὶ δύνασαι ελεύθερος γενέσθαι, μάλλον χρήσαι) were in fact rather exceptional circumstances, and his treatment implies that they should be recognized and seized as specially God-given.[46]

It is to the fixed nature of family role differentiation that Paul appeals in 4:14–15, building on the metaphor of having "fathered" them in the gospel:

> Ουκ εντρέπων υμάς γράφω ταύτα αλλ ως τέκνα μου αγαπητὰ νουθετῶ[ν]. εὰν γὰρ μυρίους παιδαγωγοὺς εχητε εν Χριστῷ αλλ ου πολλοὺς πατέρας· εν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ διὰ τοῦ ευαγγελίου εγὼ υμάς εγέννησα.
> I have not written this to shame you but to admonish you as my beloved children. For even if you have countless teachers in Christ, nevertheless you only have one father: for in Christ Jesus I begat you through the gospel.

The metaphor here is not to be pushed too far: if Paul was the father, was the gospel the mother? His intention is clearly to claim birth-parent status in relation to his audience.[47] They know for an historical fact that they owe their spiritual birth and early nurture as Christians to Paul. The church is not a debating society or philosophical school in which one may pick and chose one's mentors, but a family in which these roles are assigned by the κύριος. Paul does not have to compete with Apollos and other teachers who have ministered to his audience, because his role is different in kind. Furthermore, these roles have not been self-chosen by those exercising them, but assigned from above; their many pedagogues have been established εν Χριστῷ; he is their birth-parent εν Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ. The roles are distinctly and immutably different, and this is by the will of God.

One further consequence follows from Paul's parental relation to the audience: their obligation to follow his example:

> παρακαλῶ οὖν υμάς, μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε. (4:16)
> I appeal to you, therefore, to become my imitators.

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[45] Dale B. Martin, *Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity* (New Haven & London: Yale UP, 1990) has argued that slavery was a status that could be, and frequently was, *chosen* in Greco-Roman society as a means of social and economic self-improvement. Others have seen it quite differently, notably G.E.M. Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests* (London: Duckworth, 1981), who argues strongly against the influential position taken by M.I.Finley, who minimized the significance of fixed classes and supported the model of multi-variate social status. Finley's position was adopted in Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1983) 53-55 which appeared at the same time as Ste. Croix's study, and has exerted a strong hegemony in New Testament studies since that time, inhibiting discussion of the fundamental significance of class as the ownership of one person's labours by another as a property right. Ste. Croix argues that this factor was the fundamental determinant of social difference in the ancient world, tying not only slaves but women and all other "non-free labour" to their fixed social status and roles.

[46] For such "exceptional cases", see Collins, *First Corinthians*, 281-82.

[47] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 184-86; and Collins, *First Corinthians*, 192-93.

One of the fundamental aspects of socialization through the parent-child relation in Greco-Roman society was the obligation of the parent to set an example of acceptable behaviour and the related obligation of the child to follow it.[48] Having established those relational obligations between himself and his audience earlier in the epistle, Paul now carries them forward as a premise into his discourse on ειδωλόθυτα. We know that whatever else was going on around this issue, it involved some sort of challenge to Paul's authority: Chapter 9 stands witness to this fact, however we interpret it, as does the argumentative tone of the discourse as a whole. I have also argued that his pragmatic goal is to persuade his audience to follow the policy he has described as his personal practice in 8:13. The bare bones of this argument may be clearly seen by linking these key passages in the discourse:

> διόπερ ει βρῶμα σκανδαλίζει τὸν αδελφόν μου, ου μὴ φάγω κρέα εις τὸν αιῶνα, ἵνα μὴ τὸν αδελφόν μου σκανδαλίσω. (8:13)
> Ουκ ειμὶ ελεύθερος; ουκ ειμὶ απόστολος; ουχὶ Ιησοῦν τὸν κύριον ημῶν εώρακα; ου τὸ ἔργον μου υμεῖς εστε εν κυρίῳ; ει ἄλλοις ουκ ειμὶ απόστολος, αλλά γε υμῖν ειμι· η γὰρ σφραγίς μου τῆς αποστολῆς υμεῖς εστε εν κυρίῳ. (9:1-2)
> μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε καθὼς καγὼ Χριστοῦ. (11:1)

Firstly he states his personal policy, with the implication that he wants them to embrace it as their own, but knowing not only that they will find it distasteful to adopt, but also that it diminishes his apostolic status in their eyes. So he immediately switches to a defense of his status, knowing that this constitutes the crux of his argument, the key issue where they most need persuasion. All of chapter 9 is directed to that end, but where he begins that defence is most significant: In 9:1-2, as in 4:14-16, he reminds them of the givenness of their relation to him: they are the living proof of his apostleship, and whatever he may be to others, to them he is undeniably their founding apostle "in the Lord". The parallels with that earlier passage are plain, and we may conclude that even though he is now talking about his apostleship rather his parenthood, these are inextricably linked in his mind.[49] He is not just any apostle like others who have since come their way; he is their founding apostle, their birth-parenting apostle in the Lord. Therefore the family obligations are transferred from parenthood to apostleship: they must follow his example, just as he must follow Christ's. But I would suggest the overarching social construct binding all of this argument together is, once again, o οἶκος, the family/household.

The role of κύριος is central to this household construct, for it is his responsibility to govern the family and to make those role-assignments that are not fixed by birth. It is Christ who occupies that role in Paul's depiction of the church as family. How does that relate to the metaphorical role of God as πατήρ? Weren't they one and the same person in the ancient Greek family? Not necessarily so! The role of family κύριος did not just confer authority and privilege, but was frequently experienced as a considerable burden of responsibility by those who found themselves in it. While a juvenile male might enter it prematurely through the

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[48] See Fee, *First Corinthians*, 186-88; Hays, *First Corinthians*, 74; and Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 371-73.

[49] Fee, *First Corinthians*, 396 makes this link between the two passages, as does Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 201.

death of his father, it was normally taken up on marriage, which for Greek men took place at an about thirty (whereas for women it was usually before twenty: marriage for women was all about biological readiness for procreation, whereas for men it required emotional readiness to assume responsibility for others). He would then receive his share of the οἶκος (family land and other property including slaves and the wife purchased for him by the family) and assume responsibility for establishing and maintaining it as a separate entity: maintaining and extending its economic basis, providing for all its members, representing it in the public arena; defending it through his participation in military duties (from which he could not retire until 59 and thus be classified as elderly), and maintaining its household cult. On reaching 60, he might expect his own sons to be nearing 30, marriageable and ready to take over his family role. If he was tired of carrying all this responsibility, relief was now in sight: a father could chose to delegate this role before his death, and retire into a well-earned rest, handing over all his property and attendant responsibilities to his sons, who in taking up their own κύρεια would be obliged to provide for him along with their other dependants. He was still the patriarch, but no longer κύριος. This division of roles was, apparently, an attractive prospect.[50]

For Paul to depict the church as a household in which God was ο πατήρ and Jesus ο κύριος was therefore to adapt a clearly established social construct familiar to all of his audience. Among other implications, this model brought with it a presumption that within this household there would be distinct roles established by the instrinsic differences between family members due to the circumstances of their entry into the family (marriage/birth/adoption/purchase) and further defined by role-assignments decided by the executive head, ο κύριος. Crucially, Paul's calling and entry into the household have established him within it as an apostle with a specific authority over and responsibility for his audience in Corinth (9:1-2). It is a unique, God-given and uncontestable role, which those who contest his influence must come to terms with if they are not wanting to contest the greater authority of the κύριος who appointed him, as Israel contested the leadership of Moses (10:10). In particular, if they acknowledge his role, then they must also accept that his personal policy in relation to ειδωλόθυτα (8:13), and more broadly as a gospel-bearer (9:19-23) is an authoritative exemplification of the self-giving ministry of Christ (11:1).

Those role-differences, their divinely determined origin and eventual accountability to their originator, are crucial to Paul's argument in this discourse, and are a part of what is pre-figured in 1 Corinthians 8:6: αλλ ημν εις θεὸς ο πατὴρ εξ ου τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεις εις αυτόν, καὶ εις κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς δι ου τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεις δι αυτοῦ. Within the household of God, "everything", including all role assignments, originates in God and is mediated through Jesus Christ, his appointed heir and κύριος.

However, much more than role-differentiation is at stake in this discourse: of equal and related significance is the matter of resources.

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[50] Lacey, *Family*, 130 - 31.

10.3.2.2 Family Resources

We have seen that in offering himself as an exemplar of best practice on the issue of ειδωλόθυτα, Paul is weakening his case in the eyes of those among his audience who are already questioning his authority, and that his main task in Chapter 9 is to counter that line of attack. What he needs to do is to persuade his audience to change their view that in failing to claim his full rights as an apostle he is undermining his claims to that role. While he includes the right to be accompanied by a wife (9:5) among those foregone privileges, there is no doubt that his focus, and the sore point with his audience, is his refusal of material support from the Corinthian church. His own explanation for his stance is very general: that he has chosen "not to make use of this right"(9:12, repeated in 9:15), in order to avoid causing a "hindrance" to the gospel of Christ, ἵνα μή τινα εγκοπὴν δῶμεν τῷ ευαγγελίῳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. He does not actually say what that potential hindrance would be, but it seems clear that he is referring to some factor of particular significance at Corinth (inasmuch as he accepted support from other churches) which is too obvious or too delicate to specify. I have already argued, following Chow and others, that this factor is the particular force exerted by patron-client relationships in that situation, and Paul's need to strongly resist being seen as a client by his converts. This has, however, left them unsure about how to value his ministry: although they might equally treat him as a benefactor, they are also open to treating his service to them as that of a slave, given for nothing and therefore of little account. Paul acknowledges this perception: Ελεύθερος γὰρ ων εκ πάντων πᾶσιν εμαυτὸν εδούλωσα, ἵνα τοὺς πλείονας κερδήσω (9:19), carefully choosing to frame his service-for-nothing policy in Corinth as an integral part of a wider evangelistic policy in which he adapts himself to the particular needs of different audiences (9:20-22). Why does he embrace the "slave" label if it has such potential to devalue his ministry in Corinthian eyes? In my view, the whole point of his argument here is that he is not really *their* slave, but Christ's, and he looks to his master rather than to them for support and reward. They get his services for nothing, and he can avoid the consequent obligations that might compromise the gospel he brings them if he were to be reliant on them for support, precisely because his needs are provided for already by the Lord. Furthermore, being *Christ's* slave puts him in a position where his status is entirely dependent on the value placed on his service by the Lord, whatever they may think of it.[51]

This throws his examples in Chapter 9 into a new light. The soldier, vintner, shepherd, ox, and temple servant each operates within a context in which they have an employer who has guaranteed the reward for their services. So gospel-workers do not *need* to claim support from their peers, let alone their beneficiaries: if they do choose to do so, they are only

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[51] The parallel with the high-status slaves of "Caesar's houshold" has been well noted already. For discussion of high status available through enslavement to a powerful master, see P.R.C Weaver, *Familia Caesaris: A Social Study of the Emperor's Freedmen and Slaves* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1972); and Martin, *Slavery as Salvation*.

claiming a provision made by the Lord rather than accepting the largesse of the apparent donors. On this interpretation, the dominical saying authorizing gospel-proclaimers to receive support from their audiences obligated those audiences to give more than the proclaimers to receive. His audience, of course, might not see it that way, particularly if some among them had already seized on this dominical saying, claiming that it created an obligation upon gospel-bearers to become their clients. However, such a viewpoint means that they think of their material resources as their own, rather than belonging to their Lord, which is precisely why Paul feels unable to receive support from them as he can from those who give it as faithful servants of the true proprietor.

> οὕτως καὶ ο κύριος διέταξεν τοῖς τὸ ευαγγέλιον καταγγέλλουσιν εκ τοῦ ευαγγελίου ζῆν. (9:14)

The key figure in this relation is the Lord, ο κύριος, who has the authority to dispose of the material resources of all those for whom he is κύριος, and the social construct legitimizing that status is in fact the family. This may not appear so obvious to us 2000 years later, but it would have been clearer to Paul's audience, for at least two reasons. The first of these is that each of the economic roles named by Paul (soldier, vintner, shepherd, ox, temple worker) along with most others in ancient society was organised and provided for by families. The οἶκος was the basic organisational unit , and the wider society organised many aspects of its military, economic and cultic life as a network of family units.[52] Furthermore, each unit was headed by one person, its κύριος in Greek culture, and thus provided the commonest everyday context in which ancient Greek speakers would use this term (as opposed to the literary contexts in which we might now encounter them using it). So when Paul writes, ο κύριος διέταξεν ... ζῆν, the most natural social context in which this would fit is that of the οἶκος, in which the κύριος orders the financial affairs of the whole, providing for the means of living for each member.

So Paul's complicated defence of his refusal to accept material support from the Corinthians is unified to some extent by the everyday model of the household. Both he and his audience are members of God's household, in which Christ is κύριος and therefore in charge of all their resources. The κύριος organises the roles and tasks of each household member, and is in charge of their eventual recompense. The decision about *how* Paul receives his share of those resources and rewards is entirely between him and Christ. If those who benefit from his free services think he is acting slavishly towards them, he will take this humiliation as an inverted complement, for he is actually Christ's slave, and is serving them at Christ's direction, to achieve Christ's purposes rather than acting in response to their demands. The payoff for him is yet to be seen. He ends this self-defence by switching his metaphor to that of an athlete in training (9:24–27): they would do well to consider that what

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[52] For the family as the fundamental unit of economic organisation see Pomeroy, *Families*, 141-60; Jane F. Gardner and Thomas Wiedmann, *The Roman Household; A Sourcebook* (London: Routledge, 1991) 68; Keith R. Bradley, *Discovering the Roman Family: Studies in Roman Social History* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991) 8-9.

may appear as privation to them is better seen as the self-denial of an athlete in training. He is actually going after a greater prize than they (or, translating this back from the contestant to the servant model, is expecting a greater reward), and they would do well to re-evaluate their own goals as they consider his example.[53]

Reading 1 Corinthians 8:6 in the light of this orientation of Paul's, we can see how evocative it is of his attitude to financial support: all the financial resources he needs come from his divine Father (ο πατὴρ εξ ου τὰ πάντα) through Christ (Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς δι ου τὰ πάντα), and as a consequence he is obligated only to God, through Christ (καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν ... δι' αυτοῦ). As we have already seen, he is determined not to become the client of any of his Corinthian converts.

However he is making this very important claim not only on his own behalf but also for his audience (ημῖν ... ημεῖς ... ημεῖς). They are all members of God's family, and as such should all expect to benefit from its wealth, as of right. He has already celebrated his audience's enrichment by God, not only in spiritual gifts (1:5) but in "all things"(πάντα γὰρ υμῶν εστιν, ετε Παῦλος ετε Απολλῶς ετε Κηφᾶς, ετε κόσμος ετε ζωὴ ετε θάνατος, ετε ενεστῶτα ετε μέλλοντα· πάντα υμῶν, 3:21b-22). In doing so he emphasized the corollary that this shared wealth rendered any boasting pointless: no one is able to lay any particular claims to "ownership" of parts of that common wealth, whether this be in the form of a special affiliation with an apostle (the issue at hand there) or any other benefits given by God. In the final view, they are all beneficiaries, and God alone is owner and donor: υμεῖς δὲ Χριστοῦ, Χριστὸς δὲ θεοῦ (3:23).

One effect of family commonality is to reduce the indebtedness consequent on any sharing of wealth among family members, not only because they have a familial duty to care for one another, but also because when they do so this does not create patronage relations among them. Patronage entails the distribution of scarce resources between those who have unequal control over those resources.[54] Within God's household, his children have equal access to the family resources, which are unlimited and distributed by God alone, through Christ. All further sharing of that patrimony between siblings is not a matter of their beneficence as much as of *pietas*, the duty of devotion owed to each other by family members.[55]

So the overall effect of the relations expressed in 1 Cor.8:6 is to *oppose* patronage relations between members of the Christian community. All of Christ's people constitute one family, and therefore *beneficia* shared among them must be construed as fulfilling the prior obligations of familial duty and cannot create the obligations characteristic of patronage. The

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[53] I have already dealt with the generic aspect of this final section of ch.9 in terms of how such an exhortation may fit into a judicial self-defence (2.4.2. above).

[54] Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage in Roman Society: From Republic to Empire," *Patronage in Ancient Society*, Ed. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (London: Routledge, 1989) 72-73.

[55] On *pietas*, see Richard P. Saller, *Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family*, Cambridge Studies in Population, Economy and Society in Past Time 25 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994) 105-14.

source of those *beneficia* is in the generosity of God expressed through Christ, which suggests that the only possible patronage relation which all community members share is as God's-clients-through-Christ. In effect 8:6 implies, "If anyone is patron around here it is God alone, and we have all become his clients through Christ."

Of course, Paul could have called his audience God's clients much more directly, but he never does. The reason may now be apparent: once the Christians begin to see themselves as God's children, the patronage relation is superseded. By relating to them as ο πατήρ, God has entered into a familial relation with them, and the generosity of parents is in itself an expression of *pietas*. The gifts bestowed by parents do not make clients of their children, and the obligations inherent in receiving such gifts are filial rather than patronal. The consequence for Paul's audience is patent: if God's generosity to his children creates filial obligations but not clientage, how much less right do they have to make clients of one another when they share those gifts within the family?

1 Cor.8:6 thus presents the Corinthian audience with a choice of metaphorical models defining their relations to one another and to God. If they choose to think in terms of patronage relations, and to understand the benefits and obligations denoted by the verse's four supplementary clauses in that light alone, then the only possible patron among them is the one God from whom all benefits come and obligations are incurred, through Christ. If, however, they take the model of themselves as God's family more seriously and hence pick up the familal connotations of the key terms πατήρ and κύριος, this rules out any patronage relations at all, because in family life both the benefits and obligations are greater than in the more distant relation of patronage. In either case, the verse tells them that there can be no place for patron-client relations among themselves.

10.3.3 Paterfamilias

I have already mentioned the theme of accountability in relation to the exercise of household roles. However, accountability has a wider significance than that within this discourse, and once again this is a natural outcome of Paul's use of the family construct as a model for the church. That broader significance comes from the judicial function of the family which I have already discussed in relation to 1 Corinthians 5, and it is represented in the Latin legal terms *paterfamilias* and *patria potestas.* These must be seen to supply a judicial component to the significance of Paul's phrase, εις θεὸς ο πατὴρ in 1 Corinthians 8:6, which in combination with the similar semantic component we have already noted in εις κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς signals a vital aspect of the ensuing discourse.

Suzanne Dixon summarizes the legal powers of a Roman father over his family:

> Perhaps the most famous – or most notorious – is the extreme power of the Roman father, the *paterfamilias.* His legitimate children were in his power (*patria potestas*) from birth. They had no power to own or manipulate property in their own right, nor could they make valid wills. The father retained the power of life and death (*ius vitae nicisque*) until they died unless he

> chose to release them from his power, for example, by adopting them into another family, by "emancipating" them, or by transferring daughters to the family of their husband on marriage: the procedure in each case entailed a formulaic ceremony of great antiquity. The marriage of a person in parental power, a *filius-familias* (son of the *familia*) or *filiafamilias* (daughter of the *familia*) was not valid unless it was performed with paternal consent.....
>
> Unless the father initiated the steps outlined above to free his children from his power, they became legally independent (*sui iuris*) only on his death.[56]

We might wonder how relevant Roman family structures were in a colonial environment such as Corinth, where the colonists had generally adopted the high-status Greek culture native to their new environment. However W.K.Lacey, whose foundational study on Athenian families in both the classical and Hellenistic periods I have already cited, sees the Roman family having a similar influence on the civil institutions of Rome as Greek family structure had on its own social and legal enviroment. Both civil societies were essentially extensions of the family, and at the centre of that family structure lay the judicial power of its patriarch.

> ... the Roman's ways of doing things seem to be closely analogous to their family structures, based as they were on the heredatary formula of *patria potestas* under which the continuity of the line was so fundamental that, at least till the late Republic, Roman names were hardly personal names at all, but the name of the *familia* with son following father exactly, without any alteration whatsoever. So I would like to explore the idea that it was *patria potestas* which was the fundamental institution underlying Roman institutions, and that, in consequence, public life followed the assumptions of private life, and not vice versa.[57]

Lacey then goes on to break this idea down into four parts:

> ... the idea that the Roman state was a family and that the gods of the state were the gods of a family and were worshipped in the same way; the idea that the state did not need many magistrates, and that those it did have were only a sort of *paterfamilias* assisted by the equivalent of a family council; the idea that citizens were not equal, which lies at the root of the patron-client relationship; and the idea that the magistrate, like the *paterfamilias*, should exercise his power in consultation with his peers who formed his consilium.[58]

These interconnected ideas are important in several ways for our understanding of the social issues involved in ειδωλόθυτα, such as the cultic dimension of family life. For the moment, though, I am particularly interested in the judicial implications, as these add a further dimension to our understanding of Paul's discourse on this issue.

In practice, the administration of justice as experienced by a typical Roman took place not in courts of law, but within the household, which mirrored the Greek οἶκος in constituting the fundamental unit of the legal system.

> The family was the legal unit within the state ... The Roman family was an entity of corporate life of a kind entirely different from the family as conceived of in any occidental society ... it was, quite simply, a collectivity under the authority of one man, the *paterfamilias.*[59]

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[56] Suzanne Dixon, *The Roman Family* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992) 40-41.

[57] W.K. Lacey, "Patria Potestas," *The Family in Ancient Rome*, Ed. Beryl Rawson (London: Croom Helm, 1986) 123.

[58] Lacey, "Patria Potestas," 123-24.

[59] J.A.C. Thomas, *Textbook of Roman Law* (Amsterdam: North-Holand Publishing Co., 1976) 411.

All misdemeanours by and disagreements between household members were decided by the *paterfamilias*, who was obliged to sit in judgment over his family members, in consultation with but not bound by a council of other family members. His judgements were binding, and seldom subject to review by any judicial body outside the family, as we find expressed by two legal historians:

> Roman family law was based on the fundamental concept that each family had a *paterfamilias* – the head of the household. He was the oldest living male ancestor. He had in his power (*potestas*) all *descendants* traced through the male line. The *paterfamilias* was *sui iuris*, i.e., legally independent – he could not be in anyone else's power.[60]
>
> The concept of subjection to a single person, then, dominated the concept of the family and could be applied to persons and things alike. Everyman - woman had no legal standing in this respect - either had power or was in power, i.e. was a *pater* or was *in potestate.*[61]

Only cases that involved disputes between families normally came before civil courts, which were themselves structured as though the state were itself a family and its judges exercising the upwardly delegated power of *paterfamilias,* assisted but not bound by a council modelled on those found in family life. It is important to emphasize that this jurisdiction of the family unit, in the person of its head, over its members pertained to all matters of alleged crime, including treason and homicide. The family was expected to maintain its integrity as a unit within the state by judging and punishing crimes in an appropriate manner. All of this was the weighty responsibility of the *paterfamilias,* and the family's honour depended upon how he discharged this function. In its everyday use, "Father" meant, alongside all its other domestic associations, the person who was most likely to act in judgment over you, with the power to administer sanctions that included the power of life and death. The honour (and ultimately survival) of the family and the wellbeing of the surrounding society were dependent upon his impartial administration of the judicial responsibility invested in him by that society.[62] Given that this function frequently involved disregarding his own affections, it was his weightiest duty.[63]

How does this dimension of family life figure in 1 Corinthians 8–10? I wish to argue that it goes a long way towards explaining Paul's use of the story of the errant ancestors as a *topos* in 10:1–14. Their encounter with ancient Hebrew family life as depicted in scripture would not have led Paul's Greco-Roman audience to suppose that the judicial responsibilities vested in fathers in that narrative world were fundamentally different from that pertaining in their own[64]. This was no mistaken impression.

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[60] Borkowski, *Roman Law*, 102.

[61] Thomas, *Roman Law*, 412.

[62] On the duty of the *paterfamilias* to protect the honour of his *domus*, even if it meant putting errant members to death, see Saller, *Patriarchy, Property and Death*, 93-95.

[63] See further Lacey, "Patria Potestas," 125-40; and Saller, *Patriarchy, Property and Death*, 102-53.

[64] Consider, for instance, the impact of passages such as Deut.21:18-21, the whole narrative of David and Absalom in 2 Samuel; and the duty of parental discipline expressed in Proverbs.

> The *bêt-āb*, therefore, was the primary framework of legal authority within which the Israelite found himself from childhood, and to which he remained subject for a considerable period of his life – even into adulthood and parenthood, while his father was alive. The fifth commandment endows this social fact with all the weight of fundamental covenantal obligation to Yahweh.[65]

So when Paul's audience heard this portion of his letter, reminding them of the fate of the Israelites who were divinely punished for their misbehaviour in the desert, they would be expected to frame this as an example of judicial action happening within its most normal context, the family. Here is the ultimate father, God, dispensing justice to offenders within his own family, Israel, for capital offences against the most fundamental family value, *pietas.* Despite being led through danger and abundantly provided for, the fundamental parental duties towards children (10:1–4), they have given free reign to "evil desire", have broken down the sacral boundaries by bringing strange gods into the family cult, and have indulged themselves in unrestrained sexual immorality, "testing the Lord", and complaining against the established leadership. The consequent capital punishment meted out by their divine *paterfamilias* is no more than is appropriate in order to restore the family's honour and safety. God's family in Corinth is likewise in a situation where their *pietas* is being tested: like their Israelite forebears led out of bondage, they have been abundantly provided for in Christ, and are now judicially accountable to their divine father for how they respond in their present situation. Above all they must avoid any compromising of the family cult: Διόπερ, αγαπητοί μου, φεύγετε από τής ειδωλολατρίας(10:14). While this conclusion provides a lead into the next section of Paul's argument, it is also an expression of the fundamental lesson he wishes to draw from the wilderness narrative. The church, like ancient Israel, is a family with a divine father who has both ordained its leadership structures and richly provided for its sustenance. They are now being tempted to kick against the first and grumble about the second, both of which are highly dangerous, somewhat self-indulgent behaviours in a social context where they have to determine how to behave around non-family cults. The short answer to that is: avoid them at all costs. The rationale behind that position is then set out (10:15-22): the Lord's table, which is to say their family's cultic table is totally incompatible with extra-familial cults. The one is the realm of Christ's body and blood (Paul's most explicit use of cultic language); the rest are the realm of demons. To cross the boundary-line between these two cultic worlds is to compromise family loyalties in the most fundamental and catastrophic way, challenging the family κύριος to a terrible trial of strength: ἢ παραζηλοῦμεν τὸν κύριον; μὴ ισχυρότεροι αυτοῦ εσμεν; (10:22).[66]

Beyond this drama is the imminent prospect of paternal jurisdiction intervening to ensure the family's integrity and safety. All of the present situation is, in effect, a test set up by that divine father (10:12-13), εξ ου τὰ πάντα , through Jesus Christ δι ου τὰ πάντα; and the

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[65] C.J.H. Wright, "Family," *The Anchor Bible Dictionary, II* (New York: Doubleday, 1992) 764.

[66] For the scriptural overtones of this language, see Rosner, "Stronger than He?".

family is totally accountable to God through Christ for how they handle themselves in it: καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτὸν ..... δι' αυτοῦ. All of this comes to "us" from God, through Christ, and it is Christ who brings "us" back to give an accounting to God for all that we have done in response. That is to say, the accounting will necessarily be on Christ's terms, not ours: we will find our choices evaluated not in terms of our preferred values and rationalisations, but in terms of the specific modelling given by Christ. To pass the test, we will need to have imitated him, and disregarded conflicting exemplars. He is our one and only κύριος, the family's standard-setter.

Once again, the language of 8:6, interpreted within the family construct, can be seen to provide a potent expression of the grounds on which Paul sets out to persuade his gentile audience to adopt an essentially Jewish attitude to pagan cults in the subsequent discourse.

CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSIONS

This study has been a systematic investigation into the meaning of one verse written by the apostle Paul, 1 Corinthians 8:6. The importance of that particular verse for the early history of christology made such a lengthy investigation appropriate. Because a major aspect of the verse's historical significance has been widely held to arise from its seeming misrelation to its present textual context, I have sought to provide a rigorous investigation of the complex relation between the verse and its textual and social contexts. That rigour was structured by my explicit adoption of E.D.Hirsch's four criteria for validity in interpretation, and the credibility of my results must stand or fall to some extent with those criteria. Within the presuppositions of that methodological framework, I can now claim to have arrived at some very definite and worthwhile conclusions. In order to state these with assurance, I should firstly recapitulate the preliminary results upon which they are founded. These were arrived at in three broad phases of the investigation.

11.1 Recapitulation: the Structure of my Argument

The first phase, contained in Chapters 2 to 6, examined the *textual context* in a systematic manner, in order to determine the matters of fact required by Hirsch's third and fourth criteria: *generic appropriateness* and *coherence*. For maximum interpretive rigour, it was important to determine what demands the textual context makes on the verse quite separately from seeking to show whether or not the verse meets those demands.[1] While this procedure meant that 1 Cor.8:6 was virtually ignored for the first half of the study, this is justified by the consideration that a fresh interpretation of verse-in-context requires a fresh look at the context as well as the verse, and so a thorough re-examination of the textual context was undertaken, not as a mere "ground-clearing" exercise but in order to open up the possibility (or even necessity) of a new definition of that contextual relation. I trust that this has lead me into a coherent set of conclusions, built upon one another sequentially.

In chapter 2, I noted that at the widest level, the letter is structured by conventions of the ancient epistolary genre. An examination of the way in which Paul adapted those conventions indicated that the letter as a whole is argumentative in nature, because the apostle is addressing an audience that is in some respects resistant to his leadership. Chapter 3 built

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[1] This, after all, is the normal order in which we process any fragment of normal discourse: the preceding discourse shapes our expectations of what the fragment should be saying, providing parameters within which we interpret the fragment, and subsequent discourse then confirms or modifies that interpretation.

upon that result. Consideration of argumentative discourse in the Greco-Roman world, drawing on recent studies in this field, led me to conclude that although we cannot look to ancient rhetorical theory to define formal structures in Paul's letters, nevertheless the rhetorical genres shape his argumentative discourse significantly, alongside argumentative genres drawn from other cultural contexts. Two such other genres are of particular importance: the citing of Jewish scriptures as adapted by the early Christian movement, and the established proclamation of Christ by Paul and other authoritative bearers of the gospel. I concluded that although all three of these sources provide important *topoi* within the discourse on ειδωλόθυτα, the essentially Jewish, scriptural motivation of his stance on this issue led him to attempt to provide argumentation in its support that would have more natural appeal to gentile Christians. That is, he attempts throughout to engage his audience as participants in a *deliberative* mode of discourse, even though he does switch from that genre into a judicial self-defence for much of ch.9, and into a weighty scriptural argument through most of 10:1-22. Nevertheless, Paul ends the discourse as he began it, in deliberative mode, with the argumentative *topos* on which he relies most being the example of the crucified Christ, which he appeals to as the ultimate justification both for his stance over the explicit issue on hand and also in defending his personal practice over the related issue of financial support.

Having completed that analysis of the discourse structure and literary genre of the ειδωλόθυτα discourse as a whole, I analysed the immediate textual context of 1 Cor.8:6, the first six verses of the discourse. I argued that its rhetorical structure is indeed that which would be required for it to introduce a deliberative discourse, engaging the audience as participants in a deliberative debate while indicating Paul's own stance on the issue, his υποθέσις. The most probable discourse function of verse 6 was then identified as the expression of Paul's θέσις, the underlying grounds on which he will argue for his υποθέσις. in the subsequent discourse. At this point of my investigation I claim to have established the specific requirements of genre and discourse function that 1 Corinthians 8:6 must meet if it is to be regarded as forming an integral part of its textual context, in accordance with Hirsh's third and fourth interpretive criteria.

The second major phase of my investigation is found in Chapters 7 and 8, where I seek to fulfill Hirsch's second criterion of *correspondence*: that the reading must account for each linguistic component of the text under examination. I began with a detailed syntactic analysis of the verse, showing that, in its present form at least, it was quite unsuitable to stand on its own, while its syntactic links with its immediate pre-text were essential to its own internal semantics. Following those links led me to conclude that the fundamental assertion expressed by the paired main clauses in verse 6 does not predicate the *existence or non-existence* of the many gods nor of the one God, but rather affirms the Christian community's commitment to *calling* only one being "God" and only Jesus Christ "Lord." A structural analysis of the four supplementary clauses then showed that these depict fundamental

relational aspects of Christian faith: that all benefits come to Christians from God through Christ, and that being a recipient of these benefits entails an appropriate God-wardness that is likewise determined through Christ. While the two main clauses might be thought as of making the most fundamental assertions of the complex sentence, the subordinate clauses in combination actually constititute the Focus of the sentence in which the most significant new information is presented to the audience, qualifying the more Given assertions in the main clauses. An examination of the pre-text concluded that such a general schema linking Benefits and Obligations was already semantically activated before this point in the epistle.

In the third phase of my study, Chapters 9 and 10, that general semantic schema was then filled out by recourse to the social context in which this debate was taking place, in order to meet Hirsh's first criterion of *legitimacy*: that any reading must be permissible within the public norms of the *langue* in which the text was composed. I argued that this Benefits-and-Obligations schema would most naturally be interpreted in terms of two fundamental social constructs, *patronage* and *family*, and that those connotations were filled out by their association with the everyday use of two key terms in the verse, πατὴρ and κὺριος. I argued that by invoking these fundamental social constructs, and the shared values associated with them, within the expression of his θέσις , Paul was able to conduct large parts of his subsequent argument within the constraints imposed by the native sensibilities of his predominantly gentile audience.

11.2 Summary: What is 1 Cor.8:6 Saying?

As this study has progressed to this point, I have built a layered picture of the multiple functional and semantic links between this key verse and its textual context. I have argued that far from being an ill-fitting insertion into the text drawn from some other context, it can be interpreted in a manner completely fulfilling Hirsh's criteria. All linguistic features of the verse have been explained in terms of its textual and social context. The interpretation I have reached, in which all the key terms of the verse are related directly to basic Greco-Roman social constructs, might be held to be reductionist, inasmuch as Paul and other New Testament writers can be seen to have used some of those terms in different ways elsewhere. [2] Against any such charge, I maintain that the key terms must be interpreted by means of semantic elements drawn from Greco-Roman society, not only because the relation between the verse and its pre-textual context has prepared us to do just that, but even more *because it*

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[2] I have already argued when discussing his use of one key term, κὺριος, that such an objection runs the risk of embracing an exegetical fallacy based on a misunderstanding of the linguistic phenomenon of *polysemy*. When a word can be used to mean different things in different contexts, as most words can, then those meanings are true alternatives, rather than fragments that can be accumulated to make some bigger, more inclusive meaning attached to individual words. As I have already noted, we should always be mindful of Barr's insistence that meaning resides in sentences rather than isolated words.

is that very social context which is addressed in this discourse. Given that the most probable discourse function of the verse has been shown to be that it should provide an expression of Paul's fundamental grounds on which he will argue his case for how the church should handle the problem presented by its encounter with ειδωλόθυτα in Corinth, then it is only to be expected that his use of language should be dominated by semantic associations drawn from that very social context.

When seemingly explicit theological terms such as "Father" and "Lord" are read in terms of the patronage and family associations evoked by other features of the verse, 1 Cor.8:6 is shown to have plenty to say about Paul's approach to the problem on hand, and to do so persuasively. I shall attempt one further demonstration of this, in the form of a paraphrase expressing some of the explicit and implicit messages conveyed by this verse, in conjunction with the preceding two verses.

"Some of you argue that we should develop a common policy on what others of us call 'idol-foods' on the basis of our knowledge of such theological principles as those expressed in the sayings, "There is no idol in the world" and "There is no God except one". Such an approach would in effect deny that there is a real problem to be addressed other in the minds of those whose scruples are based on deficient theological understanding. Foods offered to non-existent beings cannot possibly do us any harm, you maintain.

But this approach ignores the most salient fact of our everyday experience: that we live in a society in which a multitude of heavenly or earthly beings is named and venerated as either a "god" or "lord", whatever we might think of the realities behind such language. It is the clash of loyalties arising from our social interaction with pagan cultic activities that constitutes the practical problem for us as Christians. The most troublesome loyalty clash of all concerns how we should relate to the cult of Caesar, in which the emperor is acclaimed as both "a god" and "supreme lord", and regarded as the supreme mediator between the divine and human realms, on the grounds that he is the ultimate patron whose "family" of loyal retainers controls the empire. If we are seen to distance ourselves from the cults around us, we will very likely come to be regarded as socially deviant and subversive to the empire itself.

Faced with these difficulties, I intend to argue for a policy that does not compromise the distinctive loyalties inherent in our Christian faith. Unlike those around us, we name only one as God, and acknowledge as our family only those who name him Father. As he alone is the source of all benefits we receive, our fundamental obligations are to him alone, and no other patronal relations can be allowed to supercede our loyalty to him, which is also expressed in our family loyalties to one another. These must take precedence over all other social obligations. Furthermore, it cannot be said that Caesar functions as the supreme mediator of God's beneficent relation with us: that role belongs to Jesus Christ. It is Christ alone we acknowledge as "lord", the one master through whom God has given us everything we need, and consequently it is through him that we are obliged to respond to God with gratitude and loyalty. It is to the example of Jesus, whose authority over us we acknowledge

in calling him "lord", that I will appeal to above all other considerations as I proceed with my discourse on the problem of what we must do about foods that have been offered to idols."

11.3 What are the Christological Implications?

This study has been an exercise in exegesis: my goal has been to identify the "best reading" of 1 Cor.8:6, the reading that gives the most satisfactory explanation of the contribution this verse has to make to the discourse in which it is found. Nevertheless, an important part of my justification for spending so much effort on this task was the signficant place accorded to this one verse by scholars engaged in the task of reconstructing the history of christological development within the first century of the Christian movement. So we might well ask what implications my study might have for that enterprise.

I am reluctant to attempt such an evaluation, prefering to leave it to those with expertise in that field of historical reconstruction. If I succeed in pursuading others that the text I have examined was indeed written to communicate the meanings I have identified, then an assessment of what this implies for christological development must be undertaken by those with a different set of competencies than I have: it requires an historian's ability to build a coherent picture from disparate texts and authors. My role is simply to affirm that the text is saying something in particular, and that other readings of its original message are highly unlikely.[3]

Nevertheless, it is appropriate for me to briefly express my sense of some tentative implications. It does not seem possible that this verse asserts Christ's agency in the creation of the universe. Cosmology on that scale is simply not within the text's horizon, even though it raises the issue of various beings εν κόσμω being called "gods" and "lords". The focus of the discourse is not on the origin of the world, but on the status of foods sacrificed to such beings within it. This in turn is dominated by the relational questions at the heart of cultic practice: What benefits do we currently obtain from the gods and their intermediaries, and what obligations do we accrue by receiving such benefits? As I have demonstrated, the focus of 1 Cor.8:6 is entirely on the Christian answer to those questions: our obligations to God are those mediated to us through Jesus Christ, for all our benefits come through him. Whether

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[3] Arguing that a text is framed to assert one thing normally implies that it is not asserting something else. If the above paraphrase of 1 Cor.8:6 within its paragraph expresses the very heart of what Paul intends to communicate to his audience in Corinth, then it follows that there may be many other ideas he *might* have used similar words to express, in this or other contexts, which are simply not on the text's horizon in the present instance. By offering this interpretation, and by arguing that it has the status of the"best reading" in Hirsch's terms, I am also implying that no other interpretation has equal validity. To the extent that my case is convincing, it necessarily rules out a number of other readings that must be seen as competing rather than complementary. If I am wrong, this will be demonstrated by an argument examining both verse and context more thoroughly than I have managed to do, arriving at a reading that is more comprehensive in its explanation of the facts and more finely balanced in its judgement. It will not, however, involve conceding that competing interpretations must be given a place alongside one another regardless of their mutual incompatibilities.

such a focus on present benefits to the Christian community mediated through Christ can possibly be extrapolated into a broader cosmological role including ideas of his pre-existence and participation in God's original creation of the world is beyond the scope of this study. I am quite clear that it is also beyond the horizon of the text.

Relating this conclusion back to the different pictures of the historical development of christology drawn by Martin Hengel and others such as James Dunn, I can only conclude that anyone wanting to cite this verse as evidence for a "big-bang" model of christological development is mistaken. 1 Cor.8:6 is not saying anything about the creation of the world, because it is actually focused on something else entirely: the relation between God and those who worship him through Christ, here and now.

11.4 Coda: What about the Shema'?

In my introductory chapter we saw that several recent interpreters have identified an essential connection between 1 Cor.8:6 and Deuteronomy 6:4, the credal statement in prominent use in first century Judaism.[4]

We can compare their terminology and structures by laying them out side by side.

1 Cor.8:6	**Deut 6:4**
αλλ ημιν	÷Ακουε, Ισραηλ
εις θεὸς	
ο πατὴρ	κὺριος
εξ ου τὰ πάντα	
καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν,	ο θεὸς ημῶν
καὶ εις κὺριος	κὺριος εις εστιν
Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς	
δι ου τὰ πάντα	
καὶ ημεῖς δι αυτοῦ.	καὶ αγαπήσεις κὺριον τὸν θεόν σου εξ ῶλης τῆς καρδίας σου καὶ εξ ῶλης τῆς ψυχῆς σου καὶ εξ ῶλης τῆς δυνάμεῶς σου.

Each formulation begins with an adjunct identifying the community of faith to which it applies: ημιν and Ισραηλ respectively. Each then specifies a name by which the community's sole deity is known: ο πατὴρ and κὺριος , although neither of these is really a personal name, as in each case it is used because of the relational characteristics its use implies: The Christian community names the one God as "the Father" because it relates to

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[4] Scholars recognizing this verse as a reference to the Shema include James D. G. Dunn, *Christology in the Making: a New Testament Inquiry Into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1980) 180; Hermann Probst, *Paulus und der Brief*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchingen zum Neun Testament, 2.Reihe 45 (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1991) 133; N. T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992) 120-36; Richard B. Hays, *First Corinthians*, Interpretation: A Biblical Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997) 140; Raymond F. Collins, *First Corinthians*, Sacra Pagina 7 (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1999) 315; and Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000) 636.

him, and addresses him in prayer, as "Our Father"; and Israel refers to the deity in Greek as Κύριος because this is the translation of אדוני , "lord" which is the closest they will ever come in the first century to using the divine personal name יהוה. Each text then affirms the relationship between the community and the deity: 1 Cor.8:6 by asserting the community's God-wardness (καὶ υμεῖς εις αυτόν), and Deut.6:4 by owning him as "our God" (ο θεός ημῶν). Each also contains, as the predicate of its main clause (or first main clause in the case of 1 Cor.8:6), an affirmation of the singularity of God, as a statement of faith distinguishing the community from its polytheistic environment. ((ἐστιν) εις θεός) in 1 Cor.8:6, and (ο θεὸς ...) εις εστιν) in Deut.6:4. Each finishes with a reference to the obligations arising for the community from this relationship with its deity: και ημεῖς εις αυτόν ... δι' αυτοῦ in one case, and the much fuller καὶ αγαπήσεις κύριον τὸν θεόν σου εξ ῶλης τῆς καρδίας σου καὶ εξ ῶλης τῆς ψυχῆς σου καὶ εξ ῶλης τῆς δυνάμεώς σου on the other.

These similarities are so strong that we must acknowledge that this is an unmistakable case of intertextual echoing: Paul has constructed his own formulation with the venerated scriptural text in mind. However, identifying such a link is not the same as deciding what function it fulfills in the present text, or if it has any *communicative* function at all.[5] Given that I have identified Paul's rhetorical strategy in this discourse as one in which he has decided to use a *deliberative* mode of argument in which his predominant *topoi* will be those drawn from Greco-Roman rather Jewish culture, in order to shift his audience towards adopting a more Jewish, covenantal attitude to the matter on hand, I find it highly unlikely that he would expect them to recognize this allusion to a scriptural text that above all encapsulates the viewpoint they are resisting. Even if they were able to do so, would that be an effective strategy, or self-defeating, putting the cart before the horse? Paul's scriptural formation is evident here, including the strong association between the monotheistic affirmation in Deut.6:4 and the committment to community-building expressed in its immediate textual context. This does not mean we can identify this echo as an integral part of the communication, as a *topos* to which he could appeal. If his converts in Corinth had shared Paul's scripturally-based convictions, the present discourse would have been unnecessary. I

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[5] Throughout this study I have operated on the axiom that the "best reading" of a text is that which comes closest to capturing what the author intended to communicate to his chosen audience: this is what Hirsch labels *the meaning* of the text. Other meanings may be identified as integral parts of the text's wider *signification.*An important category of such significations are those we can identify as present for the author but not part of what is being said to the audience. We may place these on a "continuum of awareness", ranging from a sub-conscious set of associated ideas and terminology forming the background material from which the writer selects his message and its expression, to what we might describe as "a note to myself"that the audience might or might not be able to recognize. It seems most likely to me that Paul's echoing of the Shema here falls into this latter category: that in choosing to express his θήσις in these terms, he is also reminding himself at the outset of this discourse just how far he must shift his audience's attitudes to render them compatible with the covenental values of his own scriptural heritage. We do not have to posit that this process was conscious in order to properly identify such significance-for-the-author. It seems to me that applying Hirsch's distinction between meaning and significance would help clarify some of the controversy around intertextuality, and particularly to the identification of scriptural echoes, which should be classified either as integral to the message or merely significant for the author.

think that we should regard the Shema as something Paul was arguing *for* rather than *from* with this particular audience, and that its echo here functions as a note to himself, a reminder of what he must bring his audience to face by the end of the discourse. [6] What he was using these words to actually communicate to *them* at the outset of this argumentative discourse was something else, which constitutes the text's meaning.[7]

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[6] That is, he is defining Christian beliefs and use of language over against Greek paganism and a philosophical monotheism, not against Jewish monotheism. He echoes the Shema in order to bring his audience closer to it, and to the world of Jewish faith expressed by it, not in order to differentiate Christian faith from its scriptural and Jewish roots. This sets me apart from the position taken by Wright, *Climax of the Covenant*, 132-35.

[7] However, we might also ask whether in echoing the Shema as he has done, has Paul also modified any of its essential affirmations: particularly in his use of the expression, εις κύριος Ιησούς Χριστός. I have already argued, against Wright's position, that any such modification has no place within the assertions he is presenting to his audience. But has it happened anyway, in his use of these terms? The Shema, in its Greek form, affirms that Κύριος is *one κύριος;* if both of these uses of the term are equivalent, a coded repitition of the divine name, then there is indeed a clash with Paul's assertion that the Christian community calls only one being Κύριος, and that this is Jesus Christ rather than the one they call Θεός. This would be tantamount to saying that they are applying the divine name to Jesus (which may well be what Phil.2:9 asserts, whether or not it can be seen here). If, on the other hand, the second κύριος in the Shema is equivalent to "one covenant lord", the two texts are much more compatible. I much prefer this second reading of the Greek form of Deut.6:4, as it makes for a much more straightforward predicate. Whether it is a better translation of the Hebrew original is another issue, beyond the scope of this study.

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APPENDIX A

Verbless Predication in 1 Corinthians (Section 7.2.2)

Note: I have omitted elliptical epistolary formulae, and all participles and infinitives used as predicates, although these are syntactically nominals. The exemplary clause is underlined in each case, with the core predicate (minus negative, adjuncts, etc.) in bold type.

Verbless Clauses

1:9 **πιστὸς** ο θεὸς δι ου εκλήθητε εις κοινωνίαν τοῦ υιοῦ αυτοῦ Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν.

1:20 **ποῦ** σοφός; **ποῦ** γραμματεύς; **ποῦ** συζητητὴς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου; ουχὶ εμώρανεν ο θεὸς τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ κόσμου;

1:25 ὅτι τὸ μωρὸν τοῦ θεοῦ σοφώτερον τῶν ανθρώπων εστὶν καὶ τὸ ασθενὲς τοῦ θεοῦ **ισχυρότερον τῶν ανθρώπων**.

1:26 Βλέπετε γὰρ τὴν κλῆσιν υμῶν, αδελφοί, ὅτι **ου πολλοὶ** σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα, **ου πολλοὶ** δυνατοί, **ου πολλοὶ** ευγενεῖς·

2:4 καὶ ο λόγος μου καὶ τὸ κήρυγμά μου **ουκ εν πειθοῖ[σ] σοφίας [λόγοις]** αλλ **εν αποδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως**,

3:3 ἔτι γὰρ σαρκικοί εστε. ὅπου γὰρ **εν υμῖν** ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις, ουχὶ σαρκικοί εστε καὶ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε;

4:10 ημεῖς **μωροὶ** διὰ Χριστόν, υμεῖς δὲ **φρόνιμοι** εν Χριστῷ· ημεῖς **ασθενεῖς**, υμεῖς δὲ **ισχυροί**· υμεῖς **ἔνδοξοι**, ημεῖς δὲ **ἄτιμοι**.

4:20 ου γὰρ **εν λόγῳ** η βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ αλλ **εν δυνάμει**.

5:1 «Ολως ακούεται **εν υμῖν** πορνεία, καὶ τοιαύτη πορνεία ἥτις ουδὲ **εν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν**, ὥστε γυναῖκά τινα τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχειν.

5:6 Ου **καλὸν** τὸ καύχημα υμῶν. ουκ οἶδατε ὅτι μικρὰ ζύμη ὅλον τὸ φύραμα ζυμοῖ;

6:5 πρὸς εντροπὴν υμῖν λέγω. ουτως **ουκ ἔνι εν υμῖν ουδεὶς** σοφὸς ὃς δυνήσεται διακρῖναι ανὰ μέσον τοῦ αδελφοῦ αυτοῦ;

6:13 τὰ βρώματα **τῇ κοιλίᾳ** καὶ η κοιλία **τοῖς βρώμασιν**, ο δὲ θεὸς καὶ ταύτην καὶ ταῦτα καταργήσει. τὸ δὲ σῶμα ου **τῇ πορνείᾳ** αλλὰ **τῷ κυρίῳ**, καὶ ο κύριος **τῷ σώματι**·

8:4 Περὶ τῆς βρώσεως οὖν τῶν ειδωλοθύτων, οἴδαμεν ὅτι **ουδὲν** εἴδωλον **εν κόσμῳ**, καὶ ὅτι **ουδεὶς** θεὸς **ει μὴ εἷς**.

8:6 αλλ ημῖν εις θεὸς ο πατὴρ **εξ οὗ** τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεῖς **εις αυτόν**, καὶ εις κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς **δι οὗ** τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεῖς **δι αυτοῦ**.

8:7 Αλλ ουκ **εν πᾶσιν** η γνῶσις· τινὲς δὲ τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἕως ἄρτι τοῦ ειδώλου ως ειδωλόθυτον εσθίουσιν, καὶ η συνείδησις αυτῶν ασθενὴς οὖσα μολύνεται.

10:13b ... **πιστὸς** δὲ ο θεός, ὃς ουκ εάσει υμᾶς πειρασθῆναι υπὲρ ὃ δύνασθε ...

10:26 **τοῦ κυρίου** γὰρ η γῆ καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αυτῆς**.**

11:3 θέλω δὲ υμᾶς ειδέναι ὅτι παντὸς ανδρὸς η κεφαλὴ ο Χριστός εστιν, **κεφαλὴ** δὲ **γυναικὸς** ο ανὴρ, **κεφαλὴ** δὲ **τοῦ Χριστοῦ** ο θεός.

11:8 ου γάρ εστιν ανὴρ εκ γυναικὸς αλλὰ γυνὴ **εξ ανδρός**·

11:11 πλὴν οὔτε γυνὴ **χωρὶς ανδρὸς** οὔτε ανὴρ **χωρὶς γυναικὸς** εν κυρίῳ·

11:12 ὥσπερ γὰρ η γυνὴ **εκ τοῦ ανδρός**, οὕτως καὶ ο ανὴρ **διὰ τῆς γυναικός**· τὰ δὲ πάντα **εκ τοῦ θεοῦ**.

11:30 διὰ τοῦτο **εν υμῖν** πολλοὶ ασθενεῖς καὶ ἄρρωστοι καὶ κοιμῶνται ικανοί.

12:3 διὸ γνωρίζω υμῖν ὅτι ουδεὶς εν πνεύματι θεοῦ λαλῶν λέγει, **Ανάθεμα** Ιησοῦς, καὶ ουδεὶς δύναται ειπεῖν, **Κύριος** Ιησοῦς, ει μὴ εν πνεύματι αγίῳ.

12:4 Διαιρέσεις δὲ χαρισμάτων εισίν, **τὸ** δὲ **αυτὸ** πνεῦμα·

12:5 καὶ διαιρέσεις διακονιῶν εισιν, καὶ **ο αυτὸς** κύριος·

12:6 καὶ διαιρέσεις ενεργημάτων εισίν, ο δὲ **αυτὸς** θεὸς ο ενεργῶν τὰ πάντα εν πᾶσιν.

12:12 Καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ἕν εστιν καὶ μέλη πολλὰ ἔχει, πάντα δὲ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος πολλὰ ὄντα ἕν εστιν σῶμα, **οὕτως** καὶ ο Χριστός·

12:17 ει **ὅλον τὸ σῶμα** οφθαλμός, **ποῦ** η ακοή; ει **ὅλον** ακοή, **ποῦ** η ὄσφρησις;

12:20 νῦν δὲ **πολλὰ** μὲν μέλη, **ἕν** δὲ σῶμα.

12:29 μὴ **πάντες** απόστολοι; μὴ **πάντες** προφῆται; μὴ **πάντες** διδάσκαλοι; μὴ **πάντες** δυνάμεις;

13:13 νυνὶ δὲ μένει πίστις, ελπίς, αγάπη, τὰ τρία ταῦτα· **μείζων** δὲ **τούτων** η αγάπη.

14:22 ὥστε αι γλῶσσαι εις σημεῖόν εισιν ου τοῖς πιστεύουσιν αλλὰ τοῖς απίστοις, η δὲ προφητεία **ου τοῖς απίστοις αλλὰ τοῖς πιστεύουσιν**. (**εις σημεῖόν** carried forward from preceding predicate)

14:33 ου γάρ εστιν ακαταστασίας ο θεὸς αλλὰ **ειρήνης**. (subject carried forward from previous clause)

15:14 ει δὲ Χριστὸς ουκ εγήγερται, **κενὸν** ἄρα [καὶ] τὸ κήρυγμα ημῶν, **κενὴ** καὶ η πίστις υμῶν·

15:17 ει δὲ Χριστὸς ουκ εγήγερται, **ματαία** η πίστις υμῶν, ἔτι εστὲ εν ταῖς αμαρτίαις υμῶν,

15:21 επειδὴ γὰρ **δι ανθρώπου** θάνατος, καὶ **δι ανθρώπου** ανάστασις νεκρῶν.

15:24 **εἶτα** τὸ τέλος, ὅταν παραδιδῷ τὴν βασιλείαν τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρί ...

15:39 ου πᾶσα σὰρξ **η αυτὴ σὰρξ** αλλὰ ἄλλη μὲν **ανθρώπων**, ἄλλη δὲ **σὰρξ κτηνῶν**, ἄλλη δὲ **σὰρξ πτηνῶν**, ἄλλη δὲ **ιχθύων**.

15:40 καὶ σώματα **επουράνια**, καὶ σώματα **επίγεια**· αλλὰ ετέρα μὲν **η τῶν επουρανίων δόξα**, ετέρα δὲ **η τῶν επιγείων**.

15:41 ἄλλη δόξα **ηλίου**, καὶ ἄλλη δόξα **σελήνης**, καὶ ἄλλη δόξα **αστέρων**· αστὴρ γὰρ αστέρος διαφέρει εν δόξῃ.

15:42 **Οὕτως** καὶ η ανάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν. σπείρεται εν φθορᾷ, εγείρεται εν αφθαρσίᾳ·

15:46 αλλ ου **πρῶτον** τὸ πνευματικὸν αλλὰ τὸ ψυχικόν, **ἔπειτα** τὸ πνευματικόν.

15:47 ο πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος **εκ γῆς χοϊκός**, ο δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος **εξ ουρανοῦ**.

15:48 **οἷος** ο χοϊκός, **τοιοῦτοι** καὶ οι χοϊκοί, καὶ **οἷος** ο επουράνιος, **τοιοῦτοι** καὶ οι επουράνιοι·

15:56 τὸ δὲ κέντρον τοῦ θανάτου **η αμαρτία**, η δὲ δύναμις τῆς αμαρτίας **ο νόμος**·

16:9 θύρα γάρ μοι ανέῳγεν μεγάλη καὶ ενεργής, καὶ αντικείμενοι **πολλοί**.

Nominal Predications with the Copula

1:18 Ο λόγος γάρ ο τοῦ σταυροῦ τοῖς μὲν απολλυμένοις **μωρία** εστίν, τοῖς δὲ σωζομένοις ημῖν **δύναμις θεοῦ** εστιν.

1:25 ὅτι τὸ μωρὸν τοῦ θεοῦ **σοφώτερον τῶν ανθρώπων** εστὶν καὶ τὸ ασθενὲς τοῦ θεοῦ ισχυρότερον τῶν ανθρώπων.

3:8 ο φυτεύων δὲ καὶ ο ποτίζων **ἓν** εισιν, ἕκαστος δὲ τὸν ἴδιον μισθὸν λήμψεται κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον κόπον·

3:17 εἴ τις τὸν ναὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φθείρει, φθερεῖ τοῦτον ο θεός· ο γὰρ ναὸς τοῦ θεοῦ **ἅγιός** εστιν, **οἵτινές** εστε υμεῖς.

3:19a η γὰρ σοφία τοῦ κόσμου τούτου **μωρία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ** εστιν.

3:21 ὥστε μηδεὶς καυχάσθω εν ανθρώποις· πάντα γὰρ **υμῶν** εστιν,

4:4 ουδὲν γὰρ εμαυτῷ σύνοιδα, αλλ ουκ εν τούτῳ δεδικαίωμαι, ο δὲ ανακρίνων με **κύριός** εστιν.

4:17a διὰ τοῦτο ἔπεμψα υμῖν Τιμόθεον, ὅς εστὶν **μου τέκνον αγαπητὸν καὶ πιστὸν εν κυρίῳ**,

6:7a ἤδη μὲν [οὖν] **ὅλως ἥττημα υμῖν** εστιν ὅτι κρίματα ἔχετε μεθ εαυτῶν.

6:15a ουκ οἴδατε ὅτι τὰ σώματα υμῶν **μέλη Χριστοῦ** εστιν;

6:16a [ἢ] ουκ οἴδατε ὅτι ο κολλώμενος τῇ πόρνῃ **ἓν σῶμά** εστιν;

6:17 ο δὲ κολλώμενος τῷ κυρίῳ **ἓν πνεῦμά** εστιν.

6:18 φεύγετε τὴν πορνείαν. πᾶν αμάρτημα ὃ εὰν ποιήση ἄνθρωπος **εκτὸς τοῦ σώματός** εστιν· ο δὲ πορνεύων εις τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα αμαρτάνει.

6:19 ἢ ουκ οἴδατε ὅτι τὸ σῶμα υμῶν **ναὸς τοῦ εν υμῖν αγίου πνεύματός** εστιν ου ἔχετε απὸ θεοῦ, καὶ ουκ εστὲ εαυτῶν;

7:9 ει δὲ ουκ εγκρατεύονται, γαμησάτωσαν, **κρεῖττον** γάρ εστιν γαμῆσαι **ἢ πυροῦσθαι**.

7:14 ηγίασται γὰρ ο ἄπιστος εν τῇ γυναικὶ καὶ ηγίασται η γυνὴ η ἄπιστος εν τῷ αδελφῷ· επεὶ ἄρα τὰ τέκνα υμῶν **ακάθαρτά** εστιν, νῦν δὲ **ἅγιά** εστιν.

7:19 η περιτομὴ **ουδέν** εστιν καὶ η ακροβυστία **ουδέν** εστιν, αλλὰ τήρησις εντολῶν θεοῦ.

7:29a τοῦτο δέ φημι, αδελφοί, ο καιρὸς **συνεσταλμένος** εστίν·

7:39b εὰν δὲ κοιμηθῇ ο ανήρ, **ελευθέρα** εστὶν ῳ θέλει γαμηθῆναι, μόνον εν κυρίῳ.

7:40a **μακαριωτέρα** δέ εστιν εὰν οὕτως μείνῃ, κατὰ τὴν εμὴν γνώμην·

9:2b **η** γὰρ **σφραγίς μου τῆς αποστολῆς** υμεῖς εστε εν κυρίῳ.

9:3 **Η εμὴ απολογία τοῖς εμὲ ανακρίνουσίν** εστιν αὕτη.

9:16 εὰν γὰρ ευαγγελίζωμαι, ουκ ἔστιν μοι καύχημα· ανάγκη γάρ μοι επίκειται· **ουαὶ γάρ μοί** εστιν εὰν μὴ ευαγγελίσωμαι.

9:18a **τίς** οὖν **μού** εστιν ο μισθός;

10:16 τὸ ποτήριον τῆς ευλογίας ὃ ευλογοῦμεν, ουχὶ **κοινωνία** εστὶν **τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ**; τὸν ἄρτον ὃν κλῶμεν, ουχὶ **κοινωνία τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ** εστιν;

10:18 βλέπετε τὸν Ισραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα· ουχ **οι εσθίοντες τὰς θυσίας** κοινωνοὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου εισίν;

10:19 τί οὖν φημι; ὅτι ειδωλόθυτόν **τί** εστιν ἢ ὅτι εἴδωλόν **τί** εστιν;

10:28a εὰν δὲ τις υμῖν ειπη, Τοῦτο **ιερόθυτόν** εστιν, μὴ εσθίετε ...

11:3 θέλω δὲ υμᾶς ειδέναι ὅτι **παντὸς ανδρὸς η κεφαλὴ** ο Χριστός εστιν, κεφαλὴ δὲ γυναικὸς ο ανήρ, κεφαλὴ δὲ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ο θεός.

11:5 πᾶσα δὲ γυνὴ προσευχομένη ἢ προφητεύουσα ακατακαλύπτῳ τῇ κεφαλῇ καταισχύνει τὴν κεφαλὴν αυτῆς· **εν** γάρ εστιν **καὶ τὸ αυτὸ** τῇ εξυρημένῃ.

11:7b η γυνὴ δὲ **δόξα ανδρός** εστιν.

11:8 ου γάρ εστιν ανὴρ **εκ γυναικὸς** αλλὰ γυνὴ εξ ανδρός·

11:13 εν υμῖν αυτοῖς κρίνατε· **πρέπον** εστὶν γυναῖκα ακατακάλυπτον τῷ θεῷ προσεύχεσθαι;

11:14 ουδὲ η φύσις αυτὴ διδάσκει υμᾶς ὅτι ανὴρ μὲν εὰν κομᾷ **ατιμία** αυτῷ εστιν,

11:15a γυνὴ δὲ εὰν κομᾷ **δόξα** αυτῇ εστιν; ...

11:24a καὶ ευχαριστήσας ἔκλασεν καὶ εἶπεν, Τοῦτό **μού** εστιν **τὸ σῶμα τὸ υπὲρ υμῶν**· ...

11:25a ωσαύτως καὶ τὸ ποτήριον μετὰ τὸ δειπνήσαι λέγων, Τοῦτο **τὸ ποτήριον η καινὴ διαθήκη** εστὶν **εν τῷ εμῷ αἵματι**

12:4 **Διαιρέσεις** δὲ χαρισμάτων εισίν, τὸ δὲ αυτὸ πνεῦμα·

12:5 καὶ **διαιρέσεις** διακονιῶν εισιν, καὶ ο αυτὸς κύριος·

12:6 καὶ **διαιρέσεις** ενεργημάτων εισίν, ο δὲ **αυτὸς** θεὸς ο ενεργῶν τὰ πάντα εν πᾶσιν.

12:12 Καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα **ἓν** εστιν καὶ μέλη πολλὰ ἔχει, πάντα δὲ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος πολλὰ ὄντα **ἓν** εστιν σῶμα, ουτως καὶ ο Χριστός·

12:22 αλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον τὰ δοκοῦντα μέλη τοῦ σώματος ασθενέστερα **υπάρχειν αναγκαῖά** εστιν,

12:27 Υμεῖς δὲ εστε **σῶμα Χριστοῦ καὶ μέλη εκ μέρους**.

14:14 εὰν [γὰρ] προσεύχωμαι γλώσσῃ, τὸ πνεῦμά μου προσεύχεται, ο δὲ νοῦς μου **ἄκαρπός** εστιν.

14:22 ὥστε αι γλῶσσαι **εις σημεῖόν** εισιν **ου τοῖς πιστεύουσιν αλλὰ τοῖς απίστοις**, η δὲ προφητεία ου τοῖς απίστοις αλλὰ τοῖς πιστεύουσιν.

14:25b καὶ ουτως πεσὼν επὶ πρόσωπον προσκυνήσει τῷ θεῷ απαγγέλλων ὅτι÷Οντως ο θεὸς **εν υμῖν** εστιν.

14:33 **ου** γάρ εστιν **ακαταστασίας** ο θεὸς αλλὰ ειρήνης.

15:58 «Ωστε, αδελφοί μου αγαπητοί, εδραῖοι γίνεσθε, αμετακίνητοι, περισσεύοντες εν τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ κυρίου πάντοτε, ειδότες ὅτι ο κόπος υμῶν **ουκ** εστιν **κενὸς εν κυρίῳ**.

APPENDIX B

Anaphoric Ellipsis in 1 Cor.1:10-11:1 (Section 7.3.1)

Gapping

2:10b τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα πάντα **ἐραυνᾷ**, καὶ (ἐραυνᾷ)τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ.
Logical form: both A and B.

2:12a ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου **ἐλάβομεν** ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ (ἐλάβομεν) ...
Logical form: not A but B.

6:1 Τολμᾷ τις ὑμῶν πρᾶγμα ἔχων πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον **κρίνεσθαι** ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ οὐχὶ (κρίνεσθαι)ἐπὶ τῶν ἁγίων;
Logical form: if A, why not rather B? = B is better than A

6:3 οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι ἀγγέλους **κρινοῦμεν**, μήτιγε βιωτικά (κρινοῦμεν);
Logical form: if A then B.

9:20-21 καὶ **ἐγενόμην** τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ὡς Ἰουδαῖος, ἵνα Ἰουδαίους κερδήσω· (ἐγενόμην)τοῖς ὑπὸ νόμον ὡς ὑπὸ νόμον, μὴ ὢν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον, ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον κερδήσω· (ἐγενόμην) τοῖς ἀνόμοις ὡς ἄνομος, μὴ ὢν ἄνομος θεοῦ ἀλλ ἔννομος Χριστοῦ, ἵνα κερδάνω τοὺς ἀνόμους·
Logical Form: A (=B) and likewise C.

Sluicing

1:17a οὐ γὰρ **ἀπέστειλέν με Χριστὸς** βαπτίζειν ἀλλὰ (ἀπέστειλέν με Χριστὸς) εὐαγγελίζεσθαι, ...
Logical form: not A but B.

3:1 Κἀγώ, ἀδελφοί, οὐκ **ἠδυνήθην λαλῆσαι ὑμῖν** ὡς πνευματικοῖς ἀλλ (ἠδυνήθην λαλῆσαι ὑμῖν)ὡς σαρκίνοις, ὡς νηπίοις ἐν Χριστῷ.
Logical form: not A but B.

4:14 Οὐκ ἐντρέπων ὑμᾶς **γράφω ταῦτα** ἀλλ ὡς τέκνα μου ἀγαπητὰ νουθετῶ[ν](γράφω ταῦτα)
Logical form: not A but B.

4:15a ἐὰν γὰρ μυρίους παιδαγωγοὺς **ἔχητε ἐν Χριστῷ** ἀλλ οὐ πολλοὺς πατέρας (ἔχητε ἐν Χριστῷ)
Logical form: although A, not B.

7:3 τῇ γυναικὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ **τὴν ὀφειλὴν ἀποδιδότω**, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ γυνὴ τῷ ἀνδρί (τὴν ὀφειλὴν ἀποδιδότω).
Logical form: Both A and B.

7:4 ἡ γυνὴ **τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος** οὐκ **ἐξουσιάζει** ἀλλὰ ὁ ἀνήρ (ἐξουσιάζει τό σῶμα τῆς γυναικός), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος οὐκ ἐξουσιάζει ἀλλὰ ἡ γυνή (ἐξουσιάζει τό σῶμα τοῦ ἀνδρός).
Logical form: not A but B and likewise not C but D.

9:5 μὴ οὐκ **ἔχομεν ἐξουσίαν ἀδελφὴν γυναῖκα περιάγειν** ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ τοῦ κυρίου καὶ Κηφᾶς; (ἔχουσεν ἐξουσίαν ἀδελφαί γυναῖκαι περιάγειν)
Logical form: A is like B / if B then A

9:12a εἰ ἄλλοι **τῆς ὑμῶν ἐξουσίας μετέχουσιν**, οὐ μᾶλλον ἡμεῖς (τῆς ὑμῶν ἐξουσίας μετέχουμεν);
Logical form: if A then B.

9:25 πᾶς δὲ ὁ ἀγωνιζόμενος **πάντα ἐγκρατεύεται**, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν (πάντα ἐγκρατεύεται) ἵνα φθαρτὸν στέφανον λάβωσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄφθαρτον.
Logical form: A because of B.

Appendix C

εκ Θεοῦ and ἐκ Χρίστου in Paul's Letters (Section 8.1.1)

1 Corinthians

1:30 εξ αυτοῦ δὲ υμεῖς εστε εν Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ, ὃς εγενήθη σοφία ημῖν απὸ θεοῦ, δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ αγιασμὸς καὶ απολύτρωσις,

2:12 ημεῖς δὲ ου τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου ελάβομεν αλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ **εκ** τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα ειδῶμεν τὰ υπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ημῖν·

7:7 θέλω δὲ πάντας ανθρώπους εἶναι ως καὶ εμαυτόν· αλλὰ ἕκαστος ἴδιον ἔχει χάρισμα **εκ** θεοῦ, ο μὲν οὕτως, ο δὲ οὕτως.

8:6 αλλ ημῖν εἷς θεὸς ο πατὴρ εξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεῖς εις αυτόν, καὶ εἷς κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς δι οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεῖς δι αυτοῦ.

11:12 ὥσπερ γὰρ η γυνὴ εκ τοῦ ανδρός, οὕτως καὶ ο ανὴρ διὰ τῆς γυναικός· τὰ δὲ πάντα **εκ** τοῦ θεοῦ.

2 Corinthians

2:17 ου γάρ εσμεν ως οι πολλοὶ καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, αλλ ως **εξ** ειλικρινείας, αλλ ως **εκ** θεοῦ κατέναντι θεοῦ εν Χριστῷ λαλοῦμεν.

3:5 ουχ ὅτι αφ εαυτῶν ικανοί εσμεν λογίσασθαί τι ως **εξ** εαυτῶν, αλλ η ικανότης ημῶν **εκ** τοῦ θεοῦ,

4:7 Ἔχομεν δὲ τὸν θησαυρὸν τούτον εν οστρακίνοις σκεύεσιν, ἵνα η υπερβολὴ τῆς δυνάμεως ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ μὴ εξ ημῶν·

5:1 Οἴδαμεν γὰρ ὅτι εὰν η επίγειος ημῶν οικία τοῦ σκήνους καταλυθῇ, οικοδομὴν **εκ** θεοῦ ἔχομεν, οικίαν αχειροποίητον αἰώνιον εν τοῖς ουρανοῖς.

5:18 τὰ δὲ πάντα **εκ** τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ καταλλάξαντος ημᾶς εαυτῷ διὰ Χριστοῦ καὶ δόντος ημῖν τὴν διακονίαν τῆς καταλλαγῆς,

13:4 καὶ γὰρ εσταυρώθη **εξ** ασθενείας, αλλὰ ζῇ **εκ** δυνάμεως θεοῦ. καὶ γὰρ ημεῖς ασθενοῦμεν εν αυτῷ, αλλὰ ζήσομεν σὺν αυτῷ **εκ** δυνάμεως θεοῦ εις υμᾶς.

Philippians

3:9 καὶ ευρεθῶ εν αυτῷ, μὴ ἔχων εμὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν **εκ** νόμου αλλὰ τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, τὴν **εκ** θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην επὶ τῇ πίστει,

Galatians

5:8 η πεισμονὴ ουκ **εκ** τοῦ καλοῦντος υμᾶς.

Romans

2:29 αλλ ο εν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ιουδαῖος, καὶ περιτομὴ καρδίας εν πνεύματι ου γράμματι, ου ο ἔπαινος ουκ εξ ανθρώπων αλλ εκ τοῦ θεοῦ.

3:26 εν τῇ ανοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ, πρὸς τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αυτοῦ εν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ, εις τὸ εἶναι αυτὸν δίκαιον καὶ δικαιοῦντα τὸν εκ πίστεως Ιησοῦ

11:36 ὅτι εξ αυτοῦ καὶ δι αυτοῦ καὶ εις αυτὸν τὰ πάντα· αυτῷ η δόξα εις τοὺς αἰῶνας, αμήν.

Appendix D

The Substantive (Τὰ) Πάντα in 1 Corinthians
(Section 8.1.2)

2:10 ημ ν δὲ απεκάλυψεν ο θεὸς διὰ τ ν πνε ματος· τὸ γὰρ πνε μα **πάντα** ερανν , καὶ τὰ βάθη τ ν θε ν.

2:15 ο δὲ πνευματικὸς ανακρ νει [τὰ] **πάντα,** αυτὸς δὲ υπ ουδενὸς ανακρ νεται.

3:21 ωστε μηδεὶς καυχάσθω εν ανθρώποις· **πάντα** γὰρ υμ ν εστιν,

3:22 ε τε Παυ λος ε τε Απολλ ς ε τε Κηφ ς, ε τε κόσμος ε τε ζωὴ ε τε θάνατος, ε τε ενεστ τα ε τε μέλλοντα· **πάντα** υμ ν,

6:12 **Πάντα** μοι ε ξεστιν αλλ ου **πάντα** συμφέρει. **πάντα** μοι ε ξεστιν αλλ ουκ εγὼ εξουσιασθ ησομαι υπό τινος.

8:6 αλλ ημ ν εις θεὸς ο πατὴρ εξ ου τὰ **πάντα** καὶ ημε ς εις αυτόν, καὶ εις κ ριος Ιησο ς Χριστὸς δι ου τὰ **πάντα** καὶ ημε ς δι αυτο .

9:12b Αλλ ουκ εχρησ μεθα τ ε ξουσι ταυ τη, αλλὰ **πάντα** στέγομεν, ινα μ τινα εγκοπ ν δ μεν τ ευαγγελι τ Χριστ .

9:22 εγενόμην το ς ασθενέσιν ασθενής, ινα το ς ασθενε ς κερδ σω· το ς πάσιν γέγονα **πάντα,** ινα πάντως τινὰς σ σω.

9:23 **πάντα** δὲ ποι διὰ τὸ ευαγγέλιον, ινα συγκοινωνὸς αυτ γ νωμαι.

9:25 πάς δὲ ο αγωνιζόμενος **πάντα** εγκρατε εται, εκε νοι μὲν ο ν ινα φθαρτὸν στέφανον λ βωσιν, ημε ς δὲ φθαρτον.

10:23 **Πάντα** ε ξεστιν αλλ ου **πάντα** συμφέρει· **πάντα** ε ξεστιν αλλ ου **πάντα** οικοδομε .

10:31 ε τε ο ν εσθ ετε ε τε πίνετε ε τε τι ποιε τε, **πάντα** εις δόξαν θε ποιε τε.

10:33 καθὼς καγὼ **πάντα** πάσιν αρέσκω μὴ ζητ ν τὸ εμαυτ συμφορον αλλὰ τὸ τ ν πολλ ν, ινα σωθ σιν.

11:2 Επαιν δὲ υμ ς ο τι **πάντα** μου μέμνησθε καί, καθὼς παρέδωκα υμ ν, τὰς παραδ σεις κατέχετε.

11:12 ωσπερ γὰρ η γυνὴ εκ τ ανδρ ς, ο τως καὶ ο ανὴρ διὰ τ ς γυναικ ς· τὰ δὲ **πάντα** εκ τ θε .

12:6 καὶ διαιρ σεις ενεργημ των εισ ν, ο δὲ αυτὸς θεὸς ο ενεργ ν τὰ **πάντα** εν πάσιν.

12:19 ει δὲ ν τὰ **πάντα** ν μέλος, π τὸ σ μα;

13:7 **πάντα** στέγει, **πάντα** πιστε ει, **πάντα** ελπ ζει, **πάντα** υπομένει.

14:26 Τ ο ν εστιν, αδελφοί; ταν συνέρχησθε, καστος ψαλμὸν χει, διδαχὴν χει, αποκάλυψιν χει, γλ σσαν χει, ερμηνείαν χει· **πάντα** πρὸς οικοδομὴν γινέσθω.

14:40 **πάντα** δὲ ευσχημ νως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν γινέσθω.

15:27 **πάντα** γὰρ **υπέταξεν υπὸ τ ς πόδας αυτ .** ταν δὲ ε πη ο τι **πάντα** υποτέτακται, δ λον ο τι εκτ ς τ υποτ ξαντος αυτ τὰ **πάντα.**

15:28 ταν δὲ υποταγ αυτ τὰ **πάντα,** τότε [καὶ] αυτὸς ο υιὸς υποταγ σεται τ υποτ ξαντι αυτ τὰ **πάντα,** ινα ὦ ο θεὸς [τὰ] **πάντα** εν πάσιν.

16:14 **πάντα** υμ ν εν αγάπη γινέσθω.

Appendix E

εἷς θεόν and εἷς Χρίστον in Paul's Letters (Section 8.2)

1 Corinthians

8:6 **αλλ ημ ν εἷς θεὸς ο πατὴρ εξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ημε ς <u>εις αυτόν</u>, καὶ εἷς κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς δι οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ημε ς δι αυτοῦ.**

10:31 ε τε οὖν εσθί ετε ε τε πίνετε ε τε τι ποιε τε, πάντα **<u>εις</u>** <u>δόξαν θεοῦ</u> ποιε τε.

8:12 ουτως δὲ αμαρτάνοντες **εις** τοὺς αδελφοὺς καὶ τύπτοντες αυτ ν τὴν συνείδησιν ασθενοῦσαν **<u>εις</u>** <u>Χριστὸν</u> αμαρτάνετε.

2 Corinthians

4:15 τὰ γὰρ πάντα δι υμ ς, ν η χάρις πλεονάσασα διὰ τ ν πλειόνων τὴν ευχαριστίαν περισσεύση **<u>εις</u>** <u>τὴν δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ</u> .

Galatians

2:17 ειδότες [δὲ] τι ου δικαιοῦται νθρωπος εξ ργων νόμου εὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ ημε ς **<u>εις</u>** <u>Χριστὸν Ιησοῦν</u> επιστεύσαμεν, ν α δικαιωθ μεν εκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ καὶ ουκ εξ ργων νόμου, τι εξ ργων νόμου **ου δικαιωθήσεται πάσα** σάρξ.

3:27 σοι γὰρ **<u>εις</u>** <u>Χριστὸν</u> εβαπτίσθητε, Χριστὸν ενεδύσασθε.

Romans

3:7 ει δὲ η αλήθεια τοῦ θεοῦ εν τ ε μ ψεύσματι επερίσσευσεν <u>εις τὴν δόξαν αυτοῦ</u>, τί ἔτι καγὼ ως αμαρτωλὸς κρίνομαι;

6:3 ή αγνοε τε τι, σοι εβαπτίσθημεν <u>εις Χριστὸν Ιησοῦν</u>, εις τὸν θάνατον αυτοῦ εβαπτίσθημεν;

8:7 διότι τὸ φρόνημα τ ς σαρκὸς χθρα **<u>εις</u>** <u>θεόν</u>, τ γὰρ νόμ τοῦ θεοῦ ουχ υποτάσσεται, ουδὲ γὰρ δύναται·

11:36 τι εξ αυτοῦ καὶ δι αυτοῦ καὶ **<u>εις</u>** <u>αυτὸν</u> τὰ πάντα· αυτ η δόξα **εις** τοὺς αι νας, αμήν.

15:7 Διὸ προσλαμβάνεσθε αλλήλους, καθὼς καὶ ο Χριστὸς προσελάβετο υμ ς **<u>εις</u>** <u>δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ</u>.

16:5 καὶ τὴν κατ οἶκον αυτ ν εκκλησίαν. ασπάσασθε Επαίνετον τὸν αγαπητόν μου, ς εστιν απαρχὴ τ ς Ασίας **<u>εις</u>** <u>Χριστόν</u>.

Philemon

1:6 πως η κοινωνία τ ς πίστε ς σου ενεργ ς γένηται εν επιγνώσει παντὸς αγαθοῦ τοῦ εν ημ ν **<u>εις</u>** <u>Χριστόν</u>.

Appendix F

Ημεις in the Pre-Text
(Section 8.2.1)

ημεις Including the Audience

1:2 τῇ εκκλησίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ οὔσῃ εν Κορίνθῳ, ηγιασμένοις εν Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ, κλητοῖς αγίοις, σὺν πᾶσιν τοῖς επικαλουμένοις τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου **ημῶν** Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ εν παντὶ τόπῳ, αὐτῶν καὶ ημῶν·

1:3 χάρις υμῖν καὶ ειρήνη από θεοῦ πατρὸς καὶ κυρίου Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

1:7 ὥστε υμᾶς μὴ υστερεῖσθαι εν μηδενὶ χαρίσματι απεκδεχομένους τὴν αποκάλυψιν τοῦ κυρίου **ημῶν** Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ·

1:8 ὃς καὶ βεβαιώσει υμᾶς ἕως τέλους ανεγκλήτους εν τῇ ημέρᾳ τοῦ κυρίου **ημῶν** Ιησοῦ [Χριστοῦ].

1:10a Παρακαλῶ δὲ υμᾶς, αδελφοί, διὰ τοῦ ονόματος τοῦ κυρίου **ημῶν** Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ...

1:18 Ο λόγος γὰρ ο τοῦ σταυροῦ τοῖς μὲν απολλυμένοις μωρία εστίν, τοῖς δὲ σῳζομένοις **ημῖν** δύναμις θεοῦ εστιν.

1:30 εξ αυτοῦ δὲ υμεῖς εστε εν Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ, ὃς εγενήθη σοφία **ημῖν** από θεοῦ, δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ αγιασμὸς καὶ απολύτρωσις,

2:10 **ημῖν** δὲ απεκάλυψεν ο θεὸς διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος· τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα πάντα εραυνᾷ, καὶ τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ.

2:12 **ημεῖς** δὲ ου τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου ελάβομεν αλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ εκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα ειδῶμεν τὰ υπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ημῖν·

5:4 εν τῷ ονόματι τοῦ κυρίου [ημῶν] Ιησοῦ συναχθέντων υμῶν καὶ τοῦ εμοῦ πνεύματος σὺν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ κυρίου **ημῶν** Ιησοῦ,

5:7 εκκαθάρατε τὴν παλαιὰν ζύμην, ἵνα ἦτε νέον φύραμα, καθώς εστε ἄζυμοι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάσχα **ημῶν** ετύθη Χριστός.

6:14 ο δὲ θεὸς καὶ τὸν κύριον ἤγειρεν καὶ **ημᾶς** εξεγερεῖ διὰ τῆς δυνάμεως αυτοῦ.

(Post-text Discourse)

8:8 βρῶμα δὲ **ημᾶς** ου παραστήσει τῷ θεῷ· οὔτε εὰν μὴ φάγωμεν υστερούμεθα, οὔτε εὰν φάγωμεν περισσεύομεν.

9:1 Ουκ ειμὶ ελεύθερος; ουκ ειμὶ απόστολος; ουχὶ Ιησοῦν τὸν κύριον **ημῶν** εὴρακα; ου τὸ ἔργον μου υμεῖς εστε εν κυρίῳ;

9:10 ἢ δι **ημᾶς** πάντως λέγει; δι ημᾶς γὰρ εγράφη ὅτι οφείλει επ ελπίδι ο αροτριῶν αροτριᾶν καὶ ο αλοῶν επ ελπίδι τοῦ μετέχειν.

9:25 πᾶς δὲ ο αγωνιζόμενος πάντα εγκρατεύεται, εκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν ἵνα φθαρτὸν στέφανον λάβωσιν, **ημεῖς** δὲ ἄφθαρτον.

10:1 Ου θέλω γὰρ υμᾶς αγνοεῖν, αδελφοί, ὅτι οι πατέρες **ημῶν** πάντες υπὸ τὴν νεφέλην ἦσαν καὶ πάντες διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης διῆλθον

10:6 ταῦτα δὲ τύποι **ημῶν** εγενήθησαν, εις τὸ μὴ εἶναι **ημᾶς** επιθυμητὰς κακῶν, καθὼς κακεῖνοι επεθύμησαν.

ημεις Excluding the Audience and υμεις Distancing the Writer

1:10b-12 ... ινα τὸ αυτὸ λέγητε πάντες καὶ μὴ ᾖ εν **υμιν** σχίσματα, ἦτε δὲ κατηρτισμένοι εν τῷ αυτῷ νοῖ καὶ εν τῇ αυτῇ γνώμη. εδηλώθη γάρ μοι περὶ **υμων**, αδελφοί μου, υπὸ των Χλόης οτι ἔριδες εν **υμιν** εισιν. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο, οτι εκαστος **υμων** λέγει, Εγὼ μέν ειμι Παύλου, Εγὼ δὲ Απολλῶ, Εγὼ δὲ Κηφᾶ, Εγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ.

1:23 **ημεις** δὲ κηρύσσομεν Χριστὸν εσταυρωμένον, Ιουδαίοις μὲν σκάνδαλον, εθνεσιν δὲ μωρίαν,

2:16b **ημεις** δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ εχομεν.

3:1-3 Καγώ, αδελφοί, ουκ ηδυνήθην λαλῆσαι **υμιν** ως πνευματικοῖς αλλ ως σαρκίνοις, ως νηπίοις εν Χριστῷ. γάλα **υμας** επότισα, ου βρῶμα, ουπω γὰρ εδύνασθε. αλλ ουδὲ ετι νυν δύνασθε, ετι γὰρ σαρκικοί εστε. οπου γὰρ εν **υμιν** ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις, ουχὶ σαρκικοί εστε καὶ κατὰ ανθρωπον περιπατεῖτε;

4:1 Ουτως **ημας** λογιζέσθω ανθρωπος ως υπηρέτας Χριστοῦ καὶ οικονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ.

4:3 εμοὶ δὲ εις ελάχιστόν εστιν, ινα υφ **υμων** ανακριθῶ ἢ υπὸ ανθρωπίνης ημέρας· αλλ ουδὲ εμαυτὸν ανακρίνω.

4:6 Ταῦτα δέ, αδελφοί, μετεσχημάτισα εις εμαυτὸν καὶ Απολλῶν δι **υμας**, ινα εν **ημιν** μάθητε τὸ Μὴ υπὲρ ὃ γέγραπται, ινα μὴ εις υπὲρ τοῦ ενὸς φυσιοῦσθε κατὰ τοῦ ετέρου.

4:8-10 ἤδη κεκορεσμένοι εστέ, ἤδη επλουτήσατε, χωρὶς **ημων** εβασιλεύσατε· καὶ οφελόν γε εβασιλεύσατε, ινα καὶ **ημεις υμιν** συμβασιλεύσωμεν. δοκῶ γάρ, ο θεὸς **ημας** τοὺς αποστόλους εσχάτους απέδειξεν ως επιθανατίους, οτι θέατρον εγενήθημεν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ αγγέλοις καὶ ανθρώποις. **ημεις** μωροὶ διὰ Χριστόν, **υμεις** δὲ φρόνιμοι εν Χριστῷ· **ημεις** ασθενεῖς, **υμεις** δὲ ισχυροί· **υμεις** ενδοξοι, **ημεις** δὲ ατιμοι.

5:1-2 «Ολως ακούεται εν **υμιν** πορνεία, καὶ τοιαύτη πορνεία ητις ουδὲ εν τοῖς εθνεσιν, ωστε γυναικά τινα τοῦ πατρὸς εχειν. καὶ **υμεις** πεφυσιωμένοι εστὲ καὶ ουχὶ μάλλον επενθήσατε, ινα αρθῇ εκ μέσου **υμων** ο τὸ εργον τοῦτο πράξας;

6:1 Τολμᾷ τις **υμων** πράγμα εχων πρὸς τὸν ετερον κρίνεσθαι επὶ των αδίκων καὶ ουχὶ επὶ των αγίων;

6:5 πρὸς εντροπὴν **υμιν** λέγω. ουτως ουκ ενι εν **υμιν** ουδεὶς σοφὸς ος δυνήσεται διακρῖναι ανὰ μέσον τοῦ αδελφοῦ αυτοῦ;

6:7-8 ἤδη μὲν [οὖν] ολως ηττημα υμιν εστιν οτι κρίματα εχετε μεθ εαυτων. διὰ τί ουχὶ μάλλον αδικεῖσθε; διὰ τί ουχὶ μάλλον αποστερεῖσθε; αλλὰ **υμεις** αδικεῖτε καὶ αποστερεῖτε, καὶ τοῦτο αδελφούς.

(Post-text Discourse)

7:9 βλέπετε δὲ μή πως η εξουσία **υμων** αυτη πρόσκομμα γένηται τοῖς ασθενέσιν.

9:11-12 ει **ημεις υμιν** τὰ πνευματικὰ εσπείραμεν, μέγα ει **ημεις υμων** τὰ σαρκικὰ θερίσομεν; ει άλλοι της **υμων** εξουσίας μετέχουσιν, ου μάλλον **ημεις**;

Appendix G

δια Χριστου in Paul's Letters
(Section 8.3)

1 Corinthians

1:10 Παρακαλω δε υμας, αδελφοι, **διὰ** του ονοματος του κυριου ημων Ιησου Χριστου, ινα το αυτο λεγητε παντες και μη η εν υμιν σχισματα, ητε δε κατηρτισμενοι εν τω αυτω νοι και εν τη αυτη γνωμη.

8:6 αλλ ημιν εἷς θεος ο πατηρ εξ οὗ τα παντα και ημεις εις αυτον, και εἷς κυριος Ιησους Χριστος διὰ οὗ τα παντα και ημεις διὰ αυτου.

15:21 επειδη γαρ δι ανθρωπου θανατος, και **δι** ανθρωπου αναστασις νεκρων.

15:57 τω δε θεω χαρις τω διδοντι ημιν το νικος **διὰ** του κυριου ημων Ιησου Χριστου.

2 Corinthians

1:5 οτι καθως περισσευει τα παθηματα του Χριστου εις ημας, ουτως **διὰ** του Χριστου περισσευει και η παρακλησις ημων.

1:19-20 ο του θεου γαρ υιος Ιησους Χριστος ... διο και **δι** αυτου το Αμην τω θεω προς δοξαν δι ημων.

3:4 Πεποιθησιν δε τοιαυτην εχομεν **διὰ** του Χριστου προς τον θεον.

5:18 τα δε παντα εκ του θεου του καταλλαξαντος ημας εαυτω **διὰ** Χριστου και δοντος ημιν την διακονιαν της καταλλαγης,

1 Thessalonians

4:2 οιδατε γαρ τινας παραγγελιας εδωκαμεν υμιν **διὰ** του κυριου Ιησου.

4:14 ει γαρ πιστευομεν οτι Ιησους απεθανεν και ανεστη, ουτως και ο θεος τους κοιμηθεντας **διὰ** του Ιησου αξει συν αυτω.

5:9 οτι ουκ εθετο ημας ο θεος εις οργην αλλα εις περιποιησιν σωτηριας **διὰ** του κυριου ημων Ιησου Χριστου

Philippians

1:11 πεπληρωμενοι καρπον δικαιοσυνης τον **διὰ** Ιησου Χριστου εις δοξαν και επαινον θεου.

3:9 και ευρεθω εν αυτω, μη εχων εμην δικαιοσυνην την εκ νομου αλλα την **διὰ** πιστεως Χριστου, την εκ θεου δικαιοσυνην επι τη πιστει,

Galatians

1:1 Παυλος αποστολος ουκ απ ανθρωπων ουδε δι ανθρωπου αλλα **διὰ** Ιησου Χριστου και θεου πατρος του εγειραντος αυτον εκ νεκρων,

1:12 ουδε γαρ εγω παρα ανθρωπου παρελαβον αυτο ουτε εδιδαχθην αλλα **δι** αποκαλυψεως Ιησου Χριστου.

2:16 ειδοτες [δε] οτι ου δικαιουται ανθρωπος εξ εργων νομου εαν μη **διὰ** πιστεως Ιησου Χριστου, ...

3:26 Παντες γαρ υιοι θεου εστε **διὰ** της πιστεως εν Χριστω Ιησου·

6:14 εμοὶ δὲ μὴ γένοιτο καυχᾶσθαι ει μὴ εν τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ, **δι** ου εμοὶ κόσμος εσταύρωται καγὼ κόσμῳ.

Romans

1: 4b-5 ... Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν,δι ου ελάβομεν χάριν καὶ αποστολὴν εις υπακοὴν πίστεως εν πᾶσιν τοῖς εθνεσιν υπὲρ τοῦ ονόματος αυτοῦ,

1:8 Πρῶτον μὲν ευχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ μου **διὰ** Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ περὶ πάντων υμῶν ὅτι η πίστις υμῶν καταγγέλλεται εν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ.

2:16 εν ημέρᾳ ὅτε κρίνει ο θεὸς τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ανθρώπων κατὰ τὸ ευαγγέλιόν μου **διὰ** Χριστοῦ Ιησοῦ.

3:22 δικαιοσύνη δὲ θεοῦ **διὰ** πίστεως Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ εις πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας ...

3:24 δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αυτοῦ χάριτι **διὰ** τῆς απολυτρώσεως τῆς εν Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ·

5:1-2 Δικαιωθέντες οὖν εκ πίστεως ειρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν **διὰ** τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ , **δι** ου καὶ τὴν προσαγωγὴν εσχήκαμεν [τῇ πίστει] εις τὴν χάριν ταύτην εν ῃ εστήκαμεν καὶ καυχώμεθα επ ελπίδι τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ.

5:9 πολλῷ οὖν μᾶλλον δικαιωθέντες νῦν εν τῷ αἵματι αυτοῦ σωθησόμεθα **δι** αυτοῦ απὸ τῆς οργῆς.

5:10 ει γὰρ εχθροὶ ὄντες κατηλλάγημεν τῷ θεῷ **διὰ** τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ υιοῦ αυτοῦ, πολλῷ μᾶλλον καταλλαγέντες σωθησόμεθα εν τῇ ζωῇ αυτοῦ·

5:11 ου μόνον δέ, αλλὰ καὶ καυχώμενοι εν τῷ θεῷ **διὰ** τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ **δι** ου νῦν τὴν καταλλαγὴν ελάβομεν.

5:17 ει γὰρ τῷ τοῦ ενὸς παραπτώματι ο θάνατος εβασίλευσεν **διὰ** τοῦ ενός, πολλῷ μᾶλλον οι τὴν περισσείαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης λαμβάνοντες εν ζωῇ βασιλεύσουσιν **διὰ** τοῦ ενὸς Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

5:18 Ἄρα οὖν ως **δι** ενὸς παραπτώματος εις πάντας ανθρώπους εις κατάκριμα, οὕτως καὶ **δι** ενὸς δικαιώματος εις πάντας ανθρώπους εις δικαίωσιν ζωῆς·

5:19 ὥσπερ γὰρ **διὰ** τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ενὸς ανθρώπου αμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οι πολλοί, οὕτως καὶ **διὰ** τῆς υπακοῆς τοῦ ενὸς δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται οι πολλοί.

5:21 ἵνα ὥσπερ εβασίλευσεν η αμαρτία εν τῷ θανάτῳ, οὕτως καὶ η χάρις βασιλεύση **διὰ** δικαιοσύνης εις ζωὴν αιώνιον **διὰ** Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν.

7:4 ὥστε, αδελφοί μου, καὶ υμεῖς εθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ **διὰ** τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, εις τὸ γενέσθαι υμᾶς ετέρῳ, τῷ εκ νεκρῶν εγερθέντι, ἵνα καρποφορήσωμεν τῷ θεῷ.

7:25a χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ **διὰ** Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν.

10:17 ἄρα η πίστις εξ ακοῆς, η δὲ ακοὴ **διὰ** ρήματος Χριστοῦ.

15:30 Παρακαλῶ δὲ υμᾶς [, αδελφοί,] **διὰ** τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ **διὰ** τῆς αγάπης τοῦ πνεύματος συναγωνίσασθαί μοι εν ταῖς προσευχαῖς υπὲρ εμοῦ πρὸς τὸν θεόν,

16:27 ... μόνῳ σοφῷ θεῷ **διὰ** Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ῳ η δόξα εις τοὺς αιῶνας, αμήν.

APPENDIX H

Κύριος in 1 Corinthians 1–10
(Section 9.4.1)

A ... Κύριος in the Pre-text

A 1. Quotation from Scripture

2:16 τίς γὰρ ἔγνω νοῦν **κυρίου**, ὃς συμβιβάσει αὐτόν; ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν. ὅπου γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις, οὐχὶ σαρκικοί ἐστε καὶ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε;

3:20 καὶ πάλιν, **Κύριος** γινώσκει τοὺς διαλογισμοὺς τῶν σοφῶν ὅτι εἰσὶν μάταιοι.

A 2. Used as a Relational Term

1:2 τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ οὔσῃ ἐν Κορίνθῳ, ἡγιασμένοις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, κλητοῖς ἁγίοις, σὺν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐπικαλουμένοις τὸ ὄνομα **τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν** Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ, αὐτῶν καὶ ἡμῶν·

1:3 χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς **ἡμῶν** καὶ **κυρίου** Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

1:7 ὥστε ὑμᾶς μὴ ὑστερεῖσθαι ἐν μηδενὶ χαρίσματι ἀπεκδεχομένους τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν **τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν** Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ·

1:8 ὃς καὶ βεβαιώσει ὑμᾶς ἕως τέλους ἀνεγκλήτους ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ **τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν** Ἰησοῦ [Χριστοῦ].

1:9 πιστὸς ὁ θεὸς δι ὃ ἐκλήθητε εἰς κοινωνίαν τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ **τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν.**

1:10 Παρακαλῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος **τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν** Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγητε πάντες καὶ μὴ ᾖ ἐν ὑμῖν σχίσματα, ἦτε δὲ κατηρτισμένοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοῖ καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ.

Dubiously Relational

2:8 ἣν οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου ἔγνωκεν, εἰ γὰρ ἔγνωσαν, οὐκ ἂν τὸν **κύριον** τῆς δόξης ἐσταύρωσαν.

A 3. "In the Lord" : εν κυρίῳ

4:17 διὰ τοῦτο ἔπεμψα ὑμῖν Τιμόθεον, ὅς ἐστίν μου τέκνον ἀγαπητὸν καὶ πιστὸν **ἐν κυρίῳ,** ὃς ὑμᾶς ἀναμνήσει τὰς ὁδούς μου τὰς ἐν Χριστῷ [Ἰησοῦ], καθὼς πανταχοῦ ἐν πάσῃ ἐκκλησίᾳ διδάσκω.

7:22(a) ὁ γὰρ **ἐν κυρίῳ** κληθεὶς δοῦλος ἀπελεύθερος κυρίου ἐστίν, ὁμοίως ὁ ἐλεύθερος κληθεὶς δοῦλός ἐστιν Χριστοῦ.

7:39 Γυνὴ δέδεται ἐφ ὅσον χρόνον ζῇ ὁ ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς· ἐὰν δὲ κοιμηθῇ ὁ ἀνήρ, ἐλευθέρα ἐστὶν ᾧ θέλει γαμηθῆναι, μόνον **ἐν κυρίῳ**.

A 4. "Master / Owner" Function

3:5 τί οὖν ἐστιν Ἀπολλῶς; τί δέ ἐστιν Παῦλος; διάκονοι δι ὧν ἐπιστεύσατε, καὶ ἑκάστῳ ὡς **ὁ κύριος** ἔδωκεν. γέγραπται γάρ, Ὁ δρασσόμενος τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐν τῇ πανουργίᾳ αὐτῶν·

4:4 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ σύνοιδα, ἀλλ οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ δεδικαίωμαι, **ὁ** δὲ ἀνακρίνων με **κύριός** ἐστιν.

7:10 τοῖς δὲ γεγαμηκόσιν παραγγέλλω, οὐκ ἐγὼ ἀλλὰ **ὁ κύριος,** γυναῖκα ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς μὴ χωρισθῆναι - ἐὰν δὲ καὶ χωρισθῇ, μενέτω ἄγαμος ἢ τῷ ἀνδρὶ καταλλαγήτω, - καὶ ἄνδρα γυναῖκα μὴ ἀφιέναι.

7:12 Τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς λέγω ἐγὼ οὐχ **ὁ κύριος**· εἴ τις ἀδελφὸς γυναῖκα ἔχει ἄπιστον καὶ αὕτη συνευδοκεῖ οἰκεῖν μετ αὐτοῦ, μὴ ἀφιέτω αὐτήν·

6:17 ὁ δὲ κολλώμενος τῷ **κυρίῳ** ἓν πνεῦμά ἐστιν.

7:10 τοῖς δὲ γεγαμηκόσιν παραγγέλλω, οὐκ ἐγὼ ἀλλὰ ὁ **κύριος,** γυναῖκα ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς μὴ χωρισθῆναι - ἐὰν δὲ καὶ χωρισθῇ, μενέτω ἄγαμος ἢ τῷ ἀνδρὶ καταλλαγήτω, - καὶ ἄνδρα γυναῖκα μὴ ἀφιέναι.

7:12a Τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς λέγω ἐγὼ οὐχ ὁ **κύριος**· εἴ τις ἀδελφὸς γυναῖκα ἔχει ἄπιστον καὶ αὕτη συνευδοκεῖ οἰκεῖν μετ αὐτοῦ, μὴ ἀφιέτω αὐτήν·

7:17 Εἰ μὴ ἑκάστῳ ὡς ἐμέρισεν **ὁ κύριος**, ἕκαστον ὡς κέκληκεν ὁ θεός, οὕτως περιπατείτω. καὶ οὕτως ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις πάσαις διατάσσομαι.
7:22(b) ὁ γὰρ ἐν κυρίῳ κληθεὶς δοῦλος **ἀπελεύθερος κυρίου** ἐστίν, ὁμοίως ὁ ἐλεύθερος κληθεὶς δοῦλός ἐστιν Χριστοῦ.

7:25 Περὶ δὲ τῶν παρθένων **ἐπιταγὴν κυρίου** οὐκ ἔχω, γνώμην δὲ δίδωμι ὡς ἠλεημένος **ὑπὸ κυρίου** πιστὸς εἶναι.

7:32-35 ὁ ἄγαμος μεριμνᾷ τὰ **τοῦ κυρίου,** πῶς ἀρέσῃ **τῷ κυρίῳ**· ὁ δὲ γαμήσας μεριμνᾷ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου, πῶς ἀρέσῃ τῇ γυναικί, καὶ μεμέρισται. καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἡ ἄγαμος καὶ ἡ παρθένος μεριμνᾷ τὰ **τοῦ κυρίου,** ἵνα ᾖ ἁγία καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ πνεύματι· ἡ δὲ γαμήσασα μεριμνᾷ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου, πῶς ἀρέσῃ τῷ ἀνδρί.τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τὸ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν σύμφορον λέγω, οὐχ ἵνα βρόχον ὑμῖν ἐπιβάλω ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ εὐσχήμον καὶ εὐπάρεδρον **τῷ κυρίῳ** ἀπερισπάστως.

Dubious "Master / Owner" Function

6:13-14 τὰ βρώματα τῇ κοιλίᾳ καὶ ἡ κοιλία τοῖς βρώμασιν, ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ταύτην καὶ ταῦτα καταργήσει. τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐ τῇ πορνείᾳ ἀλλὰ **τῷ κυρίῳ**, καὶ **ὁ κύριος** τῷ σώματι· ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ **τὸν κύριον** ἤγειρεν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξεγερεῖ διὰ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ.

6:17 ὁ δὲ κολλώμενος **τῷ κυρίῳ** ἓν πνεῦμά ἐστιν.

A 5. Judging Function

4:5 ὥστε μὴ πρὸ καιροῦ τι κρίνετε ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ **ὁ κύριος**, ὃς καὶ φωτίσει τὰ κρυπτὰ τοῦ σκότους καὶ φανερώσει τὰς βουλὰς τῶν καρδιῶν· καὶ τότε ὁ ἔπαινος γενήσεται ἑκάστῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ.

4:19 ἐλεύσομαι δὲ ταχέως πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐὰν **ὁ κύριος** θελήσῃ, καὶ γνώσομαι οὐ τὸν λόγον τῶν πεφυσιωμένων ἀλλὰ τὴν δύναμιν·

5:4-5 ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι **τοῦ κυρίου** [ἡμῶν] Ἰησοῦ συναχθέντων ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ πνεύματος σὺν τῇ δυνάμει **τοῦ κυρίου** ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ, παραδοῦναι τὸν τοιοῦτον τῷ Σατανᾷ εἰς ὄλεθρον τῆς σαρκός, ἵνα τὸ πνεῦμα σωθῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ **τοῦ κυρίου**.

B. Κύριος in the Εἰδωλόθυτα Discourse
The Text: 1 Corinthians 8: 5 – 6

καὶ γὰρ εἴπερ εἰσὶν λεγόμενοι θεοὶ εἴτε ἐν οὐρανῷ εἴτε ἐπὶ γῆς, ὥσπερ εἰσὶν θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ **κύριοι πολλοί**, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἷς θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν, καὶ **εἷς κύριος** Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ.

Post-Text Discourse

B 1. Quotation from Scripture

10:26 **τοῦ κυρίου** γὰρ **ἡ γῆ καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς**.

B 2. "In the Lord" : εν κυρίῳ

9:1 Οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐλεύθερος; οὐκ εἰμὶ ἀπόστολος; οὐχὶ Ἰησοῦν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν ἑώρακα; οὐ τὸ ἔργον μου ὑμεῖς ἐστε **ἐν κυρίῳ**;
9:2 εἰ ἄλλοις οὐκ εἰμὶ ἀπόστολος, ἀλλά γε ὑμῖν εἰμι· ἡ γὰρ σφραγίς μου τῆς ἀποστολῆς ὑμεῖς ἐστε **ἐν κυρίῳ**.

B3. A Relational Term

9:1(a) Οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐλεύθερος; οὐκ εἰμὶ ἀπόστολος; οὐχὶ Ἰησοῦν **τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν** ἑώρακα; οὐ τὸ ἔργον μου ὑμεῖς ἐστε ἐν κυρίῳ;

9:5 μὴ οὐκ ἔχομεν ἐξουσίαν ἀδελφὴν γυναῖκα περιάγειν ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ **τοῦ κυρίου** καὶ Κηφᾶς;

B 4. " Master / Owner" Function

10:21 οὐ δύνασθε **ποτήριον κυρίου** πίνειν καὶ ποτήριον δαιμονίων, οὐ δύνασθε **τραπέζης κυρίου** μετέχειν καὶ τραπέζης δαιμονίων.

10:22 ἢ παραζηλοῦμεν **τὸν κύριον**; μὴ ἰσχυρότεροι αὐτοῦ ἐσμεν;

APPENDIX I

πατήρ / πατρὸς in the Pauline Corpus (Section 10.1.1)

1 Cor 8:6
αλλ ημιν εις θεὸς ο **πατὴρ** εξ ου τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεις εις αυτόν, καὶ εις κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς δι ου τὰ πάντα καὶ ημεις δι αυτοῦ.

A1. "Father" = God; Relation with Plural Second Argument

1 Cor.1:3
χάρις υμιν καὶ ειρήνη απὸ θεοῦ **πατρὸς** ημῶν καὶ κυρίου Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

2 Cor. 1:2
χάρις υμιν καὶ ειρήνη απὸ θεοῦ **πατρὸς** ημῶν καὶ κυρίου Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

2 Cor. 1:3a
Ευλογητὸς ο θεὸς καὶ **πατὴρ** τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ,

2 Cor. 1:3b
...ο **πατὴρ** τῶν οικτιρμῶν καὶ θεὸς πάσης παρακλήσεως,

2 Cor. 6:18
καὶ **ἔσομαι** υμιν **εις πατέρα καὶ** υμεις εσεσθέ **μοι εις υιοὺς** καὶ θυγατέρας, λέγει κύριος παντοκράτωρ.

1 Thess. 1:3
μνημονεύοντες υμῶν τοῦ εργου τῆς πίστεως καὶ τοῦ κόπου τῆς αγάπης καὶ τῆς υπομονῆς τῆς ελπίδος τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ εμπροσθεν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ **πατρὸς** ημῶν,

1 Thess. 3:11
Αυτὸς δὲ ο θεὸς καὶ **πατὴρ** ημῶν καὶ ο κύριος ημῶν Ιησοῦς κατευθύναι τὴν οδὸν ημῶν πρὸς υμάς·

1 Thess 3:13
εις τὸ στηρίξαι υμῶν τὰς καρδίας αμέμπτους εν αγιωσύνη έμπροσθεν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ **πατρὸς** ημῶν εν τῆ παρουσία τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν Ιησοῦ μετὰ πάντων τῶν αγίων αυτοῦ, [αμήν].

Gal. 1:3
χάρις υμιν καὶ ειρήνη απὸ θεοῦ **πατρὸς** ημῶν καὶ κυρίου Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ

Gal. 1:4
τοῦ δόντος εαυτὸν υπὲρ τῶν αμαρτιῶν ημῶν, ωπως εξέληται ημάς εκ τοῦ αιῶνος τοῦ ενεστῶτος πονηροῦ κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ **πατρὸς** ημῶν,

Phmn. 3
χάρις υμιν καὶ ειρήνη απὸ θεοῦ **πατρὸς** ημῶν καὶ κυρίου Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

Phil. 1:2
χάρις υμιν καὶ ειρήνη απὸ θεοῦ **πατρὸς** ημῶν καὶ κυρίου Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

Phil 4:20
τῷ δὲ θεῷ καὶ **πατρὶ** ημῶν η δόξα εις τοὺς αιῶνας τῶν αιώνων, αμήν.

Rom. 1:7
πάσιν τοις οὖσιν εν Ρώμη αγαπητοις θεοῦ, κλητοις αγίοις, χάρις υμιν καὶ ειρήνη απὸ θεοῦ **πατρὸς** ημῶν καὶ κυρίου Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

A2. "Father" = God; Relation with Singular Second Argument

2 Cor. 11:31
ο θεὸς καὶ **πατὴρ** τοῦ κυρίου Ιησοῦ οἶδεν, ο ὢν ευλογητὸς εις τοὺς αἰῶνας, ὅτι ου ψεύδομαι.

Rom. 15:6
ἵνα ομοθυμαδὸν εν ενὶ στόματι δοξάζητε τὸν θεὸν καὶ **πατέρα** τοῦ κυρίου ημῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

A3. "Father" = God; No Explicit Relation

1 Cor. 15:24
εἶτα τὸ τέλος, ὅταν παραδιδῷ τὴν βασιλείαν τῷ θεῷ καὶ **πατρί,** ὅταν καταργήσῃ πάσαν αρχὴν καὶ πάσαν εξουσίαν καὶ δύναμιν.

1 Thess. 1:1
Παῦλος καὶ Σιλουανὸς καὶ Τιμόθεος τῇ εκκλησίᾳ Θεσσαλονικέων εν θεῷ **πατρὶ** καὶ κυρίῳ Ιησοῦ Χριστῷ, χάρις υμῖν καὶ ειρήνη.

Gal. 1:1
Παῦλος απόστολος ουκ απ ανθρώπων ουδὲ δι ανθρώπου αλλὰ διὰ Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ θεοῦ **πατρὸς** τοῦ εγείραντος αυτὸν εκ νεκρῶν,

Gal. 4:6
«Οτι δέ εστε υιοί, εξαπέστειλεν ο θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υιοῦ αυτοῦ εις τὰς καρδίας ημῶν κράζον, Αββα ο **πατήρ.**

Phil. 2:11
καὶ πάσα γλῶσσα εξομολογήσηται ὅτι κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς εις δόξαν θεοῦ **πατρός.**

Rom. 6:4
συνετάφημεν οὖν αυτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εις τὸν θάνατον, ἵνα ὥσπερ ηγέρθη Χριστὸς εκ νεκρῶν διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ **πατρός,** οὕτως καὶ ημεῖς εν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν.

Rom 8:15
ου γὰρ ελάβετε πνεῦμα δουλείας πάλιν εις φόβον αλλὰ ελάβετε πνεῦμα υιοθεσίας εν ῳ κράζομεν, Αββα ο **πατήρ.**

B1. "Father" not= God; Relation with Plural Second Argument

1 Cor.4:15
εὰν γὰρ μυρίους παιδαγωγοὺς ἔχητε εν Χριστῷ αλλ ου πολλοὺς **πατέρας·** εν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ διὰ τοῦ ευαγγελίου εγὼ υμᾶς εγέννησα.

1 Cor 10:1
Ου θέλω γὰρ υμᾶς αγνοεῖν, αδελφοί, ὅτι οι **πατέρες** ημῶν πάντες υπὸ τὴν νεφέλην ἦσαν καὶ πάντες διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης διῆλθον

1 Thess. 2:11
καθάπερ οἴδατε, ως ἕνα ἕκαστον υμῶν ως **πατὴρ** τέκνα εαυτοῦ

Rom. 4:11
καὶ σημεῖον ἔλαβεν περιτομῆς σφραγῖδα τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως τῆς εν τῇ ακροβυστίᾳ, εις τὸ εἶναι αυτὸν **πατέρα** πάντων τῶν πιστευόντων δι ακροβυστίας, εις τὸ λογισθῆναι [καὶ] αυτοῖς [τὴν] δικαιοσύνην,

Rom 4:12a
καὶ **πατέρα** περιτομῆς ...

Rom 4:12b
...τοῖς ουκ εκ περιτομῆς μόνον αλλὰ καὶ τοῖς στοιχοῦσιν τοῖς ἴχνεσιν τῆς εν ακροβυστίᾳ πίστεως τοῦ **πατρὸς** ημῶν Αβραάμ.

Rom. 4:16
διὰ τοῦτο εκ πίστεως, ἵνα κατὰ χάριν, εις τὸ εἶναι βεβαίαν τὴν επαγγελίαν παντὶ τῷ σπέρματι, ου τῷ εκ τοῦ νόμου μόνον αλλὰ καὶ τῷ εκ πίστεως Αβραάμ, ὅς εστιν **πατὴρ** πάντων ημῶν,

Rom 4:17
καθὼς γέγραπται ὅτι **Πατέρα** πολλῶν εθνῶν τέθεικά σε, κατέναντι ου επίστευσεν θεοῦ τοῦ ζωοποιοῦντος τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ως ὄντα·

Rom 4:18
ὃς παρ ελπίδα επ ελπίδι επίστευσεν εις τὸ γενέσθαι αυτὸν **πατέρα** πολλῶν εθνῶν κατὰ τὸ ειρημένον· **Οὕτως ἔσται τὸ σπέρμα σου,**

Rom 9:5
ων οι **πατέρες** καὶ εξ ων ο Χριστὸς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα· ο ων επὶ πάντων θεὸς ευλογητὸς εις τοὺς αιῶνας, αμήν.

Rom 9:10
ου μόνον δέ, αλλὰ καὶ Ρεβέκκα εξ ενὸς κοίτην έχουσα, Ισαὰκ τοῦ **πατρὸς** ημῶν·

Rom 11:28
κατὰ μὲν τὸ ευαγγέλιον εχθροὶ δι υμᾶς, κατὰ δὲ τὴν εκλογὴν αγαπητοὶ διὰ τοὺς **πατέρας·**

Rom 15:8
λέγω γὰρ Χριστὸν διάκονον γεγενῆσθαι περιτομῆς υπὲρ αληθείας θεοῦ, εις τὸ βεβαιῶσαι τὰς επαγγελίας τῶν **πατέρων,**

B2. "Father not= God; Relation with Singular Second Referrent

1 Cor.4:15
εὰν γὰρ μυρίους παιδαγωγοὺς έχητε εν Χριστῷ αλλ ου πολλοὺς **πατέρας·** εν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ιησοῦ διὰ τοῦ ευαγγελίου εγὼ υμᾶς εγέννησα.

Gal. 1:14
καὶ προέκοπτον εν τῷ Ιουδαϊσμῷ υπὲρ πολλοὺς συνηλικιώτας εν τῷ γένει μου, περισσοτέρως ζηλωτὴς υπάρχων τῶν **πατρικῶν** μου παραδόσεων.

Gal. 4:2
αλλὰ υπὸ επιτρόπους εστὶν καὶ οικονόμους άχρι τῆς προθεσμίας τοῦ **πατρός.**

Phil. 2:22
τὴν δὲ δοκιμὴν αυτοῦ γινώσκετε, ὅτι ως **πατρὶ** τέκνον σὺν εμοὶ εδούλευσεν εις τὸ ευαγγέλιον.

B3. "Father not= God; No Explicit Relation

No instances.